Why We Are Still Not Cognitive Psychologists: A Review of Why I Am Not A Cognitive Psychologist: A Tribute to B. F. Skinner

Any instructor of behavior analysis is no doubt aware that neuroscience, characterized by a cognitive–mentalistic approach, has substantial influence in behavioral science. As a counterpoint, behavior analysis can raise timely questions and promote critical thinking, as did Skinner (1977) in his critical analysis of cognitive psychology. Keenan and Dillenburger (2004) have produced a CD-ROM with effective audio-visual presentations to aid in the teaching of behavior analysis and in critiquing reductionistic mentalism.     

Behavior analysis, mentalism, and the path to social justice

Traditional psychology is mentalistic in the sense that it appeals to inner causes in the explanation of behavior. Two examples of mentalism in traditional psychology are (a) dispositional attributions and (b) conventional treatments of intelligence. These examples may be linked to such pernicious social -isms as racism and sexism by noting that some individuals justify engaging in discriminatory conduct toward others by appealing to some deficient inner quality of those being discriminated against. This sort of mentalistic appeal ultimately prevents some members of our society from being integrated into society and from progressing down the path of social justice. Behavior analysis offers a constructional alternative to the mentalistic views of traditional psychology and allows our society as a whole to move down the path.     

What is Radical Behaviorism? A Review of Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

B. F. Skinner founded both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis. His founding innovations included: a versatile preparation for studying behavior; explicating the generic nature of stimulus and response; a pragmatic criterion for defining behavioral units; response rate as a datum; the concept of stimulus control; the concept of verbal behavior; and explicating the explanatory power of contingencies. Besides these achievements, however, Skinner also made some mistakes. Subsequent developments in radical behaviorist thought have attempted to remedy these mistakes. Moore's book presents a “party line” version of radical behaviorism. It focuses narrowly on a few of Skinner's concepts (mostly mentalism and verbal behavior) and contains no criticism of his mistakes. In fact, Moore adds a few mistakes of his own manufacture; for example, he insists that the mental realm does not exist—an unprovable and distracting assertion. The book's portrayal of behavior analysis would have been current around 1960; it mentions almost none of the developments since then. It also includes almost no developments in radical behaviorism since Skinner. Moore's book would give an unwary reader a highly distorted picture of contemporary behavior analysis and radical behaviorism.     

Where have all the behaviorists gone?

Many of the world's current problems are the result of behavior, and traditional appeals to mental determinants are again proving inadequate. The time for a behavioristic alternative appears ripe, yet many behaviorists seem to be becoming less behavioristic and more mentalistic. When confronted with the complexity of human behavior many are resorting to the intellectual comfort and safety of mentalism. A recent example of this tendency (Schwartz et al, 1978) is presented and discussed. Additionally, speculations regarding the origins of the resurgence of mentalism are presented, and it is proposed that arranging histories which provide for more rigorous and lasting control of verbal behavior about behavior may serve to improve the situation.     

Nurturing behavioral repertoires within a nonsupportive environment

Recent articles have expressed concern over the increasing retreat to mentalism among behaviorists. The problem has been described elsewhere as a shift in verbal behavior resulting from the contingencies imposed by mentalistic verbal communities. Previous solutions have focused on strengthening our behavioral graduate programs to make the graduates' verbal repertoires more resistant to change. We suggest it is useful to analyze the problem in terms of inappropriate audience control and offer an approach by which behaviorists may assemble audiences to maintain their behavioral verbal repertoires within mentalistic verbal communities.     

Mentalism, behavior-behavior relations, and a behavior-analytic view of the purposes of science

In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain philosophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an issue of behavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanistically, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts common in the behavioral community share some of the dangers of mentalism if not employed properly, including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules.     

Does Counseling Need the Mind?

In this article, the author argues that the language used in counseling practice is largely a common sense language using mentalistic words. Basic mentalistic assumptions and challenges to those assumptions are outlined. The practical consequences of retaining or discarding mentalism in counseling are discussed. The author concludes that mentalistic language persists in counseling practice because it offers a useful vocabulary, but that the counseling field could benefit from adopting a path similar to that used in the cognitive sciences.     

Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative?

Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism.     

Looking for Skinner and finding Freud

Sigmund Freud and B. F. Skinner are often seen as psychology's polar opposites. It seems this view is fallacious. Indeed, Freud and Skinner had many things in common, including basic assumptions shaped by positivism and determinism. More important, Skinner took a clear interest in psychoanalysis and wanted to be analyzed but was turned down. His views were influenced by Freud in many areas, such as dream symbolism, metaphor use, and defense mechanisms. Skinner drew direct parallels to Freud in his analyses of conscious versus unconscious control of behavior and of selection by consequences. He agreed with Freud regarding aspects of methodology and analyses of civilization. In his writings on human behavior, Skinner cited Freud more than any other author, and there is much clear evidence of Freud's impact on Skinner's thinking.     

