The Challenge of Authentic Behavior

The goal of authentic behavior is postulated as an important factor in greater understanding of man as well as in more effective utilization of his potential, particularly in interpersonal relationships. The purposes and criteria for authentic behavior are described. The philosophical and psychological origins of authentic behavior are examined with particular reference to existentialism and humanistic psychology. Suggestions are offered for individual attainment of more authentic behavior. The core concern is the need for seeking greater implicit awareness of experiencing by deriving more felt meaning from experiences that involve both feeling and events or concepts. Such an expanded awareness can lead to the discarding of perceptual distortions and a greater accord between man's nature and the being of the world itself. Emphasis is placed on the serious responsibility for decisions resulting from authentic conduct. Implications of authentic behavior for personal living, for professional functions and for social action are outlined.     

Freedom,Love, and Justice

This article starts from love as being a fundamental value, guiding modes of behaviour that establish a reliable framework and basis for the recognition of the rights and dignity of everyone in the community. The affirmation of justice and freedom based on love leads to corrective and transformative action in cases where life is threatened and rights are being violated. Drawing on the experience and witness of Martin Luther King Jr, the article underlines that love empowers the oppressed to stand up and becomes a moral imperative for change, against the background of the many forces promoting conflict and violence, division, and polarization. The power of love is a message to the world, to the powerful, and to the powerless – to all who long for a different reality from what we see in today’s world. This needs to be expressed in the quest for the unity of the church and the unity of humankind, serving the sustainability and unity of God’s creation.     

论社会公正与自由的关系

自由的本义是不受限制和阻碍 ,政治哲学中的自由概念具有明确的含义 ,它并不离开常识很远 ,主要指社会制度所加于个人的限制的范围应尽可能小 ,并且以合理性为条件并向选择性开放。罗尔斯等政治哲学家对自由都作过详细的论述 ,包括自由与平等、自由与法律的关系 ,以及只能以更大的自由为理由来限制当下的自由。一方面 ,服从良法可以捍卫公民的自由 ,但另一方面 ,正如洛克所说 ,法律的目的不是否弃或限制自由 ,而是保护并扩大自由。法律与自由在此原则基础上一致了起来 ,不应片面地只强调一个方面。自由与社会整合关系密切 ,不尊重公民个人自由选择权的整合是表面的、难以持久的 ,真正的社会团结是以负责任的个人的充分自由选择为基础的。中国改革开放的实践是扩大公民自由选择权、加强社会整合的一个实例。自由与公正关系密切 ,公正分为实质公正和程序公正 ,实质公正强调的是分配结果的平等 ,而程序公正则要求分配标准的普适性 ,同等情况同等对待。程序公正看起来比实质公正具有更大的可行性 ,强调的是竞争起点的平等。就可行性而言 ,以程序公正为主、实质公正为辅 ,看起来是更现实合理的分配方式。     

Sexual Justice and the Sceptical Feminist

ABSTRACT The article considers various arguments put forward, on the subject of 'sexual justice', by Janet Radcliffe Richards in her book, The Sceptical Feminist: a Philosophical Enquiry. These arguments rest upon a version of 'the difference principle', and owe much to the exposition of this principle by John Rawls. It is argued that Radcliffe Richards fails to support her argument for sexual justice by reference to the difference principle. Indeed, it is argued that reliance by Radcliffe Richards upon this principle vitiates her advocacy of sexual justice. The article concludes by putting forward an obvious alternative to the difference principle; and with a suggestion as to why Radcliffe Richards fails to acknowledge the strength of this alternative.     

Justice at the Margins: The Social Contract and the Challenge of Marginal Cases

Attempts to justify the special moral status of human beings over other animals face a well‐known objection: the challenge of marginal cases. If we attempt to ground this special status in the unique rationality of humans, then it becomes difficult to see why nonrational humans (infants, the severely cognitively disabled, and so on) should be treated any differently than other, nonhuman animals. We respond to this challenge by turning to the social contract tradition. In particular, we identify an important role for the concept of recognition in attempts to secure rights through a social contract. Recognition, which involves identifying with or seeing ourselves as others, is the key to establishing the scope of justice, and we argue that this scope extends to all humans—even the so‐called marginal cases—but not to other animals. If this is correct, then we have a principled reason for why all humans have certain rights that other animals lack.     

Power,Freedom, and Individuality: Foucault and Sexual Difference

This paper offers a detailed account of Foucaults ethical and political notion of individuality as presented in his late work, and discusses its relationship to the feminist project of the theory of sexual difference. I argue that Foucaults elaboration of the classical ethos of care for the self opens the way for regarding the I-woman as an ethical, political and aesthetic self-creation. However, it has significant limitations that cannot be ignored. I elaborate on two aspects of Foucaults avoidance of sexual difference as a relevant category for an account of political and ethical individuality, which thus implicitly associates individual agency with men. I argue that Foucault implicitly assumes the existence of an ontological desire to become engaged in political self-creation. However, the ethical position of self-knowledge and desire should be understood as a contingent option that depends on material and historical conditions for its realization. Hence, I argue that a feminist reworking of Foucaults notion of political individuality should add a substantial ethical condition to the imperative of self-knowledge and self-creation – making possible the desiring woman subject.     

