The dimensional effects of missing information on choice processing

This paper demonstrates that choice processing may be different in missing information situations than in full information situations depending on whether inferences are used to fill in missing values and the overlap of the missing information itself. It is shown that when individuals do not form inferences to fill in missing values, fewer full attribute-based processes and more processes which accommodate for missing attribute values, alternative-based or given-dimension attribute-based, are used. It is also shown that when a processing shift due to missing information does occur, the overlap of the missing values will affect the type of shift that takes place. If overlap is high, a shift to given-dimension attribute-based processing is more likely, and when overlap is low, a shift to alternative-based processing is more likely. When individuals do form inferences to fill in missing values, processing is more similar to that in full information situations. Finally, it is shown that individuals will often partially fill in missing information, thus moderating the proposed effects.     

Regulatory fit from attribute‐based versus alternative‐based processing in decision making

This paper discusses the fit between attribute-based versus alternative-based processing and regulatory focus, and its impact on decision outcome valuation. Attribute-based processing was found to occur more frequently under prevention focus, whereas alternative-based processing occurred more frequently under promotion focus. The fit between prevention/promotion focus and attribute-based/alternative-based processing was found to enhance satisfaction with choices and the perceived monetary value of chosen options. Moreover, the effect of fit on outcome valuation was found to be mediated by ease of processing. Finally, the effects of fit on ease of processing and outcome valuation disappeared when consumers first practiced to process information based on either attributes or alternatives.     

跨期决策是基于选项还是基于维度?

跨期决策有许多不同的理论模型,按其所指信息加工过程,可以分成基于选项的和基于维度的两类决策模型。前者认为各跨期选项被独立赋予一个主观价值,主观价值最大的选项被选择;而后者则认为选项是基于维度被比较的,比较中占优势的选项被选择。本文从行为结果、过程数据和对基于选项模型基本假设的质疑等角度综述了近来支持基于维度模型的证据;并提出未来需要进一步应用认知行为实验和眼动追踪技术对两类模型进行过程研究、在基于维度模型的指导下进行f MRI研究,以及加强损失领域的跨期决策研究以完善跨期决策模型。     

Creativity Booster: How Time versus Money Impacts Creative Performances

Past research shows that time and money, although both scarce resources indispensable in modern societies, tend to exert distinct impacts on interpersonal behaviors. Yet, little is known about the effects of these two resources on intrapersonal cognitive processes, including creative thinking. In the present research, we explored whether and how increasing the saliency of time versus money concept would affect creative thinking. Six experiments provide converging evidence that activating time concept leads to superior creative performance than money concept. Specifically, individuals treated to time priming (versus money priming) were more likely to solve insight problems (Experiments 1a and 1b), to expand boundaries of conceptual categories (Experiment 2), and to identify connections among seemingly unrelated stimuli (Experiments 3a, 3b and 4). Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

金钱概念对消费者独特性需求的影响研究

本研究探讨了金钱概念对消费者独特性需求的影响。通过三个实验,实验1研究表明启动金钱概念的消费者在进行产品选择时反从众需求更强烈;实验2研究表明金钱的丰富程度会调节金钱概念对消费者创新性选择的影响,金钱富有启动组选择独特性产品的比例要显著高于金钱缺乏启动组和控制组;实验3研究表明金钱概念对消费者独特性需求的影响是通过社交距离的中介作用完成的,启动金钱概念的消费者会感知到更远的社交距离,进而产生更强烈的独特性需求。     

权力对延迟选择的影响

本研究旨在考察权力对延迟选择的影响, 并探讨决策难度在其中的调节作用以及决策过程的中介作用。两个实验均先操纵个体的权力状态, 然后再请被试完成随后的延迟选择任务。结果发现, 决策难度可调节权力对延迟选择的影响, 当决策困难时, 高权力者具有更低的延迟倾向, 当决策容易时, 权力的影响消失。决策过程的加工变异性可中介权力对延迟选择的影响。结果表明, 低权力者比高权力者具有更高的延迟倾向(尤其当决策困难时), 不同权力水平者在决策过程上的差异或可部分解释此种现象。     

偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响机制

本研究旨在探讨偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响及影响机制。本研究包括两个实验, 在被试进行决策前, 分别采用图片和短片诱发其与当前决策任务无关的偶然情绪, 然后要求被试完成选择任务, 并从决策结果和决策过程两个角度考察偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响及影响机制。结果发现, 当可选项中不存在1个优势选项时, 与正性情绪相比, 个体在负性情绪下会更倾向于延迟选择, 而个体对决策信息的加工深度在偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响中具有中介作用。这可能是因为相比于正性情绪, 个体在负性情绪下会采用更深入的加工策略, 增加了决策难度, 进而提高了个体的延迟选择倾向。     

Product assortment and individual decision processes

Research presented in this article examines the impact of product assortment on individuals' decisions. Four experiments report converging evidence that the impact of assortment is moderated by the degree to which individuals have articulated attribute preferences, whereby individuals with an articulated ideal point are more likely to prefer larger assortments than individuals without articulated preferences. The data further show that choices made from large assortments are associated with more selective, alternative-based, and confirmatory processing for individuals with articulated preferences and more comprehensive, attribute-based, and comparative processing for those without articulated preferences.     

更优更耐心：质量结果对跨期选择的影响

跨期选择以往的研究集中于金钱数量结果。基于维度加工的模型,本文探究了在跨期选择中,人们面对质量差异的结果(如,今天的低配版手机还是六个月后的高配版手机)vs.相对应的金钱结果(如,今天的5000元还是六个月后的6000元)的选择偏好差异。3个实验结果表明：人们面对质量结果(相比于金钱结果)的跨期选择表现得更耐心,而这种现象是由于人们面对选择时在结果维度差异感知不同所致。与金钱结果跨期选择相同,质量结果跨期选择的心理加工过程同样遵循维度间差异比较。本研究为基于维度的跨期选择模型提供了新的证据。     

Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Semantic activation and letter search: Blocking or suppression?

Two experiments investigated associative priming with a letter-search prime task where either the prime and letter probe were presented simultaneously, or the letter probe appeared 200 ms (Experiment 1) or 300 ms (Experiment 2) after the prime. Weak associative priming was observed in both experiments, but unlike Stolz and Besner (1996) we found no evidence that priming was increased when the probe was delayed. However, strong associative priming was observed when a semantic decision had to be made on the prime (Experiment 3). Our results are consistent with an account where semantic activation of the prime occurs but its action on the target is suppressed by the prime task. The persistence of weak priming effects with the letter search task is explained in terms of the low-frequency items used.     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

Being responsible versus acting responsibly: Effects of agency and risk taking on responsibility judgments

In three experimental studies, with managers and students as participants, we explore in this paper the relation between two kinds of responsibility judgments, called Responsibility 1 (R1) and Responsibility 2 (R2). Decision makers can be viewed as being more or less responsible for their choice and its consequences (R1). Their actions can also be evaluated, from a normative point of view, as instances of more or less responsible behavior (R2). Experiment 1 showed that managers who depart from the default or “normal” course of action, by choosing a new (versus familiar) alternative, changing (versus sticking to) an initial decision, or going against (versus following) the advice of a management team, are rated as more responsible (R1) for the outcomes of their decision. At the same time, they are perceived to act in a less responsible way (R2). Experiment 2 compared decision makers choosing between more or less risky options. High risk takers were held more responsible (R1) for their choice and for its consequences, but were again viewed as behaving in a less responsible way (R2) than low risk takers. In Experiment 3, participants judged decision makers who followed or opposed others' advice by choosing either a high or a low risk option. Opposing others' advice led to higher R1 and lower R2 scores, especially when choosing the high risk option, moderated by outcome (successful decisions appearing more responsible than those that went wrong). Thus R1 and R2 judgments should be distinguished as having different and sometimes even opposite determinants.     

Component processes of phased decision strategies

It is often assumed that decision makers apply mixtures of strategies including heuristic processes in complex choice tasks. In support of this assumption the component processes involved in phased strategies were investigated. Expectations for an experimental investigation were generated by simulations within the effort-quality framework. Effort-quality trade-off functions for tasks of different complexity favor compensatory dimension-based strategies for binary choice. For multialternative choice, a combination of initial dimension-based elimination procedures followed by alternative-based final processing would be expected. These expectations were tested in two experiments. While choosing between two, four, or eight alternatives, subjects could successively retrieve parts of the available information. Depending on their menu selection, either all features of one alternative were displayed together (alternative-based retrieval), or all features on one dimension were displayed together (dimension-based retrieval). Vincent averaging was used to analyze the retrieval sequences with respect to their stationarity. While the stationary sequences for binary choice are compatible with single processing strategies, non-stationarity of the sequences obtained for multialternative choice indicates the use of phased strategies. In particular, non-stationarity due to decreasing dimension-based retrievals over time suggests that subjects first applied dimensional elimination and later derived their choices by more thorough, alternative-based processing of the remaining alternatives.     

