How do speakers avoid ambiguous linguistic expressions?

Three experiments assessed how speakers avoid linguistically and nonlinguistically ambiguous expressions. Speakers described target objects (a flying mammal, bat) in contexts including foil objects that caused linguistic (a baseball bat) and nonlinguistic (a larger flying mammal) ambiguity. Speakers sometimes avoided linguistic-ambiguity, and they did so equally regardless of whether they also were about to describe foils. This suggests that comprehension processes can sometimes detect linguistic-ambiguity before producing it. However, once produced, speakers consistently avoided using the same linguistically ambiguous expression again for a different meaning. This suggests that production processes can successfully detect linguistic-ambiguity after-the-fact. Speakers almost always avoided nonlinguistic-ambiguity. Thus, production processes are especially sensitive to nonlinguistic- but not linguistic-ambiguity, with the latter avoided consistently only once it is already articulated.     

Prosodic disambiguation of syntactic structure: for the speaker or for the addressee?

Evidence has been mixed on whether speakers spontaneously and reliably produce prosodic cues that resolve syntactic ambiguities. And when speakers do produce such cues, it is unclear whether they do so "for" their addressees (the audience design hypothesis) or "for" themselves, as a by-product of planning and articulating utterances. Three experiments addressed these issues. In Experiments 1 and 3, speakers followed pictorial guides to spontaneously instruct addressees to move objects. Critical instructions (e.g., "Put the dog in the basket on the star") were syntactically ambiguous, and the referential situation supported either one or both interpretations. Speakers reliably produced disambiguating cues to syntactic ambiguity whether the situation was ambiguous or not. However, Experiment 2 suggested that most speakers were not yet aware of whether the situation was ambiguous by the time they began to speak, and so adapting to addressees' particular needs may not have been feasible in Experiment 1. Experiment 3 examined individual speakers' awareness of situational ambiguity and the extent to which they signaled structure, with or without addressees present. Speakers tended to produce prosodic cues to syntactic boundaries regardless of their addressees' needs in particular situations. Such cues did prove helpful to addressees, who correctly interpreted speakers' instructions virtually all the time. In fact, even when speakers produced syntactically ambiguous utterances in situations that supported both interpretations, eye-tracking data showed that 40% of the time addressees did not even consider the non-intended objects. We discuss the standards needed for a convincing test of the audience design hypothesis.     

How Cognitive Load Influences Speakers' Choice of Referring Expressions

We report on two experiments investigating the effect of an increased cognitive load for speakers on the choice of referring expressions. Speakers produced story continuations to addressees, in which they referred to characters that were either salient or non‐salient in the discourse. In Experiment 1, referents that were salient for the speaker were non‐salient for the addressee, and vice versa. In Experiment 2, all discourse information was shared between speaker and addressee. Cognitive load was manipulated by the presence or absence of a secondary task for the speaker. The results show that speakers under load are more likely to produce pronouns, at least when referring to less salient referents. We take this finding as evidence that speakers under load have more difficulties taking discourse salience into account, resulting in the use of expressions that are more economical for themselves.     

The effect of anomalous utterances on language production

Speakers sometimes encounter utterances that have anomalous linguistic features. Are such features registered during comprehension and transferred to speakers’ production systems? In two experiments, we explored these questions. In a syntactic-priming paradigm, speakers heard prime sentences with novel or intransitive verbs as part of prepositional-dative or double-object structures (e.g., The chef munded the cup to the burglar or The doctor existed the pirate the balloon). Speakers then described target pictures eliciting the same structures, using the same or different novel or intransitive verbs. Speakers overall described targets with the same structures as the primes (abstract syntactic priming), but more so when the primes and targets had the same novel or intransitive verbs (a lexical boost), an effect that was only observed when the novel words served as the verbs in both the prime and target sentences. Such a lexical boost could only manifest if speakers formed associations between the verbs and structures in the primes during comprehension, and if these associations were then transferred to their production systems. We thus showed that anomalous utterance features are not ignored but persist (at least) in speakers’ immediately subsequent production.     

