Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential effects of amount on temporal and probability discounting of gains and losses

In four experiments, we compared the effects of delay, probability, and monetary amount on the subjective value of gains and losses. For delayed gains, smaller amounts were discounted more steeply than larger amounts, whereas the opposite pattern was observed with probabilistic gains. For both delayed and probabilistic losses, however, amount had much smaller and less reliable effects on discounting. Taken together, the pattern of differential magnitude effects leads to delayed gains' being discounted significantly more steeply than delayed losses, but only at smaller amounts, whereas probabilistic gains are discounted significantly more steeply than probabilistic losses, but only at larger amounts. Even though the same hyperbola-like function described both individual and group discounting of delayed and probabilistic gains and losses, the present findings suggest that different processes are involved in discounting positive and negative outcomes. Raw data may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Delay discounting of monetary gains and losses in adolescents with ADHD: Contribution of delay aversion to choice

Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.     

Preference reversals with losses

People who prefer larger, later gains over smaller, sooner gains when considering outcomes far in the future often reverse their preference as the alternatives become closer in time. This finding, which is contrary to a normative economic account of intertemporal choice, has been interpreted as support for hyperboloid discounting, but the results can also be explained by steeper discounting of smaller amounts. The present study is the first to demonstrate that analogous preference reversals occur with losses: People who preferred a smaller, sooner loss over a larger, later loss when the outcomes were far in the future reversed their preference when these alternatives were closer in time. Because there was no magnitude effect (i.e., smaller losses were not discounted more steeply than larger losses), the present findings strongly support the proposition that reversals in preference between delayed outcomes occur because of the hyperboloid shape of the discounting function.     

情绪对延迟折扣的影响：现状、机制与展望

延迟折扣研究领域日益重视情绪的影响作用。本文基于三类研究取向对情绪与延迟折扣关系研究进行了回顾。情绪效价和唤醒度均影响延迟折扣,但是研究结果并不一致;具体情绪类型不同,其对延迟折扣影响也存在差异。除此之外,本文就情绪信息理论、情绪动机维度理论和评估倾向理论如何解释延迟折扣进行了详细阐述。未来的研究需要进一步深入考察情绪影响延迟折扣的认知神经机制,从而为延迟折扣的负性情绪效应的干预提供可靠的科学依据。     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

A discounting framework for choice with delayed and probabilistic rewards

When choosing between delayed or uncertain outcomes, individuals discount the value of such outcomes on the basis of the expected time to or the likelihood of their occurrence. In an integrative review of the expanding experimental literature on discounting, the authors show that although the same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, a variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account. The authors also review studies that compare discounting in different populations and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. The present effort illustrates the value of studying choice involving both delayed and probabilistic outcomes within a general discounting framework that uses similar experimental procedures and a common analytical approach.     

Discounting of food,sex, and money

Discounting is a useful framework for understanding choice involving a range of delayed and probabilistic outcomes (e.g., money, food, drugs), but relatively few studies have examined how people discount other commodities (e.g., entertainment, sex). Using a novel discounting task, where the length of a line represented the value of an outcome and was adjusted using a staircase procedure, we replicated previous findings showing that individuals discount delayed and probabilistic outcomes in a manner well described by a hyperbola-like function. In addition, we found strong positive correlations between discounting rates of delayed, but not probabilistic, outcomes. This suggests that discounting of delayed outcomes may be relatively predictable across outcome types but that discounting of probabilistic outcomes may depend more on specific contexts. The generality of delay discounting and potential context dependence of probability discounting may provide important information regarding factors contributing to choice behavior.     

Pigeons' discounting of probabilistic and delayed reinforcers

Pigeons' discounting of probabilistic and delayed food reinforcers was studied using adjusting-amount procedures. In the probability discounting conditions, pigeons chose between an adjusting number of food pellets contingent on a single key peck and a larger, fixed number of pellets contingent on completion of a variable-ratio schedule. In the delay discounting conditions, pigeons chose between an adjusting number of pellets delivered immediately and a larger, fixed number of pellets delivered after a delay. Probability discounting (i.e., subjective value as a function of the odds against reinforcement) was as well described by a hyperboloid function as delay discounting was (i.e., subjective value as a function of the time until reinforcement). As in humans, the exponents of the hyperboloid function when it was fitted to the probability discounting data were lower than the exponents of the hyperboloid function when it was fitted to the delay discounting data. The subjective values of probabilistic reinforcers were strongly correlated with predictions based on simply substituting the average delay to their receipt in each probabilistic reinforcement condition into the hyperboloid discounting function. However, the subjective values were systematically underestimated using this approach. Using the discounting function proposed by Mazur (1989), which takes into account the variability in the delay to the probabilistic reinforcers, the accuracy with which their subjective values could be predicted was increased. Taken together, the present findings are consistent with Rachlin's (Rachlin, 1990; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986) hypothesis that choice involving repeated gambles may be interpreted in terms of the delays to the probabilistic reinforcers.     

