THE INTERPLAY OF THE TWO HEMISPHERES OF THE BRAIN IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Several authors have written intriguingly about the right and left hemispheres of the brain. Each hemisphere perceives the world differently, impacting that which it looks upon and reinforcing our particular world view. Notably, the left hemisphere, has always been assumed to be the dominant hemisphere, but only because it has language and is so adept at formulating arguments. The detached mode of the left hemisphere, while useful and necessary to get distance, is no more real than the engaged, imaginative approach of the right hemisphere. Having written about self-sufficiency as a defense against feeling alone and helpless, I now consider these rational, problem solving, answer generating, and planning activities as products of the left hemisphere. The approach that I am suggesting is of calling our patients’ attention to how their left hemisphere overpowers the new, more uncertain voice of the right hemisphere just after it speaks in a session.     

Indelible

Many years ago I grew away from the evangelical Christian faith that had grounded my life (before and beyond death) since my early teens. Or so I thought: the stories my body now tell confront me with the sense that I have – secretly, ambivalently – held on to elements of that faith. Over recent times, through and since my doctoral studies, I have embraced poststructural and Deleuzian sensibilities. These, one might think, run right up against the entrenched binaries and certainties that remain indelibly inscribed. The narrative of progress and development I have been telling myself over the decades – that I have not just grown away but grown up – is no longer tenable. In this paper I examine my doubt at whether I doubt. Amongst the most disturbing stories is one of being beaten in God's name. Its scars remain. I revisit this story in an attempt to dwell more fully in the pain (and pleasure?) of cane on flesh. How am I to (at)tend (to) those scars? What are their meanings? I draw from the psychodynamic and poststructural theoretical frameworks that seem to have failed me, in inquiring into the political, cultural, emotional, psychological and spiritual processes at play in this current disturbance.     

THE RELEVANCE OF EMERGENCE THEORY IN THE SCIENCE–RELIGION DIALOGUE

In this article, I call into question the relevance of emergence theories as presently used by thinkers in the science–religion discussion. Specifically, I discuss theories of emergence that have been used by both religious naturalists and proponents of panentheism. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) If we take the background theory to be metaphysical realism, then there seems to be no positive connection between the reality of emergent properties and the validity of providing reality with a religious interpretation, though one could perhaps construe an argument for the positive ontological status of emergence as a negative case for a religious worldview. (2) To be considered more plausible, religious naturalism should interpret religious discourse from the perspective of pragmatic realism. (3) Panentheistic models of divine causality are unable to avoid ontological dualism. (4) It is not obvious that emergent phenomena and/or properties are nonreducible in the ontological sense of the terms; indeed, the tension between weak and strong emergence makes it difficult for the emergentist to make ontological judgments. My general conclusion is that the concept of emergence has little metaphysical significance in the dialogue between science and theology.     

