Delay discounting of different outcomes: Review and theory

Steep delay discounting is characterized by a preference for small immediate outcomes relative to larger delayed outcomes and is predictive of drug abuse, risky sexual behaviors, and other maladaptive behaviors. Nancy M. Petry was a pioneer in delay discounting research who demonstrated that people discount delayed monetary gains less steeply than they discount substances with abuse liability. Subsequent research found steep discounting for not only drugs, but other nonmonetary outcomes such as food, sex, and health. In this systematic review, we evaluate the hypotheses proposed to explain differences in discounting as a function of the type of outcome and explore the trait- and state-like nature of delay discounting. We found overwhelming evidence for the state-like quality of delay discounting: Consistent with Petry and others' work, nonmonetary outcomes are discounted more steeply than monetary outcomes. We propose two hypotheses that together may account for this effect: Decreasing Future Preference and Decreasing Future Worth. We also found clear evidence that delay discounting has trait-like qualities: People who steeply discount monetary outcomes steeply discount nonmonetary outcomes as well. The implication is that changing delay discounting for one outcome could change discounting for other outcomes.     

Delay discounting as emotional processing: An electrophysiological study

Both theoretical models and functional imaging studies implicate the involvement of emotions within the delay discounting process. However, defining this role has been difficult to establish with neuroimaging techniques given the automaticity of emotional responses. To address this, the current study examined electrophysiological correlates involved in the detection and evaluation of immediate and delayed monetary outcomes. Our results showed that modulation of both early and later ERP components previously associated with affective stimuli processing are sensitive to the signalling of delayed rewards. Together with behavioural reaction times that favoured immediacy, we demonstrated, for the first time, that time delays modify the incentive value of monetary rewards via mechanisms of emotional bias and selective visual attention. Furthermore, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that delayed and thus intangible rewards are perceived less saliently, and rely on emotion as a common currency within decision making. This study provides a new approach to delay discounting and highlights a potential novel route through which delay discounting may be investigated.     

ALTERING THE MAGNITUDE OF DELAY DISCOUNTING BY PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLERS

The present study explored the delay discounting of future and past monetary rewards by pathological gamblers. Using a multiple baseline design, following repeated exposure to choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed consequences, participants completed a relational responding task that attempted to alter the psychological functions of irrelevant stimuli and to affect subsequent delay discounting. Results support previous literature on the discounting of delayed consequences by pathological gamblers, illustrate that the discounting of past rewards occurs in a similar fashion to the well‐documented literature on the discounting of future rewards, and that magnitude of discounting can be altered.     

Age‐related differences in delay discounting: Immediate reward,reward magnitude,and social influence

Delay discounting refers to the tendency of individuals to subjectively devalue rewards that are to be received in the future, with high rates of delay discounting being associated with a variety of maladaptive life outcomes (e.g., unhealthy dietary and exercise behaviors). The current study explored the psychological and social processes involved in adult age‐related differences in delay discounting of monetary rewards. Younger adults exhibited higher levels of delay discounting than older adults. This increased level of patience in older adults was found whether smaller‐sooner rewards were to be received immediately or in the future. However, there was an interaction with reward magnitude, whereby younger adults exhibited higher levels of delay discounting for smaller reward magnitudes but not larger reward magnitudes. Social influence on delay discounting was investigated by having participants complete three phases of the delay‐discounting task: an individual precollaboration phase, a collaboration phase in age‐group‐matched dyads, and an individual postcollaboration phase. A convergence effect was observed in that dyad members' postcollaboration choices were significantly more similar compared to their baseline choices during the precollaboration phase. Moreover, levels of convergence were comparable between younger and older adults, suggesting age invariance in social influence on delay discounting. The current results demonstrate a degree of malleability in delay discounting that extends into older adulthood, making interventions targeting the construct a promising avenue for future research.     