Temporal discounting in "gain now-lose later" and "lose now-gain later" conditions

Studies on temporal discounting typically involve choosing between two outcomes of the same sign, i.e., positive or negative. For example, participants often are given a choice between a smaller, sooner gain and a larger, but later gain, or (less commonly) the options may be a sooner, larger loss and a later, but smaller loss. In contrast, participants in this study (N= 129; 66 women and 63 men, volunteers from Warsaw, Poland, all employed, with college education, ranging in age from 23 to 50 years, M=32.3 yr., SD=7.4) had to make a yes-or-no decision as to whether they would accept a financial offer involving a combination of a gain and a loss. This offer could be either an immediate gain to be followed later by a larger loss or an immediate loss followed later by a larger gain. Despite the substantial differences between the options in the present study and those in typical discounting studies, the same hyperboloid discounting function that describes choice between immediate and delayed gains also accurately described choice in the substantially different situations presented in the present study. In addition, steeper discounting was observed with a smaller delayed outcome than with a larger delayed outcome.     

负折扣现象:跨期决策中的自我-他人决策差异

负折扣现象作为一种违背时间折扣假定的现象越来越多地引起研究者关注。本文通过两种指标考察了为自己决策和为他人决策在负折扣现象上的差异。实验1运用二择一选择范式考察人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时对于何时发生负性事件的时间偏好。结果发现,相比较于为他人决策,为自己决策时被试更倾向于选择早些发生负性事件,即更容易产生负折扣现象。实验2运用测量时间折扣率的经典范式考察了人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时的时间折扣率。结果发现,为自己决策时比为他人决策时的时间折扣率更小,更容易出现负折扣率。总体结果表明,为自己决策比为他人决策更容易出现负折扣现象。从情绪卷入的角度看,我们推测,为自己决策时由于更多的预期负性情绪卷入,从而导致更容易产生负折扣现象。     

The sign effect,systematic devaluations and zero discounting

The sign effect is the steeper discounting of gains compared to losses. However, we see a greater sign effect on an individual level compared to an aggregate level. In this experiment, we compare discounting of gains and losses on an individual and aggregate level, to explore further details about when and to what extent human adults discount. Thirty-one participants went through a computer-based choice-task procedure of hypothetical monetary gains and losses. The results show clear qualitative differences between discounting of gains and losses, adding empirical data to support the sign effect. The results also support previous findings that show that aggregate and individual results do not always correspond. Further, the within-subject details showing zero discounting or nonsystematic changes concerning losses, replicate earlier studies suggesting that discounting of gains and losses involve different reinforcing contingencies. The present study expands on this research area by including verbal reports, supplementing details about the unobserved reinforcing contingencies. Implications of research on discounting may indicate how to deal with decision-making challenges and might shed light on why predictions about complex decision making sometimes fail.     

Asymmetry of the group context effect on delay discounting

Binary choice delay discounting tasks require participants to indicate preference between smaller, immediate, and larger, delayed rewards. Previous research indicates that when the delayed reward is shared with others, the delayed outcome is preferred compared with when the outcomes are for the self only, resulting in lower rates of delay discounting. The present series of studies sought to replicate and extend this finding. Study 1 compared delay discounting on a standard task in which both immediate and delayed outcomes are for the self and a group context task where the delayed outcome was shared with one other person. Replicating previous results, group context resulted in lower rates of delay discounting, and this effect was independent of how the shared outcome was presented. Study 2 compared delay discounting on a standard task and a group context task where the immediate outcome was shared. In contrast to Study 1, group context resulted in higher rates of delay discounting, suggesting that preference in intertemporal choice tracks the shared outcome. Moreover, this effect was not independent of how the shared outcome was presented. This is the first study to reveal that group context, when applied to the immediate outcome, can result in higher rates of delay discounting.     