THE SORROW THAT DARE NOT SAY ITS NAME: THE INADEQUATE FATHER,THE MOTOR OF HISTORY

Although the following essay is literary‐philosophical, it arose from a practical interest. I have been struck by how widespread today is the complaint about the ‘inadequate father’. Of course a father may be inadequate in diverse ways, either absconding, absent and weak, or overbearing, bullying, and tyrannical, or some combination of these. Further, I am not restricting the term ‘father’ to its narrow biological sense, but using it rather as a metaphor for any institution or structure which an individual or a group feels should have been in place to guide, direct, and protect them in important situations, but did not do its job properly. Consequently they are willing to concede they are not all they could have been, but they insist it is not their fault, rather the fault of the ‘father’ who should have done his job better. This ties in with the fashionable appeal of ‘victimhood’. Everybody today seems to want to cast themselves as a ‘victim’, for reasons similar to those mentioned above. If you are a ‘victim’, then there must be an ‘oppressor’– and some ‘parent’ organization that should have guided, directed, and protected you against the oppressor, but again did not do its job adequately. It is striking how many individuals and groups around the world today choose to perceive themselves, and to present themselves to others, as ‘victims’; it has indeed become a preferred characterization of our age, for it carries with it a rhetorical advantage that trumps all others. If you are able to cast yourself as a ‘victim’, and have others accept this, you disarm and neutralize criticism, not only of what you are, but of what you are currently doing – because the latter can be presented as a just ‘compensation’ for what you have suffered. As with guilt, there is no built‐in quota or statute of limitations. This rhetoric was not as common thirty or forty years ago. There is an added factor here in America and the New World generally where, according to a whispered criticism, as our ancestors crossed the ocean, they experienced a ‘drop in civilization’. Life here was initially without some of the structures and institutions which had evolved over thousands of years in the Old World, which could thus be presumed there but here were absent. As we won with difficulty our independence, we unconsciously repudiated much of the ‘higher culture’ of the colonial master, throwing out the baby with the bathwater. As the ‘economic bubble’ of having won the Second World War has gradually dissipated, we discover we are handicapped by an absence of the forms of maturation and self‐realization that arise in and are necessary for dealing with prolonged peace. In our ‘ideology of liberty’, our adults become essentially grown children, unschooled in anything higher, and thus have particular difficulty assuming the responsibilities of parenthood. They are forced to fall back upon a military style of giving orders, because on this side of the water, ‘final causes’ in the form of commonly admired or agreed on goals for striving are not in place. In this sense there is an absence of the ‘adequate father’. Further, as ‘American Culture’ expands through publicity and the media, we spread the same disease. There is another relevant factor, the ‘celebrity‐liberationist’ lifestyle that has been diffused into the general population since the 1960's and has become a default secular ethic of our time, replacing the traditional Judeo‐Christian decalogue. The former is invoked as a justification for aggressively seeking fame and fortune, and making no attempt to conceal this; rather than worrying that such an attitude will cause offense, it is worn proudly and defiantly in the hope that others will identify with it, thereby branding the performer a cultural hero. This popular strategy towards fulfilment itself rests on a metaphysic of ‘expressive individualism’, a position that holds that the supreme ethical imperative to which other obligations must be subordinated is for each to bring forward their hidden noumenal core, the only source of value, into phenomenal appearances where it may be admired and benefit others and such that creation will for the first time be complete. This change in Western culture made possible by greater affluence and security represents a trickle‐down phenomenon and democritization of the awe reserved for the artist revered as a genius during the nineteenth century, now spread to the entire population. Anything that constrains this expansion, which interrupts or limits this transfer, is to be rejected as parental abuse, psychological repression, or cultural imperialism.     

BLAME,MORAL STANDING AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL

I begin by discussing the ways in which a would‐be blamer's own prior conduct towards the person he seeks to blame can undermine his standing to blame her (to call her to account for her wrongdoing). This provides the basis for an examination of a particular kind of ‘bar to trial’ in the criminal law – of ways in which a state or a polity's right to put a defendant on trial can be undermined by the prior misconduct of the state or its officials. The examination of this often neglected legal phenomenon illuminates some central features of the criminal law and the criminal process, and some of the preconditions for the legitimacy of the criminal law in a liberal republic.     

THE TRIPLISM OF PRACTICAL REASON

There can be reasons for belief, for action, and for feeling. In each case, knowledge of such reasons requires non‐empirical knowledge of some truths about them: these will be truths about what there is reason to believe, to feel, or to do – either outright or on condition of certain facts obtaining. Call these a priori truths about reasons, ‘norms’. Norms are a priori true propositions about reasons. It's an epistemic norm that if something's a good explanation that's a reason to believe it. It's an evaluative norm that if someone's cheated you that's a reason to be annoyed with them. There are many evaluative norms, relating to a variety of feelings. Equally, there may be various epistemic norms, even though in this case they all relate to belief. My concern here, however, is with practical norms: a priori truths about what there is reason to do. I have a suggestion about what fundamental practical norms there are, which I would like to describe and explain. It is that there are just three distinct kinds of practical norm governing what there is reason to do – three categories or generic sources of practical normativity, one may say. I call them the Bridge principle, the principle of Good, and the Demand principle – Bridge, Good and Demand for short. I have said more about them in my book, The Domain of Reasons; 1 here my aim is simply to set them out and sketch some questions to which this ‘triplism of practical reason’ 2 gives rise. In particular, since these norms are about practical reasons, not about morality, a question I'll touch on is how moral obligation comes onto the scene.     

