Class, race, and the face: social context modulates the cross-race effect in face recognition

The current research investigates the hypothesis that the well-established cross-race effect (CRE; better recognition for same-race than for cross-race faces) is due to social-cognitive mechanisms rather than to differential perceptual expertise with same-race and cross-race faces. Across three experiments, the social context in which faces are presented has a direct influence on the CRE. In the first two experiments, middle-class White perceivers show superior recognition for same-race White faces presented in wealthy but not in impoverished contexts. The second experiment indicates this effect is due to the tendency to categorize White faces in impoverished contexts as outgroup members (e.g., "poor Whites"). In the third experiment, this effect is replicated using different ingroup and outgroup categorizations (university affiliation), with ingroup White faces being recognized better than outgroup White faces. In line with a social-cognitive model of the CRE, context had no influence on recognition for cross-race Black faces across the three experiments.     

The cross-category effect: mere social categorization is sufficient to elicit an own-group bias in face recognition

Although the cross-race effect (CRE) is a well-established phenomenon, both perceptual-expertise and social-categorization models have been proposed to explain the effect. The two studies reported here investigated the extent to which categorizing other people as in-group versus out-group members is sufficient to elicit a pattern of face recognition analogous to that of the CRE, even when perceptual expertise with the stimuli is held constant. In Study 1, targets were categorized as members of real-life in-groups and out-groups (based on university affiliation), whereas in Study 2, targets were categorized into experimentally created minimal groups. In both studies, recognition performance was better for targets categorized as in-group members, despite the fact that perceptual expertise was equivalent for in-group and out-group faces. These results suggest that social-cognitive mechanisms of in-group and out-group categorization are sufficient to elicit performance differences for in-group and out-group face recognition.     

A cross-race effect in metamemory: Predictions of face recognition are more accurate for members of our own race

The Cross-Race Effect (CRE) is the well-replicated finding that people are better at recognizing faces from their own race, relative to other races. The CRE reveals systematic limitations on eyewitness identification accuracy, suggesting that some caution is warranted in evaluating cross-race identification. The CRE is problematic because jurors value eyewitness identification highly in verdict decisions. We explore how accurate people are in predicting their ability to recognize own-race and other-race faces. Caucasian and Asian participants viewed photographs of Caucasian and Asian faces, and made immediate judgments of learning during study. An old/new recognition test replicated the CRE: both groups displayed superior discriminability of own-race faces. Importantly, relative metamnemonic accuracy was also greater for own-race faces, indicating that the accuracy of predictions about face recognition is influenced by race. This result indicates another source of concern when eliciting or evaluating eyewitness identification: people are less accurate in judging whether they will or will not recognize a face when that face is of a different race than they are. This new result suggests that a witness's claim of being likely to recognize a suspect from a lineup should be interpreted with caution when the suspect is of a different race than the witness.     

Power, individuation, and the cross-race recognition deficit

The well-known cross-race effect (CRE) in facial recognition is observed as better recognition for faces of one’s own race than faces of another race. Across two experiments, this very robust phenomenon was attenuated via an increase in cross-race (CR) recognition when CR targets were perceived as wielding power either because of their occupational roles (Experiment 1) or the behaviors in which they engaged (Experiment 2). Furthermore, evidence in Experiment 2 indicates that neither target stereotypicality nor target valence can easily explain the observed increase in CR recognition. These results conform closely to predictions derived from a social-cognitive model of the cross-race effect.     

The perceptual determinants of person construal: reopening the social-cognitive toolbox

Guided by a heuristic account of social-cognitive functioning, researchers have attempted to identify the cognitive benefits that derive from a categorical approach to person construal. While revealing, this work has overlooked the fact that, prior to the application of categorical thinking as an economizing mental tool, perceivers must first extract category-triggering information from available stimulus cues. It is possible, therefore, that basic perceptual processes may also contribute to people's propensity to view others in a category-based manner. This possibility was explored in 3 experiments in which the authors investigated the ease with which perceivers can extract categorical and identity-based knowledge from faces under both optimal and suboptimal (i.e., inverted faces, blurred faces, rapidly presented faces) processing conditions. The results confirmed that categorical knowledge is extracted from faces more efficiently than identity-related knowledge, a finding that underscores the importance of perceptual operations in the generation of categorical thinking.     