海洛因延迟强化物超快速折扣倾向的心理机制

以124名处于不同戒除时相的男性海洛因戒除者为被试, 采用金钱和海洛因延迟折扣任务(DDT), 并以基于线索暴露的渴求感测量为效度指标, 探讨了该类人群对海洛因延迟强化超快速折扣倾向及其心理机制。结果发现: (1) 相对于金钱延迟强化, 戒除者对海洛因延迟强化表现出显著的超快速折扣倾向, 且该倾向不随戒除期的延长而改变; (2) 戒除者对海洛因延迟强化的超快速折扣行为可能是其冲动性特质与海洛因相关线索共同作用的结果, 海洛因相对于金钱折扣率的增量部分可能反映了海洛因及其相关线索对该类人群主观渴求感的诱发效应。     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARDS:

Abstract— In this study, children, young adults, and older adults chose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards The amount of the delayed reward was held constant while its delay was varied All three age groups showed delay discounting, that is, the amount of an immediate reward judged to be of equal value to the delayed reward decreased as a function of delay The rate of discounting was highest for children and lowest for older adults, predicting a life-span developmental trend toward increased selfcontrol Discounting of delayed rewards by all three age groups was well described by a single function with agesensitive parameters (all R²s>94) Thus, even though there are quantitative age differences in delay discounting, the existence of an age-invanant form of discount function suggests that the process of choosing between rewards of different amounts and delays is qualitatively similar across the life span     

Asymmetry of the group context effect on delay discounting

Binary choice delay discounting tasks require participants to indicate preference between smaller, immediate, and larger, delayed rewards. Previous research indicates that when the delayed reward is shared with others, the delayed outcome is preferred compared with when the outcomes are for the self only, resulting in lower rates of delay discounting. The present series of studies sought to replicate and extend this finding. Study 1 compared delay discounting on a standard task in which both immediate and delayed outcomes are for the self and a group context task where the delayed outcome was shared with one other person. Replicating previous results, group context resulted in lower rates of delay discounting, and this effect was independent of how the shared outcome was presented. Study 2 compared delay discounting on a standard task and a group context task where the immediate outcome was shared. In contrast to Study 1, group context resulted in higher rates of delay discounting, suggesting that preference in intertemporal choice tracks the shared outcome. Moreover, this effect was not independent of how the shared outcome was presented. This is the first study to reveal that group context, when applied to the immediate outcome, can result in higher rates of delay discounting.     

Impulsive decision making and working memory

Decision making that favors short-term over long-term consequences of action, defined as impulsive or temporally myopic, may be related to individual differences in the executive functions of working memory (WM). In the first 2 experiments, participants made delay discounting (DD) judgments under different WM load conditions. In a 3rd experiment, participants high or low on standardized measures of imupulsiveness and dysexecutive function were asked to make DD judgments. A final experiment examined WM load effects on DD when monetary rewards were real rather than hypothetical. The results showed that higher WM load led to greater discounting of delayed monetary rewards. Further, a strong direct relation was found between measures of impulsiveness, dysexecutive function,and discounting of delayed rewards. Thus, limits on WM function, either intrinsic or extrinsic, are predictive of a more impulsive decision-making style.     

Impulsivity in borderline personality disorder: reward-based decision-making and its relationship to emotional distress

Impulsivity in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) has been defined as rapid and unplanned action. However, a preference for immediate gratification and discounting of delayed rewards might better account for the impulsive behaviors that appear to regulate emotional distress in BPD. To investigate this, a delay discounting task was administered to 30 outpatients diagnosed with BPD and 28 healthy community controls (all aged 15-24) before and after a mood induction. Trait impulsivity was measured with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. The results showed that the BPD group had a greater preference for immediate gratification and higher rate of discounting the delayed reward than the control group. Although the mood induction resulted in increased feelings of rejection and anger in all participants, and the rate of delay discounting changed significantly in the control group, the rate of discounting did not change for the BPD group. There was no evidence of rapid decision-making in the BPD group as response times were similar between the two groups during both trials. Finally, greater general impulsiveness and nonplanning impulsiveness were associated with greater rates of discounting in the BPD group. Together these findings suggest that BPD is characterized by a preference for immediate gratification and tendency to discount longer-term rewards. This characteristic appears to exist independent of feelings of rejection and anger, rather than being reactive to this, and to be related to trait impulsivity.     

Effects of reward magnitude frames on measures of delay discounting in a hypothetical money scenario

The current study analyzed the effects of three frames of reward magnitude—quantity, volume, and duration—on the rate at which college students discounted hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Hypothetical scenarios were presented using the fill-in-the-blank discounting questionnaire and participants made choices between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards. Scenarios framed the monetary choices as (a) quantity of dollar bills, (b) height (inches) of a stack of dollar bills, and (c) duration of time spent in a hypothetical cash machine to collect dollar bills. For each scenario, participants' subjective values were used to calculate the area under the curve (AuC). Framing resulted in a moderate effect size: The duration frame yielded significantly smaller AuC values compared to the quantity and volume frames. Thus, the framing of reward magnitude was a significant variable in controlling discounting rates for hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Subsequent investigations should be aware of the independent effects of the reward magnitude frames on delay discounting rates.     

