Impossible Odds

A thesis (“weak BCP”) nearly universally held among philosophers of probability connects the concepts of objective chance and metaphysical modality: Any prospect (outcome) that has a positive chance of obtaining is metaphysically possible—(nearly) equivalently, any metaphysically impossible prospect has zero chance. Particular counterexamples are provided utilizing the monotonicity of chance, one of them related to the four world paradox. Explanations are offered for the persistent feeling that there cannot be chancy metaphysical necessities or chancy metaphysical impossibilities. Chance is objective but contrary to popular opinion it is also largely epistemic. Chancy necessities are analogous to necessary a posteriori truths.     

Impossible Worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds‐based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds‐based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources.     

Embracing Impossible Justice

It is often thought that considerations of practicality speak in favour of accepting the principle that if there is no practical alternative to something then that thing is not unjust. I present an argument which suggests that there are in fact practical costs to accepting such a principle, so that on grounds of practicality we perhaps ought to reject it. That argument does not assume that there are any demands of justice which it is impossible to meet, but only that we are very fallible when it comes to knowing what the possibilities are. I then argue that rejecting that principle and embracing a notion of ‘impossible justice’ has positive practical benefits in respect of putting us in a position to respond appropriately to really necessary injustices if there are any.     

Seeing the Impossible

I defend the view that it is not impossible to see the impossible. I provide two examples in which one sees the impossible and defend these examples from potential objections. Theories of depiction should make room for impossible depictions.     

Is Responsible Essentially Impossible

Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies these considerations to responsibility in particular. Theimpossibility of regressive choice or control is explained. It is arguedthat this impossibility does not support the claim that no one is everresponsible on either context-driven or theory-driven accounts of`responsibility'.     

Fiction: Impossible!

I argue that modal realism is unable to account for fictional discourse. My starting point is an overview of modal realism. I then present a dilemma for modal realism regarding fictional characters. Finally, I provide responses to both horns of the dilemma, one motivating modal dimensionalism, the other motivating a disjunctive analysis of modality.     

Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible

Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. He also claims that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the world like mass, charge, etc. He says that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical and all current attempts to assert an identity between consciousness and the physical are just as non-reductive as his dualism. They are simply correlations and are part of the problem of the explanatory gap. In this paper, three examples of strong identities between a sensation or a quale and a physiological process are presented, which overcome these problems. They explain the identity in an a priori manner and they show that consciousness or sensations (Q) logically supervene on the physical (P), in that it is logically impossible to have P and not to have Q. In each case, the sensation was predicted and entailed by the physical. The inverted spectrum problem for consciousness is overcome and explained by a striking asymmetry in colour space. It is concluded that as some physical properties realize some sensations or qualia that human zombies are not metaphysically possible and the explanatory gap is bridged in these cases. Thus, the hard problem is overcome in these instances.     

Impossible shadows and lightness constancy

The intersection between an illumination and a reflectance edge is characterised by the 'ratio-invariant' property, that is the luminance ratio of the regions under different illumination remains the same. In a CRT experiment, we shaped two areas, one surrounding the other, and simulated an illumination edge dividing them in two frames of illumination. The portion of the illumination edge standing on the surrounding area (labelled contextual background) was the contextual edge, while the portion standing on the enclosed area (labelled mediating background) was the mediating edge. On the mediating background, there were two patches, one per illumination frame. Observers were asked to adjust the luminance of the patch in bright illumination to equate the lightness of the other. We compared conditions in which the luminance ratio at the contextual edge could be (i) equal (possible shadow), or (ii) larger (impossible shadow) than that at the mediating edge. In addition, we manipulated the reflectance of the backgrounds. It could be higher for the contextual than for the mediating background; or, vice versa, lower for the contextual than for the mediating background. Results reveal that lightness constancy significantly increases when: (i) the luminance ratio at the contextual edge is larger than that at the mediating edge creating an impossible shadow, and (ii) the reflectance of the contextual background is lower than that of the mediating one. We interpret our results according to the albedo hypothesis, and suggest that the scission process is facilitated when the luminance ratio at the contextual edge is larger than that at the mediating edge and/or the reflectance of the including area is lower than that of the included one. This occurs even if the ratio-invariant property is violated.     