Self-pacing study of faces of different races: metacognitive control over study does not eliminate the cross-race recognition effect

People often recognize same-race faces better than other-race faces. This cross-race effect (CRE) has been proposed to arise in part because learners devote fewer cognitive resources to encode faces of social out-groups. In three experiments, we evaluated whether learners’ other-race mnemonic deficits are due to “cognitive disregard” during study and whether this disregard is under metacognitive control. Learners studied each face either for as long as they wanted (the self-paced condition) or for the average time taken by a self-paced learner (the fixed-rate condition). Self-paced learners allocated equal amounts of study time to same-race and other-race faces, and having control over study time did not change the size of the CRE. In the second and third experiments, both self-paced and fixed-rate learners were given instructions to “individuate” other-race faces. Individuation instructions caused self-paced learners to allocate more study time to other-race faces, but this did not significantly reduce the size of the CRE, even for learners who reported extensive contact with other races. We propose that the differential processing that people apply to faces of different races and the subsequent other-race mnemonic deficit are not due to learners’ strategic cognitive disregard of other-race faces.     

The importance of social factors is a matter of perception

Caucasian female faces were randomly assigned to participants' in- or out-group following false feedback on a personality inventory. Participants recognised in-group faces better than out-group faces, but they showed no evidence of category-contingent opposing aftereffects. We conclude that the explanatory power of social-cognitive models will be enhanced when they are integrated with models of perceptual expertise.     

They all look the same to me (unless they're angry): from out-group homogeneity to out-group heterogeneity

People often find it more difficult to distinguish ethnic out-group members compared with ethnic in-group members. A functional approach to social cognition suggests that this bias may be eliminated when out-group members display threatening facial expressions. In the present study, 192 White participants viewed Black and White faces displaying either neutral or angry expressions and later attempted to identify previously seen faces. Recognition accuracy for neutral faces showed the out-group homogeneity bias, but this bias was entirely eliminated for angry Black faces. Indeed, when participants' cognitive processing capacity was constrained, recognition accuracy was greater for angry Black faces than for angry White faces, demonstrating an out-group heterogeneity bias.     

Differential processing of ingroup and outgroup information: the role of relative group status in permeable boundary groups

Perceivers individuate cognitively the ingroup more than the outgroup; that is, perceivers use person categories to process information about the ingroup, but use stereotypic attribute categories to process information about the outgroup. This phenomenon is labelled the differential processing effect (DPE). Is the DPE moderated by relative group status? In two experiments, either high- or low-status members of permeable-boundary groups (i.e. groups that encourage upward mobility) read through information about unfamiliar ingroup and outgroup members. Relative group status moderated the DPE. Clustering indices in recall and confusions in a name-matching task indicated that high-status members individuated the ingroup more than the outgroup, thus replicating the DPE. However, low-status members individuated the outgroup more than the ingroup, thus reversing the DPE. A third experiment suggested that these findings are predicated on the ingroup information being stereotype-consistent. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A minimal ingroup advantage in emotion identification confidence

Emotion expressions convey valuable information about others’ internal states and likely behaviours. Accurately identifying expressions is critical for social interactions, but so is perceiver confidence when decoding expressions. Even if a perceiver correctly labels an expression, uncertainty may impair appropriate behavioural responses and create uncomfortable interactions. Past research has found that perceivers report greater confidence when identifying emotions displayed by cultural ingroup members, an effect attributed to greater perceptual skill and familiarity with own-culture than other-culture faces. However, the current research presents novel evidence for an ingroup advantage in emotion decoding confidence across arbitrary group boundaries that hold culture constant. In two experiments using different stimulus sets participants not only labeled minimal ingroup expressions more accurately, but did so with greater confidence. These results offer novel evidence that ingroup advantages in emotion decoding confidence stem partly from social-cognitive processes.     

