On the de-naturalization of epistemology

Starting from an overview of approaches to naturalized epistemology, the paper shows, firstly, that Quine's programme yields a sceptical paradox. This means that Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yields a rather strong argument for scepticism and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shown that this paradox can be solved by an approach called reflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally, the paper also raises some fundamental problems which the solution proposed has to leave open. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral

My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas.     

Reasonable Partiality from a Biological Point of View

Speculation about the evolutionary origins of morality has yet to show how a biologically based capacity for morality might be connected to moral reasoning. Applying an evolutionary approach to three kinds of cases where partiality may or may not be morally reasonable, this paper explores a possible connection between a psychological capacity for morality and processes of wide reflective moral equilibrium. The central hypothesis is that while we might expect a capacity for morality to include aspects of partiality, we might also expect these same aspects of the capacity to produce systemic forms of performance-based error. Understanding these errors helps point the way toward a theory of moral competence that includes aspects of both partiality and impartiality.     

道德直觉分析：内涵、形成机制与加工判断机制

自Haidt 提出道德判断的社会直觉模型后,道德直觉便成为道德心理研究中的重要课题。本文围绕这三方面的问题就最近10多年来道德直觉的相关理论与实证研究进行了评述,得到如下结论：（1）道德直觉作为社会直觉的一种,它既有一般社会直觉的一些共性特点,又有其特殊性。从目前道德的神经认知研究结果来看,与一般社会直觉的神经机制相比,道德直觉过程还涉及到眶额皮层、颞顶联合区以及前额叶的更多脑区。相关研究表明这些脑区涉及到情绪刺激的再评价、以及对行为动机、意图、心理理论等认知成分的联合处理。（2）对于道德直觉的起源与形成问题,尽管道德直觉表现出跨文化的普遍性,但是目前还没有充分的证据支持道德直觉的先天论;同时,本研究认为基于“进化-文化-个人”的具身隐喻过程可能是道德直觉形成的重要机制。（3）目前道德判断研究的有关理论与实证研究仍然难以回答道德直觉加工的情理之争问题,但有几点发现值得注意：一是从加工的水平差异角度来看,道德直觉可能存在不同的亚类形式,且不同类型的道德直觉可能有着不同的学习获得机制与加工机制;二是道德直觉判断不完全是情绪直接作用的结果,而与道德情境中的情绪认知以及情绪背后的道德规则（信念）之间有着重要联系。     

Mackie on Practical Reason

I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism, the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.

The Moral Dilemmas Debate, Deontic Logic, and the Impotence of Argument

In this paper I argue for modesty concerning what theoretical reason can accomplish in the moral dilemmas debate. Specifically, I contend that philosophers' conclusions for or against moral dilemmas are driven less by rational argument and more by how the moral world intuitively appears to them.I support this thesis by first considering an argument against moral dilemmas, the argument from deontic logic, and showing that its persuasive force depends on one's having already accepted its conclusion. I then make a different, and general, case that any argument in the moral dilemmas debate concerning the defeasibility of conflicting obligations can be marginalized by making not-unreasonable adjustments in the conditions for wrongdoing.These two strands of argument are related by the notion of inescapable wrongdoing. It is our standing intuitions about inescapable wrongdoing which make the relevant deontic logical principles plausible or implausible to us. And whether wrongdoing can be inescapable is central to deciding what the conditions for wrongdoing are. My conclusion is that the arguments in the moral dilemmas debate merely implement whatever standing intuition we have concerning inescapable wrongdoing, and that apart from any such intuition the arguments are unpersuasive.     

Sterilization, Catholic health care, and the legitimate autonomy of culture.

Disagreement over the legitimacy of direct sterilization continues within Catholic moral debate, with painful and at times confusing ramifications for Catholic healthcare systems. This paper argues that the medical profession should be construed as a key moral authority in this debate, on two grounds. First, the recent revival of neo-Aristotelianism in moral philosophy as applied to medical ethics has brought out the inherently moral dimensions of the history and current practice of medicine. Second, this recognition can be linked to Catholic morality through Vatican II's affirmation of the legitimate autonomy of culture, including the sciences. A partial precedent for understanding the moral authority of medicine can be found in the recent history of Catholic medical morality, and we further argue that a full contemporary recognition of that authority would weigh against an absolute prohibition of direct sterilizations. Institutionally, we propose the allowance of direct sterilizations in cases where the clinically perceived biomedical good of the patient is at stake.     

儒家伦理思想与当代中国道德体系建设

儒家伦理思想作为中华民族道德传统的主干,一直深深地、普遍地影响着人们的思想观念和行为选择,对中华民族的道德追求、行为方式和人格塑造都产生了重大影响。儒家“仁爱”的道德原则及其道德规范体系,以及关于职业道德、家庭道德和社会公德的思想和要求,都是社会主义道德建设的宝贵资源。我们应当坚持批判继承其原则和方法,摒弃其消极因素,吸取、弘扬其积极因素,这对于当今中国道德体系的建设是十分重要的。     

SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND ETHICS: THE BOYLE LECTURE 2019

How do we and should we decide what is morally right and what is morally wrong? For much of human history, the teachings of religion were presumed to provide either the answer, or much of the answer. Over time, two developments challenged this. The first was the establishment of the discipline of moral philosophy. Foundational texts, such as Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the growth of coherent, nonreligious approaches to ethics, notably utilitarianism, served to marginalize the role of religion. And then, second, the twentieth century saw the rapid growth of evolutionary biology with an enthusiastic presumption that biology was the source of ethics. Here, I begin by discussing these developments and then examine the extent to which religion is still needed for a coherent account of ethics.     

There is no moral authority in medicine: response to Cowdin and Tuohey.

Central to the Cowdin-Tuohey paper is the concept of a moral authority proper to medical practitioners. Much as I agree with the authors in refusing to degrade doctors to the status of mere technicians, I argue that one does not succeed in retrieving the moral dimension of medical practice by investing doctors with moral authority. I show that none of the cases brought forth by Cowdin-Tuohey really amounts to a case of moral authority. Then I try to explain why no such cases can be found. Developing an insight that is common to all the major moral thinkers in the philosophia perennis, I show that doctors are professionally competent with respect only to a part of the human good; morally wise persons are competent with respect to that which makes man good as man. I try to show why it follows that a) professional expertise has no natural tendency to pass over into moral understanding, and that b) doctor and non-doctor alike start from the same point in developing their understanding of medical morality. It follows that the authors fail in their attempt to de-center the moral magisterium of the Church by setting up centers of moral authority outside of the Church.