Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

The closeness-communication bias: Increased egocentrism among friends versus strangers

People commonly believe that they communicate better with close friends than with strangers. We propose, however, that closeness can lead people to overestimate how well they communicate, a phenomenon we term the closeness-communication bias. In one experiment, participants who followed direction of a friend were more likely to make egocentric errors—look at and reach for an object only they could see—than were those who followed direction of a stranger. In two additional experiments, participants who attempted to convey particular meanings with ambiguous phrases overestimated their success more when communicating with a friend or spouse than with strangers. We argue that people engage in active monitoring of strangers’ divergent perspectives because they know they must, but that they “let down their guard” and rely more on their own perspective when they communicate with a friend.     

Remembering the silver lining: Reappraisal and positive bias in memory for emotion

Reappraisal and distraction, unlike suppression, are known to decrease the intensity of negative emotion in the short term. Little is known about long-term characteristics associated with emotion regulation strategies, however. In a longitudinal study, we examined the relation between the strategies people reported using to regulate emotions during a stressful situation and their later memory for their emotions. Students in Italy rated the intensity of positive and negative emotions they were experiencing as they prepared for their high school exit exam. They also rated the extent to which they were regulating emotion using reappraisal, distraction, and suppression. Six weeks later, students recalled their pre-exam emotions. The more students reported engaging in reappraisal before the exam, the more they overestimated positive emotion and underestimated negative emotion when recalling their experience. The association between reported reappraisal and memory bias was partially mediated by positive changes over time in students’ appraisals of the exam preparation experience. Reports of engaging in distraction and suppression were not associated with memory bias. Because remembered emotion guides future choices, these findings suggest that reappraisal is a highly adaptive strategy for coping with stressful situations, not only in the short run, but also in the long run.     

The rational side of egocentrism in social comparisons

Prior work has found that when people compare themselves with others they egocentrically focus on their own strengths and achievements more than on the (equally relevant) strengths and achievements of the comparison group. As a consequence, people tend to overestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is high and underestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is low. The present research investigated a rational discounting explanation of this bias—namely, that people weight the target of the comparison (the self) more than the referent of the comparison (others) because they typically have more knowledge about the former than the latter. In three studies, we found that the tendency to focus on the target in social comparisons—and the over and underestimation of relative standing that tendency engenders—was reduced (but not eliminated) as people’s knowledge about the comparison group increased. These results suggest that there may be a rational side to egocentrism in social comparisons.     

Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

The relation between rumination and temporal features of emotion intensity

Intensity profiles of emotional experience over time have been found to differ primarily in explosiveness (i.e. whether the profile has a steep vs. a gentle start) and accumulation (i.e. whether intensity increases over time vs. goes back to baseline). However, the determinants of these temporal features remain poorly understood. In two studies, we examined whether emotion regulation strategies are predictive of the degree of explosiveness and accumulation of negative emotional episodes. Participants were asked to draw profiles reflecting changes in the intensity of emotions elicited either by negative social feedback in the lab (Study 1) or by negative events in daily life (Study 2). In addition, trait (Study 1 & 2), and state (Study 2) usage of a set of emotion regulation strategies was assessed. Multilevel analyses revealed that trait rumination (especially the brooding component) was positively associated with emotion accumulation (Study 1 & 2). State rumination was also positively associated with emotion accumulation and, to a lesser extent, with emotion explosiveness (Study 2). These results provide support for emotion regulation theories, which hypothesise that rumination is a central mechanism underlying the maintenance of negative emotions.     

Emotion valence,intensity and emotion regulation in immigrants and majority members in the Netherlands

We were interested in interethnic differences and similarities in how emotion regulation strategies (reappraisal, suppression and social sharing) can be predicted by emotion valence and intensity. The sample consisted of 389 Dutch majority members and members of five immigrant groups: 136 Turkish and Moroccan, 105 Antillean and Surinamese, 102 Indonesian, 313 Western and 150 other non‐Western immigrants. In a path model with latent variables we confirmed that emotion regulation strategies were significantly and similarly related to emotion valence and intensity across the groups. Negative emotions were more reappraised and suppressed than positive emotions. Intensity was positively related to social sharing and negatively related to reappraisal and suppression. The Dutch majority group scored higher on emotion valence than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Also, the Dutch majority group scored lower on reappraisal than all non‐Western groups, and lower on suppression than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. We conclude that group differences reside more in mean scores on some components than in how antecedents are linked to regulation strategies.     