Social Categorization and Stereotyping: How Social Categorization Biases Person Perception and Face Memory

The current article offers a brief history of research and theory related to social categorization and stereotyping. We begin by outlining research focusing on category selection, category activation, and category application. We then discuss the consequences of social categorization, noting that one of the most important and ubiquitous effects of social categorization is homogenization or assimilation. We then extend this research related to the assimilative consequences of social categorization to the realm of face memory. Specifically, we introduce the Categorization‐Individuation Model (see also Hugenberg et al., forthcoming) as a new model of the Cross‐Race Effect, or the difficulty many perceivers have in recognizing members of other racial groups. The Categorization‐Individuation Model argues that the Cross‐Race Effect is due to the tendency to categorize out‐group members but individuate in‐group members. Finally, we summarize the extant research in support of this new model of person memory and close by discussing the current state of, and potential future directions for, social categorization research.     

Perceptual Processes in the Cross-Race Effect: Evidence From Eyetracking

The cross-race effect (CRE) is the tendency to have better recognition accuracy for same-race than for other-race faces due to differential encoding strategies. Research exploring the nature of encoding differences has yielded few definitive conclusions. The present experiments explored this issue using an eyetracker during a recognition task involving White participants viewing White and African American faces. Participants fixated faster and longer on the upper features of White faces and the lower features of African American faces. When instructing participants to attend to certain features in African American faces, this pattern was exaggerated. Gaze patterns were related to improved recognition accuracy.     

Social Categorization Moderates Social Projection

When categorized into social groups, people view members of in-groups, but not members of out-groups, as being similar to themselves. In three experiments, social categorization moderated the spread of social projection in both minimal and value-tagged laboratory groups and regardless of whether individual perceivers judged both groups or only one. The categorization effect tracked changes in the perceiver's group status so that most perceivers projected only to present but not past in-groups. The lack of out-group projection supported an anchoring hypothesis, according to which self-referent information is engaged only when it is considered applicable to the judgment at hand. The induction hypothesis and the differentiation hypothesis, which predicted positive and negative out-group projection, respectively, were not supported. Implications for theories of intergroup perception and bias are discussed.     

Race as a visual feature: using visual search and perceptual discrimination tasks to understand face categories and the cross-race recognition deficit

One of the most familiar empirical phenomena associated with face recognition is the cross-race (CR) recognition deficit whereby people have difficulty recognizing members of a race different from their own. Most researchers assume that the CR deficit is caused by failure to generalize perceptual encoding expertise from same-race (SR) faces to CR faces. However, this explanation ignores critical differences in the social cognitions and feature coding priorities associated with SR and CR faces. On the basis of data from visual search and perceptual discrimination tasks, it appears that the deficit occurs because people emphasize visual information specifying race at the expense of individuating information when recognizing CR faces. In particular, it is possible to observe a paradoxical improvement in both detection and perceptual discrimination accuracy for CR faces that is limited to those who recognize them poorly. These findings support a new explanation for the CR recognition deficit based on feature coding differences between CR and SR faces, and appear incompatible with similarity-based models of face categories.     

The face of chauvinism: How prejudice expectations shape perceptions of facial affect

Are individuals who chronically expect to be treated prejudicially biased toward perceiving rejecting emotions in the faces of out-group others? In two studies, participants watched a series of computer-generated movies showing animated faces morphing from expressions of rejection (i.e., contempt and anger) to acceptance, and indicated when the initial expression of rejection changed. We also assessed stigma consciousness. Study 1 tested the connection between gender-based stigma consciousness and perceptions of contempt in male vs. female faces among female participants. Study 2 examined this connection for both men and women and for perceptions of contempt as well as anger. Results show that prejudice expectations lead individuals to interpret out-group faces as more rejecting than in-group faces, but only for female perceivers, and not for males. Further, our results suggest that prejudice expectations affect perceptions of contempt, but not anger. These results are discussed in relation to intergroup relations and emotion.     

Holistic processing is tuned for in-group faces

Past research has found that mere in-group/out-group categorizations are sufficient to elicit biases in face memory. The current research yields novel evidence that mere social categorization is also sufficient to modulate processes underlying face perception, even for faces for which we have strong perceptual expertise: same-race (SR) faces. Using the composite face paradigm, we find that SR faces categorized as in-group members (i.e., fellow university students) are processed more holistically than are SR faces categorized as out-group members (i.e., students at another university). Hence, holding perceptual expertise with faces constant, categorizing an SR target as an out-group member debilitates the strong holistic processing typically observed for SR faces.     

