The importance of similarity and understanding of partners' marital ideals to relationship satisfaction

This article extends earlier work on the association between relationship partners' similarity and understanding about marital ideals and relationship satisfaction by controlling for individual differences in stereotype endorsement or typical responding. For heterosexual couples we separated a measure of understanding into the general understanding of partners and understanding that is unique to the specific relationship partner. The measures of similarity and understanding were also separated into general similarity and understanding and into those that are unique between partners. We examined the contribution of each type of similarity and understanding to relationship satisfaction in 238 dating and married couples. Findings indicate that the more satisfied individuals believe that the partner endorses a “female” stereotype. Understanding does not relate to length of the relationship or satisfaction, but similarity in values does There is some indication that marital discord decreases with an increase in the male partners' understanding of their female partners.     

The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals

Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. However, there are cases in which one's ideal counterpart cannot have one's information, knowledge, or evidence. In these situations, agents cannot compare themselves to their ideal counterpart.     

Reasons and ideals

This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies, by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends.     

The relationship between gender role ideals and psychological well-being

Previous research on the influence of gender roles upon psychological health has found that most effects may be due to participants' levels of masculine traits alone. This study investigated whether individual gender role ideals moderate the relationship between gender roles and psychological well-being. Eighty-three psychology undergraduate students of European descent were given a battery of measures of gender role and psychological well-being. Results of analysis of these tests suggest that the degree to which participants' gender-specific traits represent met or unmet ideals is a better predictor of psychological adjustment than personal gender role alone. Results also suggest that gender roles can diminish psychological well-being by creating conflict between personal beliefs about the nature of appropriate behavior and the actual demands of life situations. Theoretical implications and future research directions are discussed.     

Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Not all ideals are equal: Intrinsic and extrinsic ideals in relationships

The ideal standards model suggests that greater consistency between ideal standards and actual perceptions of one's relationship predicts positive relationship evaluations; however, no research has evaluated whether this differs across types of ideals. A self‐determination theory perspective was derived to test whether satisfaction of intrinsic ideals buffers the importance of extrinsic ideals. Participants (N = 195) in committed relationships directly and indirectly reported the extent to which their partner met their ideal on two dimensions: intrinsic (e.g., warm, intimate) and extrinsic (e.g., attractive, successful). Relationship need fulfillment and relationship quality were also assessed. Hypotheses were largely supported, such that satisfaction of intrinsic ideals more strongly predicted relationship functioning, and satisfaction of intrinsic ideals buffered the relevance of extrinsic ideals for outcomes.     

The importance of fading slowly...

Guest Editorial

The importance of fading slowly...