What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Why won’t you do what I want? The informative failures of children and models

Computational models are powerful tools – too powerful, according to some. We argue that the idea that models can “do anything” is wrong, and we describe how their failures have been informative. We present new work showing surprising diversity in the effects of feedback on children's task-switching, such that some children perseverate despite this feedback, other children switch as instructed, and yet others play an “opposites” game without truly switching to the newly instructed task. We present simulations that demonstrate the failure of an otherwise-successful neural network model to capture this failure. Simulating this pattern motivates the inclusion of updating mechanisms that make contact with a growing literature on frontostriatal function, despite their absence in theories of the development of cognitive flexibility. We argue from this and other examples that computational models are more constrained than is typically acknowledged and that their resulting failures can be theoretically illuminating.     

Who do you think I think I am? Accuracy in perceptions of others’ self-esteem

This study was conducted to assess the accuracy of perceptions of others’ self-esteem and to examine the potential moderating variables of target gender, perceiver gender, and degree of acquaintance. Degree of acquaintance was the only hypothesized moderator reliably related to accuracy. An overall tendency to overestimate targets’ self-esteem was evinced, but was not related to any of the hypothesized moderators. The data suggested that perceivers are influenced by a false consensus effect when estimating others’ level of self-esteem, independent of their degree of acquaintance with targets. Implications of the findings and directions for future investigation are discussed.     

What do you think about ink? An examination of implicit and explicit attitudes toward tattooed individuals

Tattoos are increasing in popularity, yet minimal research has examined implicit attitudes or the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes toward tattooed individuals. Seventy-seven online participants (Mage = 36.09, 52% women, 78% white, 26% tattooed) completed measures assessing implicit and explicit attitudes toward tattooed individuals. Results revealed evidence of negative implicit attitudes, which were associated with less perceived warmth, competence, and negative explicit evaluations. However, implicit attitudes were not correlated with measures of disgust or social distance. In addition, age predicted implicit prejudice, but other individual difference measures—such as personal tattoo possession, political identity, and internal/external motivations to respond without prejudice—did not. These findings are discussed in terms of how attitudes toward tattooed individuals may be multifaceted, and research may benefit from measuring implicit and explicit attitudes.     

Why do(n't) your partner's efforts at self-improvement make you happy? An implicit theories perspective

People often try to improve their interpersonal skills to satisfy romantic partners. However, when and why a partner appreciates these efforts is an important but underaddressed question. The present research explored how people's theories that interpersonal abilities are either fixed entities or can be changed incrementally affect their responses to relationship partner's efforts at self-improvement. Study 1 validated a new measure for these theories and showed that, compared to the former entity theorists, the latter incremental theorists were less likely to attribute recalled instances of partners' negative behaviors to dispositional causes and perceive these behaviors as fixed and stable. An experiment that induced these different implicit theories (Study 2) and a longitudinal study (Study 3) further demonstrated that perceptions of partners' self-improvement efforts led to greater increases in relationship security and quality among incremental than among entity theorists. How implicit theories may shape the interpersonal dynamics of self-improvement is discussed.     

Why do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?

Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom‐Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my response against a possible objection. 1     

Positive affectivity and lifestyle in adulthood: do you do what you feel?

There is much evidence for the adaptive value of positive affect. