Heidegger on Human Finitude: Beginning at the End

Interpreters generally understand Heidegger's notion of finitude in one of two ways: (1) as our mortality – that, in the end, we are certain to die; or (2) the susceptibility of our self‐ and world‐understanding to collapse – the fragility and vulnerability of human sense‐making. In this paper, I put forward an alternative account of what Heidegger means by ‘finitude’: human self‐ and world‐understanding is non‐transparently grounded in a ‘final end.’ Our self‐ and world‐understanding, that is, begins at the end, and authenticity requires us to interpretively appropriate the full range of this understanding. After laying out this view of finitude, via an analogical appeal to the Socratic account of action and desire in the Gorgias, I discuss its relationship to the two leading views of finitude mentioned above.     

State Authenticity in Everyday Life

We examined the components and situational correlates of state authenticity to clarify the construct's meaning and improve understanding of authenticity's attainment. In Study 1, we used the day reconstruction method (participants assessed real‐life episodes from ‘yesterday’) and in Study 2 a smartphone app (participants assessed real‐life moments taking place ‘just now’) to obtain situation‐level ratings of participants' sense of living authentically, self‐alienation, acceptance of external influence, mood, anxiety, energy, ideal‐self overlap, self‐consciousness, self‐esteem, flow, needs satisfaction, and motivation to be ‘real’. Both studies demonstrated that state authentic living does not require rejecting external influence and, further, accepting external influence is not necessarily associated with state self‐alienation. In fact, situational acceptance of external influence was more often related to an increased, rather than decreased, sense of authenticity. Both studies also found state authentic living to be associated with greater, and state self‐alienation with lesser: positive mood, energy, relaxation, ideal‐self overlap, self‐esteem, flow, and motivation for realness. Study 2 further revealed that situations prioritizing satisfaction of meaning/purpose in life were associated with increased authentic living and situations prioritizing pleasure/interest satisfaction were associated with decreased self‐alienation. State authenticity is best characterized by two related yet independent components: authentic living and (absence of) self‐alienation. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Cares,Identification, and Agency Reductionism

Reductionists about agency maintain that an agent's causing something is reducible to states and events involving the agent causing something. Some worry that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self‐determination. One reductionist answer to this worry, which I call ‘identification reductionism,’ contends that self‐governing agents are identified with certain attitudes, and so these attitudes causing a decision count as the agent's self‐determining the decision. I argue that a prominent species of identification reductionism developed by Harry Frankfurt, Agnieszka Jaworska, Jeffrey Seidman, and David Shoemaker – according to which an agent is identified with his (deepest) cares – is inadequate.     

Relationship between self‐worrying and self‐critical messages in clients with generalised anxiety engaging in emotion‐focused worry dialogues

Emotion‐focused therapy (EFT) has recently been adapted as a treatment for generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). One intervention used in this adaptation is a worry dialogue, in which the client enacts worry in one chair (“worrier”) and is facilitated to experience the impact of this worry in another chair (“experiencer”). Although not formally studied, anecdotal observations from therapists in the EFT for GAD treatment development study suggested that within worry dialogues there might be a link between client's self‐worrying and self‐critical messages. This study used data from 47 worry dialogues from fourteen study clients who received EFT for GAD. An observation based qualitative analysis of clients' self‐directed messages as present in in‐session worry dialogues was conducted using video/audio recordings of relevant sessions. Results indicate a relationship between self‐worrying and self‐critical messages. A total of 90 paired self‐worry and self‐critic messages across the 47 worry dialogues were logged. Six recurring clusters of themes/relationships were observed: (a) I need to be prepared for future negative events because… I'm weak and a failure; (b) I need to stop worrying… I'm flawed for being a worrier; (c) People will negatively judge me if I engage with them… because I'm not good enough; (d) If I don't worry, there will be negative consequences… and I will be responsible and will be unable to bear it; (e) I worry/ruminate that I cause(d) some damage… because I'm incompetent; and, (f) I must always be prepared against others taking advantage of me… because I'm weak. Given the observed close link between self‐critical and worry processes, it is important that therapists differentiate between these processes and remember to address both in therapy for GAD.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Overcoming Arlie Hochschild's concepts of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus

This article theoretically discusses Arlie Hochschild's (1983, 1998) concept of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self (1983: 194) and how this holds together her model about how it is we manage our emotions. Hochschild draws on ideas about surface acting, deep acting and authenticity to support her theory of emotion management. In this discussion I argue that these ideas undermine the clarity of the theoretical model Hochschild tries to develop to explain emotion management. The first aim here is to demonstrate that this concept of the real and false self acts as an unnecessary conceptual linchpin making Hochschild's ideas about emotion management opaque. The second aim in this article is to theoretically engage with Pierre Bourdieu's (1984, 1990) concept of habitus as a way of overcoming Hochschild's idea of the real and false self.     

