Shattering the subject: Georges Bataille and the limits of therapy

This article is an analysis of the work of the French intellectual Georges Bataille (1897–1962) and its implications for interrogating the limits of therapy. One of the central concepts of Bataille's thought is transgression and the destabilizing effects of transgression on any concept of the limit. I explore this thinking through an analysis of Bataille's personal and theoretical relationship to psychoanalysis. Bataille's radicalization of psychoanalysis is then pursued through his use of mythic representations of the ‘shattered subject’. These models of the shattered subject offer an interrogation of some of the theoretical and practical limits of therapy, particularly when it is centred on the individual. Drawing on these models it is then argued that Bataille offers a new ethics of abjection, which proposes that we must interrogate the subject in terms of what our culture regards as ‘waste’. Comparison is made between Bataille's thought and that of Jacques Lacan, and it is argued that Bataille offers a potential radicalization of Lacan's concept of the Real and his ‘ethics of psychoanalysis’. The limits of Bataille's own writing are critically interrogated, drawing on the readings of his work by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.     

The Uncanny Self in Love: Divorced Catholic Women Remember Abortion in Romania

This essay presents an ethnographic account of two divorced Catholic women's memories of praying to the Virgin Mary while seeking illegal abortions under the Romanian socialist regime. These women's stories focused on troubling memories of being in love, reflections that were retrospectively shaped by divorce. Drawing on Sigmund Freud's notion of the uncanny, I call these recollections uncanny memories of the self in love. Uncannily remembering one's self in love combines experiential self‐examination and ethical assessment of actions. The notion of the uncanny self in love thus helps bridge the divide between experience‐ and action‐oriented approaches to lived ethics. I argue that the ethical significance of the Virgin Mary's actions depended on my acquaintances’ approach to love. For one woman seeking to stay estranged from her ex‐husband, the Virgin Mary's actions accentuated his ethical immaturity. My other acquaintance harbored more ambivalent feelings toward her ex‐husband; for her, talking about the Virgin Mary helped her relativize feelings of ethical indignation. As a core implication of this argument, I urge greater awareness of the problematic tendency to include the need for greater awareness of tendencies in theories of lived ethics to reify socially situated perspectives on love.     

CHRISTIANITY AND EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS: SKETCH TOWARD A RECONCILIATION

Abstract. Evolutionary ethics posits the evolution of dispositions to love self, kin, and friend. Christianity claims that God's ethical demand is to love one's neighbor. I argue that the distance between these two positions can be interpreted theologically as original sin, the disposition to disobey God's command and practice self-love and nepotism rather than neighbor-love. Original sin requires Incarnation and Atonement to unite God and humanity. The ancient doctrine of the Atonement as educative does not invoke the Fall. Its revival may help reconcile Christianity and evolutionary ethics.     

The Calling of the Whole People of God into Ministry: The Spirit,Church and Laity

This article discusses implications of Bonhoeffer's notion of maturity (being of age), particularly for the notion of redemption and the ethical self. This is done through a reading of the relation between maturity and redemption in Kant, Nietzsche, and Levinas, which again is compared with Bonhoeffer's late thought as we find it in his Prison letters and his Ethics. All three philosophers share with Bonhoeffer the important premise that otherworldly redemption is downplayed to the benefit of a strong demand put on the self. At the same time, their notions of maturity show important differences, with subsequent consequences for their notions of redemption; Kant's notion is based on ethical autonomy, Nietzsche's on aesthetical autonomy, whereas Levinas presupposes ethical heteronomy. The reading of Bonhoeffer shows that he shares premises with all three thinkers, but particularly with Levinas. This is shown in the analyses of religionless Christianity as a turn to the practical dimension of faith, in the messianic structure of the ethical self, and in the turn to the Old-Testamently and the arcane discipline. Bonhoeffer's high estimation of the worldly and the aesthetic, however, also illustrates his affinities to Nietzsche.     

KIERKEGAARD'S ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SELF: ETHICO‐RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SELFHOOD

It is sometimes argued that the concept of the self is the unifying thread that ties together the rich diversity of philosophical and theological themes in Kierkegaard's works. 1 In his conception of the self he provides us with a coherent and unified view of human existence. For Kierkegaard the self is not a static entity but a dynamic and unfolding reality, something I must strive to become. One is not a self but becomes a self as an ethico‐religious task to be actualized. The purpose of this paper is to outline Kierkegaard's anthropology of the self with particular emphasis on the ethical and religious dimensions of selfhood. I will first elucidate the structure and dynamic character of the self, and then will examine the dialectical development of the self in the ethical and religious stages of existence. Finally I will address the widespread criticism of Kierkegaard's conception of the self as being radically individualistic and asocial.     

Kierkegaard,Repetition and Ethical Constancy

How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of crisis, in which our ethical self‐understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self‐transformation.     

