Intergroup relations and the attribution of emotions: control over memory for secondary emotions associated with the ingroup and outgroup

This study tested the hypothesis that people perceive their ingroup as experiencing more uniquely human secondary emotions than the outgroup. Jacoby's process-dissociation procedure was used to measure participants' controlled recognition memory for materials that associated the ingroup or outgroup with secondary or primary emotions. Conscious memory was better for associations between the outgroup and secondary emotions than for associations between the ingroup and secondary emotions. No such difference was found for primary emotions. These results suggest that people attribute more humanity to the ingroup than to the outgroup.     

Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.     

Infrahumanization or familiarity? Attribution of uniquely human emotions to the self, the ingroup, and the outgroup

People attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups. This effect is interpreted in terms of infrahumanization theory. Familiarity also could explain this differential attribution because secondary emotions are thought to be less visible and intense than primary ones. This alternative explanation to infrahumanization was tested in three studies. In Study 1, participants attributed, in a between-participants design, primary and secondary emotions to themselves, to their ingroup, or to an outgroup. In Study 2, participants answered for themselves and their ingroup or for themselves and an outgroup. In Study 3, participants made attributions to the ingroup or a series of outgroups varying in terms of familiarity. The data do not support an explanation in terms of familiarity. The discussion centers on conditions not conducting to infrahumanization.     

Retributive justice and social categorizations: the perceived fairness of punishment depends on intergroup status

In the current research, the authors investigate the influence of intergroup status and social categorizations on retributive justice judgments, that is, the extent to which observers perceive punishment as fair. Building on social identity theory and the model of subjective group dynamics, it is predicted that when the ingroup has higher status than the outgroup, people are relatively less concerned about punishment of an outgroup offender than when the ingroup has lower status than the outgroup. Two experiments revealed that participants are more punitive towards an ingroup than an outgroup offender when ingroup status is high but not when ingroup status is low. Furthermore, in correspondence with our line of reasoning, this finding emerged because participants were less punitive towards outgroup offenders when ingroup status is high than when ingroup status was low. It is concluded that the perceived fairness of punishment depends on the offender's social categorization and intergroup status. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Infrahuman outgroup or suprahuman ingroup: The role of nationalism and patriotism in the infrahumanization of outgroups

Previous research has shown that people are more likely to attribute uniquely human emotions to their ingroup than an outgroup (infrahumanization). In the current research, we examine whether these research findings are an indication of the infrahumanization of outgroups or the suprahumanization of the ingroup. We examined the role of nationalism and patriotism in the attribution of secondary emotions to groups. In line with the infrahumanization argument, we obtained a significant positive relationship between nationalism and the differential attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup versus outgroup. In contrast, patriotism was negatively related to the differential attribution of secondary emotions. These findings indicate that the differential attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup (vs. outgroup) is an indication of the derogation or infrahumanization of outgroups. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups

According to the psychological essentialism perspective, people tend to explain differences between groups by attributing them different essences. Given a pervasive ethnocentrism, this tendency implies that the human essence will be restricted to the ingroup whereas outgroups will receive a lesser degree of humanity. Therefore, it is argued that people attribute more uniquely human characteristics to the ingroup than to the outgroup. The present article focuses on secondary emotions that constitute such characteristics. Study 1 showed that members of high‐ and low‐status groups attribute more positive secondary emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup. Study 2 verified that the differential attribution extended also to negative secondary emotions. No exemplars of emotions were provided in Study 3. Instead, participants had to estimate the means of two distributions of numbers that supposedly represented characteristics of the ingroup and of the outgroup. The results of this third experiment illustrated the reluctance to attribute secondary emotions to the outgroup. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential attribution of secondary emotions to members of the ingroup and the outgroup: infrahumanization bias in children / Atribución de sentimientos a miembros del endogrupo y del exogrupo: el sesgo de infrahumanización en niños

Abstract

Research on infrahumanization has shown that people reserve uniquely human characteristics, including secondary emotions, for their ingroup, and deny them to their outgroup. However, this hypothesis has been corroborated almost exclusively in adults. The present research objective is to determine whether children, like adults, infrahumanize members of the outgroup. Forty-eight children in a competitive sports context were asked to attribute several secondary emotions to members of the ingroup and the outgroup. Results revealed that, like adults, children infrahumanize the outgroup. Their attributions showed a reluctance to accept the outgroup’s secondary emotions, which they reserved exclusively for the ingroup. Specifically, children attributed more positive and negative secondary emotions to the ingroup than the outgroup.     