Episodic Future Thinking Reduces Delay Discounting of Gains and Losses: The Role of Regulatory Focus1,2

We examined the moderating effect of regulatory foci on the efficacy of episodic future thinking in reducing delay discounting. We hypothesized that the impact of imagining positive future events (vs. recent positive events) on delay discounting of gains would be stronger for individuals with a high promotion focus than for those with a high prevention focus (Hypothesis 1). Conversely, the effects of imagining adverse future events (vs. recent negative events) on delay discounting of losses would be stronger for individuals with a high prevention focus than for those with a high promotion focus (Hypothesis 2). We conducted two experiments in which participants, randomly allocated to episodic future thinking (EFT) or episodic recent thinking (ERT) groups, completed a delayed discounting task of gain (Experiment 1) or loss (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 (N = 73) weakly supported Hypothesis 1; Experiment 2 (N = 99) did not support Hypothesis 2. Our findings suggest positive EFT is particularly effective for individuals with a high promotion focus compared to individuals with a high prevention focus, which further reveals how EFT attenuates delay discounting.     

Discounting by Probabilistic Waiting

In everyday life, many probabilistic situations may be characterized as probabilistic waiting. A gambler, for example, bets repeatedly at the racetrack, the casino, or the card table. The gambler may not win on the first try, but if a gamble is repeated enough times, a win is almost certain to occur eventually. If repeated gambles are structured as strings of losses ending in a win (probabilistic waiting) and the amount won is discounted by the delay caused by the series of losses, then strings with many losses will be discounted more than those with fewer losses, thereby causing subjective value of the series of gambles as a whole to increase. The current study used the opposite effect that amount has on the degree of delay and probability discounting as a marker to determine whether people evaluate situations involving probabilistic waiting as they evaluate situations involving delayed outcomes or as situations involving probabilistic outcomes. We find that the more likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a gamble is repeated indefinitely until reward is obtained), the more that situation conforms to delay discounting; the less likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a fixed, small number of gambles), the more that situation conforms to probability discounting. We argue that the former situation is applicable to pathological gambling, and that people with steep delay discount functions would therefore be more likely to have gambling problems. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Amount of reward has opposite effects on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic outcomes

Previous research has shown that the value of large future rewards is discounted less steeply than is the value of small future rewards. These experiments extended this line of research to probabilistic rewards. Two experiments replicated the standard findings for delayed rewards but demonstrated that amount has an opposite effect on the discounting of probabilistic rewards. That is, large probabilistic amounts were discounted at the same or higher rates than small amounts. Although amount had opposite effects on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards, nevertheless, the same form of mathematical function accurately described discounting of both types of reward. The findings suggest that fundamentally similar, but not identical, processes are involved in decision making regarding delayed and probabilistic rewards. The implications of these findings for impulsivity and self-control are discussed.     

Effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards

In the years prior to 1994, there were very high rates of inflation in Poland, and the zloty depreciated relative to the U.S. dollar. However, the new zloty, introduced in 1995, was associated with greatly decreased rates of inflation and provided a more stable currency. We report a series of three experiments that take advantage of these changes to examine the effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards. Subjects were Polish citizens familiar with both zlotys and dollars. The first two experiments, conducted in 1994, used dollars and old zlotys, and the third experiment, conducted in 1996, used dollars and new zlotys. In all three experiments, the dollar and zloty rewards were of equivalent worth, according to the then current exchange rates. In Experiment 1, subjects chose between immediate and delayed rewards and, in Experiment 2, chose between certain and probabilistic rewards. The subjective value of a delayed reward was greater when its amount was specified in dollars than when it was specified in old zlotys. In contrast, the currency in which a reward was specified had no effect on the subjective value of probabilistic rewards. The results of these two experiments suggest a selective effect of inflation on decisions involving delayed rewards. This was verified in the third experiment, in which, using new zlotys, no differences in discounting were observed between the two currencies with either probabilistic or delayed rewards. Importantly, in all three experiments, the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards was well described by the same simple mathematical model, suggesting that similar decision-making processes underlie both phenomena. However, the present results argue against a single-process theory in which the discounting of probabilistic rewards is derived from the discounting of delayed rewards.     

愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响：确定感和控制感的中介作用

本研究基于评估倾向理论, 通过3项实验考察了特定负性情绪(愤怒)对延迟折扣的影响, 并探究确定感和控制感评估倾向在这一关系中的作用。实验1考察愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响, 结果发现, 愤怒组被试的延迟满足倾向显著强于恐惧组和控制组。实验2采用实验因果链设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 愤怒情绪可以有效增强个体的确定感和控制感(实验2a), 同时确定感和控制感能够增强个体的延迟满足倾向(实验2b)。实验3采用中介测量设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中起完全中介作用。本研究结果表明, 当个体进行跨期决策时, 体验到与确定感和控制感有关的偶然愤怒情绪会增强其延迟满足倾向。本研究对探究特定负性情绪对个体延迟折扣的影响具有一定的启示意义。