Seeing is Remembering

Abstract

Working with children and adolescents in any therapeutic setting can be a challenge. Counselors who take on the task of working with this population must have a multitude of skills and tools at their disposal. This article outlines the importance of making counseling experiential for young clients by discussing several creative counseling interventions. This article focuses on the use of props with children and adolescents. Sample dialogue is offered to demonstrate creative interventions that enhance counseling with children and make the work memorable.     

Seeing is a verb

This commentary on ‘The interaction of attention and action: From seeing action to acting on perception’ by Humphreys et al. (2010) considers selection‐for‐action in relation to the role of parietal cortex corollary discharge in the ‘mastery of sensori‐motor contingencies’ that O'Regan and Noe (2001) suggest gives rise to visual awareness.     

Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.     

Angry Thoughts and Daily Emotion Logs: Validity of the Angry Cognitions Scale

The Angry Cognitions Scale (ACS; Martin and Dahlen in J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Therapy 25:155–173, 2007) was designed to measure six cognitive processes related to anger: misattributing causation, overgeneralizing, catastrophizing, demandingness, inflammatory labeling, and adaptive processes. Preliminary evidence on the reliability of the ACS has been positive, demonstrating that the ACS is correlated with the experience and expression of anger, anger consequences, hostile thoughts, and responses to provocation (Martin and Dahlen in J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Therapy 25:155–173, 2007; J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Therapy, 29:65–76, 2011). This previous research, however, has suffered from limitations associated with demand characteristics and the reliance on retrospective data. The current study sought to address these limitations by using daily emotion logs. Results showed that the ACS predicted the daily experience of anger and anger related consequences, contributing to the literature on the ACS as a valuable measure of anger-related cognitions.     

Angry Thoughts and Response to Provocation: Validity of the Angry Cognitions Scale

Recently, Martin and Dahlen (J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther 25:155–173, 2007) developed the Angry Cognitions Scale (ACS), a theoretically derived instrument designed to measure the cognitive processes related to anger. This instrument has the potential to inform clinical and research perspectives of anger. Although preliminary evidence for the reliability and validity of the ACS was positive, further research is required regarding the ACS’s temporal stability and predictive validity. The current project sought to address this concern by assessing the six-week test–retest reliability of the ACS, exploring relationships between the ACS subscales and the experience and expression of anger, and assessing the ability of the ACS to predict cognitive and emotional responses to provocation. The ACS demonstrated adequate test–retest reliability and predicted hostile thoughts and state anger following provocation. Thus, results contribute to the literature on the ACS and support its use as a measure of cognitive processes associated with anger.     

Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories

We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.     

Seeing is believing: the reality of hypnotic hallucinations

Two experiments investigated the reality attributed to hypnotic suggestion through subtle projection of a visual image during simultaneous suggestion for a visual hallucination that resembled the projected image. In Experiment 1, high and low hypnotizable participants were administered either a hypnotic induction or wake instructions, given a suggestion to hallucinate a shape, and then the projected image was subsequently introduced. Although highs in both conditions rated the projected image more vividly than lows, highs in the hypnosis (but not wake) condition made comparable reality ratings when the projected image was absent and present. In Experiment 2, high hypnotizable participants were administered a suggestion to see a shape on a wall. For half the participants the suggested image was projected on the wall and then removed, and for half the projection was initially absent and then introduced. Participants who had the projection absent and then present reported comparable reality and vividness ratings when the projection was absent and present. These findings indicate that elevated hypnotizability and hypnosis are associated with attributions of external reality to suggested experiences.     

Seeing is believing: Trustworthiness as a dynamic belief

Recent efforts to understand the mechanisms underlying human cooperation have focused on the notion of trust, with research illustrating that both initial impressions and previous interactions impact the amount of trust people place in a partner. Less is known, however, about how these two types of information interact in iterated exchanges. The present study examined how implicit initial trustworthiness information interacts with experienced trustworthiness in a repeated Trust Game. Consistent with our hypotheses, these two factors reliably influence behavior both independently and synergistically, in terms of how much money players were willing to entrust to their partner and also in their post-game subjective ratings of trustworthiness. To further understand this interaction, we used Reinforcement Learning models to test several distinct processing hypotheses. These results suggest that trustworthiness is a belief about probability of reciprocation based initially on implicit judgments, and then dynamically updated based on experiences. This study provides a novel quantitative framework to conceptualize the notion of trustworthiness.     

