Global precedence in attended and nonattended objects

In four experiments we evaluated whether there is a priority in early perceptual analysis for the global aspect of a nonattended, visual, compound stimulus. In all experiments, two objects were distinguished by being enclosed in either a square or a circle, and each object consisted of a larger letter constructed from smaller letters. Attention was directed to one of the two objects on the basis of either the square/circle distinction (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or a visual precue (Experiment 4). In agreement with previous findings, for attended objects, the global aspect was identified faster and was more difficult to ignore than the local aspect. However, for nonattended objects, no evidence was found for an overall priority in perceptual processing leading to identification of the global aspect. Rather, the results indicate that there is a priority in perceptual processing for the general category of the global information contained within nonattended objects. Although the results provide some support for the view that global information receives priority during early perceptual analysis, aspects of the results are more consistent with postidentification accounts of global precedence.     

What logical pluralism cannot be

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.     

心理疲劳不可忽视

随着科技的更新、信息的冲击、生活节奏的加快,给人们带来了巨大的心理压力,从而使人们产生各种心理应激,造成“心理疲劳”。所谓应激,就生物学而言就是刺激和反应。心理疲劳不像生理疲劳那样显露,它是潜在的、隐性的。它表现为紧张、焦虑、注意力不集中、动作不协     

Abrupt onsets cannot be ignored

Participants identified target letters at cued locations in the presence of occasional abrupt onsets of new distractor letters. The onsets distracted the participants and impaired their letter identification performance despite confirmation that they were using the information provided by the cue. This result contrasts with earlier results found by other researchers that revealed an ability of participants to ignore abrupt onsets in some cases. Our results, however, were obtained under conditions that prevented anticipatory eye movements to the target. In a subsequent experiment when participants were permitted to look at the target in advance, the distracting effect of the onsets was eliminated, suggesting that participants may have looked at the target in the earlier studies. We conclude that abrupt onsets cannot be ignored unless the target element receives a substantial advantage via fixation.     

Why Science cannot be Value-Free

Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science. Its rationality cannot be seen as merely instrumental––as it was seen by the ideal of value-free science––for this would result in limiting the autonomy of science and reducing scientists to “minds to hire”. The scientific rationality must be seen as practical rationality which takes into account the full horizon of values. The scientific responsibility must also be broaden in scope and type. On this basis I draw three practical conclusions concerning the organization of research and training of young scientists, appealing to Plato’s claim that those most capable of healing are also those most capable of harming.     

Selective attention and the perception of an attended nontarget object

Although many theories of attention assume that attending to an object results in the processing of all its feature dimensions, there has been no direct evidence that the irrelevant dimensions of an attended nontarget object are encoded. This article explores factors that modulate such processing. In 6 experiments, participants made a speeded response to a probe preceded by a prime that varied in 2 dimensions. Their reaction times to the probe were influenced by the response compatibility between the relevant and irrelevant dimensions of the prime. Furthermore, the effect was observed only when attention was directed to a nonlocation object feature and when participants' reaction times were relatively long. These results suggest that the effect of attention on a nontarget object is more complex than was previously understood.     

Function follows form: activation of shape and function features during object identification

Most theories of semantic memory characterize knowledge of a given object as comprising a set of semantic features. But how does conceptual activation of these features proceed during object identification? We present the results of a pair of experiments that demonstrate that object recognition is a dynamically unfolding process in which function follows form. We used eye movements to explore whether activating one object's concept leads to the activation of others that share perceptual (shape) or abstract (function) features. Participants viewed 4-picture displays and clicked on the picture corresponding to a heard word. In critical trials, the conceptual representation of 1 of the objects in the display was similar in shape or function (i.e., its purpose) to the heard word. Importantly, this similarity was not apparent in the visual depictions (e.g., for the target Frisbee, the shape-related object was a triangular slice of pizza, a shape that a Frisbee cannot take); preferential fixations on the related object were therefore attributable to overlap of the conceptual representations on the relevant features. We observed relatedness effects for both shape and function, but shape effects occurred earlier than function effects. We discuss the implications of these findings for current accounts of the representation of semantic memory.     

Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.     

Why elementary propositions cannot be negative

Philosophical Studies -     

There cannot be two omnipotent beings

We argue that there is no metaphysically possible world with two or more omnipotent beings, due to the potential for conflicts of will between them. We reject the objection that omnipotent beings could exist in the same world when their wills could not conflict. We then turn to Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith’s argument that two coexisting beings could remain omnipotent even if, on some occasions, their wills cancel each other out so that neither can bring about what they intend. We argue that this argument has an absurd consequence, namely having to regard an utterly powerless being as omnipotent.     

Preschoolers' and adults' reliance on object shape and object function for lexical extension.

We investigated the developmental progression of reliance on object function versus object shape to extend novel words. In 3 experiments, 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults were presented with sets of objects consisting of a target, a same-shape/different-function match, a different-shape/same-function match, and a distracter. In Experiments 1 and 2, function was emphasized during the word learning phase and participants were given direct experience with the functions of target and test objects. In Experiment 3, function was emphasized both during the learning phase and when requesting a referent of the novel labels. Across all 3 experiments, 3- and 5-year-olds focused on shape while adults focused on function when extending the novel words. These results suggest a developmental change in the consideration of shape and function in lexical extension.     

It cannot be fitting to blame God

This paper argues that it cannot be fitting to blame God. I show that divine immutability, even on a weak conception, implies that God's ethical character cannot change. I then argue that blame aims at a change in the ethical character of the one blamed. This claim is directly intuitive, explains a wide set of intuitions about when blame is unfitting, and is implied by most of the theories blame offered in the philosophical literature. Since blame targeted at God aims to change God's ethical character, an impossibility, such blame is not fitting. I then draw on this conclusion to sketch a new theodicy. I argue that a necessary condition on being blameworthy is that one can be blamed under some possible condition. So, God cannot be blameworthy. Further, I argue that if someone cannot be blameworthy, then they cannot do wrong. Wrong actions tend to make us blameworthy, but since God cannot be blameworthy nothing can tend to make him blameworthy – God cannot do wrong.     

Perceived object shape affects the perceived direction of self-movement.

The 'direct-perception' model of heading perception posits that heading is computed directly from optic flow without an intervening structural representation of environmental layout. Here, I give an example in which such a representation is seen to play a role in the interpretation of optic flow. Manipulating the outline of concave objects to give an erroneous percept of convexity caused the perceived direction of heading during a stimulated approach to change as well. Thus, the representation of environmental structure provides the context for using and interpreting image motion.