THE VAGARIES OF VEGETARIANISM

The following was meant to be a ‘fun paper’, which the author's honesty and natural seriousness of mind prevented from coming off well. Its main theme is that it is not wrong to eat meat provided the animals eaten are painlessly killed or – usually in the case of human animals – already dead. In the course of his remarks the author touches on: the bearing of affluence on vegetarianism; animal rights; child eating; treating animals as ends and with due Kantian respect; the inadequacy of the word ‘duty’; aesthetics and morals; the distinction between private behaviour – say driving on the left hand side of the road – and public duty – say advocating or legislating for driving on the right hand side of the road; our duties to vegetables, snakes, flying ants and Martians; and the desirability of irrationality in matters of duty; stealing and eating as much meat as possible as a way of bringing the meat industry to its knees; the contribution that animals should make to animal welfare, viz. allowing themselves to be eaten. He ends by emphasising the likeness of non‐human animals to human animals. 1     

EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

PRE‐PUNISHMENT,COMMUNICATIVE THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT,AND COMPATIBILISM

Saul Smilansky holds that there is a widespread intuition to the effect that pre‐punishment – the practice of punishing individuals for crimes which they have not committed, but which we are in a position to know that they are going to commit – is morally objectionable. Smilanksy has argued that this intuition can be explained by our recognition of the importance of respecting the autonomy of potential criminals. ( Smilansky, 1994 ) More recently he has suggested that this account of the intuition only vindicates it if determinism is false, and argues that this presents a problem for compatibilists, who, he says, are committed to thinking that the truth of determinism makes no moral difference ( Smilansky, 2007 ). In this paper I argue that the intuitions Smilansky refers to can be explained and vindicated as consequences of the truth of a communicative conception of punishment. Since the viability of the communicative conception does not depend on the falsity of determinism, our intuitions about pre‐punishment do not clash with (what Smilanksy calls) compatibilism. And if the communicative theory of punishment is – as Duff (2001 ) suggests – a form of retributivism, the account also meets New's (1992 ) challenge to retributivists to explain what is wrong with pre‐punishment.     

BETWEEN THE LINES OF AGE: REFLECTIONS ON THE METAPHYSICS OF WORDS

Abstract: The central concern of this paper is the nature of the relation between words on the one hand and their occurrences on the other. I argue here that while Kaplan's “common currency” conception of words is immune to much of the criticism to which Cappelen has subjected it, it runs afoul of the role words play in communication. And I sketch an alternative conception – the type‐continuant model – which shares the virtues but avoids the vices of Kaplan's conception.     

Grounding nonexistence

ABSTRACT

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental.     

Affective Priming Effects in the Left and Right Cerebral Hemispheres in Patients With Alzheimer's Disease

Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients and control subjects were tested in an affective priming paradigm associated with an affective discrimination task. Two pictures, one affectively positive or affectively negative and the other neutral, were presented simultaneously in the right and in the left visual fields; the participants had to decide which of the two pictures was the most affectively positive or negative. The target pictures were preceded by a prime picture that was either affectively positive, affectively negative, or neutral. The principal result was the observation, in AD patients as well as in control subjects, of negative affective priming effects for targets presented in the right hemisphere, and of positive affective priming effects for targets presented in the left hemisphere. The presence of affective priming effects suggests that AD patients have no particular deficit in the automatic activation of emotional information; the fact that priming effects were also observed for targets presented in the left hemisphere showed that AD patients probably have no left hemisphere deficit in the automatic activation of emotional information. However, in AD patients, affective priming effects were significant with negative targets but not with positive targets, which could suggest that AD patients processed positive targets in a more semantic way than negative targets.     

