Ten Principles for Interpreting Neuroscientific Pronouncements Regarding Human Nature

As the field of brain research continues to advance, much is being discovered about the various aspects of the brain that are associated with certain feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. However, certain studies, or popularized accounts thereof, overreach in their pronouncements, drawing unwarranted conclusions regarding human nature. There are ten principles that will assist the non‐specialist in critically assessing both now and future discoveries reported from the neurosciences, with a focus on helping theologians using neuroscientific data in multidisciplinary work regarding human nature.     

The Inner Game of Sport: is Everything in the Brain?

The article deals with the following: (1) Three brain imaging studies on athletes are evaluated. What do these neuroscientific studies tell us about the brain and mind of the athlete? (2) Empirical investigations will need a neuro-theory of mind if they are to make the leap from neural activity to the mental. The article looks at such a theory, Gerald Edelman's ‘Neural Darwinism’. What are the implications of such a theory for sport science and philosophy of sport? (3) The article appreciates some of the neurosciences applications, but questions the hope of giving a complete theory of mind.     

PSYCHOANALYSIS IN SCANDINAVIA: PART ONE

During recent years, the neurosciences have entered into a dialogue with psychoanalysis, which has opened new perspectives for their integration. Despite these developments, reservations remain concerning the reducing effects of the neurosciences by overtly or covertly hiding the core elements of psychoanalysis. However, Freud made an explicit parallel between psychoanalysis and physics in their relationship with the unknown reality, and in their task of filling in gaps in knowledge. Freud's epistemological view implies that the relationship with the unknown reality unites rather than separates psychoanalysis from other sciences. On the other hand, in the clinical realm, Freud emphasized the autonomy of psychoanalysis. Instead of offering causal explanations, the value of the neurosciences to psychoanalysis depends on how well the knowledge derived from them can be integrated in psychoanalysis and given a clinical meaning. The primacy of clinical relevance also pertains to the findings of empirical outcome research.     

The developmental cognitive neuroscience of functional connectivity

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is a rapidly growing field that examines the relationships between biological development and cognitive ability. In the past decade, there has been ongoing refinement of concepts and methodology related to the study of ‘functional connectivity’ among distributed brain regions believed to underlie cognition and behavioral control. Due to the recent availability of relatively easy-to-use tools for functional connectivity analysis, there has been a sharp upsurge of studies that seek to characterize normal and psychopathologically abnormal brain functional integration. However, relatively few studies have applied functional and effective connectivity analysis techniques to developmental cognitive neuroscience. Functional and effective connectivity analysis methods are ideally suited to advance our understanding of the neural substrates of cognitive development, particularly in understanding how and why changes in the functional ‘wiring’ of neural networks promotes optimal cognitive control throughout development. The purpose of this review is to summarize the central concepts, methods, and findings of functional integration neuroimaging research to discuss key questions in the field of developmental cognitive neuroscience. These ideas will be presented within a context that merges relevant concepts and proposals from different developmental theorists. The review will outline a few general predictions about likely relationships between typical ‘executive’ cognitive maturation and changes in brain network functional integration during adolescence. Although not exhaustive, this conceptual review also will showcase some of recent findings that have emerged to support these predictions.     

Jungian metapsychology and neurobiological theory

This paper deals with brain research and depth psychology. Because brain research is becoming significantly more sophisticated and increasingly able to assay the neurobiology of subjective (i.e. mental) events in vivo , it is suggested that any school of depth psychology will probably not survive as a mainstream treatment modality if its theory and practice is found to be in frank variance with the findings of the modern neurosciences. Jung's psychology is compared to Freud's and shown to be reasonably consonant with such findings. Historical highlights of Jung's non-reductive way of conceptualizing and working are presented and put in the context of more recent scientifically defensible concepts (emergence, supervenience, complexity theory) from the fields of both philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. These concepts postulate a hierarchical model of reality which permits an exploration of the mind/brain relationship without resorting to reductionism or dualism. A sense of the present struggle is conveyed between the proponents of these and more traditional scientific concepts. Finally, the nature of mind/brain confluence is elucidated by examples from the areas of learning, memory, and the capacity to symbolize in order to illustrate how clinical practices and observations familiar to experienced depth therapists and also in agreement with Jungian theory are compatible with neuroscientific findings. A research suggestion is offered.     

