Dialogue Foundations: A Sceptical Look: Wilfrid Hodges

During the last forty or so years it has become popular to offer explanations of logical notions in terms of games. There is no doubt that many people find games helpful for understanding various logical phenomena. But we ask whether anything is really 'explained' by these accounts, and we analyse Paul Lorenzen's dialogue foundations for constructive logic as an example. The conclusion is that the value of games lies in their ability to provide helpful metaphors and representations, rather than in any true conceptual analysis. In fact some of the standard explanations of logical notions in terms of competitive games simply don't work.     

How to have a radically minimal ontology

In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view ‘there are Fs’ can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as truthmakers for S if it is true. I rebut some recent objections that have been levelled against this metaontological view.     

非严格弗雷格自由逻辑

莱曼(S.Lehmann)的1994年的论文从三值逻辑角度处理语言中的空词项。弗雷格认为句子的所指是真值,包含空词项的句子缺乏所指,而只有涵义,那么这样的句子不真也不假。莱曼的文章刻画了弗雷格这一思想,但有两点不尽人意之处:其一、对量词进行特殊处理,使得量词公式是二值的;其二,把包含空词项的复合句一概归于第三值。针对上述两点,本文以一度衍推系统为基础,在语义上,以偏解释函数为基础构造了一个非严格弗雷格中性自由逻辑表列系统,使得量词公式是三值的,同时使得一部分包含空词项的复合公式或真或假。     

Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem

In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the other parts of her theory obtain. This can be done even though she asserts her theory as if it was wholly true.     

Unity versus multiplicity: a conceptual analysis of the term "self" and its use in personality theories

There is no single answer to the unity-multiplicity problem regarding the self for the simple reason that the term "self" is used by too many different theorists in too many different ways. In fact, there are several important substantive topic areas that need to be distinguished and studied scientifically. The topic areas I examine in this article are reflexivity, unit coherence, agency, and subjectivity. Each of these areas will be evaluated in terms of what it contributes to, and can be interpreted in terms of, the unity-multiplicity issue. It is proposed that we need a more differentiated technical vocabulary if we are to better understand the phenomena we are examining. Matching our technical vocabulary to this empirical detail sharpens the questions being asked and places the empirical facts in better focus. A more elaborate framework of conceptual differentiation provides a better basis for developing an integrated theory.     

Die therapeutische Beziehung

The therapeutic relationship is deserving of special consideration. Both knowledge of the widely varying aspects of proposals in terms of possible relationship regulation and acquisition of the different forms of therapeutic relationship management are crucial for therapeutic success. Impact factors are used in the psychotherapeutic process (resource activation, problem activation, problem identification and problem solving), which are predominantly used in rapid succession or even simultaneously. This is also true of the relationship proposals intended and deployed by the therapist, which can also be conceptualised on the basis of impact factors. It has been shown that a single relationship quality can have very different mechanisms of action (e.g. on problem updating and identification). Successful therapeutic relationship regulation is characterized by high flexibility on the part of the therapist, who is able to move between the poles of understanding/confirmation, guidance/support and leadership/control. A good therapeutic relationship in terms of effecting an improvement in the patient is characterized according to the therapist’s flexibility as regards what he/she can offer in the relationship, a flexibility which can no longer be squarely attributed to one therapy discipline alone. In order to take the significance of the therapeutic relationship into account, the training and specific skills required for this need to be taught during training and supervision. A prerequisite to this, in addition to a sound theoretical training in the relevant aspects of relationship regulation, is relationship regulation skills in terms of both concept and own practical experience.     

Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance

Abstract: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance—no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ‘of the universe’, the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance—neither entails the other—and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be.     

Popper’s three worlds and attitudes to the explanatory gap

The thesis is explored that Popper’s three worlds may be used as an intuition pump to reveal the insight that all three attitudes to the explanatory gap (that there is no gap, an unclosable gap, or a closable gap) are true from different perspectives. Ontologically, there is only one world and no gap. Epistemically, there is an irresolvable duality, an unclosable gap. From the point of view of scientific theory, there is a soluble problem, that of providing a principled account of the relation between phenomenal features of consciousness and functional accounts in terms of behaviour, neurophysiology and physics. Requirements for filling the gap are examined in more detail, and attempts to fill the gap are discussed. It is argued that, on current knowledge, it appears that only at the level of sub-atomic physics can parallels with phenomenal features of consciousness be found that are sufficiently powerful to provide a transparent account.     