Postencoding cognitive processes in the cross-race effect: Categorization and individuation during face recognition

The cross-race effect (CRE) describes the finding that same-race faces are recognized more accurately than cross-race faces. According to social–cognitive theories of the CRE, processes of categorization and individuation at encoding account for differential recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Recent face memory research has suggested that similar but distinct categorization and individuation processes also occur postencoding, at recognition. Using a divided-attention paradigm, in Experiments 1A and 1B we tested and confirmed the hypothesis that distinct postencoding categorization and individuation processes occur during the recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Specifically, postencoding configural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for same-race than for cross-race faces; on the other hand, for White (but not Black) participants, postencoding featural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for cross-race than for same-race faces. A social categorization paradigm used in Experiments 2A and 2B tested the hypothesis that the postencoding in-group or out-group social orientation to faces affects categorization and individuation processes during the recognition of same-race and cross-race faces. Postencoding out-group orientation to faces resulted in categorization for White but not for Black participants. This was evidenced by White participants’ impaired recognition accuracy for same-race but not for cross-race out-group faces. Postencoding in-group orientation to faces had no effect on recognition accuracy for either same-race or cross-race faces. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B suggest that this social orientation facilitates White but not Black participants’ individuation and categorization processes at recognition. Models of recognition memory for same-race and cross-race faces need to account for processing differences that occur at both encoding and recognition.     

Memory for in-group and out-group information in a minimal group context: the self as an informational base

The authors argue that persons derive in-group expectancies from self-knowledge. This implies that perceivers process information about novel in-groups on the basis of the self-congruency of this information and not simply its valence. In Experiment 1, participants recalled more negative self-discrepant behaviors about an in-group than about an out-group. Experiment 2 replicated this effect under low cognitive load but not under high load. Experiment 3 replicated the effect using an idiographic procedure. These findings suggest that perceivers engage in elaborative inconsistency processing when they encounter negative self-discrepant information about an in-group but not when they encounter negative self-congruent information. Participants were also more likely to attribute self-congruent information to the in-group than to the out-group, regardless of information valence. Implications for models of social memory and self-categorization theory are discussed.     

Increasing perceived variability reduces prejudice and discrimination

We examined whether increasing individuals' perceived variability of an out-group reduces prejudice and discrimination toward its members. In a series of 4 laboratory and field experiments, we attracted participants' attention to either the homogeneity or the heterogeneity of members of an out-group, and then measured their attitudes or behaviors. Perceived variability was manipulated by making subgroups salient, by portraying the out-group members as having diverse opinions, by making salient that out-group members have different characteristics, or by asking participants to think about differences among out-group members. Prejudice and discrimination were measured in terms of self-reported attitudes, distribution of rewards, helping an out-group confederate, and evaluation of an out-group candidate in a simulated hiring decision. In all experiments, perceived variability decreased prejudice and discrimination. This effect may be due to the fact that perceived variability decreases the role of group membership in the production of attitudes and behaviors toward other individuals.     

The implicit power motive predicts decisions in line with perceived instrumentality

Past research suggests that the implicit power motive (i.e., an unconsciously held motivational disposition to derive pleasure from having impact on others) predicts a preference to interact with individuals having submissive-looking faces. The present research extends this finding by testing whether the relation between the implicit power motive and approaching submissiveness depends on instrumentality. In two experiments, participants were assigned to a group that would ostensibly compete with another group. Within this intergroup context, they were asked to select persons as leaders or members for the in-group or the out-group. Potential leaders and members were displayed as submissive-looking or dominant-looking. Results showed that the implicit power motive predicted decisions favoring dominant-looking persons as in-group leaders, and submissive-looking persons as out-group leaders (Study 1) or in-group members (Study 2). These findings indicate that the tendency for people high in the implicit power motive to approach submissive-looking persons depends on the perceived instrumentality for gaining influence over others.