Testing four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect: Single- and multi-item entities as comparison targets and referents

In six experiments, we tested four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect (B/WTA) by manipulating the number of items comprising the target or referent of direct comparison. A single-item target tended to be rated more extremely than a single-item or a multi-item referent (Experiments 1–3). No B/WTA was obtained, however, when a multi-item target was compared with either a single- or multi-item referent (Experiments 4 and 5). A bias favoring a multi-item target was found only if cohesiveness among the items was increased through instructions (Experiment 6). The Unique-Attributes Hypothesis generally provided the best explanation the findings; the focalism explanation also demonstrated some empirical viability. The results suggest that important preferential decision-making outcomes can be affected by both the number of items and whether items are strategically manipulated to serve as targets or referents of comparison.     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

There's more to emotion than meets the eye: A processing bias for neutral content in the domain of emotional prosody

Research on emotion processing in the visual modality suggests a processing advantage for emotionally salient stimuli, even at early sensory stages; however, results concerning the auditory correlates are inconsistent. We present two experiments that employed a gating paradigm to investigate emotional prosody. In Experiment 1, participants heard successively building segments of Jabberwocky “sentences” spoken with happy, angry, or neutral intonation. After each segment, participants indicated the emotion conveyed and rated their confidence in their decision. Participants in Experiment 2 also heard Jabberwocky “sentences” in successive increments, with half discriminating happy from neutral prosody, and half discriminating angry from neutral prosody. Participants in both experiments identified neutral prosody more rapidly and accurately than happy or angry prosody. Confidence ratings were greater for neutral sentences, and error patterns also indicated a bias for recognising neutral prosody. Taken together, results suggest that enhanced processing of emotional content may be constrained by stimulus modality.     

The role of self-evaluation and envy in schadenfreude

In this article we address why and when people feel schadenfreude (pleasure at the misfortunes of others) in both interpersonal and intergroup contexts. Using findings from our own research programmes we show that schadenfreude is intensified when people are chronically or momentarily threatened in their self-worth, whereas it is attenuated when their self-evaluation is boosted; that malicious envy, but not benign envy, intensifies pleasure at the misfortunes of others; that these emotional responses are manifested in intergroup contexts via the same mechanisms; and that mere stereotypes, in the absence of any interaction or overt competition, are sufficient to elicit schadenfreude via such mechanisms. Together, these findings suggest that self-evaluation and envy both play an important role in evoking schadenfreude; people feel pleasure at the misfortunes of others when these misfortunes provide them with social comparisons that enhance their feelings of self-worth or remove the basis for painful feelings of envy.     

BIS, BAS, and bias: The role of personality and cognitive bias in social anxiety

The goal of the present research was to test the hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information mediate the effects of behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and behavioral approach system (BAS) sensitivity on social anxiety. Participants completed self-report measures of BIS and BAS and then underwent a social-threat induction procedure in which they were told they would have to perform a speech. A battery of cognitive bias measures was then administered, followed by a battery of state anxiety measures. Audience members also rated participants’ anxiety during the speech. Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypothesized model. As predicted, the fully-mediated model showed the best fit to the data, and higher BIS and lower BAS were found to have significant indirect effects on social anxiety via cognitive bias.     

The harmful and beneficial impacts of weight bias on well-being: the moderating influence of weight status

Weight bias is evident among normal weight and obese individuals. This weight bias may be associated with comparisons to others, which may enhance feelings of self-worth. However, the ego-enhancing versus ego-diminishing influence of these evaluations may be moderated by the individual's weight status, and the strength of these effects may be moderated by gender. Eight-five participants completed the Implicit Associations Test, questionnaires assessing explicit weight bias, body image, and self-esteem, and height and weight assessments. Implicit weight bias was prevalent among all individuals, p < .001, and was associated with a more positive body image, ps < .05, and higher self-esteem, ps < .01, for thinner individuals but a more negative body image and lower self-esteem for heavier individuals. Gender moderation effects were not observed. It is arguably problematic that the positive benefits to normal weight individuals’ self-esteem and body image appear to come via negative comparisons with overweight individuals.     

The concept of egocentrism in the context of Piaget’s theory

In this paper, we trace the origin and development of the concept of egocentrism in Piaget’s work. We evaluate a number of criticisms that have been leveled against the concept of egocentrism. Based on our evaluation, we propose a reconceptualization of the concept of egocentrism as a decentering process with different phases that is recapitulated at different stages of development. We provide examples of the decentering process for the sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete-operational, and formal operational stages.Piaget introduced the concept of egocentrism in his early writings in the 1920s to describe general characteristics of the preschool child. Since its introduction, the concept of egocentrism has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention and has drawn numerous criticisms. Piaget attributed these criticisms to serious misunderstandings of the concept of egocentrism. Indeed, Piaget (1945/1962, p. 285, fn) admitted that the choice of the term egocentrism was “unfortunate”, and he apologized (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1967, p. 220) for having dwelt on this expression for the last twenty-five years.In this paper, we trace the origins of the concept of egocentrism in Piaget’s writings and examine the subsequent changes to this concept. We examine some of the criticisms leveled against the concept of egocentrism and conclude that the concept of egocentrism remained ambiguous in Piaget’s writings. Finally, we suggest a revision of the concept of egocentrism that addresses these ambiguities.     

