LOGICAL PLURALISM AND SEMANTIC INFORMATION

Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore. Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (Belgium)     

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

The paper argues that it can be demonstrated that the position of Jacques Dupuis, S.J., a pluralist, is compatible with that of the syllabus on religious pluralism produced by the Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominius Iesus. This demonstration provides good reason to believe that at least one form of de jure pluralism, labeled “inclusivist pluralism”, is a theological theory compatible with orthodox Christian belief.     

JOHANNINE DUALISM AND CONTEMPORARY PLURALISM

The main thrust of this essay is an argument that (1) John's Gospel is not “dualistic” in the technical sense of the term but that it does operate with “oppositional dualities”; (2) far from being negating of pluralism as both a social fact and a political project, John's kind of oppositional dualities may in fact be the best way to preserve social pluralism and make it flourish; (3) two notable features of John's oppositional dualities are that (i) they are soft enough to allow surprisingly blurry boundaries between “inside” and “outside” and that (ii) they mandate a willingness to sacrifice one's own life on behalf of one's deadly enemies.     

宗教多元性与认同性危机

现代末期的宗教及其未来在新千年降临之际 ,宗教正在经历某些彻底的变革 :首先一个变革就是世俗化过程[1] 对于各种传统宗教产生的巨大影响 ,这种世俗化以各种不同的形式从基督教开始 ,在今天和未来将依然这样进行下去 ,但它并不干预作为一个制度和公共因素的宗教的没落 ,更不必说作为一个私人现象的信仰的没落。我们正在经历的 ,毋宁说是伴随社会 文化的深刻变形而发生的作为私人领域的宗教信仰和作为制度因素的宗教的一个巨大变革和适应过程 (利翁 ,2 0 0 2 )。这种变革的两个主要因素是 ,大众传媒和消费社会的胜利以及全球化过程 (库尔…     

PLURALISM, TOLERATION, AND ETHICAL PROMISCUITY

This paper argues that from an ethical point of view tolerance, which is simply one of a number of possible responses to ethical pluralism, is not an acceptable ideal. It fails to acknowledge and appreciate the good in other forms of life and thereby does not adequately respect the people who live these lives. Toleration limits the range of goods we might appreciate in our own lives and in the lives of those we care most about, and it tends to lead to a number of deformations or personal failures of character. In place of tolerance, we should embrace ethical promiscuity—a view that not only acknowledges ethical pluralism but also offers good reasons to celebrate this state of affairs.     

SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth‐bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a ) and Lynch (2009 ), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.     

STABILIZING ALETHIC PLURALISM

Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T₁ ... T_n). A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or T_n. Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform across domains, contra pluralism. I defend pluralism against the instability challenge. I show that the challenge bifurcates: one challenge is formulated in terms of predicates, and the other is formulated in terms of properties. The pluralist has the resources to defuse both of these. The sparse/abundant property distinction and considerations of explanatory asymmetry play a crucial role in my argument.