The case for neuropsychoanalysis: Why a dialogue with neuroscience is necessary but not sufficient for psychoanalysis

Recent advances in the cognitive, affective and social neurosciences have enabled these fields to study aspects of the mind that are central to psychoanalysis. These developments raise a number of possibilities for psychoanalysis. Can it engage the neurosciences in a productive and mutually enriching dialogue without compromising its own integrity and unique perspective? While many analysts welcome interdisciplinary exchanges with the neurosciences, termed neuropsychoanalysis, some have voiced concerns about their potentially deleterious effects on psychoanalytic theory and practice. In this paper we outline the development and aims of neuropsychoanalysis, and consider its reception in psychoanalysis and in the neurosciences. We then discuss some of the concerns raised within psychoanalysis, with particular emphasis on the epistemological foundations of neuropsychoanalysis. While this paper does not attempt to fully address the clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis, we offer and discuss a brief case illustration in order to demonstrate that neuroscientific research findings can be used to enrich our models of the mind in ways that, in turn, may influence how analysts work with their patients. We will conclude that neuropsychoanalysis is grounded in the history of psychoanalysis, that it is part of the psychoanalytic worldview, and that it is necessary, albeit not sufficient, for the future viability of psychoanalysis.     

Entre neurosciences et neurophilosophie : la psychologie cognitive et les sciences cognitives

The cognitive sciences are all at once a scientific field with far-reaching epistemological implications and the locus of institutional confrontation between several academic disciplines. In this context, cognitive psychology occupies a key historical and theoretical position. It is therefore essential to clearly situate its contribution to the origin and the development of the cognitive sciences. For some, cognitive psychology may end up being dissolved by cognitive neuroscience, with its brain imaging techniques, which in the long run, should solve the age-old problem of brain-mind dualism. For others, this epistemic wager can only be won by reducing cognition to its most elementary states and processes. Here, the problem of mental representation (of meaning and consciousness) is brought to bear to rule out a view that strictly reduces the mind to the brain. Will the cognitive sciences, then, be nothing more than a mere stage in the integration of cognitive psychology into the cognitive neurosciences? Or on the contrary, will the other disciplines in the cognitive sciences be led to recognize the specificity of cognitive psychology and put it at the centre of their research program? The debate is underway, but the scientific and institutional outcome is uncertain.     

INTERFACING RELIGION AND THE NEUROSCIENCES: A REVIEW OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EXPLORATION AND REFLECTION

Abstract. Exploration and reflection on the interfacing of religion and the neurosciences in the last twenty-five years provide a unique point of convergence on the relationship between science and religion. A focus on two streams of consciousness characterized the first phase in the 1970s. Scholarship suggested correlates between the styles of analytical steps and synthetic leaps of imagination and the belief patterns of proclamation and manifestation. The use of lateralized consciousness was critiqued as covering too much as well as not attending to evolutionary developments and philosophical and theological foundations. A shift to whole brain functioning with more differentiated investigations came during the second phase in the 1980s. Empirical studies corroborated the earlier analytical speculations in neurotheology and advanced the heuristic value or using the whole brain as a metaphor for understanding religion. By the third phase of the 1990s, meaning-making and integrating consciousness emerged as shaping the agenda between religion and cognitive neuroscience. The emerging methodology combines analogical continuities among levels of complexity and metaphorical leaps of inferential patterning.     

The anticipatory construction of reality as a central concern for psychology and robotics

How is it that, given our diverse sensors that are moving at any moment, we get to the idea that there is a more or less permanent world around us that contains objects and living beings and that is endowed with spatial and temporal properties? This question is difficult, it is “the child’s construction of reality” issue. Given the complexity of the underlying phenomena, it requires a dialog between engineering sciences and life sciences to be solved. In this paper, we introduce the contributions to this dialog that have been collected in this special issue.     

Time to get rid of the ‘Modular’ in neuropsychology: A unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding

Cognitive neuroscience, being more inclusive and ambitious in scope than cognitive neuropsychology, seems to have taken the place of the latter within the modern neurosciences. Nevertheless, recent advances in the neurosciences afford neuropsychology with epistemic possibilities that simply did not exist even 15 years ago. Human lesion studies still have an important role to play in shaping such possibilities, particularly when combined with other methods of enquiry. I first outline theoretical and methodological advances within the neurosciences that can inform and shape the rebirth of a dynamic, non‐modular neuropsychology. I then use an influential computational theory of brain function, the free energy principle, to suggest an unified account of anosognosia for hemiplegia as a research example of the potential for transition from a modular, cognitive neuropsychology to a dynamic, computational and even restorative neuropsychology. These and many other adjectives that can flexibly, take the place of ‘cognitive’ next to ‘neuropsychology’ will hopefully designate the much needed rebirth and demarcation of a field, neuropsychology itself, that has somehow lost its place within the modern neurosciences and yet seems to have a unique and important role to play in the future understanding of the brain.     