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re‐evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account – an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.     

Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy

Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. I suggest that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action-tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action-types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token.     

Future Contingents and Relative Truth

If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea battle is raging (or not), it seems we must assign the utterance a definite truth-value. I argue that both arguments must be given their due, and that this requires relativizing utterance-truth to a context of assessment. I show how this relativization can be handled in a rigorous formal semantics, and I argue that we can make coherent sense of assertion without assuming that utterances have their truth-values absolutely.     

WARRANTED ASSERTABILITY MANEUVERS AND THE RULES OF ASSERTION

Abstract: In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which we mistakenly judge an assertion to be true because we confuse conversational propriety with truth. I argue that no invariantist WAM against Stewart Cohen's Airport Case can succeed. The problem is that such a WAM is inconsistent with the known ways of accounting for the evidence that motivates the knowledge account of assertion.     

A realistic perspective on pattern representation in growth data: comment on Bauer and Curran (2003)

D. J. Bauer and P. J. Curran (2003) cautioned that results obtained from growth mixture models may sometimes be inaccurate. The problem they addressed occurs when a growth mixture model is applied to a single, general population of individuals but findings incorrectly support the conclusion that there are 2 subpopulations. In an artificial sampling experiment, they showed that this can occur when the variables in the population have a nonnormal distribution. A realistic perspective is that although a healthy skepticism to complex statistical results is appropriate, there are no true models to discover. Consequently, the issue of model misspecification is irrelevant in practical terms. The purpose of a mathematical model is to summarize data, to formalize the dynamics of a behavioral process, and to make predictions. All of this is scientifically valuable and can be accomplished with a carefully developed model, even though the model is false.     

A defense of middle knowledge

Conclusion Adams has not demonstrated that conditionals of freedom are necessarily false, just as I have not demonstrated that they are possibly true. According to Adams, we have good reason to think that they are not possibly true because we do not know what it is for them to be true. This is basically the claim that we cannot explain conditionals of freedom without reference to what would happen in certain situations. I argued that similar considerations apply to propositions about future free choices. We cannot explain propositions about future free choices without reference to what will happen. Neither conditionals of freedom nor propositions about future free choices are true in virtue of corresponding to actual states of affairs or any states of affairs that are necessitated by certain other states of affairs. In both instances we must appeal to states of affairs that are not determined to be actual by either the present states of affairs or the antecedent of the counterfactual. I do not consider this difficulty with propositions about future free choices to be a sufficient reason to reject the possibility of them being true. They are true because they correspond to what will happen. But then I also do not believe that Adams' reasons are sufficient to reject the possibility of true conditionals of freedom. They are true because they correspond with what would happen in certain counterfactual situations. Hence it is no more difficult to understand what it is for conditionals of freedom to be true than it is to understand what it is for propositions about future free choices to be true. I conclude that, contrary to Adams, it is possible for God to have middle knowledge.     

A Classical Prejudice?

In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing like contradictory information.     

Socio-Cultural Learning as a 'Transcendental Fact': Habermas's Postmetaphysical Perspective

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false judgment. However, in this paper I argue that Leibniz can distinguish between a perception and a judgment in their semantic aspect. The sense in which a perception turns out to be false (or true) for Leibniz is different from the sense in which a judgment turns out to be false (or true). This is because, while a perception, understood in Leibniz's terms, lacks truth-conditions, a judgment, in being representational, has such conditions. Thus while a perception remains true always, a judgment can be false. Pointing to the equivocal use of 'false' in (a) and (c) above, I conclude that (c) does not follow from (a) and (b).     

NTV观点引发的逻辑哲学问题——直陈条件句能嵌套吗

NTV观点的核心思想是直陈条件句不是命题,它没有真值条件并且无真值,其既不为真也不为假,而只表现为一个相应的概率值。这就引发了一个有争论的逻辑哲学问题——直陈条件句能否嵌套。如果把直陈条件句视为无真值的,那么嵌套后的复合条件句就不能判断其真假（真值表不能使用）。对于直陈条件句能否嵌套的问题,学界有不同的观点,我们认为要完全解决真之条件主义与条件概率主义两者之间的矛盾是非常困难的,然而,完全接受条件概率论题的哲学后果是非常危险的,同样,暗示放弃真之语义观也是非常危险的。