LOCKE AND THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION

Abstract: It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistant epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that [physical] objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We see or hear birds and bells but we also have visual and auditory ideas of birds and bells. This suggestion is explored through examination of what Locke says about perception in his Elements of Natural Philosophy and the accounts offered both by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and by some of Locke's successors.     

THE THEORY OF THE PROCESS OF EXPLANATION GENERALIZED TO INCLUDE THE INCONSISTENT CASE

This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper (Halonen and Hintikka 2004). The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them.     

THE PATIENT'S OBJECTS IN THE ANALYST'S MIND

In every analysis, the analyst develops an internal relationship with the patient's objects—that is, the people in the patient's life and mind. Sometimes these figures can inhabit the analyst's mind as a source of data, but at other times, the analyst may feel preoccupied with or even invaded by them. The author presents two clinical cases: one in which the seeming absence of a good object in the patient's mind made the analyst hesitate to proceed with an analysis, and another in which the patient's preoccupation with a “bad” object was shared and mirrored by the analyst's own inner preoccupation with the object. The use and experience of these two objects by the analyst are discussed with particular attention to the countertransference.     

客体投影方式对空间问题解决和再认的影响

通过设置四种实验条件,旨在阐明空间问题解决和再认的水平是如何受到客体不同投影方式的影响。除进一步支持了正投影问题的解决是以一个具有三维结构特性的心理表征为基础而并非是对二维正投影信息进行了充分识别的观点外,研究结果还表明：（１）这个具有客体三维结构特性的心理表征是建构于对正投影问题解决而非轴测投影图的再认过程中;（２）正投影问题解决的复杂性显著地高于轴测投影图问题解决而且一个建构于正投影问题解决中     

关于錯觉的一般理論、錯觉的說明和錯觉的控制

錯觉的本貭是旧的、已經确立了的、作为感知过程的基础的神經联系在新的、不寻常的环境情况下的失效。由于牢固的神經联系——个体經驗中的暫时联系或已經通过种族遺传的固定联系,这里难以划定清楚的界綫——某种刺激条件产生了确定的感知效果,而这个效果却是不符合当前的客观情况的。 产生錯觉的关鍵不在感官,也不在脑,而在于不同的客观情况提供了相同的或等值的刺激条件,而我們的神經联系却是在其中之一种客观情况下建立和发展起来的,不可能同时也适合于另一种。按照感知效果应該肯定一种客观情况,而实践指明应該肯定另     

EXPERIENCE AND EXPLANATION: THE JUSTIFICATION OF COGNITIVE CLAIMS IN THEOLOGY

Abstract. The justification of cognitive claims in theology can be dealt with adequately only if the epistemological issues of metaphorical reference, experiential adequacy, and explanatory progress are seen as crucial problems for the more encompassing problem of rationality in theology. In order to guarantee any claim to reality depiction the theologian will have to argue for a plausible theory of reference on the basis of interpreted religious experience. In this discussion important analogies between the rationality of theological theorizing and the rationality of science are revealed.     

BELIEF IS NOT THE ISSUE: A DEFENCE OF INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

Defences of inference to the best explanation (IBE) frequently associate IBE with scientific realism, the idea that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories. I argue that this linkage is unfortunate. IBE does not warrant belief, since the fact that a theory is the best available explanation does not show it to be (even probably) true. What IBE does warrant is acceptance: taking a proposition as a premise in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. We ought to accept our best scientific theories since they are the theories that are most likely to lead to the goal of science, which is that of knowledge. In support of this claim I invoke Bill Lycan's Panglossian reflections regarding Mother Nature. 1     

THE PERVERSITY OF INANIMATE OBJECTS: STIMULUS CONTROL BY INCIDENTAL MUSICAL NOTATION

Social cognition research suggests that incidental, environmental stimuli (e.g., business suits) can nonconsciously influence the degree to which behavioral dispositions (e.g., competitiveness) are expressed. Similarly, cognitive research suggests that incidental action-related objects (e.g., hammers) can prime action plans that then affect the speed with which a concurrent, intended action (e.g., power grip) is executed. However, whether incidental stimuli can instigate actions that run counter to one's current goals has yet to be determined. Moving beyond indirect effects, we show that such stimuli can directly cause the expression of undesired actions: Incidental stimuli resembling musical notation caused the systematic expression of unintended key presses in musicians, but not in nonmusicians. Moreover, the effect was found even when targets and distracters bore no apparent perceptual or semantic relation. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of action production and for social-cognitive concepts (e.g., applicability) regarding the limits of nonconscious processing.