“批判正义”与人的自由和解放

马克思恩格斯的正义观是一种"批判正义".这种"批判正义"大致包括以下三个主要方面的内容:一,批判蒲鲁东(主义)、杜林等人"永恒正义"理念,确立正义理解的生产方式基础;二,批判资产阶级抽象人权理念,确立人权范畴的"过渡正义"性质;三,批判资本主义现实私有制度结构的非正义制度安排,确立未来正义社会的根本实现原则--每个人的全面而自由的发展.他们的目的是要摒弃资本主义财产关系下的狭隘的、片面的正义观念,确立一个每个人得以自由发展和全面解放自身与个性发展的正义社会.对于中国和谐社会的构建而言,马克思恩格斯的"批判正义"理念具有重要的借鉴意义.     

Intimate Justice: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Satisfaction

This article elaborates an intimate justice framework to help guide research on sexual satisfaction. Using a critical historiography approach, I examine the etiology and development of the psychological construct of “satisfaction” over the last century and argue that social and political antecedents to satisfaction ratings are an essential and under-theorized aspect of research in this field. By examining what are considered to be the most influential definitions in life satisfaction research, I identify conceptual gaps, oversights, and disagreements that characterize this body of work, and specifically its theoretical treatment of inequity. Moving to the intimate domain, I argue that the field of sexual satisfaction must include theories and methods that systematically consider the role of social and sexual stigmas as antecedents to sexual satisfaction ratings. In the conclusion, building from existing social justice theories, I propose an intimate justice framework as a means to guide research that can highlight issues of entitlement and deservingness in sexual satisfaction research. This is particularly important as sexual satisfaction is increasingly used as an indicator of individual and relational well-being; however, this construct is presently limited and inadequately measured for women and men who experience limited sexual rights in the socio-political domain because of their gender and/or sexual minority status.     

Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Philosophia - The aim of this paper is to challenge libertarian accounts of free will. It is argued that there is an irreconcilable tension between the way in which philosophers motivate the...     

Justice in Teams: The Context Sensitivity of Justice Rules Across Individual and Team Contexts1

Two empirical studies investigated the context sensitivity of various rules for fostering organizational justice using hypothetical vignettes. Study 1 compared the importance of distributive justice rules (equity, equality, need) and procedural justice rules (process control, decision control, consistency, correctability, accuracy, bias suppression, ethicality) across individual and team contexts. The results showed that team contexts enhanced the importance of equality, consistency, and decision control. Study 2 compared the importance of procedural justice rules across different types of teams. The results showed that the accuracy rule was more important in small teams, while the consistency and bias suppression rules were more important in diverse teams. The importance of other rules, including interpersonal and informational justice, did not vary across the experimental conditions.     

Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson's Libertarian Challenge

Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice? In this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive duties) can be duties of justice against one of the most important principled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be duties of justice, whereas positive duties (basic or nonbasic) must be seen, at best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson's contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not provide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully justify libertarianism's protection of negative rights nor its denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic positive duties are duties of global justice.     

The Complexity of Justice - A Challenge to the 21st Century

The author discusses two questions, the relation between liberalism and democracy, and the relation between ethics, morality and law. As to the first question, she argues that neither liberalism nor democracy are merely formal. Roughly spoken, it can be said that liberalism stands for negative liberties, whereas democracy stands for positive ones. She observes a non-contingent tension between the ethos of liberalism (personal freedom) and the ethos of democracy (equality; majority rule). It is the task of morality to maintain and restore the balance between these two kinds of ethos. As to the second question, she is worried about the balance between law (legal regulation), ethics, and morality. On the one hand, abolishing legal regulations would amount to abolishing the freedom of the moderns. On the other hand, the substitution of legal regulations for ethical regulations would lead to a similar result: the end of the freedom of the moderns through the homogenisation of life. In the former case, personal support, charity, magnanimity, and caring would get lost, while in the latter there would be no escape from community pressure towards uniformity.     

Feminism as Revolutionary Practice: From Justice and the Politics of Recognition to Freedom

In the 1980s extra‐parliamentary social movements and critical theories of race, class, and gender added a new sociocultural understanding of justice—recognition—to the much older socioeconomic one. The best‐known form of the struggle for recognition is the identity politics of disadvantaged groups. I argue that there is still another option to conceptualize their predicament, neglected in recent political philosophy, which understands exclusion not in terms of injustice, more particularly a lack of sociocultural recognition, but in terms of a lack of freedom. I draw my inspiration from Hannah Arendt's model of political action. Arendt diagnoses exclusion not solely as a mode of injustice, but as a lack of participation and public freedom. Consequently, she advocates a struggle for participation, political equality, and freedom as a strategy for emancipation or empowerment. Arendt could help feminists see that collective empowerment is made possible not by a shared identity (the target of poststructuralist critics) but by common action in the service of a particular worldly issue or common end. In other words, feminists would do well to appreciate the revolutionary quality and heritage of the feminist movement better, that is, its character as a set of practices of freedom.     

庄子论真人与真知的关系——《大宗师》篇"且有真人而后有真知"命题的现代诠释

千百年来,《庄子》一书一直成为中国思想家们不断获得新的思想启示意义的宝库。今天,在比较哲学的视域里,《庄子》一书中的诸多哲学命题将会获得广泛的现代意义,从而对当今人们的生活方式产生极有价值的启迪意义。本文将着力阐发《庄子·大宗师》篇“且有真人而后有真知”命题的现代启示意义。