The benefits of collective responsibility: How ingroup reputation concern motivates prosociality in intergroup contexts

Collective responsibility processes have been investigated from the perspectives of the outgroup (e.g., collective blame) and the ingroup (e.g., collective guilt). This article extends theory and research on collective responsibility with a third perspective, namely that of the individual actor whose behavior triggers the attribution of collective blame. Four experiments (n = 78, 118, 208 and 77, respectively) tested the hypotheses that collective responsibility processes influence the individual actors' appraisals, emotions and behavior. The possibility of collective blame for their individual action prompted more prosocial behavior among participants (Experiment 1). Participants also experienced more ingroup reputation concern and in turn more negative emotions (Experiment 2–4) for a past wrongdoing if it could reflect negatively on the ingroup in the eyes of outgroups. The increased negative emotions then motivated participants to improve the ingroup's image (Experiment 4). The effects were moderated by perceived ingroup entitativity, in that activating collective blame increased ingroup reputation concern and negative emotions only for ingroups perceived as highly entitative (Experiment 3).     

Can We Identify with a Nation Low in Morality? The Heavy Weight of (Im)Morality in International Comparison

Research has shown that the perceived morality of the ingroup is a primary source of group pride and ingroup identification. The present research examined whether this is true even when a group has a poor reputation for morality in terms of dishonesty and corruption, such as in the case of Italians. To address this issue, two studies analyzed the role of the three fundamental dimensions of social judgment—morality, competence, and sociability—in predicting Italians’ identification with their nation when the salience of social comparison and the status of the comparison outgroup were varied. Findings showed that perceived morality predicted ingroup identification when participants did not engage in social comparison. Under salient social comparison, individuals based group identification on other dimensions: Perceived sociability was the main predictor of identification when respondents compared with a higher status outgroup (Germans; Study 1; N = 109), whereas perceived competence was the main predictor of identification when participants compared with a lower status outgroup (Romanians; Study 2; N = 121). Overall, findings showed compensation processes in social identification: When social comparison is salient, members of a low morality group base identification on the dimension which allows positive differentiation from the outgroup.     

Morality and political orientations: An analysis of their relationship

Groups are social constructions with differences. People spontaneously attempt to explain differences between groups. Stereotypes often play this explanatory role. Specifically, group members tend to attribute different essences to social categories. Given widespread ethnocentrism, it is not surprising that individuals reserve “the human essence” for their ingroup, while other groups are attributed a lesser humanity. This phenomenon is called infra‐humanisation and happens outside people's awareness. Secondary emotions (e.g., love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions in contrast to primary emotions (e.g., joy, surprise, fear, anger) that are shared with animals. The research programme summarised in this chapter demonstrates through various paradigms that members of groups not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are also reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively with an outgroup member who expresses himself with secondary emotions than with an ingroup member who uses the same terms. Interestingly, infra‐humanisation occurs for both high‐ and low‐status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups.     

Convergent and divergent responses to emotional displays of ingroup and outgroup

In the present research, we test the assumption that emotional mimicry and contagion are moderated by group membership. We report two studies using facial electromyography (EMG; Study 1), Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Study 2), and self-reported emotions (Study 2) as dependent measures. As predicted, both studies show that ingroup anger and fear displays were mimicked to a greater extent than outgroup displays of these emotions. The self-report data in Study 2 further showed specific divergent reactions to outgroup anger and fear displays. Outgroup anger evoked fear, and outgroup fear evoked aversion. Interestingly, mimicry increased liking for ingroup models but not for outgroup models. The findings are discussed in terms of the social functions of emotions in group contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