Behaviorism, private events, and the molar view of behavior

Viewing the science of behavior (behavior analysis) to be a natural science, radical behaviorism rejects any form of dualism, including subjective-objective or inner-outer dualism. Yet radical behaviorists often claim that treating private events as covert behavior and internal stimuli is necessary and important to behavior analysis. To the contrary, this paper argues that, compared with the rejection of dualism, private events constitute a trivial idea and are irrelevant to accounts of behavior. Viewed in the framework of evolutionary theory or for any practical purpose, behavior is commerce with the environment. By its very nature, behavior is extended in time. The temptation to posit private events arises when an activity is viewed in too small a time frame, obscuring what the activity does. When activities are viewed in an appropriately extended time frame, private events become irrelevant to the account. This insight provides the answer to many philosophical questions about thinking, sensing, and feeling. Confusion about private events arises in large part from failure to appreciate fully the radical implications of replacing mentalistic ideas about language with the concept of verbal behavior. Like other operant behavior, verbal behavior involves no agent and no hidden causes; like all natural events, it is caused by other natural events. In a science of behavior grounded in evolutionary theory, the same set of principles applies to verbal and nonverbal behavior and to human and nonhuman organisms.     

A model of communicative perspective-taking for typical and atypical populations of children

Successful communication requires that individuals attend to the perspective of their conversational partners and use this information to modify their behavior accordingly. This paper presents a framework by which to understand children’s communicative perspective-taking skills and, within this framework, outlines three routes by which children’s communicative perspective-taking performance can be disrupted. First, children may have difficulty in communicative contexts due to deficits in mentalizing ability whereby they are unable to appreciate another’s perspective. Second, children may have intact mentalizing abilities but do not have the cognitive skills to support the use of this information when generating communicative behaviors. Third, decreased social exposure may lead to exacerbated deficits in either mentalizing ability or the use of mentalistic information within communicative contexts. Patterns within both typical and atypical populations (i.e., autism, ADHD, and mood disorders) are reviewed.     

A self-interpretive behavior analysis.

Although it rejects self-awareness as psychological bedrock, behavior-analytic theory can be stated self-inclusively, keeping the theorist within view. Its principles of discrimination and generalization have been elaborated to include concepts and higher order conditionalities, including those of logic and of awareness. Its violating a cultural bias that is called the "fundamental attribution error" may be a primary source of controversies. Its other disagreements with mainstream psychologies hinge more on contiguous versus remote causation than on mentalism versus antimentalism, which Skinner emphasized. The nonmediational, Skinnerian theorist is a participation in the world rather than an isolated self.     

Jacques Loeb, B. F. Skinner, and the legacy of prediction and control

The biologist Jacques Loeb is an important figure in the history of behavior analysis. Between 1890 and 1915, Loeb championed an approach to experimental biology that would later exert substantial influence on the work of B. F. Skinner and behavior analysis. This paper examines some of these sources of influence, with a particular emphasis on Loeb's firm commitment to prediction and control as fundamental goals of an experimental life science, and how these goals were extended and broadened by Skinner. Both Loeb and Skinner adopted a pragmatic approach to science that put practical control of their subject matter above formal theory testing, both based their research programs on analyses of reproducible units involving the intact organism, and both strongly endorsed technological applications of basic laboratory science. For Loeb, but especially for Skinner, control came to mean something more than mere experimental or technological control for its own sake; it became synonomous with scientific understanding. This view follows from (a) the successful working model of science Loeb and Skinner inherited from Ernst Mach, in which science is viewed as human social activity, and effective practical action is taken as the basis of scientific knowledge, and (b) Skinner's analysis of scientific activity, situated in the world of direct experience and related to practices arranged by scientific verbal communities. From this perspective, prediction and control are human acts that arise from and are maintained by social circumstances in which such acts meet with effective consequences.     

Artificial intelligence and animal psychology: A response to Boden, Margolis and Sloman

We propose the elements of an epistemological framework in which to situate the fundamental problem of ascribing mentalistic concepts to animals and machines that is posed by Margaret Boden's, Aaron Sloman's and Joseph Margolis' discussion of artificial intelligence and animal psychology.     

ALIVE AND KICKING: A REVIEW OF HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORISM,EDITED BY WILLIAM O'DONOHUE AND RICHARD KITCHENER

Behaviorists have struggled and continue to struggle with basic questions about behavior, such as how to define behavior, how to talk about behavior in relation to environment, and what constitutes an adequate explanation of behavior. Skinner made huge progress on these questions, because of his emphasis on the generic character of stimuli and responses, his advocacy of rate as a datum, his introduction of stimulus control, and his reliance on selection by consequences as a mode of explanation. By no means, however, did he provide final answers. In particular, Skinner fell short because he never escaped from the limitations imposed by thinking in terms of contiguity and discrete events and because he never specified a useful role for theory. The 14 chapters in this book offer varying degrees of clarity on the ways in which behaviorists and behaviorally oriented philosophers dealt with basic questions in the past and are dealing with them in the present, post‐Skinner. They are reviewed individually, because they are uneven in quality. Overall, the book is a useful tool for gaining historical and philosophical background to behaviorism and for getting some idea of behaviorists' current directions.