Auditory awareness negativity is an electrophysiological correlate of awareness in an auditory threshold task

One theory of visual awareness proposes that electrophysiological activity related to awareness occurs in primary visual areas approximately 200 ms after stimulus onset (visual awareness negativity: VAN) and in fronto-parietal areas about 300 ms after stimulus onset (late positivity: LP). Although similar processes might be involved in auditory awareness, only sparse evidence exists for this idea. In the present study, we recorded electrophysiological activity while subjects listened to tones that were presented at their own awareness threshold. The difference in electrophysiological activity elicited by tones that subjects reported being aware of versus unaware of showed an early negativity about 200 ms and a late positivity about 300 ms after stimulus onset. These results closely match those found in vision and provide convincing evidence for an early negativity (auditory awareness negativity: AAN), as well as an LP. These findings suggest that theories of visual awareness are also applicable to auditory awareness.     

Visual awareness negativity is an early neural correlate of awareness: A preregistered study with two Gabor sizes

Electrophysiological recordings are commonly used to study the neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Previous research is inconsistent as to whether awareness can be indexed with visual awareness negativity (VAN) at about 200 ms or if it occurs later. The present study was preregistered with two main aims: First, to provide independent evidence for or against the presence of VAN, and second, to study whether stimulus size may account for the inconsistent findings. Subjects were shown low-contrast Gaussian filtered gratings (Gabor patches) in the four visual quadrants. Gabor size (large and small) was varied in different sessions and calibrated to each subject’s threshold of visual awareness. Event-related potentials were derived from trials in which subjects localized the Gabors correctly to capture the difference between trials in which they reported awareness versus no awareness. Bayesian analyses revealed very strong evidence for the presence of VAN for both Gabor sizes. However, there was no evidence for or against an effect of stimulus size. The present findings provide evidence for VAN as an early neural correlate of awareness.     

Afterimages: a tool for defining the neural correlate of visual consciousness

Our visual system not only mediates information about the visual environment but is capable of generating pictures of nonexistent worlds: afterimages, illusions, phosphenes, etc. We are "aware" of these pictures just as we are aware of the images of natural, physical objects. This raises the question: is the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) of such images the same as that of images of physical objects? Images of natural objects have some properties in common with afterimages (e.g., stability of verticality) but there are also obvious differences (e.g., images maintain size constancy, whereas afterimages follow Emmert's Law: when seen while screens at different distances are observed, an afterimage looks larger, the greater the distance of the screen). The differences can be explained by differences in the retinal extent of images and afterimages, which favors the view that both have the same NCC. It seems reasonable to assume that before neural activity can produce awareness, all the computations necessary for a veridical representation of, e.g., an object, must be completed within the neural substrate and that information characteristic of a particular object must be available within the NCC. Given these assumptions, it can be shown that no retinotopic (in a strict sense) cortical areas can serve as the NCC, although some type of topographic representation is necessary. It seems also to be unlikely that neurons classified as cardinal cells alone can serve as NCC.     

Balancing awareness: Vestibular signals modulate visual consciousness in the absence of awareness

The processing of visual and vestibular information is crucial for perceiving self-motion. Visual cues, such as optic flow, have been shown to induce and alter vestibular percepts, yet the role of vestibular information in shaping visual awareness remains unclear. Here we investigated if vestibular signals influence the access to awareness of invisible visual signals. Using natural vestibular stimulation (passive yaw rotations) on a vestibular self-motion platform, and optic flow masked through continuous flash suppression (CFS) we tested if congruent visual–vestibular information would break interocular suppression more rapidly than incongruent information. We found that when the unseen optic flow was congruent with the vestibular signals perceptual suppression as quantified with the CFS paradigm was broken more rapidly than when it was incongruent. We argue that vestibular signals impact the formation of visual awareness through enhanced access to awareness for congruent multisensory stimulation.     

Streams and consciousness: visual awareness and the brain

Vision is our most powerful sense and, arguably, it gives us our most vivid sensory and imaginal experiences. It is also one of the best understood systems in contemporary neuroscience. Yet, contrary to both traditional assumptions and our phenomenological intuition, recent research has shown that vision is not a monolithic system that creates a single general-purpose representation in the brain. For example, selective brain damage can compromise visuomotor control while leaving perception intact, and damage elsewhere can compromise visual perception while leaving visuomotor control intact. Thus, it is becoming apparent that we have two (largely) separate visual systems. One of them is dedicated to the rapid and accurate guidance of our movements: it is a complex and powerful system, and yet it lies outside the realm of our conscious visual awareness. The other seems to provide our perceptual phenomenology, although its primary purpose is probably to provide suitably coded visual inputs for storage in and retrieval from memory. According to this conceptualization, both systems can be seen as serving our behaviour, but each does so on a different time scale. Recent studies suggest that neuropsychological research in humans can play a central role in bridging the gap between neurobiological studies of the monkey's visual system and the search to narrow down the brain mechanisms that mediate our visual awareness.     