Judging scandal: Standards or bias in politics

As the number of political scandals rises, we examined the circumstances that might influence how a politician would be judged as a result of a scandal. Specifically, we hypothesized that ingroup bias theory and shifting standards theory would produce different patterns of judgements. In two studies, we found support for the ingroup bias theory, such that participants rated the fictitious politician’s public approval and perceived character as higher if the politician was a member of their own political party (i.e. their ingroup) than if the politician was a member of the another political party (i.e. their outgroup). These results may explain, in part, why people may judge politicians involved in scandal more or less harshly depending on whether they are an ingroup member or outgroup member.     

Retributive reactions to suspected offenders: the importance of social categorizations and guilt probability

In the current research, the author investigates the influence of social categorizations on retributive emotions (e.g., anger) and punishment intentions when people evaluate suspected offenders as independent observers. It is argued that information that guilt is certain or uncertain (i.e., guilt probability) has different consequences for retributive reactions to ingroup and outgroup suspects. In correspondence with predictions, results of four experiments showed that people reacted more negatively to ingroup than outgroup suspects when guilt was certain but that people reacted more negatively to outgroup than ingroup suspects when guilt was uncertain. It is concluded that guilt probability moderates the influence of social categorizations on people's retributive reactions to suspected offenders.     

Cognitive differentiation between self,ingroup, and outgroup: The roles of identification and perceived intergroup conflict

Several models predict that persons ascribe opposite characteristics to self and ingroups on the one hand and outgroups on the other (outgroup contrast). However, only few studies have found this effect. This study explored its boundary conditions. Sixty‐two students rated (a) characteristics of themselves, an ingroup (own study major), and an outgroup (other study major), (b) ingroup identification, and (c) perceived intergroup conflict. Participants who were relatively high in ingroup identification and who perceived relatively high levels of intergroup conflict displayed outgroup contrast, as indicated by negative correlations between trait ratings for self and ingroup and between trait ratings for ingroup and outgroup. The other participants showed weaker or no outgroup contrast. Thus, this study is one of the few empirical demonstrations of outgroup contrast and points to moderators that should be considered in future research on this effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional prejudice,essentialism, and nationalism The 2002 Tajfel lecture

In explaining differences between groups, people ascribe the human essence to their ingroup and consider outgroups as less human. This phenomenon, called infra‐humanization, occurs outside people's awareness. Because secondary emotions (e.g. love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions, people not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively (in terms of altruism, imitation, and approach) with an outgroup member who expresses himself through secondary emotions. Infra‐humanization occurs for high and low status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups. It does not occur when the outgroup target is adequately individualized, by a complete name or through perspective taking, for instance. The differential familiarity with the ingroup and the outgroup cannot explain infra‐humanization. Yet, preliminary results show that subjective essentialism and ingroup identification may mediate the effects of infra‐humanization. A connection is made between nationalism and infra‐humanization. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高确定性情绪（开心、愤怒）与低确定性情绪（悲伤）对信任的影响

本研究通过信任游戏的实验范式探讨了在与“受信任者”高/低可信赖性有关的信任线索时,具体情绪的确定性维度对信任行为的影响。实验一发现,当被试被告知“受信任者”在可信赖量表上的得分（高/低）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断上更容易被受信任者的“可信赖性”水平的高低所影响;实验二发现,当告知被试“受信任者”的群体身份（内/外群）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断更容易被受信任者的“内外群”身份所影响。上述结果表明,高确定性的情绪比低确定性的情绪更容易使被试的信任判断受到与“受信任者”是否值得信赖有关的线索所影响。     

Affective divergence: automatic responses to others' emotions depend on group membership