Revisioning Fordham's ‘Defences of the self’ in light of modern relational theory and contemporary neuroscience

This paper explores the evolution of Michael Fordham's ideas concerning ‘defences of the self’, including his application of this concept to a group of ‘difficult’ adult patients in his famous 1974 paper by the same name. After tracing the relevance of Fordham's ideas to my own discovery of a ‘self‐care system’ in the psychological material of early trauma patients (Kalsched 1996 ), I describe how Fordham's seminal notions might be revisioned in light of contemporary relational theory as well as early attachment theory and affective neuroscience. These revisionings involve an awareness that the severe woundings of early unremembered trauma are not transformable through interpretation but will inevitably be repeated in the transference, leading to mutual ‘enactments’ between the analytic partners and, hopefully, to a new outcome. A clinical example of one such mutual enactment between the author and his patient is provided. The paper concludes with reflections on the clinical implications of this difficult case and what it means to become a ‘real person’ to our patients. Finally, Jung's alchemical views on transference are shown to be useful analogies in our understanding of the necessary mutuality in the healing process with these patients.     

Positive Self‐regard and Claim to Leadership: Two Fundamental Forms of Self‐evaluation

The present article examines the common factor structure of various self‐evaluative personality constructs. Consistent with previous research, we found considerable redundancy between constructs. Two basic forms of self‐evaluation could be distinguished: Positive Self‐regard (PSR) reflects people's contentedness with themselves in comparison with their own standards. Constructs such as depression, self‐esteem and neuroticism have very high loadings on this factor. In contrast, Claim to Leadership (CTL) reflects the subjective conviction that one is called to take charge and lead others. This conviction is often called ‘narcissism’. PSR mainly reflects an intra‐personal kind of self‐evaluation, whereas CTL reflects an inter‐personal kind. Both forms of self‐evaluation independently predict intellectual self‐enhancement, but only one of them (PSR) also predicts self‐reported mental health. Moreover, the two forms of self‐evaluation are differentially associated with self‐reported and peer‐reported inter‐personal traits (Dominance and Affiliation). Finally, the concepts of ‘Grandiosity’ and ‘Vulnerability’ from narcissism research may easily be reframed in terms of CTL and PSR. The two‐dimensional framework may help overcome the conceptual confusion that exists around different forms of self‐evaluation and streamline the field for future research. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Authenticity in Heidegger: A response to Dreyfus

In his book, Being‐in‐the‐World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, Hubert Dreyfus argues that Heidegger's concept of authenticity is incomprehensible. He maintains that there are two conflicting accounts of inauthenticity in Being and Time. He elucidates what he calls the ‘structural account’ of inauthenticity and being‐in‐the‐world in the main body of his work, and then criticizes what he calls the ‘motivational account’ in an Appendix. Because he overlooks certain textual evidence and underemphasizes fleeing and the role of choice, his interpretation is neither complete nor compelling. I offer an alternative interpretation of authenticity. While Heidegger's notion of authenticity may still be weakened by other flaws, it is not incomprehensible in the sense that Dreyfus contends.     

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

Friendship Work on Facebook: Young Adults' Understandings and Practices of Friendship

Young adults use social networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook to engage as friends, yet there has been little systematic research that has investigated their sense‐making of friendship in relation to their uses of Facebook, as well as how Facebook as a socio‐technical system interacts with their friendship practices. Twelve friendship discussion groups were conducted in urban and non‐urban New Zealand, with 26 women and 25 men aged 18–25 years, in same and mixed‐gender groups. Our social constructionist thematic analysis showed the young adults made sense of friendship through themes of ‘fun times together’, an ‘investment’, ‘protection’ and ‘self‐authenticity’, and these meanings were enacted in particular ways within Facebook. This SNS was used primarily for enjoying friendship and ‘investing in’ friendships, and friendship protection was required to maintain friends' online privacy. Facebook provided a way to demonstrate self‐authenticity within friendship relationships through censored ‘show off’ self‐displays and favoured friendship activities. Facebook supported, disrupted and modified these particular friendship understandings by broadening the audience for friendship actions and intensifying friends' responses through 24/7 accessibility and instantaneous activity notifications. These interactions between friendship understandings and Facebook as a socio‐technical system demonstrate how friendship was reinforced, negotiated and re‐worked through this online context. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm,and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections (Paper 2 of 2)