Cooking Living Beings:

Bodies play important and diverse roles in Buddhist ethics. Drawing upon an Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist compendium of bodhisattva practice, this paper explores the role bodhisattva bodies play in the ethical development of other living beings. Bodhisattvas adopt certain disciplinary practices in order to produce bodies whose very sight, sound, touch, and even taste transform living beings in physical and moral ways. The compendium uses a common South Asian and Buddhist metaphor to describe a bodhisattva's physical and moral impact on others. Bodhisattvas are said to “cook living beings.” The paper considers how this metaphor suggests ways of nuancing modern Western conceptions of ethical self‐cultivation, particularly as articulated by Michel Foucault in his studies of the technologies of the self.     

SELF‐SACRIFICE TO SAVE THE LIFE OF ANOTHER IN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITIONS1

Although both the Jewish and Christian traditions permit and even valorize self‐sacrificial death for the sake of God (martyrdom), and for other people, they diverge on the issue of self‐sacrificial death for the sake of a single individual. The Jewish tradition prohibits such self‐sacrifice on the basis of the principles that (1) God owns the body and that (2) one cannot exchange one's life for another's. Christian ethics, in contrast, permits sacrificing one's life to save a single person based on the model of Christ's self‐sacrificial love. This ethical disagreement exposes a fundamental theological disagreement between the two traditions concerning what constitutes the imago Dei.     

Ibsen's Nora and the Confucian Critique of the “Unencumbered Self”

Criticisms of the liberal‐individualist idea of the “unencumbered self” are not just a staple of communitarian thought. Some modern Confucian thinkers are now seeking to develop an ethically particular understanding of social roles in the family that is sensitive to gender‐justice issues, and that provides an alternative to liberal‐individualist conceptions of the “unencumbered self” in relation to family roles. The character of Nora in Henrik Ibsen's A Doll's House seemingly exemplifies such conceptions of the unencumbered self in her rejection of her housewife role for a more authentic selfhood. Drawing upon the capabilities approach to justice, and positive early Japanese bluestockings’ responses to Ibsen's play, I argue that Nora's character is better understood as exemplifying an ethically compelling disencumbered self in potentially cross‐cultural circumstances: a self criticizing and rejecting social roles that are found to be unjust according to universal, as opposed to particularist, “Confucian” ethical standards.     

Kant,Oppression, and the Possibility of Nonculpable Failures to Respect Oneself

I argue that Kant's ethical framework cannot countenance a certain kind of failure to respect oneself that can occur within oppressive social contexts. Kant's assumption that any person, qua rational being, has guaranteed epistemic access to the moral law as the standard of good action and the capacity to act upon this standard makes autonomy an achievement within the individual agent's power, but this is contrary to a feminist understanding of autonomy as a relational achievement that can be thwarted by the systematic attack on autonomy that occurs within oppressive social conditions. Insofar as Kant's negative duty of self‐respect is unable to accommodate the ways immersion in oppressive social environments can warp an individual's understanding of what she is owed and capable of as a moral agent, it perpetuates the cruelty of unjust social systems in the guise of respecting individual autonomy. I conclude by considering Carol Hay's argument that those who are oppressed have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression, in order to explore how this limitation in how Kant conceives of the duty to respect the self may reach expression in contemporary ethical theory inspired by Kant.     

Legal rulings on suicide in India and implications for the right to die

In this paper I am concerned to address the question of voluntary or self‐willed death from two distinct positions—a particular community's socio‐religious practice (viz. Jaina sallekhanā) and as the matter stands in law (penal code, constitution, judicial wisdom, etc.) in India—in the light of the recent move by a bench of its apex court striking down the penal code section proscribing suicide. I also wish to draw out some implications of these deliberations for the beneficence of medical practice and related bio‐ethical ramifications in the Indian context.     

Ekstasis as (Beyond?) Jouissance: Sex,Queerness, and Apophaticism in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition

Ekstasis (ecstasy) is central to Eastern Orthodox theology, an encounter that sets the self on the way towards knowledge of and union with God. Ekstasis is fundamentally apophatic — achieved through the eschewal of cognitive knowledge, and experiential — precipitated by practices that foster self-renunciation and transcendence. This article examines how this notion of ecstasy, as narrated in the Orthodox theology of Staniloae and Lossky, can aid, and be aided by, queer theoretical claims regarding sex. Through examining Lacan's notion of jouissance and Bersani's utilization of it, as well as Williams's analysis of sex as “the body's grace,” this article explores how sex, particularly orgasm, can function as a spiritual resource, as a site of and practice towards ecstasy. This article concludes with a brief examination of the ethical implications of this frame.     

