Reflections on Averintsev’s Method

The author represents Averintsev’s thought as a response to, and commentary on, Russia’s Silver Age, and describes his particular method of seeing and understanding. The article considers his response to the cultural context in which he worked, focusing mainly on Averintsev’s language, style and syntax, and linking it with his ideal of equilibrium. Finally, the article moves on to Averintsev’s criticism of thinking in polarities.     

Roache’s Argument against the Cohabitation View

Rebecca Roache’s recent critique of David Lewis’s “cohabitation” view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.     

Remarks on Penrose’s “New Argument”

It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas–Penrose arguments and even Penrose’s ‘new argument’ in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42] and elsewhere of this question.     

Comments on Plantinga’s Argument of Transworld Identity

Plantinga’s conception of possible worlds is problematic in one sense: it relies on the prior idea of modality. His strategy for resolving the puzzle of transworld identity is significant in the metaphysical sense but fruitless in the epistemological sense because world-indexed properties cannot be used as effectively in epistemic practice as their counterparts, i.e., space- and time-indexed properties. His isolation of transworld identification from transworld identity is unconvincing. This paper argues that the intelligibility of modal discourse and reference is the essence of transworld identity. It is also proved that transworld identification is the epistemic ground of such intelligibility. Hence, the transworld identification problem is the epistemological foundation of the transworld identity problem, and there must be a comprehensive answer to the former.     

Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self

Abstract

At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (OUP, 2014). In these remarks I suggest that Zahavi’s view of what he calls ‘The Experiential Self’ defends precisely the sorts of claims to which a Kantian account of consciousness is fundamentally opposed, and while assessing the overall merits of the two contrasting outlooks is no easy matter, I side with the Kantian view.     

Camus’s Absurd and the Argument against Suicide

There are striking differences between Camus’s early and late philosophical essays, but Camus often claimed that his works were part of one consistent project. This paper argues that, although Camus had a significant change in his views on the consequences of the absurd, throughout his life he also had a common concern with the relation of the absurd to morality. Showing this requires us to clarify what Camus meant by the “absurd,” and identify at least three different uses of the term by Camus: lacking a purpose; lacking an explanation; and a tension between purpose and purposelessness. Clarifying the meaning of “absurd” allows one to show that Camus’s late argument against suicide, often dismissed as inadequate, is valid. This also illustrates the consistency of his concerns over time.

     

Further Reflections on Sandra Lipsitz Bem’s Impact

Over 20 years since her last published new work, Sandra Lipsitz Bem’s ideas continue to inspire and influence many contemporary researchers—as reflected in the many excellent papers appearing in the two special issues of Sex Roles. In my review, I highlight how Sandra Bem was repeatedly at the vanguard of the intellectual zeitgeist that shaped the psychology of gender over the last four decades. Notably, Bem was at the forefront of second-wave feminist psychology in the 1970s. In this regard, she challenged androcentric ways of thinking about gender and sexuality. Moreover, she helped to expand our notion of gender and gender identities beyond bipolar or dichotomous models. By extension, her androgyny and gender schema theories pushed people to consider the multifaceted features of gender and sexuality. Bem heralded the benefits of greater flexibility and gender equality for children as well as adults. In addition, she was one of the first psychologists to study how language and gender divisions are intertwined. Finally, she was on the forefront of researchers addressing heterosexism and genderism. The papers appearing in the two special issues are used to illustrate each of these important contributions.     

Korsgaard’s Other Argument for Interpersonal Morality: the Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency

Christine Korsgaard’s (1996, 2009) argument for the claim that one should not only value one’s own humanity but also the humanity of all other persons, ‘the publicity of reasons argument’, has been heavily criticized and I believe rightly so. However, both in an early paper (1986) and in her most recent work (forthcoming), Korsgaard does not rely on controversial, Wittgensteinian ideas regarding the publicity of reasons, but instead she uses a different argument to justify interpersonal morality, which I will refer to as ‘the argument from the sufficiency of agency’. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether the argument from the sufficiency of agency can succeed where the publicity of reasons argument fails. I will argue that although the argument from the sufficiency of agency is potentially more promising, it fails to justify a categorical and universal principle of interpersonal morality. I argue, however, that this failure has less to do with the argument from the sufficiency of agency itself and more with Korsgaard’s specific version of it. This leaves open the possibility that other Kantian constructivist arguments from the sufficiency of agency might be more successful.     