行为决策中诱饵效应的认知加工机制

在原选项集中加入一个诱饵选项能够使人们的选择发生改变, 这就是诱饵效应。研究者发现可以通过设置相似诱饵、妥协诱饵、吸引诱饵以及幽灵诱饵等达到诱导决策者选择目标选项的目的。当前, 很多研究探索了诱饵效应的认知加工机制, 有研究者基于启发式加工和分析式加工的视角开展研究, 也有研究者从维度加工和选项加工的视角对此进行探索。诱饵效应的认知加工过程受到年龄、后悔情绪、决策形式以及时间压力等因素的影响。未来的研究需要构建适用于各类诱饵效应的统一的认知加工机制模型, 探索知觉在诱饵效应形成过程中的基础性作用, 探索个体的决策风格对不同类型诱饵效应的影响, 并通过合理利用诱饵效应助推社会发展。     

Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain-specific moral psychology. However, the candidate "principles" we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics.     

Effects of mindful eating training on delay and probability discounting for food and money in obese and healthy-weight individuals

Obese individuals tend to behave more impulsively than healthy weight individuals across a variety of measures, but it is unclear whether this pattern can be altered. The present study examined the effects of a mindful eating behavioral strategy on impulsive and risky choice patterns for hypothetical food and money. In Experiment 1, 304 participants completed computerized delay and probability discounting tasks for food-related and monetary outcomes. High percent body fat (PBF) predicted more impulsive choice for food, but not small-value money, replicating previous work. In Experiment 2, 102 randomly selected participants from Experiment 1 were assigned to participate in a 50-min workshop on mindful eating or to watch an educational video. They then completed the discounting tasks again. Participants who completed the mindful eating session showed more self-controlled and less risk-averse discounting patterns for food compared to baseline; those in the control condition discounted similarly to baseline rates. There were no changes in discounting for money for either group, suggesting stimulus specificity for food for the mindful eating condition.     

The right hemisphere maintains solution-related activation for yet-to-be-solved problems

In five experiments, we examined the time course of hemispheric differences in solution activation for insight-like problems. We propose that solving insight problems requires retrieval of unusual interpretations of problem elements, and that right-hemisphere (RH) coarse semantic coding is more likely than left-hemisphere (LH) fine semantic coding to maintain semantic activation of such interpretations. In four experiments, participants attempted word problems for 7 sec (Experiments 1A and 1B) or 2 sec (Experiments 2A and 2B), and 750 msec later responded to lateralized target words. After 7 sec of solving effort, Experiment 1A participants showed greater solution-related priming (i.e., they named solutions faster than unrelated words) for left visual field-RH (lvf-RH) targets than for right visual field-LH (rvf-LH) targets, and Experiment 1B participants made faster solution decisions on target words presented to the RH, as previously demonstrated following 15 sec of effort. After 2 sec of solving effort in Experiment 2A, women showed symmetric solution-related priming, although men showed a slight lvf-RH advantage in priming; and in Experiment 2B participants made equally quick solution decisions for targets presented to the LH and to the RH. In Experiment 3, participants viewed the problems for 1,250 msec then named lateralized target words; they showed symmetric solution-related priming. These experiments demonstrate solution activation initially in both hemispheres, but maintained solution activation only in the RH.     

Orientation invariance in visual object priming depends on prime—target asynchrony

Two experiments are reported in which orientation effects on visual object recognition latency were examined. In Experiment 1, we assessed picture-naming performance as a function of image-plane stimulus orientation and found increasing response times with increased misorientation of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, we examined the repetition priming effect on the identification of upright targets as a function of prime orientation. With time delays of 100, 200, or 500 msec between the onset of the prime and that of the target (i.e., stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA]), the magnitude of the priming effect decreased with increasing misorientation of the prime. These results contrast with the orientationinvariant priming effects reported in some previous repetition priming studies. These investigations all used relatively long prime—target SOAs. Confirming the crucial role of the latter variable, Experiment 2 shows that the magnitude of the repetition priming effect is invariant across prime orientations with an SOA of 1,000 msec. The possible implications of the present observations with respect to the issue of orientation invariance versus dependency of the visual object recognition process are discussed.