Understanding the influence of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior

In this study we investigate how outcome valence affects the importance of self-interest and fairness in ultimatum bargaining. In three experiments we systematically study the effect of outcome valence on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Results on all three aspects show strong evidence for the hypothesis that fairness becomes more important and self-interest becomes less important in negative valence bargaining. Fairness accessibility was higher when bargaining involved negative payoffs than when it involved positive payoffs (Experiment 1), the fairness norm was stronger in negatively versus positively valenced bargaining when an identical unequal offer benefiting the allocators was evaluated (Experiment 2), and allocators allocated more to recipients in negative valence bargaining than in positive valence bargaining (Experiment 3). We relate our findings to insights derived from the do-no-harm principle.     

Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups

In this chapter we present a social utility approach to coalition formation. The central tenet of our approach is that outcome allocations and partner selection in multiparty situations are affected by self-interest and fairness. Inspired by the social utility model we argue that the relative weight assigned to both components is affected by structural aspects of the situation and individual characteristics of the negotiators. We first investigate how coalition bargainers substantiate their coalition demands. We show that bargainers are self-serving in their choice of allocation rules, indicating that perceptions of fairness can be coloured by self-interest. Second, we investigate how the alignment of self-interest and fairness fosters the formation of coalitions that maximise the payoffs of its members. Finally, we present a series of experiments that expands the notion of being fair to those who are excluded from a coalition. We show that bargainers are reluctant to benefit themselves when this harms the outcomes of others and that this is dependent on personal factors (e.g., social value orientations), situational factors (e.g., the valence of outcomes), and whether bargainers negotiate in an interindividual or in an intergroup setting.     

Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining

People typically think of negotiations as competitive, which often leads them to engage in secrecy and even deception. In three experiments we show that this approach can backfire in coalition bargaining. Results show that, even though bargainers with an outcome advantage only obtain favorable outcomes when this information is public, they rarely choose to reveal this information. Fairness motivations fueled decisions to reveal this information and make attractive offers whereas self-interest fueled decisions not to reveal and make unattractive offers. Finally, perspective taking increased proselfs' inclinations to keep their advantage private whereas it increased prosocials' inclinations to reveal. These findings suggest that many people are not naturally inclined to reveal private information when they have an outcome advantage, but that fairness motives encourage revelation and, ironically, increase revealers' outcomes in coalition bargaining. Thus, in this context, honesty pays.     

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

One of the main issues in research on ultimatum bargaining is whether bargainers are motivated by self-interest or by a concern for fairness. It is difficult to distinguish between both motivations, because it may be in the own interest to make fair offers. In the current paper on ultimatum bargaining, it is investigated whether bargainers are truly motivated to be fair, or whether they merely strategically use fairness as a means to increase their own outcomes. The results of two experimental studies indicate that social value orientations play an important role: strategic use of fairness is mainly displayed by proselfs.     

Effects of social value orientations on fairness judgments

The authors assessed the impact that social value orientations--prosocial (i.e., concerned about outcomes for both oneself and others) versus proself (i.e., concerned about one's own outcome only)--had on fairness judgments in a non-negotiation setting. The results indicated that prosocials generally formed fairness judgments in a manner suggested by equity theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw an equal outcome as fairer than a favorable or unfavorable outcome. The fairness determinations of proselfs, however, tended to follow the tenets of self-interest theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw a favorable outcome as fairer than an unfavorable outcome. Contrary to self-interest theory, proselfs did not find a favorable outcome fairer than an equal outcome. These findings indicate that social value orientations differentially affect the evaluation of outcome information in the formation of fairness judgments.     

Response–effect compatibility of finger–numeral configurations in arithmetical context

Research in experimental economics suggests that decision making in strategic interactions is often guided by a concern for fairness. However, experimental economics studies routinely place participants of equal social status and no prior social history in anonymous interactions, a context that would tend to foster the adoption of an egalitarian fairness norm. Extensive research in anthropology (Fiske, 1991) and psychology (Bugental, 2000) suggests that social norms, including fairness norms, are relationship-specific, raising doubts about whether the concern for egalitarian fairness observed in the experimental economics literature would generalize to a wider range of social relations. In this paper we focus on an alternative social norm characteristic of hierarchical relationships: noblesse oblige—the obligation of high-ranking individuals to act honorably and beneficently towards subordinates. In a series of five experiments, we show that the norm of noblesse oblige predicts tolerance of free riding better than individual self-interest does.     

