Salvaging the self in a world without soul: William James's The Principles of psychology

This article explores William James's transformation of the religious soul into the secular self in The Principles of Psychology. Although James's views on the self are familiar to many historians of psychology, the article places his treatment of the self within the broader social and cultural context of a secularizing, industrializing society. There were palpable tensions and anxieties that accompanied the cultural shift, and these are particularly transparent in James's Principles. James attempted the project of secularizing the soul in order to promote a natural science of the mind but with marked ambivalence for the project, because it left out some of the moral and metaphysical questions of great interest to him.     

Darwinism and positivism as methodological influences on the development of psychology

The methodological significance of evolutionary theory for psychology may be distinguished from its substantive or theoretical significance. The methodological significance was that evolutionary theory broadened the current conceptions of scientific method and rendered them relatively independent of physics. It thereby made the application of the “scientific method” to psychology much more feasible than it had been previously, and thus established the possibility of a wide-ranging scientific psychology for the first time. The methodological eclecticism that made scientific psychology possible did not, however, remain a feature of psychology for very long. Psychology's methodology rapidly became restricted and codified through the influence of, and in imitation of, the rigorously positivistic orientation of physics around the turn of the twentieth century.     

Karl Popper and Albert Ellis: Their ideas on psychology and rationality compared

This paper considers leading ideas of Albert Ellis on psychological theory and therapy in relation to ideas of the celebrated philosopher, Karl Popper. The aim is to indicate striking similarities in their views on learning, the genesis of emotional disturbance and, in particular, rationality. Discussion commences with Popper's early, and little studied, work on psychology. His philosophy of science is then surveyed along with the theory of rationality that he analogically extends from it. After tracing the evolution of Ellis' thought, we note the central roles he assigns to irrational thinking in explaining emotional disturbance and to rational thinking in its treatment. Different senses of rationality are distinguished in his work, one of them associated with criticism, which provides a most important similarity to Popper's view of rationality.For helpful comments on draft versions of this paper the author is indebted to Barry Butcher.Drs. Jocelyn Dunphy and Albert Ellis, and an anonymous reviewer for this journal.Studies of Popper on psychology have only begun to appear in recent years. The most detailed is (Berkson & Wettersten, 1984).     

Lange on essentialism,counterfactuals, and explanation

Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is—with minor modification—compatible with essentialism.     

Academic professionalization and protestant reconstruction, 1890-1902: George Albert Coe's psychology of religion

This paper examines the relationship between the New Psychology and American Protestantism in the late nineteenth century through a consideration of the early career of George Albert Coe. Coe originally aspired to become a Methodist minister but after several years studying evolutionary biology and the New Theology his professional interests came to rest on the New Psychology. His decision to pursue a career in psychology and his subsequent research program is discussed in relation to the religious and institutional context of the period. For Coe, the New Psychology was not an ideologically secular initiative but a methodologically secular means of advancing a religious agenda. His experience suggests that the field's growth in the 1890s is partly attributable to the perception that psychology could help bring Protestantism into line with modern experience.     

Trauma, soul murder, and change

The author discusses trauma, particularly in relation to childhood events, as well as one of its possible sequelae, soul murder (Shengold 1989, 1999). Negative interactions with parental figures can have long-term implications for the developing child, sometimes persisting into adulthood, and yet even the most loving parents cannot always behave toward the child in an optimal manner. The profound effect of change on the human psyche is also discussed, and two clinical vignettes are presented to illustrate the author's points.     

The Truth, Goodness, and Beauty of Darwinism

As a young proponent of "creation science," I rejected Darwinian biology as false, bad, and ugly. Now I defend Darwinism as true, good, and beautiful. Moreover, I now see Darwinism as compatible with the natural piety that arises as one moves from nature to nature's God.     

Dickens, Little Dorrit, and soul murder

The effects of moderate psychological child abuse by parents and parental substitutes on Charles Dicken's life and work are examined.     

A biographical note on Max Friedrich (1856-1887), Wundt's first PhD student in experimental psychology

This article unveils some previously unknown facts about the short life of Max Friedrich (1856-1887), the author in 1881 of the first PhD dissertation on experimental psychology, written under the supervision of Wilhelm Wundt: "On the Duration of Apperception for Simple and Complex Visual Stimuli." The article describes Friedrich's family background and life, professional career as a teacher, and works in psychology and mathematics.     

Neuroscience,quantum indeterminism and the Cartesian soul

Quantum indeterminism is frequently invoked as a solution to the problem of how a disembodied soul might interact with the brain (as Descartes proposed), and is sometimes invoked in theories of libertarian free will even when they do not involve dualistic assumptions. Taking as example the Eccles–Beck model of interaction between self (or soul) and brain at the level of synaptic exocytosis, I here evaluate the plausibility of these approaches. I conclude that Heisenbergian uncertainty is too small to affect synaptic function, and that amplification by chaos or by other means does not provide a solution to this problem. Furthermore, even if Heisenbergian effects did modify brain functioning, the changes would be swamped by those due to thermal noise. Cells and neural circuits have powerful noise-resistance mechanisms, that are adequate protection against thermal noise and must therefore be more than sufficient to buffer against Heisenbergian effects. Other forms of quantum indeterminism must be considered, because these can be much greater than Heisenbergian uncertainty, but these have not so far been shown to play a role in the brain.     

Yoga,Eugenics, and Spiritual Darwinism in the Early Twentieth Century

Put briefly: perhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is a question of the body; it is the history of the development of a higher body that emerges into our sensibility. The organic is rising to yet higher levels. Our lust for knowledge of nature is a means through which the body desires to perfect itself. Or rather: hundreds of thousands of experiments are made to change the nourishment, the mode of living and of dwelling in the body; consciousness and evaluations in the body, all kinds of pleasure and displeasure, are signs of these changes and experiments. In the long run, it is not a question of man at all: he is to be overcome (Nietzsche 1967: 358).