A PROBLEM ABOUT THE MORALITY OF SOME COMMON FORMS OF PRAYER

At a time of acute danger, people commonly petition God for help for themselves or their loved ones; such as praying that an avalanche heading in one's direction be diverted, or that an organ donor be found for one's dying child. Such prayer seems natural and, indeed, for believers, reasonable and acceptable. It seems perverse to condemn such typical prayer, as wrong. But once we closely examine what is actually happening in such situations, we shall see that frequently prayer of this sort is morally problematic. I argue that such prayer ought to be seen as a form of action (rather than, say, mere hope), thereby needing to meet the higher moral standards that apply to actions; and that the assumption of the benevolence of the deity does not suffice to make such prayer legitimate.     

LIVING WITH THE WICKED PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Outlining the characteristics of “wicked” and “super‐wicked” problems, climate change is considered as a global super‐wicked problem that is primarily about the future. Being global‐ and future‐oriented makes climate change something we have to learn to live with but cannot expect to solve. Because the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) is a multidisciplinary society that yokes the natural and social sciences with values, it is in a position to explore strategies for living with climate change—exemplified by the articles in this section. Finally, asking “who/what is in charge,” it is suggested that in a dynamically interrelated and evolving world no one is. It is important to distinguish between good that is already created and the creative interactions that give rise to new good. In order to live with climate change, our primary orientation should be to live with the creativity that has created and continues to create our life on Planet Earth—since we are not able to know what the future holds.     

THE SPLIT LEVEL PROBLEM AS RELATED TO THE TASK OF EVALUATING ITEMS IN THE CLINICAL AREA

H olley , J. W. & H ansson , K. The split level problem as related to the task of evaluating items in the clinical area. Scand.J. Psychol ., 1969, 10, 124–128—It is pointed out that correlational values can be distorted in item evaluation when the proportions of persons in the criterion groups are variant. The use of a 'K ratio' is suggested as a possible solution to be applied under restrictive conditions.     

GENERATING HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF STUDENT PROBLEM BEHAVIOR BY OBSERVING TEACHER BEHAVIOR

We examined whether, as predicted by research on child effects, we could generate hypotheses about the function of student problem behavior by observing the amount of attention teachers provided to students. In the first phase of the study, we observed the amount of attention teachers distributed among small groups of students who exhibited problem behavior in individual or small-group instructional settings (problem behavior presumably maintained by attention or escape). Based on the amount of attention each student received, we generated hypotheses about the function of his or her problem behavior. In the second phase of the study, we determined the accuracy of these predictions by conducting a brief functional assessment with each student. Results confirmed that, for 14 of the 15 students, we were able to generate accurate hypotheses about the function of their problem behavior. These results suggest the potential efficacy of using the amount of attention teachers distribute among groups of students to generate empirically based hypotheses about the function of student problem behavior maintained by attention and/or escape. These results also illustrate the efficiency of this procedure; by observing teacher behavior, we were able to generate hypotheses about the function of problem behavior for several students at one time.     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.