Logic and Ontology

A brief review of the historicalrelation between logic and ontologyand of the opposition between the viewsof logic as language and logic as calculusis given. We argue that predication is morefundamental than membership and that differenttheories of predication are based on differenttheories of universals, the three most importantbeing nominalism, conceptualism, and realism.These theories can be formulated as formalontologies, each with its own logic, andcompared with one another in terms of theirrespective explanatory powers. After a briefsurvey of such a comparison, we argue that anextended form of conceptual realism provides themost coherent formal ontology and, as such, canbe used to defend the view of logic as language.     

Wave Function Ontology

I argue that the wave function ontology for quantum mechanics is an undesirable ontology. This ontology holds that the fundamental space in which entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but instead 3N-dimensional, where N is the number of particles standardly thought to exist in three-dimensional space. I show that the state of three-dimensional objects does not supervene on the state of objects in 3N-dimensional space. I also show that the only way to guarantee the existence of the appropriate mental states in the wave function ontology has undesirable metaphysical baggage: either mind/body dualism is true, or circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible.While our theory can be extended formally in a logically consistent way by introducing the concept of a wave in a 3N-dimensional space, it is evident that this procedure is not really acceptable in a physical theory... (Bohm 1957, 117)     

Quantification and Ontology

Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form ' x ', assimilated to theEnglish 'there is something that is a '. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.     

解构与本体论——记德里达在上海社科院的讲演

J.德里达,当今世界上最负盛名的哲学家之一,于2001年9月14日下午访问了上海社会科学院哲学研究所,进行了学术交流.他先作了简短而精练的讲演,题为"解构与本体论",然后,又在讨论中回答了提问.本文系根据德里达的讲演以及他对与本题有关问题的回答的记录整理而成.     

A Process Ontology

The paper assumes that to be of practical interest process must be understood as physical action that takes place in the world rather than being an idea in the mind. It argues that if an ontology of process is to accommodate actuality, it must be represented in terms of relative probabilities. Folk physics cannot accommodate this, and so the paper appeals to scientific culture because it is an emergent knowledge of the world derived from action in it. Process is represented as a contradictory probability distribution that does not depend on a spatio-temporal frame. An actuality is a probability density that grounds the values of probabilities to constitute their distributions. Because probability is a conserved value, probability distributions are subject to the constraint of symmetry and must be zero-sum. An actuality is locked-in by other actualities to become a zero-sum symmetry of probability values. It is shown that the locking-in of actualities constructs spatio-temporal locality, lends actualities specificity, and makes them a contradiction. Localization is the basis for understanding empirical observation. Because becoming depends on its construction of being, processes exist as trajectories. The historical trajectories of evolution and revolution as well as the non-historical trajectory of strong emergence are how processes are observed to exist.     

The Ontology of Thisness

This paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an individual to instantiate thisness (i.e. primitive individual essence). Thisnesses are peculiar entities, and even those who endorse their existence and instantiation by objects/entities, have said very little about how an individual and its thisness are related. My approach will be to seek out a model for the instantiation of thisness by canvassing broadly Aristotelian accounts of the substance/attribute relation, and then by making appropriate modifications to the most likely candidates in order to accommodate an individual's instantiation of thisness. What will emerge is that the model with the most utility makes thisness redundant in the case of material substances. Nonetheless, I will suggest that a version of the model can be appropriately applied in the case of other individuals which might instantiate thisness: for example, events (where these are conceived as a fundamental category of ontology distinct from material substances).

     

The Ontology of Mutualism

Abstract

The homeokinetic approach to behavior (applied to humans, the approach is described in Iberall & McCulloch, 1969; and more generally in Soodak & Iberall, 1978) is extended in this article to argue that free will is exercised at a temporal scale of approximately 6 s. The homeokinetic theory of complex physical systems, including living systems, analyzes activity into component sets of oscillators, action modes, each with a characteristic time scale. A full set of nested time scales involved can be thought of as a spectrum. In this article, I argue that a survey of human action modes, as a spectral analysis, allows for the free election of acts only at the 6-s scale.

Intention (per Hebb, see Wolman, 1973, p. 437): central guidance of behavior by an enduring system that maintains its independence despite sensory input. Volition: act of willing or choosing.

This article is concerned with establishing a physical foundation for such actions in mammals, particularly human.     

Ontology in Cognitive Perspective

Ontology cannot be left to the natural sciences, if only because it deals also with hypothetical and fictional objects. It pivots about proto-categorical issues relating to the features of objects of any and all kinds. This brings into its range issues that test the limits of knowledge by asking questions that are inherently unanswerable (for example: “What is an instance of an occurrence that no one ever mentions?”). And it raises issues of norms and values that science (in its usual configuration) does not address.