Emotional Contagion and Social Judgment

This study examined the influence of another's emotional expressions and individual differences in responsiveness to afferent feedback on attention, evaluations, and memory. In a mixed design, participants (N = 71) rated pictures following exposure to a sender in a neutral mood and then in either a happy or sad mood. Attention, ratings, and recall evidenced a bias characteristic of the sender's mood: Participants spent more time viewing happy and sad pictures following exposure to the happy and sad sender, respectively; ratings by participants exposed to the happy and sad sender were more positive and negative, respectively, and this effect was greater for those more cue-responsive; participants recalled more pictures congruent with the sender's mood and those more cue-responsive exposed to the sad sender exhibited impaired memory characteristic of the effect of sadness on memory. Findings suggest that exposure to even mild emotional expressions can influence cognition and behavior and this effect is greater for those more responsive to cues generated by afferent feedback.     

Effects of sad mood on time-based prospective memory

Very little is known about the influence of emotional factors on prospective memory (PM) performance. We used a mood induction (neutral or sad) to examine the effects of sad mood on time-based PM performance. Based on Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) resource allocation model, we hypothesised an adverse effect of sad mood on PM performance. Results revealed that participants who responded to the sad mood induction procedure showed reduced PM performance that mainly resulted from a decreased timeliness of PM responses, but only in the first half of the task. Mood effects on PM could be explained in terms of reduced and less accurate monitoring. Implications for concepts of PM and the assessment of emotional after-effects are discussed.     

Mood-congruent and mood-incongruent learning

We report two experiments that investigate the effect of an induced mood on the incidental learning of emotionally toned words. Subjects were put in a happy or sad mood by means of a suggestion technique and rated the emotional valence of a list of words. Later on, they were asked to recall the words in a neutral mood. For words with a strong emotional valence, mood-congruent learning was observed: strongly unpleasant words were recalled better by sad subjects and strongly pleasant words were recalled better by happy subjects. The reverse was true for slightly toned words: here, mood-incongruent learning was observed. Both effects are predicted by a two component processing model that specifies the effect of the mood on the cognitive processes during learning. Further evidence for the model is given by rating times measured in Experiment 2.     

Sad mood,emotion regulation,and response inhibition

ABSTRACT

Affect-as-information models, resource allocation models, and arousal biased competition theory predict different effects of mood on cognition. To test these theories, this study examines the effect of sad mood on response inhibition (RI) and whether emotion dysregulation impacts this potential relationship. Participants were 273 undergraduates who wrote about either a typical day or a sad event from their life. They self-reported mood and emotion regulation difficulties, and RI was a composite score of Colour-Word Stroop, Stop-Signal, and go/no-go computerised tasks. The intensity of self-reported sad mood did not affect RI as predicted, but those who wrote about sad events had worse RI. Worse emotion regulation also predicted worse RI. Cognitive loads, rumination, and mind-wandering are discussed as possible mechanisms. Findings are extended from well-established areas such as working memory to the less-established area of RI.     

负性情境诱导下抑郁个体的情绪Stroop效应：ERPs研究

运用ERPs技术探讨了正常和抑郁个体在中性和负性情境诱导下的情绪Stroop效应。结果发现正常被试在负性情境下对中性词判断的错误率比在中性情境下更高,对负性词加工的P1波幅减小、N1增大,出现了Stroop效应;抑郁被试在两种情境下对负性词加工的P1和 N1波幅没有差异。研究结果提示,抑郁个体在负性情境下出现注意脱离困难和资源不足,难以解决情绪冲突任务,支持了注意脱离损伤假说,并进一步说明抑郁个体的情绪选择性注意加工会受到心境一致性状态的影响,因过多的注意资源卷入从而出现负性情绪调节不良。实验结果为探讨抑郁个体对负性情绪的注意加工和调节过程提供了来自电生理的证据。     

