Is Psychoanalytic Education Effective? Comment on Damsa et al. (2010)

While a growing body of empirical data attests increasingly to the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment, what data do we have that attests to the effectiveness of psychoanalytic education? In this comment on Damsa et al. (2010), I briefly address that question and suggest that—if we are to truly generate passionate interest in psychoanalysis among psychiatric residents and other mental health professionals in training—perhaps we need to begin by researching the largely unresearched process of psychoanalytic education and supervision.     

Cooperation or dolphin ‘tug-of-war’? Comment on Kuczaj et al. and Eskelinen et al.

Two recent papers by Kuczaj et al. (Anim Cognit 18:543–550, 2015) and Eskelinen et al. (Anim Cognit 19:789–797, 2016) claim to have demonstrated that (i) bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) cooperated to solve a novel task and (ii) vocal signals were important for coordinating these cooperative efforts. Although it is likely that bottlenose dolphins may share communicative signals in order to achieve a common goal, we suggest that this has not been demonstrated in the aforementioned studies. Here, we discuss the two main problems that preclude any definitive conclusions being drawn on cooperative task success and vocal communication from these studies. The first lies in the experimental design. The ‘cooperative task’, involving an apparatus that requires two dolphins to pull in opposite directions in order to achieve a food reward, is not conducive to cooperation, but could instead reflect a competitive ‘tug-of-war’. It is therefore of questionable use in distinguishing competitive from cooperative interactions. Second, the suggestion that the occurrence of burst-pulsed signals in this task was indicative of cooperation is disputable, as (i) this study could not determine which dolphins were actually producing the signals and (ii) this sound type is more commonly associated with aggressive signalling in dolphins. We commend the authors for investigating this exciting and topical area in animal communication and cognition, but the question of whether dolphins cooperate and communicate to solve a cooperative task remains as yet unanswered.     

Commentary on Corradi et al.’s (2019) new conception of aesthetic sensitivity: Is the ability conception dead?

Corradi et al. (British Journal of Psychology, 2019) argue that their new conception of visual aesthetic sensitivity (as responsiveness to aesthetic features in one’s preferences) presents several advantages in comparison with the current ability view of aesthetic sensitivity, usually defined as the ability to judge aesthetic stimuli in accordance with standards (The Journal of Psychology, 1964, 57 and 49). Although the measure they propose is interesting and presents advances to the field, we point to important issues. Notably, the authors conveniently base their comparison between the two conceptions on psychometric double standards, discard a century of research on aesthetic sensitivity by focusing on Eysenck’s speculations, and disguise an extension of already existing aesthetic preference tests (e.g., The Journal of Psychology, 1952, 33 and 199; Empirical Studies of the Arts, 2005, 23 and 165) as a redefinition of aesthetic sensitivity. We conclude that both aesthetic preference and aesthetic sensitivity research are legitimate objects of study, that the authors present interesting ideas to further the study of aesthetic preferences, but that their approach is not new and that its proposed renaming only adds confusion to the field.     

Critique or Misrepresentation? A Reply to Timimi et al.

In rebuttal to Timimi et al., we show that their critique is not a form of reasonable scientific debate with informed, constructive criticism, but merely a misrepresentation of the existing scientific literature on ADHD apparently designed to convince the scientifically uninformed of its nonexistence and of the misuse of medications for its management. We show their argument to be based on faulty logic, selective citation, misreprensentation of individual studies, ignorance of the vast literature on ADHD, and innuendo that maligns the integrity of scientists studying the disorder. Our original International Consensus Statement on ADHD remains untarnished by this faux critique – indeed it was intended to refute just such unsupported and unsupportable criticism that often appears in the popular media.     

Is Open‐mindedness a Moral Virtue?

Is open‐mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account of open‐mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case that open‐mindedness is a moral virtue by appealing to the notion of moral understanding. Specifically, we provide a new rationale as to why we should exercise open‐mindedness and offer several arguments to allay the concern that doing so can at times cause us to be in an epistemically and morally weaker position.     

Geographic heuristics or shortcuts to failure?: response to Snook et al.