社会决策：自我利益与他人利益的权衡

自我利益与他人利益之间的冲突是社会决策中最重要的心理冲突之一。在自我利益与他人利益中寻求平衡是社会决策的关键。西方经济学理论在很长一段时间里认为,追求自我利益是人类行为的唯一动机。近年来越来越多的理论和实证研究表明在社会互动中,人类同时也会关心他人的利益。本文试图将自我利益和他人利益作为社会决策中利益权衡的两端,综合起来阐释诸如合作、利他、公平、利己等人类社会决策行为的重要概念,力图将纷繁的概念整合到统一、清晰的框架中。     

Adding versus averaging: Evaluability theory applied to job choice decisions

While the unique roles of individual job attributes (e.g., salary and benefits) in job and organizational attraction have received extensive research attention, research examining the mechanisms through which an overall evaluation of a job option is made by combining evaluations of individual attributes is scarce. The current study examined the process through which job choice decisions are made under three conditions: when evaluating a single job offer, when comparing two job offers, and when evaluating more than two job offers. In Study 1, it was found that when a single job offer is evaluated, the average of perceived values of attributes in an offer (e.g., the perceived attractiveness of a salary) drives the choice, whereas the difference between jobs is what matters when two jobs are evaluated simultaneously, potentially leading to a preference reversal between conditions when the same two jobs are evaluated. In Study 2, it was found that average values of attributes across options (e.g., average salary in all job offers received) influence job choice when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously. These findings indicate that in all three conditions, job choice decisions are influenced by the evaluability of the choice set, which becomes low when a single job offer is evaluated without any context, or when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously, and becomes high when two jobs are compared with each other. When evaluability is low, candidates resort to averaging as the decision rule, whereas adding is used when evaluability is high.     

Are perceptions of fairness relationship-specific? The case of noblesse oblige

Research in experimental economics suggests that decision making in strategic interactions is often guided by a concern for fairness. However, experimental economics studies routinely place participants of equal social status and no prior social history in anonymous interactions, a context that would tend to foster the adoption of an egalitarian fairness norm. Extensive research in anthropology (Fiske, 1991) and psychology (Bugental, 2000) suggests that social norms, including fairness norms, are relationship-specific, raising doubts about whether the concern for egalitarian fairness observed in the experimental economics literature would generalize to a wider range of social relations. In this paper we focus on an alternative social norm characteristic of hierarchical relationships: noblesse oblige—the obligation of high-ranking individuals to act honorably and beneficently towards subordinates. In a series of five experiments, we show that the norm of noblesse oblige predicts tolerance of free riding better than individual self-interest does.     

Procedural fairness in ultimatum bargaining: Effects of interactional fairness and formal procedure on respondents’ reactions to unequal offers1

Abstract: Ninety‐nine Japanese students received one of three offers in an ultimatum bargaining scenario: unfavorable and unequal; equal; or favorable but unequal. These offers were determined by either the other participant or by a computerized lottery. We also manipulated the arbitrariness of the role assignment procedure. Participants perceived the intentional small offer as more unfair in the interactional sense than the unintentional small offer, while they perceived the same offers as unfair in the distributive sense, regardless of intentionality. The intentional small offer was more likely to be rejected than the unintentional small offer. Participants perceived the arbitrary procedure of the role assignment as highly unfair, whereas the difference of arbitrariness in role assignment procedures had no significant impact on their reactions to the offer. Acceptance of the offer was strongly determined by interactional fairness, as well as by distributive fairness, and these types of fairness were influenced by different situational characteristics, such as intentionality, the size of the offer, and the equality of the offer.     

Assimilation and contrast in organizational justice: The role of primed mindsets in the psychology of the fair process effect

This paper focuses on the psychology of the fair process effect (the frequently replicated finding that perceived procedural fairness positively affects people's reactions). It is argued that when people have received an outcome they usually assimilate their ratings of outcome fairness and affect toward their experiences of procedural fairness. As a result, ratings show fair process effects. It is also possible, however, that when people have received their outcome they compare this outcome to the procedure they experienced: Is the outcome better or worse than the procedure? A result of this comparison process may be that contrast effects are found such that higher levels of procedural fairness lead to more negative ratings of outcome fairness and affect. Research findings suggest that when comparison goals have been primed, contrast effects indeed can be found. The implications for the psychology of the fair process effect and organizational behavior are discussed.     

Dynamic adjustments of cognitive control during economic decision making

Decision making in the Ultimatum game requires the resolution of conflicts between economic self-interest and fairness intuitions. Since cognitive control processes play an important role in conflict resolution, the present study examined how control processes that are triggered by conflicts between fairness and self-interest in unfair offers affect subsequent decisions in the Ultimatum game. Our results revealed that more unfair offers were accepted following previously unfair, compared to previously fair offers. Interestingly, the magnitude of this conflict adaptation effect correlated with the individual subjects' focus on economic self-interest. We concluded that conflicts between fairness and self-interest trigger cognitive control processes, which reinforce the focus on the current task goal.     