Libet-style experiments,neuroscience, and libertarian free will

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not (but possibly could) support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will, but that Libet-style experiments have not done that so far.     

Publishing in the Psychological Sciences: Enhancing Journal Impact While Decreasing Author Fatigue

ABSTRACT— The publication process in the psychological sciences is unduly tedious and would benefit from the adoption of a publishing model typical of the neurosciences and basic sciences. The author argues that such a change would result in higher impact publications in the psychological sciences and would also conserve the time of busy scientists.     

The relations between neuroscience and human behavioral science.

Neuroscience seeks to understand how the human brain, perhaps the most complex electrochemical machine in the universe, works, in terms of molecules, membranes, cells and cell assemblies, development, plasticity, learning, memory, cognition, and behavior. The human behavioral sciences, in particular psychiatry and clinical psychology, deal with disorders of human behavior and mentation. The gap between neuroscience and the human behavioral sciences is still large. However, some major advances in neuroscience over the last two decades have diminished the span. This article reviews the major advances of neuroscience in six areas with relevance to the behavioral sciences: (a) evolution of the nervous system; (b) visualizing activity in the human brain; (c) plasticity of the cerebral cortex; (d) receptors, ion channels, and second/third messengers; (e) molecular genetic approaches; and (f) understanding integrative systems with networks and circadian clocks as examples.     

Reading other people's mind: Insights from neuropsychology

When trying to make sense of other people's behaviour we usually invoke their mental states, such as their intentions, beliefs or emotions. This mind reading ability has been traditionally investigated in developmental psychology and comparative psychology but is now receiving increasing attention from the cognitive neurosciences. I will show the important role that neuropsychology plays in unravelling the cognitive and neural basis of our mind reading abilities. I will illustrate this by showing how cases of adults with acquired brain lesions can help us tease apart the different mechanisms that underlie mind reading abilities and can help us understand the nature of these mechanisms, especially their relation to language and executive function.     

The Humanizing Brain: A Clinician/Pastor Response

The Humanizing Brain is an effort by theological scholars to integrate neuroscience and theological constructs into a cohesive evolutionary and developmental scheme. The primary strength is a developing dialogue between neurodevelopmental theory and process theology. The book's widest appeal should be to theologians exploring religious and spiritual manifestations in the brain and neurosciences. The relatively simplistic science may limit significant usefulness to broad neuroscientific and medical communities, although neuroscientists and sophisticated lay readers with interests and back-grounds in theology may find The Humanizing Brain quite informative and interesting.     

Brain‐mind philosophy

The remarkable advances in continuing elucidation of the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the central nervous system in recent experimental animal and clinical studies have provided new contexts for evaluating earlier historical and current controversies on human brain‐structure‐function and brain‐mind relationships. Churchland's Neurophilosophy reviews and critically evaluates the implications of the recent advances in the various neurosciences for formulation of a comprehensive concept of the nature of the mind and the historical controversies on human structure‐function and brain‐mind relationships. Although uneven, it is a monumental effort and a remarkable achievement that will provide new, broader, and deeper contexts for philosophers as well as for those engaged in the various neurosciences.     

Discussions

Summary  In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).

     

认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics

From a twenty-first century partnership between bioethics and neuroscience, the modern field of neuroethics is emerging, and technologies enabling functional neuroimaging with unprecedented sensitivity have brought new ethical, social and legal issues to the forefront. Some issues, akin to those surrounding modern genetics, raise critical questions regarding prediction of disease, privacy and identity. However, with new and still-evolving insights into our neurobiology and previously unquantifiable features of profoundly personal behaviors such as social attitude, value and moral agency, the difficulty of carefully and properly interpreting the relationship between brain findings and our own self-concept is unprecedented. Therefore, while the ethics of genetics provides a legitimate starting point—even a backbone—for tackling ethical issues in neuroimaging, they do not suffice. Drawing on recent neuroimaging findings and their plausible real-world applications, we argue that interpretation of neuroimaging data is a key epistemological and ethical challenge. This challenge is two-fold. First, at the scientific level, the sheer complexity of neuroscience research poses challenges for integration of knowledge and meaningful interpretation of data. Second, at the social and cultural level, we find that interpretations of imaging studies are bound by cultural and anthropological frameworks. In particular, the introduction of concepts of self and personhood in neuroimaging illustrates the interaction of interpretation levels and is a major reason why ethical reflection on genetics will only partially help settle neuroethical issues. Indeed, ethical interpretation of such findings will necessitate not only traditional bioethical input but also a wider perspective on the construction of scientific knowledge.