Observers' Language Proficiencies and the Detection of Non‐native Speakers' Deception

We examined whether observers' language proficiencies affected their abilities to detect native and non‐native speakers' deception. Native and non‐native English speakers were videotaped as they either lied or told the truth about having cheated on a test. A total of 284 laypersons—who were either native or non‐native English speakers themselves—viewed these videos and indicated whether they believed that the speakers were being truthful or deceptive. Observers were more accurate when judging native speakers than when judging non‐native speakers, suggesting that perceptual fluency aided deception detection. Although there was no effect of observers' language proficiencies on discrimination, their belief that interviewees were telling the truth increased with proficiency. On the whole, these findings suggest that non‐native speakers may be at greater risk of being incorrectly classified in forensic contexts.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using uh and um in spontaneous speaking

The proposal examined here is that speakers use uh and um to announce that they are initiating what they expect to be a minor (uh), or major (um), delay in speaking. Speakers can use these announcements in turn to implicate, for example, that they are searching for a word, are deciding what to say next, want to keep the floor, or want to cede the floor. Evidence for the proposal comes from several large corpora of spontaneous speech. The evidence shows that speakers monitor their speech plans for upcoming delays worthy of comment. When they discover such a delay, they formulate where and how to suspend speaking, which item to produce (uh or um), whether to attach it as a clitic onto the previous word (as in "and-uh"), and whether to prolong it. The argument is that uh and um are conventional English words, and speakers plan for, formulate, and produce them just as they would any word.     

Embodied communication: Speakers’ gestures affect listeners’ actions

We explored how speakers and listeners use hand gestures as a source of perceptual-motor information during naturalistic communication. After solving the Tower of Hanoi task either with real objects or on a computer, speakers explained the task to listeners. Speakers’ hand gestures, but not their speech, reflected properties of the particular objects and the actions that they had previously used to solve the task. Speakers who solved the problem with real objects used more grasping handshapes and produced more curved trajectories during the explanation. Listeners who observed explanations from speakers who had previously solved the problem with real objects subsequently treated computer objects more like real objects; their mouse trajectories revealed that they lifted the objects in conjunction with moving them sideways, and this behavior was related to the particular gestures that were observed. These findings demonstrate that hand gestures are a reliable source of perceptual-motor information during human communication.     

A reversed word length effect in coordinating the preparation and articulation of words in speaking

Speakers tend to prepare their nouns immediately before saying them, rather than preparing them further in advance. To test the limits of this last-second preparation, speakers were asked to name object pairs without pausing between names. There was not enough time to prepare the second name while articulating the first, so the speakers’ delay in starting to say the first name was based on the amount of time available to prepare the second name during speech. Before speaking, they spent more time preparing a second name (e.g., carrot) when the first name was monosyllabic (e.g., wig) rather than multisyllabic (e.g., windmill ). When additional words intervened between names, the length of the first name became less important and speech began earlier. Preparation differences were reflected in speech latencies, durations, and eye movements. The results suggest that speakers are sensitive to the length of prepared words and the time needed for preparing subsequent words. They can use this information to increase fluency while minimizing word buffering.     

Do verb bias effects on sentence production reflect sensitivity to comprehension or production factors?

Speakers should be motivated to produce easy-to-understand sentences, but they must successfully say sentences that are harder to produce. Four experiments assessed how verb bias influences the mention of the optional “that” in sentence-complement structures. Without the “that”, such sentences can be incorrectly interpreted as including direct objects (garden paths), and especially so after direct-object-biased verbs (compared to embedded-clause-biased verbs). But direct-object-biased verbs are rarely produced as sentence-complement structures, and so they might be harder to produce as such. Experiments 1 and 2 show that speakers mention the “that” more after direct-object-biased verbs than after embedded-clause-biased verbs. Experiment 3a shows that sentences with verbs biased toward neither direct objects nor embedded subjects were often produced with the “that”, and Experiment 3b shows that postverbal noun phrases after neither-biased verbs are interpreted as direct objects less than direct-object-biased verbs and so should cause a milder garden path. Thus, frequent “that” mention is not sensitive to the tendency of a verb to be followed by a direct object, but by how rarely the verb has been produced in the formulated structure.     