Now for Me,Later for Us? Effects of Group Context on Temporal Discounting

Delayed rewards are less valuable than immediate rewards. This well‐established finding has focused almost entirely on individual outcomes. However, are delayed rewards similarly discounted if they are shared by a group? The current article reports on three experiments exploring the effect of group context on delay discounting. Results indicate that discount rates of individual and group rewards were highly correlated, but that respondents were more willing to wait (decreased discounting) for shared outcomes than for individual outcomes. An explanatory model is proposed suggesting that decreased discount rates in group contexts may be due to the way the effects of both delay and social discounting are combined. That is, in a group context, a person values both a future reward (discounted by delay) and a present reward to another person (discounted by the social distance between them). The results are explained by a combined discount function containing a delay factor and a factor representing the social distance between the decision maker and group members. Practical implications of the fact that shared consequences can increase individual self‐control are also discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discounting of monetary and directly consumable rewards

We compared temporal and probability discounting of a nonconsumable reward (money) and three directly consumable rewards (candy, soda, and beer). When rewards were delayed, monetary rewards were discounted less steeply than directly consumable rewards, all three of which were discounted at equivalent rates. When rewards were probabilistic, however, there was no difference between the discounting of monetary and directly consumable rewards. It has been reported that substance abusers discount delayed drug rewards more steeply than delayed money, but this difference may reflect special characteristics of drugs or drug abusers, or it may reflect a general property of consumable rewards. The present findings suggest that abused substances (like beer) share the properties of other directly consumable rewards, whereas delayed monetary rewards are special because they are fungible, generalized (conditioned) reinforcers.     

Temporal discounting predicts student responsiveness to exchange delays in a classroom token system

Typical assessments of temporal discounting involve presenting choices between hypothetical monetary outcomes. Participants choose between smaller immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards to determine how the passage of time affects the subjective value of reinforcement. Few studies, however, have compared such discounting to actual manipulations of reward delay. The present study examined the predictive validity of a temporal discounting procedure developed for use with children. Forty-six sixth-grade students completed a brief discounting assessment and were then exposed to a classwide intervention that involved both immediate and delayed reinforcement in a multiple baseline design across classrooms. The parameters derived from two hyperbolic models of discounting correlated significantly with actual on-task behavior under conditions of immediate and delayed exchange. Implications of temporal discounting assessments for behavioral assessment and treatment are discussed.     

The need of young adults to text now: Using delay discounting to assess informational choice

This study examined the value of responding immediately to a text or call and the ability to wait. The willingness to delay texting or calling for a larger monetary reward was compared with delay tolerance for monetary rewards alone. The results of two experiments showed no differences in the qualitative shape of the delay discounting functions, indicating a similar decision-making process for informational (texting or calling) and monetary decisions. Data in the second experiment showed that the degree of delay tolerance varied as a function of the social distance of the texting partner, indicating a strategic decision-making process in informational decisions. However, the time course of loss of value for informational versus monetary rewards revealed substantial quantitative differences. While money loses value on the time span of weeks, information loses value within minutes, which may explain why behaviors like texting often occur in inappropriate situations and may seem like addictions.     

Delay discounting of monetary gains and losses in adolescents with ADHD: Contribution of delay aversion to choice

Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.     

Impulsive choice and pre‐exposure to delays: iv. effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training relative to maturational changes in impulsivity

Impulsive choice describes preference for smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later rewards. Excessive delay discounting (i.e., rapid devaluation of delayed rewards) underlies some impulsive choices, and is observed in many maladaptive behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, gambling). Interventions designed to reduce delay discounting may provide therapeutic gains. One such intervention provides rats with extended training with delayed reinforcers. When compared to a group given extended training with immediate reinforcers, delay‐exposed rats make significantly fewer impulsive choices. To what extent is this difference due to delay‐exposure training shifting preference toward self‐control or immediacy‐exposure training (the putative control group) shifting preference toward impulsivity? The current study compared the effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training to a no‐training control group and evaluated within‐subject changes in impulsive choice across 51 male Wistar rats. Delay‐exposed rats made significantly fewer impulsive choices than immediacy‐exposed and control rats. Between‐group differences in impulsive choice were not observed in the latter two groups. While delay‐exposed rats showed large, significant pre‐ to posttraining reductions in impulsive choice, immediacy‐exposed and control rats showed small reductions in impulsive choice. These results suggest that extended training with delayed reinforcers reduces impulsive choice, and that extended training with immediate reinforcers does not increase impulsive choice.     

