Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for positive,negative, and neutral events

We investigated memory qualities for positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical events. Participants recalled two personal experiences of each type and then rated their memories on several characteristics (e.g. sensorial and contextual details). They also reported whether they ‘see’ the events in their memories from their own perspective (‘field’ memories) or whether they ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would (‘observer’ memories). Positive memories contained more sensorial (visual, smell, taste) and contextual (location, time) details than both negative and neutral events, whereas negative and neutral memories did not differ on most dimensions. Positive and negative events were more often recollected with a field perspective than neutral events. Finally, participants were classified in four groups according to the repressive coping style framework. Emotional memories of repressors were not less detailed than those of the other groups. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Switching memory perspective

The perspective in which memories were spontaneously recalled, field (original perspective) or observer (see oneself in the memory), was examined for both recent and remote memories. Recent memories were dominated by field perspective whilst remote memories were dominated by observer perspective. Further, field memories contained reliably more episodic detail than observer memories. After a 1-week interval, the same memories were recalled again but with a switched memory perspective. Switching from an observer to a field perspective did not reliably increase the amount of episodic details in a memory. Switching from field to observer perspective did, however, reliably reduce the number of episodic details. These findings suggest that memories may be represented in long-term memory with a fixed perspective, either field or observer, which can be temporarily altered sometimes changing the nature of a memory, i.e. how much detail remains accessible.     

Memory for emotionally provocative words in alexithymia: A role for stimulus relevance

Alexithymia is associated with emotion processing deficits, particularly for negative emotional information. However, also common are a high prevalence of somatic symptoms and the perception of somatic sensations as distressing. Although little research has yet been conducted on memory in alexithymia, we hypothesized a paradoxical effect of alexithymia on memory. Specifically, recall of negative emotional words was expected to be reduced in alexithymia, while memory for illness words was expected to be enhanced in alexithymia.Eighty-five high or low alexithymia participants viewed and rated arousing illness-related (“pain”), emotionally positive (“thrill”), negative (“hatred”), and neutral words (“horse”). Recall was assessed 45 min later.High alexithymia participants recalled significantly fewer negative emotion words but also more illness-related words than low alexithymia participants. The results suggest that personal relevance can shape cognitive processing of stimuli, even to enhance retention of a subclass of stimuli whose retention is generally impaired in alexithymia.     

Self-schema for assertiveness: Extending the validity of the self-schema construct

This research attempted to extend the validity of the self-schema concept by examining a previously untested self-attribute and by examining self-schema effects on the interpretation of more realistic stimulus situations than used in past studies. The attribute was a self-schema for assertiveness and the validity of this self-knowledge structure was evaluated in two studies. In Stuty 1 assertion schematics and aschematics were compared for retrieval of schema-relevant information on a laboratory task of incidental recall. In Study 2 schematics and aschematics were compared on five different tasks that required elaboration of information about rights assertion conflict situations. Study 1 results revealed that schematics as compared to aschematics recalled more assertion related adjectives but did not differ in recall of domain-irrelevant words. Results from Study 2 showed that schematics as compared to aschematics recalled more past instances of assertive behaviors when asked to elaborate why an assertion adjective was endorsed as “Like me”. Also, schematics were significantly more certain they would behave assertively both in situations where assertion was appropriate and in those where compromise was more appropriate. On two perceptual factors known to correlate with assertive behavior, schematics were more likely to judge moderately legitimate requests (i.e., ambiguous requests) as more unreasonable and when asked to generate expected consequences for assertive responses focused more on self rather than other person consequences. The consistency of the results with respect to various hypothesized functions of the self-schema construct are discussed.     

Visual perspective in autobiographical memories: Reliability,consistency, and relationship to objective memory performance

Visual perspective in autobiographical memories was examined in terms of reliability, consistency, and relationship to objective memory performance in a sample of 99 individuals. Autobiographical memories may be recalled from two visual perspectives—a field perspective in which individuals experience the memory through their own eyes, or an observer perspective in which individuals experience the memory from the viewpoint of an observer in which they can see themselves. Participants recalled nine word-cued memories that differed in emotional valence (positive, negative and neutral) and rated their memories on 18 scales. Results indicate that visual perspective was the most reliable memory characteristic overall and is consistently related to emotional intensity at the time of recall and amount of emotion experienced during the memory. Visual perspective is unrelated to memory for words, stories, abstract line drawings or faces.     

Vantage point in traumatic memory

Abstract— Persons with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) spontaneously recalled the traumatic event that led to their condition from either a field or an observer vantage point. In the former case, participants recollected the event as if they were seeing it again through their own eyes; in the latter case, the event was recalled from the perspective of a detached spectator. Analysis of the two types of recollections revealed marked differences in their contents. Whereas field memories afforded richer accounts of the affective reactions, somatic sensations, and psychological states that participants experienced during the focal trauma, observer memories contained more information about participants' physical appearance and actions and the spatial layout of the traumatic scene. Observer trauma memories were also experienced as less emotional and anxiety provoking than field trauma memories. The discussion focuses on the clinical implications of these findings and prospects for future research on traumatic memory.     