Emotional after‐effects on the P3 component of the event‐related brain potential

Agrowing body of literature indicates that affective states can influence cognitive processes. The core assumption of Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) model explaining these emotional after‐effects on cognition is that the emotional state regulates the allocation of processing resources. A negative emotional state is supposed to pre‐empt capacity normally allocated to the cognitive task at hand. This is assumed to occur because the negative emotional state leads to an increase in intrusive, irrelevant thoughts, which compete with relevant cognitive activities and thus result in a lack of attention given to relevant features of the task to be performed. In the present study, the hypothesis that negative emotions lead to a reduced information‐processing capacity and that this is observable on a very basic level of information processing is tested. Therefore, 102 participants were assigned to three independent groups, each inducing one of a negative, a positive, or a neutral mood by means of a 3‐minute video‐clip. Shortly after the video‐clip, two acoustical stimuli with increasing information were presented, while the P3 component of the event‐related brain potential on these stimuli was measured as a psychophysiological indicator of cognitive resource allocation. In addition, the expenmental manipulation was checked by assessing subjective and external mood ratings as well as cortical alpha activity. Results show that the videos did in fact induce positive, neutral, or negative mood. Moreover, even when controlling for video‐related unspecific cortical arousal, a significant emotional after‐effect was found on the P3 component of the event‐related brain potential, indicating reduced information‐processing capacity, particularly in the negative mood condition. The reported data support Ellis and Ashbrook's model of emotional after‐effects on cognitive processes. As those effects were observable after an event that did not demand a high amount of cognitive resources, this suggests that even tasks that do not heavily engage central processing resources and are not likely to be influenced by cognitive strategies, seem to be affected by a negative emotional state.     

注意与记忆中的“积极效应” ——“老化悖论”与社会情绪选择理论的视角

老年人在注意和记忆活动中存在着“积极效应”现象,即对积极材料的加工维持得较好,表现出对积极信息的偏向。社会情绪选择理论从时间的认知评估影响情绪目标的选择来解释这一现象。同时,研究发现信息的加工方式与“积极效应”有密切关联,当控制加工时,“积极效应”出现;而自动加工时,“积极效应”消失。“积极效应”受到时间认知的控制,也受到认知资源和认知能力的限制。目前,随着认知神经科学的发展,利用先进设备与仪器研究老年人认知活动中的“积极效应”有着广阔的前景     

Emotional distraction unbalances visual processing

Brain mechanisms used to control nonemotional aspects of cognition may be distinct from those regulating responses to emotional stimuli, with activity of the latter being detrimental to the former. Previous studies have shown that suppression of irrelevant emotional stimuli produces a largely right-lateralized pattern of frontal brain activation, thus predicting that emotional stimuli may invoke temporary, lateralized costs to performance on nonemotional cognitive tasks. To test this, we briefly (85 ms) presented a central, irrelevant, expressive (angry, happy, sad, or fearful) or neutral face 100 ms prior to a letter search task. The presentation of emotional versus neutral faces slowed subsequent search for targets appearing in the left, but not the right, hemifield, supporting the notion of a right-lateralized, emotional response mechanism that competes for control with nonemotional cognitive processes. Presentation of neutral, scrambled, or inverted neutral faces produced no such laterality effects on visual search response times.     

The Impact of Ruminative Processing on the Experience of Self-Referent Intrusive Memories in Dysphoria

The current study sought to experimentally assess the differential effects of analytical ruminative processing and distraction on the experience of self-referent naturally occurring intrusive memories in a sample of dysphoric (BDI-II ≥ 12) participants. Seventy-seven undergraduate participants completed a memory interview to elicit details about a self-referential intrusion and were randomly assigned to either an analytical rumination or distraction condition. Subsequent to the rumination induction, participants rated their intrusive memory as more negative, more distressing, and more evocative of a negative emotional response compared to participants who were allocated to the distraction induction. Inducing analytical rumination also resulted in participants reporting worse (i.e., more sad) mood relative to those in the distraction condition. The findings align with the suggestion that depressed individuals may get caught up in a ruminative cycle that, due to the documented effects of analytical self-focus, exacerbate the emotional response elicited by intrusions and perpetuate biased attentional focus on them. Directions for future investigations of the cognitive processes that are important in the maintenance of intrusions in depressive disorders are discussed.     

Are there age differences in attention to emotional images following a sad mood induction? Evidence from a free-viewing eye-tracking paradigm

Two experiments examined age differences in the effect of a sad mood induction (MI) on attention to emotional images. Younger and older adults viewed sets of four images while their eye gaze was tracked throughout an 8-s presentation. Images were viewed before and after a sad MI to assess the effect of a sad mood on attention to positive and negative scenes. Younger and older adults exhibited positively biased attention after the sad MI, significantly increasing their attention to positive images, with no evidence of an age difference in either experiment. A test of participants’ recognition memory for the images indicated that the sad MI reduced memory accuracy for sad images for younger and older adults. The results suggest that heightened attention to positive images following a sad MI reflects an affect regulation strategy related to mood repair. The implications for theories of the positivity effect are discussed.     