This second of two papers focuses on the shame which emerged in the first 14 years of analysis of a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed, and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. To explore this intense and pervasive shame I draw on Jung's and Laplanche's emphasis on experiences of unresolvable, non‐pathological ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at the heart of the psyche. Images, metaphors, elements of clinical experience, and working hypotheses from a number of analytic traditions are used to flesh out this exploration. These include Kilborne's use of Pirandello's image of shame as like a ‘hole in the paper sky’ which, I suggest, points to a crack in subjectivity, and reveals our belief in the efficacy of the self to be illusory. Hultberg's observations on shame as having an existential mode (function) are also explored, as is the nature of analytic truth. Using these ideas I describe my patient's process of finding some small but freeing space in relation to her shame and self‐hatred. Through enduring and learning from her shame in analysis she realized that it was part of a desperate unconscious attempt to draw close to her troubled father and so to ‘love him better’.     

CHARACTER,PSYCHOANALYTIC IDENTIFICATION,AND NUMERICAL IDENTITY

Identification figures prominently in moral psychological explanations. I argue that in identification the subject has an ‘identity‐thought’, which is a thought about her numerical identity with the figure she identifies with. In Freud's psychoanalytic psychology character is founded on unconscious identification with parental figures. Moral philosophers have drawn on psychoanalysis to explain how undesirable or disadvantageous character dispositions are resistant to insight through being unconscious. According to Richard Wollheim's analysis of Freud's theory, identification is the subject's disposition to imagine, unconsciously, her bodily merging with the figure she identifies with. I argue that this explanation of identification is not adequate. Human character is held to be capable of change when self‐reflection brings unconscious identifications to conscious self‐knowledge. I argue that for self‐knowledge these identifications must be an intelligible part of the subject's self‐conception, and that Wollheim's ‘merging phantasy’ is not intelligible to the subject in this way. By contrast, the subject's thought that she is numerically identical to the figure she identifies with does provide an intelligible starting‐point for reflecting on this identification. This psychoanalytic account provides a clear conception of identification with which to investigate puzzle cases in the moral psychology of character.     

Better Living Through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Persson on ‘Moral Enhancement’

In ‘Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine’, Savulescu and Persson argue that recent scientific findings suggest that there is a realistic prospect of achieving ‘moral enhancement’ and respond to Harris's criticism that this would threaten individual freedom and autonomy. I argue that although some pharmaceutical and neuro‐scientific interventions may influence behaviour and emotions in ways that we may be inclined to evaluate positively, describing this as ‘moral enhancement’ presupposes a particular, contested account, of what it is to act morally and implies that entirely familiar drugs such as alcohol, ecstasy, and marijuana are also capable of making people ‘more moral’. Moreover, while Savulescu and Persson establish the theoretical possibility of using drugs to promote autonomy, the real threat posed to freedom by ‘moral bioenhancement’ is that the ‘enhancers’ will be wielding power over the ‘enhanced’. Drawing on Pettit's notion of ‘freedom as non‐domination’, I argue that individuals may be rendered unfree even by a hypothetical technology such as Savulescu and Persson's ‘God machine’, which would only intervene if they chose to act immorally. While it is impossible to rule out the theoretical possibility that moral enhancement might be all‐things‐considered justified even where it did threaten freedom and autonomy, I argue that any technology for biomedical shaping of behaviour and dispositions is much more likely to be used for ill rather than good.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections

This paper is the first of a two‐part series which explores some of the theoretical and experiential reference points that have emerged in my work with people whose relationship to their body and/or sense of self is dominated by self‐hatred and (what Hultberg describes as) existential shame. The first paper focuses on self‐hatred and the second paper focuses on shame. This first paper is structured around vignettes taken from a 14‐year analysis with a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. It draws together elements of Jung's concepts of the complex and symbol, and Laplanche's enigmatic signifier to focus on experiences of ‘inner otherness’ around which we are unconsciously organized. It also brings Jung's understanding that emotion is the chief source of consciousness into conversation with Laplanche's approach to the transference which is that by being aware that they do not ‘know’, the analyst provides a ‘hollow’ in which the patient's analytic process can evolve. These combinations of ideas are linked speculatively to emerging understandings of the neuroscience of perception and throughout the paper clinical material is used to illustrate these discussions.     

