Roads to Necessitarianism

Journal of Philosophical Logic - We show that each of three natural sets of assumptions about the conditional entails necessitarianism: that anything possible is necessary. Since most agree that...     

Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism

This paper consists of four sections. The first section considers what the proof of necessitarianism in Spinoza's system requires. Also in the first section, Jonathan Bennett's (1984) reading of lpl6 as involving a commitment to necessitarianism is presented and accepted. The second section evaluates Bennett's suggestion how Spinoza might have been led to conclude necessitarianism from his basic assumptions. The third section of the paper is devoted to Don Garrett's (1991) interpretation of Spinoza's proof. I argue that Bennett's and Garrett's interpretations of Spinoza's necessitarianism have shortcomings which justify an attempt to offer an alternative proof. In the proof given in the fourth section, it is argued that Spinoza derived necessitarianism from the conjunction of the following principles: (i) necessary existence of the substances; (ii) substance-property ontology; (iii) superessentialism; and (iv) the 'no shared attribute'thesis.     

Metaphysical Rationalism

The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are “metaphysically brute” and that the world could in so many ways have been different.     

Rationalism,irrationalism and taylorism

From Taylorism to Fordism: A Rational Madness, by Bernard Doray, London: Free Association Books, 1988, 229 pages, hb £27.50, pb £11.95.     

Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism

Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis, and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.

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The New Rationalism

Abstract

The goal of the essay is to articulate some beginnings for an empirical approach to the study of agency, in the firm conviction that agency is subject to scientific scrutiny, and is not to be abandoned to high-brow aprioristic philosophy. Drawing on insights from decision analysis, game theory, general dynamics, physics and engineering, this essay will examine the diversity of planning phenomena, and in that way take some steps towards assembling rudiments for the budding science, in the process innovating (parts of) a technical vocabulary. The key is focus upon the organization of effort in time. This paper categorizes forms of organization of effort in time, and yields an analysis of both individual agency and coalitions of agents as forms of effort organized in time. Finally, it articulates precise questions pertaining to the natural (evolutionary) history of forms of agency (once upon a time referred to as ‘Will’) that we now find on the ground.     

Strong Necessitarianism: The Nomological Identity of Possible Worlds

Dispositional essentialism, a plausible view about the natures of (sparse or natural) properties, yields a satisfying explanation of the nature of laws also. The resulting necessitarian conception of laws comes in a weaker version, which allows differences between possible worlds as regards which laws hold in those worlds and a stronger version that does not. The main aim of this paper is to articulate what is involved in accepting the stronger version, most especially the consequence that all possible properties exist in all worlds. I also suggest that there is no particularly strong reason for preferring the weaker to the stronger version. For example, Armstrong's instantiation condition on universals entails that according to strong necessitarianism every property is instantiated in all possible worlds. But first we do not need to accept Armstrong's instantiation condition, in part because his arguments for it are forceful only for a contingentist about laws and properties. Secondly, even if we do accept the condition, the consequence that all properties are instantiated is not itself contradictory, so long as any form of necessitarianism holds. Strong necessitarianism is prima facie counter‐intuitive. But for that matter so is weak necessitarianism. Accepting either weak or strong necessitarianism requires denying the force of intuition in this area. And indeed we have every reason to deny the force of intuition and its primary source, imagination, concerning modal facts.     

理念主义与形式主义的巴别塔

圣经里讲了一个关于语言的故事,早期的先民们使用相同的语言,尝试建立通天的巴别塔,这个计划因为语言变乱而失败。这个故事或许隐喻着:人类是不可能通过语言来达到真理的。然而,人类自从吃了知识果,走出了伊甸园,就担当起自己的运命。从理念主义(Rationalism)和形式系统(Formalism)这两条线索,人类尝试着重建新的巴别塔。我们从理念主义的线索,沿着柏拉图的理念世界,到康德的先天准则,再到胡塞尔的本质直观,评论了理念主义的不自明性,提出了使用处于构造之中的"共相"来代替"理念"或者"本质"。维特根斯坦提出"家族相似",反对理念主义和本质主义,但"家族相似"可能过于宽泛。另一方面,从形式主义的线索,沿着莱布尼兹的通用计算,到弗雷格和罗素的逻辑主义,到希尔伯特的形式主义纲领,再到哥德尔不完备性定理,评论了逻辑主义和形式主义的失败。形式主义失败之后,人们转向形式主义的能力范围研究,从而提出了图灵机,为计算机科学的出现奠定了理论基础。基于以上的思考,文中最后提出一些有待研究的问题,比如基于关系的数学,基于谓词的逻辑,矛盾但完备的形式系统。     

Rationalism and empiricism: A new perspective

Though classical and twentieth-century versions of empiricism and rationalism fail in their aims, as does the Kantian attempt at a compromise between those views, there are residues of those views that play important roles in the scientific enterprise. Those residue, and their scientific roles, are examined in this paper.     

Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles

Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles (such as the fundamental principle of morality) because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important respects. First, they fail to recognize the ways in which Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian view departs from more orthodox Kantian views. Second, they fail to recognize the respect in which Korsgaard’s view is a version of moral rationalism. Third, they overlook an important scope ambiguity in an important premise of their argument. A sensible way of resolving this ambiguity gives the constitutivist a reasonable response.     

卢梭《论科学与艺术》中的伦理的理性主义

虽然卢梭是18世纪法国启蒙运动的重要代表,但是,当其他启蒙思想家对理性、文明、科学、进步充满赞美时,卢梭却在《论科学与艺术》中敏锐地觉察到了被神化的科学理性所隐含的危险,揭示了科学的进步与道德风尚之间的深刻矛盾.尽管他对科学伤风败俗的指责并不严谨,但却以伦理的理性主义的视角触及了启蒙时代的重要问题.这不但成为他后来学说的出发点,也开启了启蒙运动对唯科学主义的自我反思.     

Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment

According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation. Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’ because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically. In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.

西方哲学史中的理性主义和非理性主义

理性主义是西方哲学两千多年发展的主导方面,非理性主义是其附属方面,双方构成西方哲学史中的一对矛盾,后者是在前者的基础上再加超越和提升的结果.这一矛盾来自古希腊理性的两大精神要素逻各斯和努斯的交替上升,体现为柏拉图的"迷狂说",但不是前理性的迷狂,而是理性基础上的迷狂,有别于中国传统的非理性.西方哲学的非理性是由理性中的努斯发展出来的,但常与宗教神秘主义合一,到黑格尔才明确将二者分开,但仍免不了堕入理性神学.