The Impossible Demand of Forgiveness

Abstract

Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s work, I argue that neither of the two standard accounts of forgiveness offer an adequate understanding of forgiveness. Conditional accounts insist on specifying the conditions an offender needs to satisfy in order to count as deserving of forgiveness. I argue that such accounts not only render forgiveness unintelligible (since forgiveness is intelligibly offered only to the offender qua offender), but also dissolve the ethical decision forgiveness demands of us. Unconditional accounts promise to do justice to both by insisting that forgiveness is a freely granted gift offered to the guilty as guilty. But I argue that when pressed to justify why one should forgive unconditionally and how one avoids the threat of condoning, they typically fall back onto the conditionalist’s ground and lose the electivity of forgiving. I conclude by arguing that genuine forgiveness would have to be purely unconditional but could never appear as such.     

Impossible obligations and the non-identity problem

In a common example of the non-identity problem (NIP), a person (call her Wilma) deliberately conceives a child (call her Pebbles) who she knows will have incurable blindness but a life well worth living. Although Wilma’s decision seems wrong, it is difficult to say why. This paper develops and defends a version of the “indirect strategy” for solving the NIP. This strategy rests on the idea that it is wrong to deliberately make it impossible to fulfill an obligation; consequently, it is wrong for Wilma to create Pebbles because doing so makes it impossible to fulfill her obligation to protect her child from harms like blindness. A challenge for the indirect strategy is the well-known “rights waiver problem”: Since Pebbles’s very existence depends on Wilma’s having made herself unable to fulfill an obligation to Pebbles, Pebbles is likely to waive that obligation. I address this problem by recasting the indirect strategy in terms of a non-grievance evil. I argue that deliberately making it impossible to fulfill a moral obligation manifests a defective attitude toward morality—an attitude which sees moral obligations as things to be dodged whenever they are inconvenient. Next, I argue that acting on this attitude is a wrong-making feature that is independent of any wrong that might be done to Pebbles. I conclude that Wilma’s decision remains wrong even if Pebbles waives any objection to it.

     

Mission Impossible and Wittgenstein's Standard Metre

In this paper, I argue that context sensitivity is crucial for a proper exegesis of Wittgenstein's remark that one can say of the standard metre rod neither that it is one metre long nor that it is not one metre long. I discuss cases in which we can meaningfully assert that the rod in question is one metre long and explain why these cases do not conflict with Wittgenstein's insight. I analyse Pollock's recent defence of Wittgenstein's remark, as well as Kripke's objections to it, and show that, while their commentaries are helpful, blindness to context renders them unsatisfactory.     

The Impossible Ideal: A Patient-Oriented Therapy

Abstract

Langan R. Proteus Reprised. Int Forum Psychoanal 1997;6:45-49. Stockholm, ISSN 0803-706X.

Proteus was the mythical Greek sea-god able to change his shape at will. In the Odyssey, King Menelaos manages not to release his wrestler's hold on the mercurial trickster, and theory can, at last, return home. The myth has sundry and changing applications to the living experience of what goes on between patient and psychoanalyst. In one sense, the analyst's job is to be like Proteus, escaping the transferential grip whereby the patient tries to pin the analyst into characterological shapes of the past. In another sense, the patient is Proteus, and the analyst's job is to hold firmly to the process of future change, refusing to settle for one fixed version of selfhood. In yet another sense, both patient and analyst become Proteus, experiencing fluidly present senses of self as an inner subjective “I,” as an intimately relational “Thou” with “Thee,” and objectively, as one Other among others. Additionally, the myth insinuates within the psychoanalytic situation a potential transcendence of time.     

Why Even Kim-Style Psychophysical Laws Are Impossible

If the mental is subject to indeterminacy, does this rule out the possibility of psychophysical laws? One might think so. However, Jaegwon Kim has argued for the existence of a kind of psychophysical law that is not obviously susceptible to problems posed by indeterminacy. I begin by introducing a weak and relatively uncontroversial indeterminacy thesis. Then, by appealing to constraints on theories of strong supervenience and to general considerations about the nature of indeterminacy, I argue that even Kim’s laws cannot accommodate indeterminacy. The result is an argument against the possibility of Kim-Style psychophysical laws.