Conceivability,Imagination and Modal Knowledge*

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle (in this context). Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology.     

Rational Actions and the Integration of Knowledge

Summary  The paper emphasizes the role of knowledge dimensions of an action which could be regarded as rational. Rational action usually results of specific decision – making process including selection, evaluation and acceptance of a preferred alternative. This process should integrate not only various types of knowledge but also the interdisciplinary or interdepartmental knowledge integration. The integration of knowledge may cover various forms, especially integration of knowledge relating to different domains, of different quality, of knowledge connected with different goal-orientations. The paper stresses the role of the hitherto known and recognized alternatives. The integration procedures should also include the integration of various spheres and types of knowledge with accepted and justified systems of values.     

Conceivability,Counterfactual Thinking and Philosophical Exceptionality of Modal Knowledge

Topoi - According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of metaphysical necessities and possibilities is just a “special case” of our...     

Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism

Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis, and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.

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Modal Mereology and Modal Supervenience

David Lewis insists that restrictivist composition must be motivated by and occur due to some intuitive desiderata for a relation R among parts that compose wholes, and insists that a restrictivist??s relation R must be vague. Peter van Inwagen agrees. In this paper, I argue that restrictivists need not use such examples of relation R as a criterion for composition, and any restrictivist should reject a number of related mereological theses. This paper critiques Lewis and van Inwagen (and others) on their respective mereological metaphysics, and offers a Golden Mean between their two opposite extremes. I argue for a novel account of mereology I call Modal Mereology that is an alternative to Classical Mereology. A modal mereologist can be a universalist about the possible composition of wholes from parts and a restrictivist about the actual composition of wholes from parts. I argue that puzzles facing Modal Mereology (e.g., puzzles concerning Cambridge changes and the Problem of the Many, and how to demarcate the actual from the possible) are also faced in similar forms by classical universalists. On my account, restricted composition is rather motivated by and occurs due to a possible whole??s instantiating an actual type. Universalists commonly believe in such types and defend their existence from objections and puzzles. The Modal Mereological restrictivist can similarly defend the existence of such types (adding that such types are the only wholes) from similar objections and puzzles.     

Imagination

This paper begins by examining a text in which one writer, Richard Ford, is discussing both the persona and the work of another writer, Raymond Carver. Ford's positive reaction to Carver provides us with a puzzle as to what the basis for it is. I suggest that what he is really admiring is a kind of originality that he detects in Carver. I try to specify the constitutive rules for the generation of this form of originality. They seem to take the form of at once being able to preserve what is valuable in existing material and yet managing to add what could be said to be missing. I then argue that, if Carver is doing this sort of work, so too is Ford. Having seen various examples of a kind of originality, I argue that the process we have been seeing might be formulated as the exercise of imagination, and address the issue of the possible significance of accomplishing such imaginative work. If, as many contemporary philosophers and workers in the human sciences have argued, there is no escape from the need for interpretation, there is a problem of what could ever be a satisfactory interpretation. I suggest that the idea or the possibility of an imaginative interpretation could be a way of providing such satisfaction.     

Imagination and Emotion

A study was conducted for the purpose of determining whether or not the addition of one or both of the supplementary WISC subtests, Digit Span of the Verbal Scale—and Mazes of the Performance Scale, materially affected the obtained IQs for high achieving fifth grade subjects. All 12 subtests of the WISC were individually administered to 44 Ss, and IQs were then calculated in such a manner that specific comparisons could be made. These comparisons were between Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs composed of the maximum number of subtests, and Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs exclusive of Digit Span, Mazes, or both subtests. Analyses by use of t tests for correlated means revealed highly significant differences. The addition of Digit Span and Mazes in the WISC battery served to depress the Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs of the high achieving Ss.     

Ethics and Imagination

Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases.     

Students' Multi‐Modal Re‐Presentations of Scientific Knowledge and Creativity

The paper brings the results of a project that passed on to students the opportunity for re‐presenting their acquired knowledge via the construction of multi‐modal ‘learning resources’. These ‘learning resources’ substituted for lectures and books and became the official learning sources in the classroom. The rational for the project was multiple: a. It was expected that the process of re‐contextualizing the scientific concepts into students' lifeworlds, their metaphors and into their everyday language, would benefit both, the creators and the consumers, b. Students were expected to develop multiliteracies in addition to gaining authorship and c. The open and encouraging learning environment that enabled multiple and multimodal ways of presentation was expected to promote small c creativity to be expressed in the diversified natures of the constructed materials. The results indicate that the stimulating and encouraging environment did promote creative divergence in students' re‐presented products. This was found to be true for Relative Creativity (number of higher creativity products as compared to lower ones), and Diversified Creativity (changing the nature of the constructed product from semester to semester). These materials as learning resources were shown to be as effective as lectures and the construction period was shown to add to students' knowledge gains. An interesting effect of frontal lectures was found which is attributed to possible different ways of knowledge organization that are induced under different learning conditions.     

Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism

How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self‐knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self‐knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self‐knowledge, our capacity for self‐knowledge derives from our rational agency—our ability to conform our attitudes to our reasons, and to commit ourselves to those attitudes through avowals (Burge 1996; Moran 2001; Bilgrami 2006; Boyle 2009). This paper has two goals. The first is exegetical: to identify agentialism's defining thesis and precisely formulate the agentialist challenge to empiricism. The second goal is to defend empiricism from the agentialist challenge. I propose a way to understand the role of agency in reasoning and avowals, one that does justice to what is distinctive about these phenomena yet is compatible with empiricism about self‐knowledge.     

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.     

Imagination and Will

1. Evoked potentials generated by cerebral self-stimulation were studied in white rats. Stimulus trains of 30 biphasic rectangular waves of various repetition rates (30, 50, 100, 150, 200 pps) were employed. The pulses were always 4 msec in width and of fixed intensity at all repetition rates for a given animal. Potential changes during a 2-second interval after the termination of a stimulus train were recorded from various points in the cerebral mass and averaged electronically.

2. The early portion of the 2-second interval was characterized by rhythmic oscillations in the alpha range whose number and amplitude were related to repetition rate of the rectangular waves within the stimulus train. The periodicity of the oscillations when they occurred was not so affected and remained practically constant over subjects, intensity of stimulus, and repetition rate.

3. The number of oscillations was greatest at 200 and 150 pps and diminished with diminishing stimulus repetition rates, the drop being greatest below 100 pps.

4. There was a positive covariation between the rate of lever pressing for self-stimulation and the phenomenon of rhythmic after oscillations in the evoked potential. Animals who refused to press the lever for cerebral self-stimulation showed no rhythmic potentials when the stimulus was delivered by E; animals who had become pressers gave good after-discharges when so stimulated.