Towards ethical decision-making in counselling research

This paper explores the process of ethical decision-making in counselling research and asks the question: after following ethical guidelines, reviewing ethical principles and consulting codes of practice, to what extent is our decision-making based on intuitive thinking? The paper begins by examining Kitchener's model of ethical justification and the ethical principles upon which it rests. Bond's approach to ethical problem-solving is also considered. The second part of the paper explores the sequential decision-making process suggested by Gellatt, upon which both the Kitchener and Bond models seem to rest, and compares this with Gellatt's later revision of his model. The process by which we arrive at an ethical decision is then explored in relation to these. The final part of the paper argues that we reach ethical decisions through intuition, informed by ethical principles, codes of practice and reference to the laws of society. In order to safeguard the well-being of our clients and/or research participants, we need to be aware of this and offer up our decision-making process to the scrutiny of peers and the public at large. Although much of the paper explores this process at a general level, research undertaken into children's perception of stress will be used as an example.     

A Foucauldian Foray into the New Genetics

A Foucauldian assessment of the common presumption that genetic information is potent and thus oppressive demonstrates that the concern may be misplaced. Foucault's concept of “technologies of self” reveals that genetic power originates not only from the potency of genetic information but from the penchant of individuals to victimize themselves in the name of optimal health, enhanced intelligence, perfect babies, or would-be immortality. Rather than seeking liberation from the power of the new genetics, Foucault's reinterpretation of the ancient understanding of concern for the self offers the possibility to avoid control by the scientific discourse. His ethical response calls for resistance rather than opposition and places responsibility for resistance in the hands of the subject. Characteristically, he avoids a generalizable form of morality but clarifies that resistance includes acknowledging the human appetite for perfection and subordinating science to ethical and aesthetic matters.     

Accepting Fallibility: A Model for Personal Responsibility for Nonegregious Ethics Infractions

The profession's ethics standards require counselors to self‐monitor their professional actions and take responsibility for misconduct. However, the professional literature has focused on preventing misconduct and on response to serious violations and has offered little guidance regarding the minor infractions that all professionals are vulnerable to committing during their careers. The author presents a 4‐element model to guide counselors in ethically repairing damage when they recognize they have violated ethics codes or ethical principles in minor ways. The model uses the ethical principles that underlie the American Counseling Association's (1995) Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice and J. R. Rest's (1983, 1994) model of moral behavior as a foundation.     

Ethical social justice: Do the ends justify the means?

This article offers an ethical decision‐making model, informed by community psychology values, as a means for guiding psychologists when engaging in social justice‐oriented work. The applicability of this model is demonstrated through a case analysis elucidating how America's psychologists individually and collectively arrived at the decision to endorse torture—ostensibly as a means for preventing terrorism. Critics have wondered how the American Psychological Association succumbed to these involvements, and how to prevent such ethical lapses in the future. Unfortunately, the American Psychological Association's ethical codes fail to provide explicit guidance for psychologists' involvement in social justice work that impacts communities and systems. To address this gap, we present a values‐driven, ethical decision‐making framework that may be used to guide psychologists' future practices. This framework infuses fundamental community psychology values (i.e., caring and compassion; health; self‐determination and participation, human diversity, social justice; and critical reflexivity) into a 9‐step model.     

BOOK REVIEW

In this brief note, we respond to Gottlieb and Lasser's (2001/this issue) critical commentary on our work on narrative research ethics. We argue that their concern for privileging voices needs to be balanced against the risk of exploiting some research participants, that conflicts of interest are best resolved through appropriately prioritizing ethical principles and in consultation with others, and that the researcher's ability to protect participants from harm can be enhanced through appropriate clinical training and access to clinical expertise. We welcome Gottlieb and Lasser's specific recommendations for ethical practice in narrative research and encourage further ethical reflection by other researchers in this area.     

The Tat Newsletter

In this article, we argue that the student's first lessons in ethical decision making in personality assessment are in those assessment courses that have a practice component. In these courses, the student has an opportunity to experience in vivo how ethical problems are identified, addressed, and resolved. The faculty member's demonstration of a process wherein the ethical principles activated are highlighted and explored, will enable students to internalize a model for addressing future dilemmas. Four particular ethical situations are considered: (a) the students' procurement of personal experience with personality testing, (b) the identification of assessment participants, (c) the development of informed consent procedures for assessment participants, and (d) classroom presentations. This discussion does not provide concrete solutions to ethical problems but offers a consideration of the relevant ethical principles that any adequate solution must encompass.     

The Pedagogy of Self-Fashioning: A Foucaultian Study of Montaigne’s “On Educating Children”

In this paper I interpret Montaigne??s essay, ??On Educating Children??, as a pedagogical text through its performance of a distinct epistolary function, one that addresses the letter-recipient for the purpose of shaping the ideas, actions, and beliefs of that individual. At the same time, I also read ??On Educating Children?? within the context of the wider project of Montaigne??s Essays, which, as I suggest, is an ethical-aesthetic project of self-fashioning and self-cultivation. The net result is an interpretation of teaching as an ethical-aesthetic practice of the self, one that is in concert with the interpretation of Montaigne??s writing of the Essays as a similar practice of the self. In order to build this case, I employ Michel Foucault??s fourfold schema of ethical subjectivity, mapping that schema onto ??On Educating Children??, so as to reveal a unique pedagogy of self-formation??a pedagogy that works as much upon the self of the teacher as it does the self of the student.