Critical notice of On the people's terms: a Republican theory and model of democracy,by Philip Pettit,Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii+333pp.

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting.     

EFFECTS OF SYSTEMATIC,RESPONSE-DEPENDENT FADING AND THINNING PROCEDURES ON THE MAINTENANCE OF CHILD-CHILD INTERACTION

Previous investigations of the social behavior of handicapped preschool children (Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1974, 7 , 583–590; Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1976, 9 , 31–40; Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1977, 10 , 289–298) demonstrated that introduction of adult or peer confederate intervention agents produced substantial increases in levels of positive social behavior emitted by the subjects. In addition, it was observed that changes in rates of positive social behavior emitted by recipients of intervention tactics were accompanied by parallel changes in rates of positive social behavior emitted by interacting peers. However, with one limited exception, sudden removals of arranged intervention procedures were followed by immediate reductions in the levels of positive social behavior emitted by subjects and peers in each study. The current investigation was designed to examine the effects of response-dependent removal of intervention procedures on the positive behavior of three socially withdrawn preschool boys. Interactive effects on the social behavior of classroom peers who did not receive adult prompts and contingent attention events were also examined. A combination of withdrawal of treatment and multiple baseline procedures was employed. The three target subjects received fixed numbers of prompts and contingent attention events during Intervention I and Intervention II, Phase 1 conditions. During Intervention II, Phase 2 conditions, prompts and contingent attention events were reduced on a response-dependent basis for two subjects and on a response-independent basis for the third subject. The results suggest that: (a) the intervention procedures produced marked increases in positive social behavior emitted by each subject; (b) response-dependent fading and thinning, contrasted with response-independent tactics, maintained levels of positive social behavior equivalent to those observed during Intervention I and Intervention II, Phase 1 conditions; (c) changes in positive and negative behaviors emitted by peers paralleled changes in positive and negative behaviors emitted by each subject; and (d) no “spillover” of treatment effects was noted for subjects during periods in which they were not direct recipients of intervention procedures.     

THE NEUTRALITY OF RIGHTNESS AND THE INDEXICALITY OF GOODNESS: BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND BACK AGAIN

My purpose in the present paper is two‐fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision‐making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.     

Knowing how things might have been

I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will offer an account based on our knowledge of the natures, or essencess, of things. I will argue that essences need not be viewed as metaphysically bizarre entities; that we can conceptualise and refer to essences; and that we can gain knowledge of them. We can know about which properties are, and which properties are not, essential to a given entity. This knowledge of essence offers a route to knowledge of the ways those entities must be or could be.

     

Why Does It Feel Good To Act Like an Extravert?

Research into enacted personality provides a novel perspective on the tendency for extraverted individuals to experience high levels of positive affect. Several studies now show that behaving in an extraverted way – thereby enacting an extraverted ‘personality state’ – is sufficient for elevating levels of positive affect. A question that remains, however, is why extraverted behavior has this robust impact on affective experience. In this paper, I consider several potential explanatory mechanisms for this phenomenon, including reward‐ and goal‐related processes, as well as physical/bodily processes underpinning affective experience. Future research addressing these explanations may facilitate greater understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, along with its potential theoretical and practical implications.     

FORGIVENESS,COMMEMORATION, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF MORAL EMOTIONS

Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and commemorations can elicit these emotions to preserve memories of this sort. Moreover, commemorations can be a restorative justice practice that promotes reconciliation, but only on condition that the memories they preserve are constituted by nonangry negative, not retributive, emotions.     

THE PROBLEM OF HEAVEN

An argument against the rationality of desiring to go to heaven might be put in the form of a trilemma: (1) any state of being that both lasts eternally and preserves me as the person I am would be hellish and therefore would not be a state of being that I could have any reason to desire; (2) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into a non‐person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire; and (3) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into some other person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire. This paper offers defenses of each of the three horns of this trilemma and concludes that there is no rationally compelling reason for any human being to desire to go to heaven.