Cues to deception

Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions.     

People avoid situations that enable them to deceive others

Information advantage enables people to benefit themselves by deceiving their counterparts. Using a modified ultimatum bargaining game with an exit option, we find that people are more likely to avoid settings enabling them to privately deceive their counterparts than settings which do not enable deception. This tendency is explained by people's reduced desire to become responsible for the other's outcomes when deception is possible. Results of three experiments show that people avoid entering a setting that enables deception by appearing fair while being unfair (Exp. 1–3). Experiment 2 showed that this tendency was reduced when interaction partners were displayed as competitive rather than cooperative. Experiment 3 showed a stronger tendency to avoid tempting situations that enable private deception than to approach situations in which one can privately benefit others. We conclude that when navigating through social space, people avoid situations enabling them to deceive others.     

Probability judgments of agency: Rational or irrational?

We studied how people attribute action outcomes to their own actions under conditions of uncertainty. Participants chose between left and right keypresses to produce an action effect (a corresponding left or right light), while a computer player made a simultaneous keypress decision. In each trial, a random generator determined which of the players controlled the action effect at varying probabilities, and participants then judged which player had produced it. Participants’ effect control ranged from 20% to 80%, varied blockwise, and they could use trial-by-trial feedback to optimize the accuracy of their agency judgments. Participants tended to attribute action effects to themselves (agency bias), probably reflecting a rational guessing strategy of always naming the more likely player. However, participants systematically neglected information favoring the computer player as the agent, even under conditions where this bias could only harm judgment accuracy. We conclude that agency biases have both rational and irrational components.     

Embracing Chance Tactically: A Different Perspective on Risk Taking

Although they value certainty, people are willing to take risks to avoid losses. Consequently, they are risk‐seeking in the domain of losses but risk‐avoidant in the domain of gains. This behavior, frequently demonstrated in framing experiments, is traditionally explained in terms of prospect theory. We suggest a different account whereby involving chance in one's decisions may serve a strategic impression‐formation function. In the domain of losses actors may embrace chance to distance themselves from the outcomes and deflect possible blame. Given potential gains, however, actors may avoid uncertainty to enhance their association with valued outcomes. We test this idea by manipulating the level of actors' personal responsibility for the decision outcomes. The results of four studies consistently showed that when personal responsibility is high, the original framing effect is replicated (i.e., greater risk‐taking when choices are framed in terms of losses rather than gains). However, when because of assigned role or decision circumstances, actors experience low personal responsibility for the outcomes, and the classic framing effect is eliminated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

The price of deceptive behavior: Disliking and lying to people who lie to us

We hypothesized that frequency and quality of deception influences how people perceive those who lie to them and that people subsequently increase deceptive behavior as a consequence of being lied to. In Study 1, participants were covertly videotaped conversing with a partner. Following the conversation, participants evaluated partners, and partners reviewed the videotape, identifying deceptions that they told. Findings indicated that partner’s frequency of deception was inversely related to likeability. In Study 2, participants watched a videotape of a confederate who appeared to produce one or four exaggerated or minimized lies, and then evaluated the confederate. Participants and confederates subsequently engaged in a conversation. When participants witnessed either one exaggerated lie, one or four minimal lies, or no lies they trusted and liked the confederate more than when witnessing four exaggerated lies. Moreover, participants increased their own use of deception as a function of the severity and quantity of confederate’s lies.     

On the psychology of ‘if only’: Regret and the comparison between factual and counterfactual outcomes

People experience regret when they realize that they would have been better off had they decided differently. Hence, a central element in regret is the comparability of a decision outcome with the outcomes forgone. Up to now, however, the comparison process that is so essential to the experience of regret has not been the subject of psychological research. In this article, we tune in on the comparison dependency of regret. We argue that factors that reduce the tendency to compare attenuate regret, and demonstrate that uncertainty about counterfactual outcomes (Experiment 1), and incomparability of counterfactual and factual outcomes (Experiments 2 and 3) produce such effects.     