Snook, Taylor, and Bennell, in ‘Geographic profiling: The fast, frugal, and accurate way’ (Applied Cognitive Psychology, January 2004, volume 18, pp. 105–121), suggest that by invoking two simple rules untrained individuals can perform geographic profiling tasks as accurately as sophisticated computer software. While the results are interesting in terms of geographic heuristics, the authors' reach conclusions unsupported by their data and methods. Though they claim to address ‘the ongoing debate about whether individuals can perform as well as actuarial techniques when confronted with real world, consequential decisions,’ their laboratory experiment bears little resemblance to the reality of criminal investigation. Major flaws exist with both data selection (the cases used may not have met the assumptions underlying geographic profiling, and they only involved a series of three locations, too low for pattern detection), and methods of analysis (nonlinear error was measured linearly, and computerized geographic profiling search strategies were distorted). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Orthogonal factors of mental ability? A response to Hampshire et al.

We respond to the main points raised by Hampshire et al. (2014). First, we note that the simulation study of Hampshire et al. (2012) was based on the assumption that individual differences in the capacities of the three proposed brain networks are mutually independent. However, this orthogonality cannot be assumed even if those networks are anatomically and functionally distinct. We also consider further the implications of our finding that a blended variable or task-mixing model of the structure of mental ability would require nearly every mental ability task to load on nearly every factor of mental ability. We explain that such a result is implausible and favors more parsimonious models that include a g factor.     

Scapegoating and classroom dynamics: Perspectives on the theoretical significance of social groups—Commentary on Atria et al. and Mahdavi & Smith

Mahdavi and Smith (2007 Mahdavi, D. and Smith, P. K. 2007. Individual risk factors or group dynamics? An investigation of the scapegoat hypothesis of victimization in school classes. European Journal of Development Psychology, 4: 353–371. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Atria et al. (2007 Atria, M., Strohmeier, D. and Spiel, C. 2007. The relevance of the school class as social unit for the prevalence of bullying and victimization. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4: 372–387. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) address Schuster's (1999 Schuster, B. 1999. Outsiders at school: The prevalence of bullying and its relation with social status. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 2: 175–190. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) claim that every class needs a whipping boy or scapegoat. In the present discussion, we focus on the concept of scapegoating, both as it was originally proposed by Allport (1954), and in terms of Schuster's more recent and rather narrower interpretation. We argue that social psychological approaches to scapegoating would not automatically predict that there will be a scapegoat in every class. Rather, the concept of scapegoating is broader and covers a range of social contexts and social groups. Future research on bullying and scapegoating needs to focus on a diverse range of social milieu (e.g., year groups rather than classrooms, intergroup relations outside of school) and social factors (e.g., ethnicity, gender) to identify the ways in which work on social group dynamics and relations can inform approaches to the study and prevention of bullying in schools. Researchers should also explore why some classes, schools, and societies have a greater number of scapegoats than others.     

Is scent‐enhanced memory immune to retroactive interference?

Research shows that scent enhances memory for associated information. Current debate centers around scent's immunity to “retroactive interference,” i.e., reduced memory for earlier-learned information after exposure to additional, subsequently-learned information. This paper demonstrates that scent-enhanced memory is indeed prone to retroactive interference, but that some of the information lost is restored using a scent-based retrieval cue. Two process explanations for interference effects are proposed, with the evidence providing more support for an inhibition rather than a response competition explanation. The results enhance our understanding of the encoding and retrieval of olfactory information from long-term memory, and reasons why interference occurs.     

Do people need self-esteem? Comment on Pyszczynski et al. (2004)

In spite of impressive empirical evidence consistent with aspects of terror management theory (TMT) reviewed by T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, J. Arndt, and J. Schimel (2004), several fundamental assumptions of the theory remain untested or lack support. Specifically, Pyszczynski et al. (2004) have not demonstrated that (a) people need self-esteem, (b) pursuing self-esteem is an effective means for reducing anxiety, (c) pursuing self-esteem helps people achieve their important goals, (d) having or pursuing self-esteem is the only way to deal with anxiety to achieve important goals, or (e) death is the real issue driving the pursuit of self-esteem. The authors suggest there is a different paradigm for thinking about death, one in which awareness of one's mortality serves as a precious reminder of the limited time one has to accomplish one's most important goals. All of these questions can be addressed with empirical research.