Cognitive vulnerability to depression in never depressed subjects

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether dysfunctional cognitions could be measured in never-depressed individuals after a sad mood prime, and if these dysfunctional cognitions would predict future depression. Subjects were first screened for current or past depression. Never-depressed subjects were randomly assigned to a prime or no-prime condition and completed the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale. After one month, subjects completed the Beck Depression Inventory. The mood induction was successful in producing a sad mood, but had no effect on accessibility of dysfunctional cognition. Dysfunctional cognitions did predict depressive symptoms one month later, for the women in the sample, but not the men. These results were actually stronger for the unprimed subjects. The results provide some support for the cognitive diathesis-stress model, and suggest that cognitive vulnerability to depression may exist prior to a clinically significant depressive episode. However, mood priming does not appear to be a useful strategy with never-depressed subjects.     

Depending on My Mood: Mood-Driven Influences on Text Comprehension

Reading comprehension is a critical component of success in educational settings. To date, research on text processing in educational and cognitive psychological domains has focused predominantly on cognitive influences on comprehension, and in particular, those influences that might be derived from particular tasks or strategies. However, there is growing interest in documenting the influences of emotional factors on the processes and products of text comprehension, because these factors are less likely to be associated with explicit reading strategies. The present study examines this issue by evaluating the degree to which mood can influence readers' processing of text. Participants in control, happy-induced, or sad-induced groups thought aloud while reading expository texts. Happy, sad, and neutral moods influenced the degree to which readers engaged in particular types of coherence-building processes in the service of comprehension. Although reading strategies clearly influence processing, understudied factors that are less explicitly goal-driven, such as mood, can similarly impact comprehension activity. These findings have important implications for the role of mood on reading instruction and evaluation.     

Affective state and event-based prospective memory

Event-based prospective memory tasks require the realisation of a delayed intention at the occurrence of a specific target event. The present research investigates how performance in this kind of prospective memory task is influenced by the current affective state. By manipulating participants' mood during intention realisation we tested two competing models of mood effects on memory (i.e., a capacity consuming account and a processing style account). Furthermore, we manipulated the valence of the target event to investigate mood-congruency effects in prospective memory. No evidence was found for a mood-congruency effect, but the results showed that prospective memory performance increased with a sad mood. This effect is consistent with recent theories on mood-dependent processing-style regulation, postulating that a sad mood produces a more analytic and detailed processing style whereas a happy mood produces a more global and less detailed processing style.     

Positive memory enhancement training for individuals with major depressive disorder

When in a negative mood state, individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) may have difficulties recalling positive autobiographical memories in a manner that repairs that negative mood. Using cognitive bias modification techniques, investigators have successfully altered different aspects of cognition among individuals with MDD. However, little has been done to investigate the modification of positive autobiographical memory recall. This study examined the impact of a novel positive memory enhancement training (PMET) on the memories and subjective affective experiences of individuals with MDD (N = 27). Across a series of trials, participants first recalled a sad memory to elicit a negative mood state. They then recalled a happy memory and completed procedures to elicit a vivid, here-and-now quality of the memory. PMET procedures were hypothesized to promote mood repair via the recall of increasingly vivid and specific positive memories. PMET participants demonstrated improved memory specificity and greater perceived ability to “relive” positive memories. The procedures also repaired mood; PMET participants’ affect following recall of positive memories did not differ from control participants’ affect following recall of neutral memories. Results provide preliminary support for PMET as a method to improve the quality of positive memories and facilitate emotion regulation in MDD.     