How egocentrism and optimism change in response to feedback in repeated competitions

People tend to egocentrically focus on how adverse or beneficial conditions in competitions affect the self, while inadequately considering the comparable impact on opponents. This leads to overoptimism for a victory in easy tasks and underoptimism in hard tasks. Four experiments investigated whether experience and performance feedback in a multi-round competition would influence egocentric weighting and optimism biases across rounds. The results indicated that egocentric weighting and optimism biases decreased across rounds. However, this apparent debiasing occurred under restrictive conditions, and participants did not generalize their learned, non-egocentric tendencies to novel contexts. The roles of differential confidence and surface/structural similarity are discussed as reasons why optimism biases were generally pervasive.     

Determinants of the shape of emotion intensity profiles

It has been shown that variability in the shape of emotion intensity profiles can be described in terms of three functional features, namely steepness at onset, skewness and number of peaks. However, it remains unclear which factors account for variability in each of these features. In the present study participants were asked to report intensity profiles of positive and negative emotions on a daily basis. Information was further collected regarding potential determinants of the functional features of the intensity profiles at three levels: trait-, episode-, and moment-determinants. Regarding steepness at onset, it was found for positive and negative emotions that intensity profiles have an especially explosive start when the eliciting stimulus is important, when the stimulus is still present during the beginning of the episode, and, in case of positive emotions, when the participant is an extravert. Concerning skewness, it was found for positive and negative emotions that profiles reach their peak more often towards the end when the eliciting stimulus is important, when the stimulus is absent during the beginning of the episode but present towards the end, and, in case of negative emotions, when the stimulus is uncontrollable. Regarding the number of peaks, it was found that profiles more often have multiple peaks when the eliciting stimulus is absent during the middle of the emotional episode.     

The mediating role of state maladaptive emotion regulation in the relation between social anxiety symptoms and self-evaluation bias

Although social anxiety symptoms are robustly linked to biased self-evaluations across time, the mechanisms of this relation remain unclear. The present study tested three maladaptive emotion regulation strategies – state post-event processing, state experiential avoidance, and state expressive suppression – as potential mediators of this relation. Undergraduate participants (N?=?88; 61.4% Female) rated their social skill in an impromptu conversation task and then returned to the laboratory approximately two days later to evaluate their social skill in the conversation again. Consistent with expectations, state post-event processing and state experiential avoidance mediated the relation between social anxiety symptoms and worsening self-evaluations of social skill (controlling for research assistant evaluations), particularly for positive qualities (e.g. appeared confident, demonstrated social skill). State expressive suppression did not mediate the relation between social anxiety symptoms and changes in self-evaluation bias across time. These findings highlight the role that spontaneous, state experiential avoidance and state post-event processing may play in the relation between social anxiety symptoms and worsening self-evaluation biases of social skill across time.     

The influence of provocateurs' emotion displays on the social information processing of children varying in social adjustment and age

This study examined the effect of provocateurs' emotion displays on first through fourth graders' social information processing (SIP). Rating and nomination sociometric techniques were used to identify rejected-aggressive, rejected-nonaggressive, average-nonaggressive, and popular-nonaggressive groups. Children viewed videotaped ambiguous provocation situations in which provocateurs' emotion displays were varied systematically. After each vignette, children's recall of story details, attribution of intent, and problem-solving responses were obtained. Half of the children were randomly assigned to a condition where they were asked directly about provocateurs' emotions, and the remaining children were not asked about provocateurs' feelings. Results revealed both developmental and social adjustment differences in SIP. In addition, provocateurs' emotion displays and asking versus not asking about those displays influenced multiple aspects of SIP.     

In fairness to future generations: The role of egocentrism, uncertainty, power, and stewardship in judgments of intergenerational allocations

In this paper, we found that fairness judgments in intergenerational allocation decisions depend on (1) individuals’ position in the intergenerational sequence (i.e., whether they are in the preceding or succeeding generation), (2) the amount of uncertainty about the effect of the preceding generation’s decisions on the succeeding one, and (3) whether the preceding generation is primed with power. We found that both power priming and greater levels of uncertainty about the future consequences of present decisions can elicit stewardship attitudes, which may temper self-interested behavior on the part of the preceding generation. Our data also indicate that the nature of the uncertainty is important; it is not just a matter of how much future generations will be affected, but also whether or not they will be affected at all by the decisions of earlier generations. Our findings help to explain (1) how intergenerational inequities can occur even when people are explicitly focused on achieving fair allocations of resources between generations, and (2) how social responsibility concerns can motivate intergenerational beneficence in the face of intergenerational conflict.     

Attention bias in youth: Associations with youth and mother's depressive symptoms moderated by emotion regulation and affective dynamics during family interactions

Recent research has highlighted the potential role of attention bias for emotional stimuli as a possible cognitive risk factor for depression in youth. However, differences in youth emotion regulation or maternal affect may moderate the association between maternal and youth depression and youth attention biases. The current study investigated the relationship between maternal and youth depressive symptoms and youth (aged 11–17 years) attention bias for sad and happy faces in 59 mother–youth dyads, examining whether positive and negative maternal affect observed during structured interaction tasks or youth emotion regulation tendencies moderated associations between maternal and youth depression and attention biases. Youth suppression interacted with maternal and youth depression to predict sad attentional biases in youth, while maternal positive affect interacted with maternal depression to predict happy attention biases in youth.