Making children gesture brings out implicit knowledge and leads to learning

Speakers routinely gesture with their hands when they talk, and those gestures often convey information not found anywhere in their speech. This information is typically not consciously accessible, yet it provides an early sign that the speaker is ready to learn a particular task (S. Goldin-Meadow, 2003). In this sense, the unwitting gestures that speakers produce reveal their implicit knowledge. But what if a learner was forced to gesture? Would those elicited gestures also reveal implicit knowledge and, in so doing, enhance learning? To address these questions, the authors told children to gesture while explaining their solutions to novel math problems and examined the effect of this manipulation on the expression of implicit knowledge in gesture and on learning. The authors found that, when told to gesture, children who were unable to solve the math problems often added new and correct problem-solving strategies, expressed only in gesture, to their repertoires. The authors also found that when these children were given instruction on the math problems later, they were more likely to succeed on the problems than children told not to gesture. Telling children to gesture thus encourages them to convey previously unexpressed, implicit ideas, which, in turn, makes them receptive to instruction that leads to learning.     

Repairing inappropriately specified utterances: Revision or restart?

In two experiments, we investigated repair of inappropriately specified utterances (e.g.,blue square instead ofdark blue square) to determine whether speakers can simply revise a speech plan or must begin anew. In Experiment 1, speakers produced a prime utterance followed by a target utterance that differed from the prime in only one word, but in Experiment 2, they only planned the prime but produced the target. If speakers must repair by restarting, both situations would involve planning from scratch, with a possible benefit of residual activation. If they can repair by revising, though, only the first situation would involve planning from scratch, and the second situation would involve revision of a plan. The targets had either one word more (addition) or fewer (deletion) than the prime sentences. The restart hypothesis predicted that any cost of addition over deletion should be similar in the two experiments. In contrast, the revision hypothesis predicted an extra cost of addition in Experiment 2, because addition involves retrieval of an extra word. In support of the revision hypothesis, there was no difference between additions and deletions in Experiment 1, but in Experiment 2 additions took longer than deletions. We conclude that speakers can repair utterances by revising a speech plan.     

Eye movements during the production of nouns and pronouns

Earlier research has established that speakers usually fixate the objects they name and that the viewing time for an object depends on the time necessary for object recognition and for the retrieval of its name. In three experiments, speakers produced pronouns and noun phrases to refer to new objects and to objects already known. Speakers looked less frequently and for shorter periods at the objects to be named when they had very recently seen or heard of these objects than when the objects were new. Looking rates were higher and viewing times longer in preparation of noun phrases than in preparation of pronouns. If it is assumed that there is a close relationship between eye gaze and visual attention, these results reveal (1) that speakers allocate less visual attention to given objects than to new ones and (2) that they allocate visual attention both less often and for shorter periods to objects they will refer to by a pronoun than to objects they will name in a full noun phrase. The experiments suggest that linguistic processing benefits, directly or indirectly, from allocation of visual attention to the referent object.     

On non-pragmatic Millianism

Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians like Braun, on the other hand, have argued that the Millian should not appeal to pragmatics and opt instead for a purely psychological explanation. I will present two objections against Non-Pragmatic Millianism. The first one is that the view cannot account for the intuitions of speakers who accept the identity sentence “Superman is Clark Kent”: applying a psychological account in this case, I will argue, would yield wrong predictions about speakers who resist substitution with simple sentences. I will then consider a possible response from the non-pragmatic Millian and show that the response would in fact require an appeal to pragmatics. My conclusion will be that Braun’s psychological explanation of anti-substitution intuitions is untenable, and that the Millian is therefore forced to adopt a pragmatic account. My second objection is that Non-Pragmatic Millianism cannot account for the role that certain commonsense intentional generalizations play in the explanation of behavior. I will consider a reply offered by Braun and argue that it still leaves out a large class of important generalizations. My conclusion will be that Braun’s non-pragmatic strategy fails, and that the Millian will again be forced to adopt a pragmatic account of intentional generalizations if he wants to respond to the objection. In light of my two objections, my general conclusion will be that non-pragmatic versions of Millianism should be rejected. This has an important consequence: if Millianism is true, then some pragmatic Millian account must be correct. It follows that, if standard objections against pragmatic accounts succeed, then Millianism must be rejected altogether.     