Extant research suggests that targets' emotion expressions automatically evoke similar affect in perceivers. The authors hypothesized that the automatic impact of emotion expressions depends on group membership. In Experiments 1 and 2, an affective priming paradigm was used to measure immediate and preconscious affective responses to same-race or other-race emotion expressions. In Experiment 3, spontaneous vocal affect was measured as participants described the emotions of an ingroup or outgroup sports team fan. In these experiments, immediate and spontaneous affective responses depended on whether the emotional target was ingroup or outgroup. Positive responses to fear expressions and negative responses to joy expressions were observed in outgroup perceivers, relative to ingroup perceivers. In Experiments 4 and 5, discrete emotional responses were examined. In a lexical decision task (Experiment 4), facial expressions of joy elicited fear in outgroup perceivers, relative to ingroup perceivers. In contrast, facial expressions of fear elicited less fear in outgroup than in ingroup perceivers. In Experiment 5, felt dominance mediated emotional responses to ingroup and outgroup vocal emotion. These data support a signal-value model in which emotion expressions signal environmental conditions.     

Social identity and prosocial and antisocial behavior in youth sport

ObjectivesTo examine (a) the effects of social identity on prosocial and antisocial behavior toward teammates and opponents, and (b) whether any effects of social identity on prosocial and antisocial behavior were mediated by cohesion.DesignProspective, observational.MethodsMale and female youth–sport participants (N = 329; M_age = 15.88 years) completed questionnaires at the beginning, middle and end of the season assessing three dimensions of social identity (cognitive centrality, ingroup ties, ingroup affect), cohesion (task, social) and prosocial and antisocial behavior toward teammates and opponents.ResultsWith the exception of cognitive centrality (which was therefore not analyzed further), all measures of study variables proved reliable. Structural equation modeling indicated the following: Ingroup affect had a positive effect on prosocial teammate behavior, Task cohesion mediated a positive effect of ingroup ties on prosocial teammate behavior and a negative effect of ingroup ties and ingroup affect on antisocial behavior toward teammates and opponents. Social cohesion mediated a positive effect of ingroup ties on antisocial behavior toward teammates and opponents. Prosocial opponent behavior was not predicted by any dimension of social identity.ConclusionThe findings highlight that social identity may play a salient role in regulating prosocial and antisocial behavior in youth sport, and changes in cohesion may partially explain these effects.     

Perceptions of social influence when messages favour ‘us’ versus ‘them’: A closer look at the social distance effect

The third‐person effect (TPE) is the tendency for individuals to assume that persuasive communications have a stronger effect on other people than on themselves. In turn the social distance effect (SDE) is the tendency for this TPE to increase with the psychological distance between self and comparator. Two experiments showed that the SDE is moderated by whether the message favours the ingroup or the outgroup, holding all other content constant. In Study 1, male and female participants read a message arguing that either women were better drivers than men or vice versa, and then indicated how much they thought themselves, ingroup members, outgroup members and society would be influenced. The results indicate that for the pro‐outgroup message the SDE was found. However, for the pro‐ingroup message the SDE was reversed with ingroup members perceived as more influenced than all other targets, including the self. Study 2 replicated this finding using minimal groups, which eliminated the effects of prior stereotypes about male and female drivers. Across both studies the self was perceived as relatively invulnerable to influence regardless of message bias. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Majority — minority status and perceived ingroup variability revisited

Social identity theory predicts that ingroup members should see their group as more homogeneous when confronted by a large and presumably dominant outgroup. This prediction has been supported in a series of recent studies, all of which purport to show that the usual ingroup—outgroup difference in perceived variability, i.e. outgroup homogeneity, is reversed when the ingroup is in a minority position. In all of these studies, however, the ingroup—outgroup distinction has been confounded with the size of the target group judged. The present study was conducted to overcome this confound. Subjects judged both the ingroup and outgroup, under one of two different orders, and the first group judged varied in size across subjects while the size of the second group was held constant. This permitted comparisons of the perceived variability of the second judged group (be it the ingroup or outgroup) when it followed the judgment of either a larger or equal size first group. Consistent with social identity theory, ingroups were judged as less variable when judged after a large outgroup than after a small one. This was true, however, only on measures of perceived dispersion and not on measures of perceived stereotypicality. On both sorts of measures, however, overall outgroup homogeneity was found, over and above the difference due to the comparison of the ingroup with a large or small outgroup.