Al-Ghazali’s Reflections on the Metaphysics of Metaphor in the Mishkāt al-Anwar

Mythological language is sometimes understood as a way of representing, by concrete imagery, more abstract notions. In this paper, we will pose some metaphysical questions about the possibility of such a representation. These questions will serve to motivate a brief tour of Mishkāt al-Anwār (Niche of Lights)—Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s commentary on the famous ayat al-nur (“verse of light”) of the Qur’an—wherein is discussed, among other things, how symbolic imagery is possible, and “the respect in which the spirits of the meanings are specified within the frames of the similitudes.”

Muller’s Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism

For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to demonstrate that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge.     

Rethinking Gibbard’s Riverboat Argument

According to the Principle of Conditional Non-Contradiction (CNC), conditionals of the form “If p, q” and “If p, not q” cannot both be true, unless p is inconsistent. This principle is widely regarded as an adequacy constraint on any semantics that attributes truth conditions to conditionals. Gibbard has presented an example of a pair of conditionals that, in the context he describes, appear to violate CNC. He concluded from this that conditionals lack truth conditions. We argue that this conclusion is rash by proposing a new diagnosis of what is going on in Gibbard’s argument. We also provide empirical evidence in support of our proposal.     

On Quine’s Translation Argument

Quine's translation argumnent figures centrally in his views on logic. The goal of this paper is to get clear on that argument. It can be interpreted as an argument to the effect that one should never translate somebody’s speech as going against a law of the translator’s logic. Key to this reading of the translation argument is the premise that one should never translate somebody's speech such that their speech is unintelligible. Ultimately, it is my aim to reject this reading. I argue that only a weaker conclusion—one that says “not most of the time” instead of the stronger “never”—should be attributed to Quine. Accordingly, I propose and defend a weaker version of the first premise that better coheres with the weaker conclusion of the translation argument. Instead of the claim that one should never translate somebody’s speech such that their speech is unintelligible I argue that we should only ascribe to Quine the claim that one should not most of the time translate somebody’s speech in a way that makes it unintelligible. I go on to  sum up the results of my discussion and respond to a criticism of my reading.

     

Concerning the resilience of Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument

Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action.     

Reflections on Kenneth Gergen’s Contributions to Family Therapy

Kenneth Gergen has made significant contributions to family therapy. This article highlights selected contributions and specifically discusses his idea of therapy as relational recovery, including the importance he places on a client??s developing relational skills that they can put into action in their everyday lives outside the therapy room. In response to this idea of therapy as relational recovery, the article presents the concept of therapy as a dialogically-structured activity in which transformation whether in meaning, understanding, thought or action is inevitable, inherent and unpredictable. Client feedback on after therapy session transformation partially illustrates this concept.     

Early Wittgenstein’s Views on Ethics: Some Reflections

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The paper undertakes an in-depth analysis of the early phase of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings in Notebooks (NB), Tractatus Logico...     

Davidson’s Phenomenological Argument Against the Cognitive Claims of Metaphor

Axiomathes - In this paper, I take a critical look at the Davidsonian argument that metaphorical sentences do not express propositions because of the phenomenological experience—seeing one...     

Some Reflections on Erikson’s Ninth Stage of Life: Introduction to the Panel on Aging

In my introduction to these three papers on the experience of aging, I begin with my observations on aging in the 9th Stage of Life (a stage added by Erik Erickson in 1984, when he himself was nearing death) by talking about my own aging, 87-year-old husband whose end of life included changes in himself that no one who knew him, including himself, would have predicted. Following these thoughts I review the excellent essays that follow, which take the perspectives of aging from both personal and professional perspectives.