Skills,historical disclosing,and the end of history: A response to our critics

We appreciate the thoughtful responses we have received on ‘Disclosing New Worlds’. We will respond to the concerns raised by grouping them under three general themes. First, a number of questions arise from lack of clarity about how the matters we undertook to discuss ‐ especially solidarity ‐ appear when one starts by thinking about the primacy of skills and practices. Under this heading we consider (a) whether we need more case studies to make our points, and (b) whether national and other solidarities require willingness to die for the values that produce that solidarity. Second, we take up questions concerning the historical character of the skills of entrepreneurs, virtuous citizens, and culture figures. Here we shall (a) emphasize how we distinguish ourselves from earlier writers on these subjects, (b) consider essentialism, relational identities, and exclusion, (c) answer a number of Habermasian concerns raised by Hoy, (d) speak to Taylor's concern regarding the contingency of solidarity and forgetting, and (e) take up Grant's objection that we are both formalists and relativists. Third, we shall take up the concern, raised mostly by Borgmann, that historical disclosing, that is to say history as the West has known it, is over, and that now all that can be done by those who transform the practices is to make them more and more technological.     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Reply to Reynolds

Abstract

How should we read Foucault's claims, in his late work, for the relevance of ‘aesthetic criteria’ to politics? What is Foucault's implicit understanding of the nature of aesthetics and the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere? Would an ethics which gave a place to the aesthetic legitimize a politics of manipulation, brutality and aggression ‐ in short, a ‘fascist’ politics ‐ as some of Foucault's critics argue? In this paper, I examine key accounts of the fascist ‘aestheticization of politics’ ‐ from Walter Benjamin's classic essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936), to Philippe Lacoue‐Labarthe's work on the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and the fascist theme of politics as the plastic art of the state. Through a discussion of Foucault's late work, the paper demonstrates the connection between Foucault's turn to ancient Greek ethical practices and his call for a contemporary renewal of the idea of ethics as an art of living. The aim of the paper is to show in what ways the ethico‐political position which is presented in Foucault's late work, far from contributing to a fascist politics, in fact provides ways of thinking about the relationship between the aesthetic and the political which avoid both mindless radicalism and totalitarian narcissism. In doing so, the key question is, ‘What's aesthetic about Foucault's “aesthetics of existence"?’     

Skillful solidarity

This discussion of ‘Disclosing New Worlds’ by Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus raises four groups of questions. First, do skills, which are largely unreflective, need to be distinguished more sharply from strategies for social action, which are more reflective and deliberative? Second, is there a tension between the article's emphasis on the importance of background practices, which are collective and nonindividual, and its frequent appeal to examples of single individuals (the entrepreneur, the cultural hero) who are able to transform these practices? Third, why does the appeal to solidarity not undermine democratic action, since solidarities compete and conflict with one another, and are often formed by excluding others? Or are the ideas of solidarity and universality not necessarily inconsistent with each other? Fourth, without universalistic values how will a theory of pluralistic solidarities explain social resistance to perceived oppression? Is the authors’ notion of being willing to die for the group's commitments too extreme a test for social solidarity? Even if it were offered as only a limiting case, is it an adequate test for the value or justice of the commitments themselves?     

An integrative framework on the impact of allies: How identity-based needs influence intergroup solidarity and social movements

What impact do advantaged group allies have within social movements? Although solidarity between advantaged and disadvantaged group members is often encouraged to achieve long-term social change, allies run the risk of being ineffective or counterproductive, therefore making it important to shift our focus towards understanding the impact of allies. We propose an integrative theoretical framework describing the positive and negative impact of allies based on their distinct identity-based needs: advantaged group members’ need for moral acceptance and disadvantaged group members’ need for empowerment and respect. By consolidating extant literature and identifying gaps in prior research, we propose a set of hypotheses concerning (a) tensions that arise within intergroup solidarity efforts for social change between advantaged group allies and disadvantaged group members, and (b) the role of allies in influencing broader public opinion to advance the psychology of social change.     

