共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Andrea Guardo 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):195-209
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions
to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The
first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of
meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on
Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions
that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call ‘Actuality Constraint’. The third section of the
paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional
analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian).
This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a
possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show
(1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible
to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not
exist. 相似文献
2.
Jean-Yves Béziau 《Synthese》2007,154(3):371-382
In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing
Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki
with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding
boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition,
according to which a whole hierarchy of congruences leads to different kinds of objects. 相似文献
3.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
4.
Jordi Fernández 《Synthese》2008,160(1):103-121
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features
of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is
inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’
feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next,
I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories
that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories
that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different
theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory
that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. 相似文献
5.
Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is
being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note
the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach
to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition,
‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously
to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity
will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a
human person. 相似文献
6.
7.
Sungho Choi 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):579-588
This paper discusses Lee’s argument that Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple
conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee’s argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled
by Lewis’s analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully
understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role
for Lewis’s analysis. 相似文献
8.
Kristjan Laasik 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(4):439-459
9.
John Bengson 《Philosophical Issues》2016,26(1):25-58
Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge‐how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding. 相似文献
10.
Andy Egan 《Synthese》2009,166(2):251-279
It’s a presupposition of a very common way of thinking about context-sensitivity in language that the semantic contribution
made by a bit of context-sensitive vocabulary is sensitive only to features of the speaker’s situation at the time of utterance.
I argue that this is false, and that we need a theory of context-dependence that allows for content to depend not just on
the features of the utterance’s origin, but also on features of its destination. There are cases in which a single utterance
semantically conveys different propositions to different members of its audience, which force us to say that what a sentence
conveys depends not just on the context in which it is uttered, but also on the context in which it is received. 相似文献
11.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
12.
Tamar Schapiro 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):147-167
In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims
if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having
a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the
world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction
between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to
which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction
between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation
Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. 相似文献
13.
Framing effects are well established: Listeners’ preferences depend on how outcomes are described to them, or framed. Less
well understood is what determines how speakers choose frames. Two experiments revealed that reference points systematically
influenced speakers’ choices between logically equivalent frames. For example, speakers tended to describe a 4-ounce cup filled
to the 2-ounce line as half full if it was previously empty but described it as half empty if it was previously full. Similar
results were found when speakers could describe the outcome of a medical treatment in terms of either mortality or survival
(e.g., 25% die vs. 75% survive). Two additional experiments showed that listeners made accurate inferences about speakers’
reference points on the basis of the selected frame (e.g., if a speaker described a cup as half empty, listeners inferred
that the cup used to be full). Taken together, the data suggest that frames reliably convey implicit information in addition
to their explicit content, which helps explain why framing effects are so robust. 相似文献
14.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献
15.
Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies
by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction
of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool
ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or
practice of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation
of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account
arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar
as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual
honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual
honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness.
An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity. 相似文献
16.
Neil Edward Williams 《Synthese》2009,170(1):7-19
Arguing against the claim that every dispositional property is grounded in some property other than itself, Stephen Mumford
presents what he calls the ‘Ungrounded Argument’. If successful, the Ungrounded Argument would represent a major victory for
anti-Humean metaphysics over its Humean rivals, as it would allow for the existence of primitive modality. Unfortunately,
Humeans need not yet be worried, as the Ungrounded Argument is itself lacking in grounding. I indicate where Mumford’s argument
falls down, claiming that even the dispositions of the simplest particles can have categorical bases. 相似文献
17.
Paul C. Anders 《Sophia》2011,50(1):25-37
Many religiously minded materialist philosophers have attempted to understand the doctrine of the survival of death from within
a physicalist approach. Their goal is not to show the doctrine false, but to explain how it can be true. One such approach
has been developed by Peter van Inwagen. After explaining what I call the duplication objection, I present van Inwagen’s proposal
and show how a proponent might attempt to solve the problem of duplication. I argue that the very features of the view that
aid the proponent in responding to the duplication objection entails the possibility of an impossible state of affairs—that
two distinct persons can at the same time be identical with the same bundle of material simples. The religiously minded materialist
is caught between the horns of a dilemma. One’s view regarding human persons must be robust enough to account for personal
identity over time, and so not fall to the duplication objection. At the same time, the view must not entail the possibility
of two persons temporarily having complete coincident existence. 相似文献
18.
Tengland PA 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(4):257-284
The starting point for the contemporary debate about theories of health should be the holistic theory of Lennart Nordenfelt,
claims George Khushf, not the refuted theory of Christopher Boorse. The present paper is an attempt to challenge Nordenfelt
and to present an alternative theory to his and other theories, including Boorse’s. The main problems with Nordenfelt’s theory
are that it is relativistic, that it leads to counter-intuitive results as to what goals can count as healthy, that it focuses
on the wrong kind of abilities, that it makes measuring health extra difficult, and that it does not give us a sufficient
account of health, at most a necessary one. The alternative theory proposed is two-dimensional. First, health is to have developed
the abilities and dispositions that members of one’s culture typically develop, and be able to use them, in acceptable circumstances;
and second, health is to experience positive moods and sensations, the kinds that have internal causes. The theory solves
the problems attached to Nordenfelt’s theory by not being individual relativistic, by eliminating the goals in the definition,
by giving an alternative interpretation of “ability,” by making health easier to measure, and by adding the dimension of well-being
that, together with health as ability, not only gives us a necessary, but also a sufficient, account of health. 相似文献
19.
Claude Romano 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(1):1-21
Taking the problem of perception and illusion as a leading clue, this article presents a new phenomenological approach to
perception and the world: “holism of experience.” It challenges not only Husserl’s transcendentalism, but also what remains
of it in Heidegger’s early thought, on the grounds that it is committed to the skeptical inference: “Since we can always doubt
any perception, we can always doubt perception as a whole.” The rejection of such an implicit inference leads to a relational
paradigm of Being-in-the-World that differs from Heidegger’s on many points. 相似文献
20.
This paper contributes towards a lay ethics of nanotechnology through an analysis of talk from focus groups designed to examine
how laypeople grapple with the meaning of a technology ‘in-the-making’. We describe the content of lay ethical concerns before
suggesting that this content can be understood as being structured by five archetypal narratives which underpin talk. These
we term: ‘the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’; ‘kept in the dark’; ‘opening Pandora’s box’; ‘messing with nature’;
and ‘be careful what you wish for’. We further suggest that these narratives can be understood as sharing an emphasis on the
‘giftedness’ of life, and that together they are used to resist dominant technoscientific and Enlightenment narratives of
control and mastery which are encapsulated by nanotechnology. 相似文献