A neural correlate of consciousness related to repression

In previous research Libet (1966) discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for neural activation of consciousness, suggesting the possibility that this neurophysiological time factor is a necessary condition for the development of repression.     

Duration of auditory sensory memory in parents of children with SLI: a mismatch negativity study

In a previous behavioral study, we showed that parents of children with SLI had a subclinical deficit in phonological short-term memory. Here, we tested the hypothesis that they also have a deficit in nonverbal auditory sensory memory. We measured auditory sensory memory using a paradigm involving an electrophysiological component called the mismatch negativity (MMN). The MMN is a measure of the brain's ability to detect a difference between a frequent standard stimulus (1000 Hz tone) and a rare deviant one (1200 Hz tone). Memory effects were assessed by varying the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) between the standard and deviant. We predicted that parents of children with SLI would have a smaller MMN than parents of typically developing children at a long ISI (3000 ms), but not at a short one (800 ms). This was broadly confirmed. However, individual differences in MMN amplitude did not correlate with measures of phonological short-term memory. Attenuation of MMN amplitude at the longer ISI thus did not provide unambiguous support for the hypothesis of a reduced auditory sensory memory in parents of affected children. We conclude by reviewing possible explanations for the observed group effects.     

Change in dexterity with sensory awareness training: a randomised controlled trial

The role of sensory awareness in movement control is receiving increasing interest in sports and clinical literature as a feed-forward and feedback mechanism. The aim of the study was to assess the feasibility and effect of training in sensory awareness on dexterity in healthy adults. 29 healthy students were randomly allocated to a single-group, sensory awareness lesson with the dominant hand, the same lesson with the nondominant hand, or to a sham control group. Dexterity measures included the Purdue Pegboard Test, a grip-lift manipulandum, and perceived changes using a questionnaire. The sensory awareness lesson with the dominant hand produced a statistically significant improvement in mean dexterity compared to the control group, but not between the other two pairs of groups. The sensory awareness training paradigm is feasible and a single session improved dexterity in healthy adults.     

Perceptual awareness and categorical representation of faces: evidence from masked priming

How internal categories influence how we perceive the world is a fundamental question in cognitive sciences. Yet, the relation between perceptual awareness and perceptual categorization has remained largely uncovered so far. Here, we addressed this question by focusing on face perception during subliminal and conscious perception. We used morphed continua between two face identities and we assessed, through a masked priming paradigm, the perceptual processing of these morphed faces under subliminal and supraliminal conditions. We found that priming from subliminal faces followed linearly the information present in the primes, while priming from visible faces revealed a non-linear profile, indicating a categorical processing of face identities. Our results thus point to a special relation between perceptual awareness and categorical processing of faces, and support the dissociation between two modes of information processing: a subliminal mode involving analog treatment of stimuli information, and a supraliminal mode relying on discrete representation.     

Perceptual processing affects the reactivation of a sensory dimension during a categorization task

According to grounded theories of cognition, knowledge is grounded in its sensory-motor features. Therefore, perceptual and conceptual processing should be based on the same distributed system so that conceptual and perceptual processes should interact. The present study assesses whether gustatory stimulation (participants tasted a sweet or a nonsweet yoghurt) could influence performance on a categorization task that involves the reactivation of the same sensory dimension. The results indicate that participants were slower (Experiment 1) or faster (Experiment 2), respectively, at categorizing pictures as representing edible sweet stimuli when they either simultaneously or had previously tasted a sweet yoghurt as compared to a nonsweet yoghurt. These results confirm the significant overlap between perceptual and memory mechanisms and suggest the functional equivalence between perceptually present and perceptually absent (memory reactivated) dimensions.     

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), face is what we might call "the why question": why would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the cross-order integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the "general shape" of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations.     

Simulating consciousness in a bilateral neural network: "nuclear" and "fringe" awareness

A technique for the bilateral activation of neural nets that leads to a functional asymmetry of two simulated "cerebral hemispheres" is described. The simulation is designed to perform object recognition, while exhibiting characteristics typical of human consciousness-specifically, the unitary nature of conscious attention, together with a dual awareness corresponding to the "nucleus" and "fringe" described by William James (1890). Sensory neural nets self-organize on the basis of five sensory features. The system is then taught arbitrary symbolic labels for a small number of similar stimuli. Finally, the trained network is exposed to nonverbal stimuli for object recognition, leading to Gaussian activation of the "sensory" maps-with a peak at the location most closely related to the features of the external stimulus. "Verbal" maps are activated most strongly at the labeled location that lies closest to the peak on homologous sensory maps. On the verbal maps activation is characterized by both excitatory and inhibitory Gaussians (a Mexican hat), the parameters of which are determined by the relative locations of the verbal labels. Mutual homotopic inhibition across the "corpus callosum" then produces functional cerebral asymmetries, i.e., complementary activation of homologous "association" and "frontal" maps within a common focus of attention-a nucleus in the left hemisphere and a fringe in the right hemisphere. An object is recognized as corresponding to a known label when the total activation of both hemispheres (nucleus plus fringe) is strongest for that label. The functional dualities of the cerebral hemispheres are discussed in light of the nucleus/fringe asymmetry.     

Measuring consciousness: task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity (thus obtaining an accuracy and an awareness curve) as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff (2007). The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness to change proportionally as much as accuracy and the slopes of the curves are used to assess how fast accuracy and awareness increases and whether awareness is dichotomous. The method is successfully employed to assess consciousness characteristics on data from four different awareness scales.     

多目标觉知范式检验视觉意识容量

采用一种新的多目标觉知范式检验视觉意识容量。实验中首先迅速呈现包含8个刺激的圆形阵列（刺激位置随机分布）,然后所有刺激被灰色的圆覆盖,并随机选取阵列中的一个刺激作为目标,要求被试用尽可能少的点击次数找到目标。结果发现,即使被试不能一次击中目标,其也可能拥有对目标不精确的视觉信息。这些不精确的视觉信息能够帮助被试用更少的点击次数和更短的点击距离找到目标,且被试对这些不精确的视觉信息是有意识的。研究结果表明视觉意识能够以概率性的表征存在,并支持视觉整体统计假说,也能够进一步解释视觉意识容量的主观测量和客观测量之间存在的冲突。     

"Binaural rivalry": dichotic listening as a tool for the investigation of the neural correlate of consciousness

Since about two decades neuroscientists have systematically faced the problem of consciousness: the aim is to discover the neural activity specifically related to conscious perceptions, i.e. the biological properties of what philosophers call qualia. In this view, a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) is a precise pattern of brain activity that specifically accompanies a particular conscious experience. Almost all studies aimed at investigating the NCC have been carried out in the visual system. One of the most promising paradigms is based on sensory stimuli which elicit bistable percepts, as they allow to decouple subjective perception from the characteristics of the physical stimulation. Such kind of perception can be produced in the visual modality by using particular images (e.g. Rubin's vase/face figure) or by presenting two dissimilar stimuli separately to the two eyes (binocular rivalry). The stimuli compete for perceptual dominance and each image is visible in turn for a few seconds, while the other is suppressed. The use of this methodology has led to important findings concerning visual consciousness, which are briefly discussed. For the investigation of auditory consciousness, a similar stimulation paradigm can be achieved by using dichotic listening, consisting in two different stimuli presented each to one ear, which compete for perception (binaural rivalry). The principal aim of the present mini-review is to discuss the few contributes facing the issue of auditory consciousness and to advance the use of dichotic listening and binaural rivalry as valid tools for its investigation.     

First-person approaches in neuroscience of consciousness: Brain dynamics correlate with the intention to act

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet’s experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N = 1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.     

Identification and integration of sensory modalities: Neural basis and relation to consciousness

A key question in studying consciousness is how neural operations in the brain can identify streams of sensory input as belonging to distinct modalities, which contributes to the representation of qualitatively different experiences. The basis for identification of modalities is proposed to be constituted by self-organized comparative operations across a network of unimodal and multimodal sensory areas. However, such network interactions alone cannot answer the question how sensory feature detectors collectively account for an integrated, yet phenomenally differentiated experiential content. This problem turns out to be different from, although related to, the binding problem. It is proposed that the neural correlate of an enriched, multimodal experience is constituted by the attractor state of a dynamic associative network. Within this network, unimodal and multimodal sensory maps continuously interact to influence each other’s attractor state, so that a feature change in one modality results in a fast re-coding of feature information in another modality. In this scheme, feature detection is coded by firing-rate, whereas firing phase codes relational aspects.