Explaining old worlds

This Comment treats each of Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus's three subjects ‐entrepreneurship, democratic activity, and cultivation of solidarity ‐ in turn. Though marred by inattention to moral consequences and an accordingly unjustified meliorism, the authors’ insights reaffirm and strengthen a number of convictions obscured in current political‐theory debates. In particular, their account of the virtuous citizen, and of a variant of solidarity which grows out of such citizens’ activity, deserves recognition. The basic contention that humans are ‘at their best’ when self‐consciously engaged in transformative activities is accepted, with the essential caveat that such activity can only be sustained for relatively short periods of time by individuals and polities alike.     

From Classroom to Controversy: Conflict in the Teaching of Religion

What happens when a class assignment becomes a source of controversy? How do we respond? What do we learn? By describing the controversy surrounding an assignment on religion and representation, this article examines conflict's productive role in teaching about New Religious Movements (NRMs) and religion. It suggests that we consider how our personal and institutional dispositions toward conflict influence our pedagogies. Moreover, it urges us to consider how teaching conflicts within and/or between disciplines can enhance our learning objectives and stimulate students' ability to think critically.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Expanding motivations for global justice: A dialogue between public Christian social ethics and Ubuntu ethics as Afro-communitarianism

Faced with the ongoing tragedy of poverty, ethicists call for effective measures of global justice to set up just institutional structures. Their arguments for a transnational obligation to help however remain contested, one of the main reasons for that being the lack of motivational support for trans-national visions of global justice. This articles suggests that the debate will gain new and helpful insights if it studies the motivational mechanisms at work in the dominant religious and cultural traditions, asking: How do these particular traditions conceive of social justice; how do they motivate their adherents to extend solidarity? And how can the similarities surfacing in their motivational strategies be informative for the quest to devise a motivationally saturated account of global justice? The article demonstrates the potential of such an concrete-universal discourse in an exemplary manner by staging a dialogue between public Christian Social Ethics and African Ubuntu Ethics.     

Called to repair injustice: Connecting everyday practices to societal phenomena,creating momentum for solidarity and change

I have been working with a model of witnessing for more than 30 years (Weingarten, 2000a). In this article, I add layers to its conceptualization by discussing several related concepts: the implicated subject (Rothberg, 2019) and ethical loneliness (Stauffer, 2015) among them. What distinguishes the Witnessing Model positions from the implicated subject is that the implicated subject is always aligned with power and/or domination, whereas a witness may not be. Certain responsibilities accrue if we take our implication seriously. Just as I have suggested there are steps one can take from positions two, three and four of the Witnessing Model to enter, return or remain in the aware and empowered position, a position from within which accountability is more likely, I offer ideas about how one can respond accountably when one acknowledges one's implication. Throughout this article, I raise questions, some of which I cannot answer. For instance, can empathic repair be undertaken by one party to a ruptured relationship, one segment of a society, without an unfolding process of mutual recognition and compassion? The contemporary moment in which we are living presents us with dire outcomes if the answer is “no.” The entire article is an extended meditation on the following central question: How can we, implicated subjects, practice solidarity to diminish ethical loneliness and create movement toward the personal, interpersonal and structural changes necessary to address the truths that our implication entails?     

II. Intentions and conditions of satisfaction 1

This paper discusses a problem arising from the way in which John Searle marks the distinction between intentional and unintentional action (Inquiry, Vol. 22, pp. 253–80), namely, that of adequately distinguishing those events which we regard as unintentional actions on the part of an agent from those other events occasioned by or brought about as a result of his action which we (correctly) do not countenance as actions of any sort ‐ unintentional or otherwise. Searle's attempt to distinguish them in terms of the ‘proximity of the contents of intentions’ is examined and rejected, and an alternative account which exploits the anthropocentric character of our action vocabulary is proposed and defended. The discussion ends with a brief indication of some other difficulties engendered by Searle's analysis.     

Response

The theme of love has long been neglected in studies on African myths. The often-heard explanation is that African myths and folktales do not tell stories about love because they primarily express social interests and obligations while love ‐ intended as both emotional imperative and biological drive ‐ is an individual need and feeling. This latter definition relies on a very specific understanding of ‘love’: the Romantic love of 19th century European novels. This paper argues that when love means attraction, affection, passion, and necessity, it turns up as liaisons dangereuses in many African narratives. Love becomes a driving force that generates gender constructions by reinforcing the unity of the couple or by fuelling the struggle between partners. In the case of Kabyle narratives (Algeria),1 conceptualisations of love as well as the relationships between myths and folktales are explored by analyzing formula tales2 and the only known collection of Kabyle Berber myths: those collected by Leo Frobenius, ethnologist and historian of religion, at the beginning of the 20th century and published in the first volume of his Volksmarchen der Kabylen in 1921. The discussion of the relationship between Kabyle myths and folktales touches upon a well-known interpretative problem in the study of religion: the articulation of myth and ritual with history as communities respond to sweeping social, political, and religious changes, such as the coming of Islam, colonization, decolonization, and globalization.     

Higher Education,Knowledge for Its Own Sake,and an African Moral Theory

I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of “blue-sky” knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in “tangible” or “concrete” social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are right insofar as they respect relationships in which people both share a way of life, or identify with one another, and care for others’ quality of life, or are in solidarity with each other. I argue that while considerations of identity and solidarity each provide some reason for a state university to pursue blue-sky knowledge as a final end, they do not provide conclusive reason for it to do so. I abstain from drawing any further conclusion about whether this provides reason to reject the Afro-communitarian moral theory or the intuition that blue-sky knowledge is a proper final end of public higher education. I do point out, however, that the dominant Western moral theories on the face of it do no better than the African one at accounting for this intuition.     

The Ethical Challenge of Touraine's ‘Living Together’

In Can We Live Together? Alain Touraine combines a consummate analysis of crucial social tensions in contemporary societies with a strong normative appeal for a new emancipatory ‘Subject’ capable of overcoming the twin threats of atomisation or authoritarianism. He calls for a move from ‘politics to ethics’ and then from ethics back to politics to enable the new Subject to make a reality out of the goals of democracy and solidarity. However, he has little to say about the nature of such an ethics. This article argues that this lacuna could usefully be filled by adopting a form of radical humanism found in the work of Erich Fromm. It defies convention in the social sciences by operating from an explicit view of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of common human nature, specifying reason, love and productive work as the qualities to be realised if we are to move closer to human solidarity. Although there remain significant philosophical and political differences between the two positions, particularly on the role to be played by ‘the nation’, their juxtaposition opens new lines of inquiry in the field of cosmopolitan ethics.     

Optimism,Agency, and Success

Does optimism lead to success? Friends of optimism argue that positive beliefs about ourselves and our future contribute to our fitness and mental health, and are correlated with good functioning, productivity, resilience, and pro-social behaviour. Sceptics, instead, claim that when we are optimistic we fail to react constructively to negative feedback, and put ourselves at risk because we underestimate threats. Thus, it is controversial whether optimistic beliefs are conducive to success, intended as the fulfilment of our goals in a given domain. According to the traditional view, optimistic beliefs lead to success when they do not involve any distortion of reality, and according to the trade-off view, they lead to success when they involve a distortion of reality, but a small one. Based on the literature about positive illusions in the perception of romantic partners and in the assessment of future health prospects, I suggest that optimistic beliefs lead to goal attainment when they support agency by contributing to the sense that we are competent and efficacious agents and that our goals are both desirable and attainable.     

Solidarity,justice, and recognition of the other

Solidarity has for a long time been referred to as the core value underpinning European health and welfare systems. But there has been debate in recent years about whether solidarity, with its alleged communitarian content, can be reconciled with the emphasis on individual freedom and personal autonomy. One may wonder whether there is still a place for solidarity, and whether the concept of justice should be embraced to analyse the moral issues regarding access to health care. In this article, I will answer this question by analysing the normative foundations of the concept of justice, followed by a deeper examination of the concept of solidarity in continental philosophy. More specifically, I will compare the philosophical traditions rooted in Kant (with emphasis on autonomy and individual rights) to approaches rooted in Hegel (with emphasis on individual relations of recognition). In addition, I will present the work of Avishai Margalit on the decent society to criticize a predominantly liberal approach to access to health care. The importance of solidarity lies particularly in its emphasis on relational aspects and the role of recognition in care practices, which are usually ignored in liberal approaches to justice. However, the article will argue that solidarity is not an alternative to a rights-based concept of justice, but must be considered as a necessary complement to it.     

Time in the mind: using space to think about time

How do we construct abstract ideas like justice, mathematics, or time-travel? In this paper we investigate whether mental representations that result from physical experience underlie people's more abstract mental representations, using the domains of space and time as a testbed. People often talk about time using spatial language (e.g., a long vacation, a short concert). Do people also think about time using spatial representations, even when they are not using language? Results of six psychophysical experiments revealed that people are unable to ignore irrelevant spatial information when making judgments about duration, but not the converse. This pattern, which is predicted by the asymmetry between space and time in linguistic metaphors, was demonstrated here in tasks that do not involve any linguistic stimuli or responses. These findings provide evidence that the metaphorical relationship between space and time observed in language also exists in our more basic representations of distance and duration. Results suggest that our mental representations of things we can never see or touch may be built, in part, out of representations of physical experiences in perception and motor action.     

Positive Contact with Feminist Women as a Predictor of Feminist Solidarity,Gender Privilege Awareness,and Public and Domestic Support for Gender Equality in Straight Men

Men can play an important role in supporting gender equality. In the present research, we draw on Intergroup Contact Theory to examine positive intergroup contact with feminist women as one factor that can encourage men to support gender equality. In one cross-sectional study (N?=?170) and one half-longitudinal panel study (N?=?240), we found that straight men who reported more positive contact with feminist women also reported greater feminist solidarity. Cross-sectional results indicated that straight men’s solidarity with feminists, in turn, predicted more support for gender equality in public and domestic spheres and greater awareness of their gender privilege. The longitudinal results also supported the association between solidarity with feminists and gender privilege awareness, but not public and domestic support for gender equality. Decades of research has shown that positive intergroup contact can change attitudes. Our research suggests that, when it comes to gender equality, positive contact with feminist women may also encourage men to identify with feminists and raise their gender consciousness.

     

Gadamer and Scholz on Solidarity: Disclosing,Avowing, and Performing Solidaristic Ties with Human and Natural Others

ABSTRACT

This essay is concerned with Gadamer’s reflections on solidarity and practice as found in several of his later writings. While Gadamer offers a robust explanation of practice, practical reason, and how both are operative in solidarities, his investigations of solidarity are in no way systematic. He does, however, distinguish two aspects of solidarity, viz. what one might call “natural solidarity” and “avowed solidarity”. In contrast to natural solidarities, avowed solidarities require an intentional decision and commitment to act with others for a common cause. Since Gadamer’s writings on solidarity are more sketches than detailed treatises, we will bring his work into dialogue with feminist and political philosopher Sally Scholz. Scholz has devoted significant research to the concept of political solidarity. Like Gadamer, Scholz too is concerned with how we engage natural others and how our present practices harm and exploit them. By bringing Scholz’s and Gadamer’s work into dialogue, we gain a better understanding of different facets and types of solidarity, how they interrelate and influence one other, and how their interrelations might help to effect positive social and political changes for all who inhabit this world.