Games of luck and games of chance: the effect of luck- versus chance-orientation on gambling decisions

Chance and luck are conceived as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. The present study examined the proposition that persons who habitually attribute the outcome of random events to chance (chance-oriented persons) and those who prefer to attribute such outcomes to luck (luck-oriented persons) cope differently with decision making under uncertainty. Chance-oriented persons decide according to given or estimated odds that define the decision problem. Luck-oriented persons, on the other hand, rely on self-attributions of personal luck, and ignore the probabilities of decision outcomes. The hypothesized qualitative difference between the approaches of chance- and luck-oriented persons to decision making under uncertainty was supported substantially by the findings. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investing in karma: when wanting promotes helping

People often face outcomes of important events that are beyond their personal control, such as when they wait for an acceptance letter, job offer, or medical test results. We suggest that when wanting and uncertainty are high and personal control is lacking, people may be more likely to help others, as if they can encourage fate's favor by doing good deeds proactively. Four experiments support this karmic-investment hypothesis. When people want an outcome over which they have little control, their donations of time and money increase (Experiments 1 and 2), but their participation in other rewarding activities does not (Experiment 1b). In addition, at a job fair, job seekers who feel the process is outside (vs. within) their control make more generous pledges to charities (Experiment 3). Finally, karmic investments increase optimism about a desired outcome (Experiment 4). We conclude by discussing the role of personal control and magical beliefs in this phenomenon.     

The effects of suspiciousness of deception and the perceived legitimacy of deception on task performance in an attitude change experiment1

Subjects participated in two immediately consecutive experiments In the first, they either experienced a deception and debriefing, learned about deception in the abstract, did not learn about deception In the second, they either did or did not hear a reference to the possibility of a deception in that experiment A measure of incidental learning of the message in the second experiment showed that experiencing deception and learning about it in the abstract were not functionally equivalent, that only experiencing deception tended to produce absolute bias, that this bias was probably caused by “vigilance” rather than by “negativism,” that the reference to deception before the second experiment did not itself cause bias, and that the reference eliminated the difference in performance due to experiencing a deception as opposed to only learning about it in the abstract Furthermore, suspiciousness and the reported legitimacy of deception were positively related to each other at the group mean level Separating out their contribution to experimental performance showed that they complexly interacted to determine performance. These results were discussed with reference to the fear that subjects who have heard about deception from friends might perform differently from subjects who have not, with reference to the necessity for deception in some attitude change research, with reference to one alternative to deception, and with reference to explanations of why some experiments have shown no relationship between suspiciousness and experimental performance while others have shown a negative relationship     

Cognitive strategies for coping with uncertain outcomes

It was proposed that, when faced with highly desirable but uncertain outcomes, people may employ cognitive strategies in an attempt to influence their future affective responses to the outcomes in question. The present study attempted to demonstrate the use of two such strategies. First, it was hypothesized that when people are faced with a low probability of obtaining a highly desirable outcome, they tend to derogate that outcome by perceiving it as less attractive. Second, it was proposed that when people are faced with uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a highly desirable outcome, they tend to underestimate the likelihood of its occurrence, in an attempt to avoid future disappointment. These hypotheses were tested within the context of a lottery in which subjects were given a low, moderate, or high chance of winning a prize that was either high or low in attractiveness. As predicted, subjects viewed the highly attractive prize as less valuable and attractive when they had a low probability of winning than when the probability of winning was moderate or high. Subjects also perceived themselves as less likely to win when the prize was high in attractiveness than when it was low in attractiveness. The relationship of these findings to studies of self-handicapping and attribute ambiguity is discussed.     

Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive.     

Telling lies

Men and women (20 each) were videotaped while describing someone they liked, someone they disliked, someone they were ambivalent about, someone they were indifferent about, someone they liked as though they disliked him or her, and someone they disliked as thought they like him or her. Accuracy at detecting that some deception had occurred was far greater than accuracy at detecting the true underlying affect, and people who were good at detecting that deception was occurring were not particularly skilled at reading the speakers' underlying affects. However, people whose deception attempts were more easily detected by others also had their underlying affects read more easily. Speakers whose lies were seen more readily by men also had their lies seen more readily by women, and observers better able to see the underlying affects of women were better able to see the underlying affects of men. Skill at lying successfully was unrelated to skill at catching others in their lies. A histrionic strategy (hamming) was very effective in deceiving others, and this strategy was employed more by more Machiavellian people, who also tended to get caught less often in their lies. Methodological considerations and systematic programs for future research are discussed.     