Counterfactual comparison modulates fairness consideration in the mini‐ultimatum game: An event‐related potentials study

Existing literature on the mini‐ultimatum game indicates that counterfactual comparison between chosen and unchosen alternatives is of great importance for individual's fairness consideration. However, it is still unclear how counterfactual comparison influences the electrophysiological responses to unfair chosen offers. In conjunction with event‐related potentials’ (ERPs) technique, the current study aimed to explore the issue by employing a modified version of the mini‐ultimatum game where a fixed set of two alternatives (unfair offer vs. fair alternative, unfair vs. hyperfair alternative, unfair offer vs. hyperunfair alternative) was presented before the chosen offer. The behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to accept unfair chosen offers when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. The ERPs results showed that the feedback‐related negativity (FRN) elicited by unfair chosen offers was insensitive to the type of unchosen alternative when correcting for possible overlap with other components. In contrast, unfair chosen offers elicited larger P300 amplitudes when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. These findings suggest that counterfactual comparison may take effect at later stages of fairness consideration as reflected by the P300.     

Intergroup fairness and bias in children

In recent years in research on intergroup relationships, the assumption has increasingly been made that discrimination dominates decisions when individuals allocate resources between (members of) own and other group. Conversely, in empirical studies of interpersonal decision-making, including an extensive literature on the development of children's allocation rules within dyadic relationships, it has been repeatedly observed that in dyadic relationships choices though responsive to various changes in the environment, are more strongly governed by fairness rules. The present research extends the interpersonal fairness paradigm to the intergroup case, and examines the effects of some of those variables, namely, children's age, input and attitudes toward other, that have been observed to influence choice behaviour within interpersonal relationships. The findings indicate that as children are socialized, fairness rules also play an increasing dominant role in intergroup allocation decisions, and that both relative input and the language of the outgroup influence such decisions. At the same time, there is some preliminary evidence to indicate that the relative strength of self-interest may be somewhat stronger in intergroup than in interpersonal relationships. Finally, a number of the issues that must be confronted in comparing the two more important forms of human social choices, interpersonal and intergroup decision-making, are considered.     

The multi-value basis of procedural justice

Three experiments demonstrate that multiple values can account for the relation between respectful treatment and judgments of procedural fairness. The Group Value Theory of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) asserts that respectful treatment is viewed as fair because it communicates positive information about one's standing within one's group. We propose that other values introduced in other contexts, including a desire for positive intergroup standing, and self-interest, will also mediate the relation between respect and procedural fairness. Three experiments are reported in which individuals have encounters with ingroup or outgroup members who treat them respectfully or disrespectfully. Results from these experiments support this multiple value model by showing that: (1) Each of the value judgments of intragroup standing, intergroup standing, and self-interest has positive direct effects on procedural fairness; and (2) The effect of respect on procedural fairness is mediated by each of these value judgments. Additionally, evidence is summarized that is generally supportive of a third, ancillary hypothesis: (3) The meaning of respect varies across contexts that highlight different values. These findings suggest that theorizing about procedural fairness will benefit by recognizing the multiply-determined and contextually-dependent nature of procedural fairness.     

The salience of a recipient’s alternatives: Inter- and intrapersonal comparison in ultimatum games

The social utility model suggests that in social decision-making, both inter- and intrapersonal comparisons are important in assessing the utility of a decision outcome. In the ultimatum game both these comparisons play a role. This is especially true for recipients reacting to an unfair offer. We propose that the relative weights inter- and intrapersonal comparisons receive in ultimatum games depend on the way the decision is structured. In three studies we show that presenting recipients with a straightforward choice instead of the usual accept/reject question makes recipients more inclined to accept unfair offers. Moreover, the existence of an alternative outcome, i.e., the fact that refusal of the offer also leads to a substantial outcome, similarly raises the level of acceptances in a standard ultimatum game. Results are discussed in relation to the joint/separate evaluation disparity and the distinction between occurrences and non-occurrences.     

Revisiting the self-interest versus values debate: The role of temporal perspective

Scholars of public opinion have struggled to explain why people often vote against their economic self-interest in favor of a value-based rationale. Based on Construal Level Theory (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007), we argue that both values and material self-interest affect social and political attitudes, but in different temporal contexts. Specifically, because material self-interest is more concrete and applicable to everyday concerns, we predict that it should carry more weight with regard to judgments made in the context of the near future. In contrast, values, which are more abstract by nature, should carry greater weight for judgments made in the distant future. In an experimental test of this hypothesis, we presented participants with a fictitious policy that affected their pocketbooks in an otherwise value-laden domain. We found that people's financial self-interest more strongly predicted attitudes toward a proposal to increase tuition in the near condition, whereas antiegalitarian values more strongly predicted attitudes in the far condition. These findings offer new insights into the symbolic politics debate.     

Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining

In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient’s use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.     

关于个人利益的心理学研究

个人利益是影响人的行为和态度的一个重要动机因素。该文分3部分系统地介绍了当代心理学家主要是西方心理学家关于个人利益的研究,分析了个人利益在人类行为中的作用、个人利益与态度的关系、个人利益对认知过程的影响以及跨文化差异比较等几个研究方向,从总体上展现了这些研究领域的现状和进展,并提出了值得进一步探究的问题。