Field and observer modes of remembering

Abstract

Nigro and Neisser (1983) contrasted two ways of remembering personal experiences: the rememberer may ‘see’ the event from his or her perspective as in normal perception, or ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would. Several factors contribute to the determination of perspective, but Nigro and Neisser also reported that many subjects claimed they could change to another perspective at will. We sampled personal memories from several life periods and assessed ability to change the initially reported perspective. Changing was easier for recent or vividly recalled events, harder for older and less vividly recalled events. Memory perspectives may differ in other aspects than their imagery. A second study was conducted to determine whether affective experience is altered when perspectives are changed. The affect experienced decreased when shifting from a field to an observer perspective, but did not change with the converse shift. These studies provide further evidence that remembering is more than retrieval. The information that enters awareness is determined by the information sources in memory and the organisational scheme adopted for recollection.     

Effect of memory perspective on retrospective causal attributions

Two studies examined whether people's retrospective causal attributions might be mediated by the visual perspective from which events are recalled. In Study 1, pairs of Ss participated in "get-acquainted" conversations and made a series of attribution ratings for their performance. They returned 3 weeks later to rerate their performance on the same attribution scales and to indicate the perspective from which they remembered their earlier conversation. Ss reported either "observer" memories in which they could "see" themselves from the outside or "field" memories in which their field of view matched that of the original situation. Study 2 was identical to Study 1 with the exception that Ss' memory perspectives were manipulated via verbal instructions. In both experiments, conversations that were recalled from an observer's perspective were attributed more dispositionally. These results suggest that the different perspectives from which events can be recalled function much like the divergent visual perspectives available to actors and observers in immediate, everyday experience. Discussion of these results focuses on how they further understanding of the contradictory findings reported in the literature on temporal shifts in attributions.     

Emotion and vantage point in autobiographical

Autobiographical memories may be recalled from two different perspectives: Field memories in which the person seems to remember the scene from his/her original point of view and observer memories in which the rememberer sees him/herself in the memory image. Here, 122 undergraduates participated in an experiment examining the relation between field vs. observer perspective in memory for 10 different emotional states, including both positive and negative emotions and emotions associated with high vs. low intensity. Observer perspective was associated with reduced sensory and emotional reliving across all emotions. This effect was observed for naturally occurring memory perspective and when participants were instructed to change their perspective from field to observer, but not when participants were instructed to change perspective from observer to field.     

Closure of autobiographical memories: The effects of written recounting from first- or third-person visual perspective

Autobiographical memories are recalled with varying degrees of psychological closure. Closure is a subjective assessment of how far a remembered experience feels resolved, and it has been suggested that one predictor of closure is the amount of emotional detail in the memory. Study 1 examined which aspect of emotional detail is important for closure, and showed that open and closed negative memories were distinguished by ratings of emotion evoked during recall, not by remembered emotion from the time of the event. The recall of open memories was accompanied by more intense, more negative, and less positive emotion than the recall of closed memories. Biased retelling of memories has been shown to influence closure and on the basis of evidence that third-person recall serves a distancing function, Study 2 examined whether instructions to repeatedly recount an open memory from a third-person perspective would increase closure compared with a single or repeated recounting from a first-person perspective. While repeated third-person recounting had the greatest influence on closure, there were also increases in the first-person recounting groups. The results suggest that closure can be increased by reporting memories in written narrative form, particularly if repeatedly expressed from the third-person perspective.     

Closure of autobiographical memories: The effects of written recounting from first- or third-person visual perspective

Autobiographical memories are recalled with varying degrees of psychological closure. Closure is a subjective assessment of how far a remembered experience feels resolved, and it has been suggested that one predictor of closure is the amount of emotional detail in the memory. Study 1 examined which aspect of emotional detail is important for closure, and showed that open and closed negative memories were distinguished by ratings of emotion evoked during recall, not by remembered emotion from the time of the event. The recall of open memories was accompanied by more intense, more negative, and less positive emotion than the recall of closed memories. Biased retelling of memories has been shown to influence closure and on the basis of evidence that third-person recall serves a distancing function, Study 2 examined whether instructions to repeatedly recount an open memory from a third-person perspective would increase closure compared with a single or repeated recounting from a first-person perspective. While repeated third-person recounting had the greatest influence on closure, there were also increases in the first-person recounting groups. The results suggest that closure can be increased by reporting memories in written narrative form, particularly if repeatedly expressed from the third-person perspective.     