Comparing rapid assessments of delay discounting with real and hypothetical rewards in children

Recent advances in assessment methodology have resulted in a highly efficient procedure for obtaining delay discounting rates for adults: a 5‐trial adjusting delay task (ADT‐5) examining intertemporal choice for hypothetical rewards. The low participant burden of this task makes it potentially useful for children, with whom delay discounting research is relatively limited. However, it is unknown whether results from this task match choice for real rewards. The present study assessed delay discounting for real and hypothetical monetary rewards using a modified ADT‐5 with 9 children admitted to a psychiatric day treatment program. Participants completed up to 3 tasks with each reward type in alternating order. No difference in discounting rate, via log(k), was observed between the first task of each reward type. This finding was replicated across subsequent tasks for the subset of participants (n = 6) who completed all 6 tasks. However, delay discounting of real and hypothetical rewards was not found to be statistically equivalent. These results suggest that a modified ADT‐5 using hypothetical rewards may be a viable option for assessing delay discounting in children with psychiatric diagnoses, but additional research is needed to explicitly examine whether hypothetical and real rewards are discounted equivalently in this population.     

Modeling the effect of reward amount on probability discounting

The present study with college students examined the effect of amount on the discounting of probabilistic monetary rewards. A hyperboloid function accurately described the discounting of hypothetical rewards ranging in amount from $20 to $10,000,000. The degree of discounting increased continuously with amount of probabilistic reward. This effect of amount was not due to changes in the rate parameter of the discounting function, but rather was due to increases in the exponent. These results stand in contrast to those observed with the discounting of delayed monetary rewards, in which the degree of discounting decreases with reward amount due to amount-dependent decreases in the rate parameter. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that delay and probability discounting reflect different underlying mechanisms. That is, the fact that the exponent in the delay discounting function is independent of amount is consistent with a psychophysical scaling interpretation, whereas the finding that the exponent of the probability-discounting function is amount-dependent is inconsistent with such an interpretation. Instead, the present results are consistent with the idea that the probability-discounting function is itself the product of a value function and a weighting function. This idea was first suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), although their prospect theory does not predict amount effects like those observed. The effect of amount on probability discounting was parsimoniously incorporated into our hyperboloid discounting function by assuming that the exponent was proportional to the amount raised to a power. The amount-dependent exponent of the probability-discounting function may be viewed as reflecting the effect of amount on the weighting of the probability with which the reward will be received.     

The Effects of Social Status and Culture on Delay Discounting

People generally tend to discount future outcomes in favor of smaller but immediate gains (i.e., delay discounting). This study examines the hypothesis that culture and social status moderate this tendency, as well as the alternative hypothesis that social status and culture influence delay discounting independently of each other. American and Japanese adults were asked to choose receiving hypothetical monetary rewards either immediately or receiving rewards of different amounts with a delay of 1 year. The results replicated previous findings and supported the alternative hypothesis. Delay discounting was lower when subjective socioeconomic status (i.e., an individual’s perception of her or his social rank) was higher. Also, the Japanese were less likely to discount future rewards than the Americans. However, there was no interaction between social status and culture in influencing the rates of delay discounting.     

The absence of numbers to express the amount may affect delay discounting with humans

Human delay discounting is usually studied with experimental protocols that use symbols to express delay and amount. In order to further understand discounting, we evaluated whether the absence of numbers to represent reward amounts affects discount rate in general, and whether the magnitude effect is generalized to nonsymbolic situations in particular. In Experiment 1, human participants were exposed to a delay‐discounting task in which rewards were presented using dots to represent monetary rewards (nonsymbolic); under this condition the magnitude effect did not occur. Nevertheless, the magnitude effect was observed when equivalent reward amounts were presented using numbers (symbolic). Moreover, in estimation tasks, magnitude increments produced underestimation of large amounts. In Experiment 2, participants were exposed only to the nonsymbolic discounting task and were required to estimate reward amounts in each trial. Consistent with Experiment 1, the absence of numbers representing reward amounts produced similar discount rates of small and large rewards. These results suggest that value of nonsymbolic rewards is a nonlinear function of amount and that value attribution depends on perceived difference between the immediate and the delayed nonsymbolic rewards.