The Discrepancy Between How Women See Themselves and Feminists Predicts Identification with Feminism

Many women who accept the basic tenets of feminist ideology are reluctant to call themselves feminists, which is problematic because feminist self-identification is related to a variety of positive outcomes. The present research tests the idea that discrepancies between women’s self-view and feminist-view on the dimensions of competence and warmth are related to identification with feminism. This supposition is guided by the idea that a full understanding of why women have difficulty embracing feminism must take into account not only their view of feminists, but also whether women see themselves as different from feminists. Three online survey studies, which included 387, 288, and 116 adult U.S. women, demonstrate that perception of warmth identification with feminism was lower if women regard feminists as less warm than they see themselves. For perceptions of competence, the direction of this discrepancy was irrelevant: The more women see feminists as differently competent (i.e., higher or lower), the less they identify with feminists. Moreover, perceived discrepancy predicted identification with feminism even after controlling for women’s agreement with feminist values. Both endorsement of feminist values and perceived discrepancy are important in predicting identification with feminism and therefore practical interventions to maximize identification should target both of these components. For perceived discrepancy, interventions to reduce feminist-self discrepancies will likely be most effective if they target stereotypes of feminists as being cold.     

Social-Cognitive and Situational Influences on the Use of Face-Saving Persuasive Strategies

This study investigated the influences of three situational variables and interpersonal construct differentiation on the use of face-saving strategies. Speakers carried out role-play persuasive tasks that were varied on the dimensions of speaker power, request magnitude, and familiarity. The resulting messages were coded for the dominant levels of autonomy granting and positive face support provided to the target. Speakers provided more face support when they had relatively little power. Furthermore, this effect was stronger for positive face support than for autonomy granting. Speakers also granted more autonomy when making large requests, especially when they had relatively little power. With respect to familiarity, speakers provided less face support to familiar targets when small requests were involved but provided more face support when making large requests. The study also found several interactions between construct differentiation and the situational factors. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Monitoring and self-repair in speech

Making a self-repair in speech typically proceeds in three phases. The first phase involves the monitoring of one's own speech and the interruption of the flow of speech when trouble is detected. From an analysis of 959 spontaneous self-repairs it appears that interrupting follows detection promptly, with the exception that correct words tend to be completed. Another finding is that detection of trouble improves towards the end of constituents. The second phase is characterized by hesitation, pausing, but especially the use of so-called editing terms. Which editing term is used depends on the nature of the speech trouble in a rather regular fashion: Speech errors induce other editing terms than words that are merely inappropriate, and trouble which is detected quickly by the speaker is preferably signalled by the use of ‘uh’. The third phase consists of making the repair proper. The linguistic well-formedness of a repair is not dependent on the speaker's respecting the integrity of constituents, but on the structural relation between original utterance and repair. A bi-conditional well-formedness rule links this relation to a corresponding relation between the conjuncts of a coordination. It is suggested that a similar relation holds also between question and answer. In all three cases the speaker respects certain structural commitments derived from an original utterance. It was finally shown that the editing term plus the first word of the repair proper almost always contain sufficient information for the listener to decide how the repair should be related to the original utterance. Speakers almost never produce misleading information in this respect.It is argued that speakers have little or no access to their speech production process; self-monitoring is probably based on parsing one's own inner or overt speech.     

Proactive interference effects on sentence production

Proactive interference refers to recall difficulties caused by prior similar memory-related processing. Information-processing approaches to sentence production predict that retrievability affects sentence form: Speakers may word sentences so that material that is difficult to retrieve is spoken later. In this experiment, speakers produced sentence structures that could include an optionalthat, thereby delaying the mention of a subsequent noun phrase. This subsequent noun phrase was either (1) conceptually similar to three previous noun phrases in the same sentence, leading to greater proactive interference, or (2) conceptually dissimilar, leading to less proactive interference. Speakers produced morethats (and were more disfluencies) before conceptually similar noun phrases, suggesting that retrieval difficulties during sentence production affect the syntactic structures of sentences that speakers produce.     

Using the Hands to Identify Who Does What to Whom: Gesture and Speech Go Hand-in-Hand

In order to produce a coherent narrative, speakers must identify the characters in the tale so that listeners can figure out who is doing what to whom. This paper explores whether speakers use gesture, as well as speech, for this purpose. English speakers were shown vignettes of two stories and asked to retell the stories to an experimenter. Their speech and gestures were transcribed and coded for referent identification. A gesture was considered to identify a referent if it was produced in the same location as the previous gesture for that referent. We found that speakers frequently used gesture location to identify referents. Interestingly, however, they used gesture most often to identify referents that were also uniquely specified in speech. Lexical specificity in referential expressions in speech thus appears to go hand-in-hand with specification in referential expressions in gesture.