Angry faces hold the eyes

Efficient processing of complex social and biological stimuli associated with threat is crucial for survival. Previous studies have suggested that threatening stimuli such as angry faces not only capture visual attention, but also delay the disengagement of attention from their location. However, in the previous studies disengagement of attention was measured indirectly and was inferred on the basis of delayed manual responses. The present study employed a novel paradigm that allows direct examination of the delayed disengagement hypothesis by measuring the time it takes to disengage the eyes from threatening stimuli. The results showed that participants were indeed slower to make an eye movement away from an angry face presented at fixation than from either a neutral or a happy face. This finding provides converging support that the delay in disengagement of attention is an important component of processing threatening information.     

Coping with the Angry Patient

This patient is enacting two chronic maladaptive patterns. In one he alternates between the role of victim and abuser while inducing the therapist to play the counterrole. He tries to master the abuse he suffered passively as a child by becoming abusive with the therapist and having her experience what it feels like to be mistreated. My effort would be to interpret this pattern even while acknowledging and absorbing some degree of his anger. In a second pattern he acts like an angry, demanding child in an effort to extract nurturance and special treatment from the therapist. I would help him explore this posture in terms of his deprived background and its maladaptiveness in his current life. Finally, I present vignettes from my own practice to demonstrate how I work with patients' anger when it is expressed indirectly rather than in Mr. P's very direct manner.     

The Myth of the Angry Atheist

Atheists are often portrayed in the media and elsewhere as angry individuals. Although atheists disagree with the pillar of many religions, namely the existence of a God, it may not necessarily be the case that they are angry individuals. The prevalence and accuracy of angry-atheist perceptions were examined in 7 studies with 1,677 participants from multiple institutions and locations in the United States. Studies 1–3 revealed that people believe atheists are angrier than believers, people in general, and other minority groups, both explicitly and implicitly. Studies 4–7 then examined the accuracy of these beliefs. Belief in God, state anger, and trait anger were assessed in multiple ways and contexts. None of these studies supported the idea that atheists are particularly angry individuals. Rather, these results support the idea that people believe atheists are angry individuals, but they do not appear to be angrier than other individuals in reality.     

Seeing Small,Seeing the Future

The Role of Science in Law by Feldman analyzes the vexed relationship between science and law. The book provides a good overview on the ongoing debate on the topic, but the author's attempt to suggest a guideline for the conflict between science and law falls short of any satisfactory conclusion.     

Angry adolescents who worry about becoming violent

In the present study, 31 of 89 adolescents responded affirmatively to the following statement: "Sometimes I get so angry that I worry I will become violent." These adolescents (the anger group) were compared with the nonanger group, and several differences were found. The anger group (1) reported less intimacy with parents, received less support from them, and was less close to siblings; (2) had more opposite-sex friends, dated more frequently, and more frequently had a boyfriend or girlfriend; (3) had a lower grade point average; (4) were more depressed; and (5) used marijuana more frequently. Results of a regression analysis revealed that depression and dating were the only significant predictors of anger, explaining 17% of the variance.     

Angry facial expressions hamper subsequent target identification

There is considerable evidence indicating that people are primed to monitor social signals of disapproval. Thus far, studies on selective attention have concentrated predominantly on the spatial domain, whereas the temporal consequences of identifying socially threatening information have received only scant attention. Therefore, this study focused on temporal attention costs and examined how the presentation of emotional expressions affects subsequent identification of task-relevant information. High (n = 30) and low (n = 31) socially anxious women were exposed to a dual-target rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm. Emotional faces (neutral, happy, angry) were presented as the first target (T1) and neutral letter stimuli (p, q, d, b) as the second target (T2). Irrespective of social anxiety, the attentional blink was relatively large when angry faces were presented as T1. This apparent prioritized processing of angry faces is consistent with evolutionary models, stressing the importance of being especially attentive to potential signals of social threat.     

从就医经历谈过度医疗

通过一次就医亲身经历,遇到的过度医疗现象,分析过度医疗产生的原因,主要有医者和医疗机构两方面。阐述过度医疗造成的不良影响,提出制约过度医疗的对策     

Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing

Block ( 2012 ) highlights two experimental studies of neglect patients which, he contends, provide ‘dramatic evidence’ for unconscious seeing. In Block's hands this is the highly non‐trivial thesis that seeing of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur outside of phenomenal consciousness. Block's case for it provides an excellent opportunity to consider a large body of research on clinical syndromes widely held to evidence unconscious perception. I begin by considering in detail the two studies of neglect to which Block appeals. I show why their interpretation as evidence of unconscious seeing faces a series of local difficulties. I then explain how, even bracketing these issues, a long‐standing but overlooked problem concerning our criterion for consciousness problematizes the appeal to both studies. I explain why this problem is especially pressing for Block given his view that phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness. I further show that it is epidemic—not only affecting all report‐based studies of unconscious seeing in neglect, but also analogous studies of the condition most often alleged to show unconscious seeing, namely blindsight.