Blurring the Dichotomy of Good and Evil: The Idiosyncratic Helping Strategies Associated with Unmitigated‐Agentic and Unmitigated‐Communal Personalities

We theorized that unmitigated‐agentic personality constructs (UAPs)—prioritizing 'getting ahead’ over 'getting along’—and unmitigated‐communal personality constructs (UCPs)—prioritizing getting along over getting ahead—are associated with distinct affect‐regulatory helping strategies. In Study 1 (N = 179), UAPs, on average, related to greater negative‐affect versus positive‐affect induction helping tactics. In two experiments, UAPs, on average, related to a greater likelihood of selecting anger‐inducing versus love‐inducing or sadness‐inducing songs to help a target overcome a breakup (Study 2; N = 313) and greater selection of anger‐inducing and hubris‐inducing messages versus authentic‐pride‐inducing and love‐inducing messages to help a teammate struggling in a game (Study 3; N = 246). UCPs manifested the opposite patterns. Generally, these associations corresponded with helping‐strategy utility beliefs and were robust to moderators of helping target (self or other; Study 2) or altruistic versus selfish motives (Study 3). Study 4 (N = 205) provided some evidence of ecological validity in contexts of recalled everyday helping. Associations between personality constructs and relative helping strategies were about moderate in size (rs ~ .20) across these four studies. Findings suggest that UAPs are associated with helping strategies believed to promote ‘contemptuous’ self‐enhancement relative to ‘innocuous’ self‐enhancement and self‐transcendence, and vice versa for UCPs. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Hyper‐affiliation to the Religious In‐group Among British Pakistani Muslim Gay Men

This article examines how British Muslim gay men may safeguard membership in the religious group, which can be threatened as a result of self‐identifying as gay. Twenty British Pakistani Muslim gay men were interviewed. Data were analyze using an interpretative phenomenological analysis through the heuristic lens of identity process theory. The following themes are discussed: (i) ‘gay identity casting doubt upon one's Muslim‐ness’; (ii) ‘Ramadan: a symbolic opportunity to be a “true Muslim”’; and (iii) ‘accepting “Muslim views” and religious authenticity’. Data suggest that threatened Muslim identity can lead to hyper‐affiliation to the religious in‐group, which is achieved through a multitude of substrategies. Practical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expressive Individualism,the Cult of the Artist as Genius,and Milton's Lucifer

I propose an ‘intellectual genealogy’ of the widespread contemporary lifestyle called ‘expressive individualism’, tracing it back first to the cult of the artist as genius, which flourished during the 19^th century, but which has been democratized and universalized in our time. I then trace it back one step further, somewhat surprisingly, to the altered depiction of Lucifer John Milton gives in his poem Paradise Lost. Milton's Lucifer rejects not only Jesus as the highest creature, he rejects the Father as father; he announces ‘I know none before me; I am self‐begot.’ To the extent that we embrace the ethic of ‘expressive individualism’, therefore, we are implicitly committed to Milton's Lucifer as an archetype for human fulfilment, which I suggest, however, is a toxic model.     

I,me, and mine—how products become consumers' extended selves

• Consumer research literature has recognized the consumers' use of products and brands as props to their self‐identity. While this literature has illuminated that products indeed serve to extend one's sense of self, the concept of ‘self’ itself is under‐identified. In this conceptual essay, we propose a set of components that make up one's sense of self. Then we identify processes through which possessions become associated with one's identity or self‐concept. We suggest the utility of using the proposed framework in practice for consumers' self‐concept profiles, and for linking brands to appropriate components of ‘self.’ Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

     

True to oneself? Broad and narrow ideas on authenticity in the enhancement debate

Our knowledge of the human brain and the influence of pharmacological substances on human mental functioning is expanding. This creates new possibilities to enhance personality and character traits. Psychopharmacological enhancers, as well as other enhancement technologies, raise moral questions concerning the boundary between clinical therapy and enhancement, risks and safety, coercion and justice. Other moral questions include the meaning and value of identity and authenticity, the role of happiness for a good life, or the perceived threats to humanity. Identity and authenticity are central in the debate on psychopharmacological enhancers. In this paper, I first describe the concerns at issue here as extensively propounded by Carl Elliott. Next, I address David DeGrazia’s theory, which holds that there are no fundamental identity-related and authenticity-related arguments against enhancement technologies. I argue, however, that DeGrazia’s line of reasoning does not succeed in settling these concerns. His conception of identity does not seem able to account for the importance we attach to personal identity in␣cases where personal identity is changed through enhancement technology. Moreover, his conception of authenticity does not explain the reason why we find inauthentic values objectionable. A broader approach to authenticity can make sense of concerns about changes in personal identity by means of enhancement technologies.