Exercise of Human Agency Through Collective Efficacy

Social cognitive theory adopts an agentic perspective in which individuals are producers of experiences and shapers of events. Among the mechanisms of human agency, none is more focal or pervading than the belief of personal efficacy. This core belief is the foundation of human agency. Unless people believe that they can produce desired effects and forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act. The growing interdependence of human functioning is placing a premium on the exercise of collective agency through shared beliefs in the power to produce effects by collective action. The present article analyzes the nature of perceived collective efficacy and its centrality in how people live their lives. Perceived collective efficacy fosters groups' motivational commitment to their missions, resilience to adversity, and performance accomplishments.     

Reconsidering the Relation between Regret and Responsibility

Recently Connolly, Ordóñez, and Coughlan challenged the view that regret is partly determined by perceived responsibility for the regretted outcome [Connolly, T. Ordóñez, L. D., & Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsibility in the evaluation of decision outcomes.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73–85]. In a series of experiments they manipulated whether actors arrived at an outcome through their own decision or through a “computer assignment” over which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation did not affect their “regret measure.” We show in two experiments that this null-effect is due to the fact that regret was measured by means of a general happiness assessment. In the present research we replicated the basic design of their experiments and also found no effects of decision agency on the happiness assessment. However, the results showed the predicted effects of decision agency when regret was directly measured. Moreover, a measure of disappointment seemed to indicate the opposite effect: People are more disappointed when a negative outcome is caused by a computer assignment than when caused by their own choice. The role of regret and disappointment in decision making is discussed.     

Meaning-Making in Delayed-Return Cultures: The Case of Personal Uncertainty

The large majority of humans nowadays live in cultures in which there is often a delay between the efforts they exert and the feedback they receive regarding the outcome of their efforts. As a result, individuals may experience uncertainty between their efforts and outcomes, leading them to pay special attention to uncertainty information. In particular, we propose that when people feel uncertain about themselves, this may be alarming to them as it may signal that their personal contract with their delayed-return culture may be in jeopardy. Therefore, under conditions of personal uncertainty, people are looking forward to events that bolster their cultural worldviews and detest events that violate these worldviews. We review research findings that show that personal uncertainty indeed has a special role in the social psychology of meaning-making and worldview defense, sometimes even yielding a better explanation of worldview defense reactions than terror management theory.     

Adaptations to changing times: Agency in context

British society has changed greatly over the past half century. Increasing uncertainty about economic and social developments is becoming a distinctive feature of modern industrialized countries, affecting the life chances and opportunities of young people making the transition from dependent childhood into independent adulthood. Summarizing recent findings from data collected from about 30,000 individuals born 12 years apart, in 1958 and 1970 respectively, this paper examines the role of individual agency in shaping educational and occupational transitions as well as the assumption of family‐related roles in times of social change. The data suggest that societal change and the associated increasing uncertainty does not impact on all individuals in the same way, and that there has been an increasing polarization between those who are able to benefit from the economic and social transformations and the ones who are excluded, largely because of their relatively disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances and lack of access to opportunities in education and employment. It is concluded that human agency processes cannot be studied in isolation from the sociohistorical context in which they are embedded.     

Feeling of doing in obsessive–compulsive checking

Research on self-agency emphasizes the importance of a comparing mechanism, which scans for a match between anticipated and actual outcomes, in the subjective experience of doing.This study explored the “feeling of doing” in individuals with checking symptoms by examining the mechanism involved in the experienced agency for outcomes that matched expectations. This mechanism was explored using a task in which the subliminal priming of potential action-effects (emulating outcome anticipation) generally enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur, due to the unconscious perception of a match between primed and observed outcomes. The main result revealed a negative relationship between checking and self-agency for observed outcomes that were primed prior to actions. This suggests that checking individuals fail to grasp the correspondence between actual outcomes of their actions and expected ones. We discuss the possible role of undermined self-agency in checking phenomena and its relationship with cognitive dysfunction.     

Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Being uncertain about what? Procedural fairness effects as a function of general uncertainty and belongingness uncertainty

Do different forms of uncertainty account for different procedural fairness effects? We hypothesized that general uncertainty accounts for fairness judgments, whereas belongingness uncertainty accounts for group identification. Experiment 1 manipulated general versus belongingness uncertainty. Participants in the general uncertainty condition regarded the procedures as fairer when they were granted than denied voice, whereas participants in the belongingness uncertainty condition showed stronger group identification when they were granted than denied voice. Experiment 2 split the belongingness uncertainty condition into family and stranger uncertainty. Only participants in the family-belongingness uncertainty condition identified with their group when they were granted than denied voice. The findings have implications for the construct of uncertainty, models of procedural fairness, and group membership.