Collaboration in Recall: Do Pairs of People Cross-cue Each Other to Produce New Memories?

When people collaborate over their recall of a shared experience, it might be expected that they could “cross-cue” each other so as to produce new memories not available to either member of the pair on their own. In a previous series of experiments (Meudell et al., 1992), we found that pairs of people always recalled more than one person, but we failed to show that social interaction facilitated performance so as to produce such “emergent” new memories. However, a phenomenon akin to cross-cuing was employed by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) in their classic study of the availability and accessibility of memories; accordingly, in this study, we repeated Tulving and Pearlstone's work directly in a social context. So as to assess whether new memories emerged in collaborating pairs, a sequential design was employed. People learned categorized lists of words, and then all the subjects recalled the items strictly on their own. Subjects then recalled again in pairs (collaboratively) or once more on their own. The results showed that even when the opportunity for cross-cuing was directly manipulated through the provision of categorized lists, no additional new memories emerged in the collaborating groups. Possible mechanisms for the results are considered.     

Context, categorization, and recall: The “change-of-standard” effect

A psycholinguistically based conception of the relation among context, categorization, and memory is tested by examining what happens to people's memory of an object when the object is initially categorized in terms of the context in which it appears, but, when the object is later recalled, this context is no longer salient. Subjects read about the sentencing decisions of a target trial judge in the context of other trial judges who consistently gave either higher sentences or lower sentences than the target judge. As predicted, subjects tended to categorize the target judge as “lenient” in the former, harsh context condition, and as “harsh” in the latter, lenient context condition. A week later, subjects read about the sentencing decisions of some additional judges, and then recalled the sentencing decisions of the target judge they had read about the week before. Across the two sessions, either a harsh, moderate, or lenient category norm for judges' sentencing decisions was established by having subjects read about decisions that involved either high, medium, or low sentences, respectively. The results indicated that subjects recalled the target judge's decisions by interpreting their prior categorization of his behavior in terms of the category norm established across the two sessions rather than the original context. Thus, subjects who were exposed to the same target in the same circumstances, and initially categorized the target in the same way, nevertheless remembered his behavior differently if their category norm was different at the moment of recall. Other types of “change of standard” and their implications for human judgment and memory are discussed.     

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.     

Vantage point in episodic memory

University undergraduates undertook a series of manual tasks (e.g., shaping objects out of clay) and later recalled the experiences they had while doing so from either afield or anobserver vantage point. In the former case, the subjects mentally reinstated the original task environment as if they were seeing it again through their own eyes; in the latter condition, the original task environment was envisioned from the perspective of a detached spectator. Analysis of the subjects’ recollections revealed marked differences in the contents of field and observer memories. For instance, whereas field memories afforded richer accounts of the affective reactions, physical sensations, and psychological states that the subjects experienced as they performed the tasks, observer memories included more information about how the subjects looked, what they did, or where things were. Discussion focuses on prospects for future research whose aim would be to investigate the forensic and clinical implications of the field/observer distinction.     

Using Personal Landmark Events Improves Judgments about Time,but not Contents,in Autobiographical Memory

Landmark events are strong memories that function as reference points for other memories. We examined whether people's accuracy in recalling when an earlier target event occurred was related to whether they spontaneously used personal landmark events or not. Participants completed two questionnaires separated by 2‐31 days. In the first, they described a personal event including what happened, who was there, where it was, and when it occurred. In the second questionnaire, they recalled the personal event and specific details. They also described whether they had used landmark events to assist their recall. Overall, participants' memories for temporal and content information faded over time. Spontaneous use of landmark events was associated with an increase in participants’ recall of temporal information but not content information. Analysis of the landmark events revealed that almost two‐thirds were significant events, such as birthdays, parties, and travel‐related events. Applications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of burn injury on adolescents autobiographical memory

Autobiographical memory recall was investigated in two female adolescent groups; one group who had experienced a burn injury and a matched control group. The Burn group was not currently depressed or anxious, but scored significantly higher on the intrusion subscale of the impact of event scale compared to controls. Two autobiographical memory tasks, the autobiographical memory cueing task and the Children's Autobiographical Memory Inventory (CAMI), were used. For the cueing task, the Burn group was significantly slower to recall specific memories. This group also recalled significantly fewer specific memories and significantly more extended overgeneral memories. For the CAMI, the burns group produced significantly lower semantic and episodic recall. The Burn group also produced significant correlations between sub-scales of the impact of event scale and selected measures on the autobiographical memory tasks. Higher intrusion scores were associated with less detailed episodic recall. Higher avoidance scores were associated with longer latencies to recall memories to negative cue words and fewer specific memories to all cue words. These results are discussed from the perspective that the Burn group experienced intrusive thoughts which interfered with normal autobiographical functioning.