Arctic cognition: a study of cognitive performance in summer and winter at 69°N

Evidence has accumulated over the past 15 years that affect in humans is cyclical. In winter there is a tendency to depression, with remission in summer, and this effect is stronger at higher latitudes. In order to determine whether human cognition is similarly rhythmical, this study investigated the cognitive processes of 100 participants living at 69°N. Participants were tested in summer and winter on a range of cognitive tasks, including verbal memory, attention and simple reaction time tasks. The seasonally counterbalanced design and the very northerly latitude of this study provide optimal conditions for detecting impaired cognitive performance in winter, and the conclusion is negative: of five tasks with seasonal effects, four had disadvantages in summer. Like the menstrual cycle, the circannual cycle appears to influence mood but not cognition. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Autobiographical memory characteristics in depression vulnerability: formerly depressed individuals recall less vivid positive memories

The differential activation hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1988) proposes that individuals who are vulnerable to depression can be distinguished from non-vulnerable individuals by the degree to which negative thoughts and maladaptive cognitive processes are activated during sad mood. While retrieval of negative autobiographical memories is noted as one such process, the model does not articulate a role for deficits in recalling positive memories. Two studies were conducted to compare the autobiographical memory characteristics of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals following a sad mood induction. In Study 1, features of negative memories of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals did not differ, either in neutral or sad mood. For positive memories, groups did not differ in neutral mood, but following a sad mood induction, formerly depressed individuals rated their positive memories as less vivid than their never-depressed counterparts. Study 2 examined positive autobiographical memory features more comprehensively and replicated the finding that in a sad mood formerly depressed individuals recalled less vivid positive memories than never-depressed controls. These findings suggest that the phenomenological features of positive memories could represent an important factor in depressive vulnerability, and, more broadly, that depression may be associated with a deficit in the processing of positive material.     

Autobiographical memory characteristics in depression vulnerability: Formerly depressed individuals recall less vivid positive memories

The differential activation hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1988) proposes that individuals who are vulnerable to depression can be distinguished from non-vulnerable individuals by the degree to which negative thoughts and maladaptive cognitive processes are activated during sad mood. While retrieval of negative autobiographical memories is noted as one such process, the model does not articulate a role for deficits in recalling positive memories. Two studies were conducted to compare the autobiographical memory characteristics of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals following a sad mood induction. In Study 1, features of negative memories of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals did not differ, either in neutral or sad mood. For positive memories, groups did not differ in neutral mood, but following a sad mood induction, formerly depressed individuals rated their positive memories as less vivid than their never-depressed counterparts. Study 2 examined positive autobiographical memory features more comprehensively and replicated the finding that in a sad mood formerly depressed individuals recalled less vivid positive memories than never-depressed controls. These findings suggest that the phenomenological features of positive memories could represent an important factor in depressive vulnerability, and, more broadly, that depression may be associated with a deficit in the processing of positive material.     

Mood and the perception of unusual people: Affective asymmetry in memory and social judgments

Does good and bad mood have a different influence on our perceptions of typical and atypical people? In this experiment, people in happy, sad or neutral moods recalled, and formed impressions of high- or low-prototypical characters. We expected an asymmetric mood effect on memory, with better recall of typical targets that require simplified, schematic processing in positive mood, but greater negative mood effects on atypical targets that require more detailed and inferential processing. Subjects (N = 66) an audio-visual mood induction in an allegedly separate experiment, before recalling, and forming impressions about people who were consistent or inconsistent with familiar prototypes within their social milieu. We found the predicted mood-congruent bias in judgments, that was significantly greater for non-typical than for typical people. We also found evidence for positive-negative mood asymmetry in memory, with better recall of typical people in positive mood, and atypical people in negative mood. The findings are discussed in terms of contemporary multi-process models of affect and cognition (Forgas, 1992), and the implications for everyday affective influences on social judgments and stereotyping are considered.     

Reappraisal and mindfulness: A comparison of subjective effects and cognitive costs

The present study investigated the relative effects of mindfulness and reappraisal in reducing sad mood and whether trait mindfulness and habitual reappraisal moderated the effects. The study also compared the extent to which implementation of these strategies incurred cognitive resources. A total of 129 participants were randomly assigned to receiving training in mindfulness, reappraisal, or no training prior to undergoing an autobiographical sad mood induction. Results showed that mindfulness and reappraisal were superior to no training, and equivalent in their effects in lowering sad mood. Compared to mindfulness, reappraisal resulted in significantly higher interference scores on a subsequent Stroop test, reflecting greater depletion of cognitive resources. Higher trait mindfulness, but not habitual reappraisal, predicted greater reductions in sadness across conditions. The study suggests that although mindfulness and reappraisal are equally effective in down-regulating sad mood, they incur different levels of cognitive costs.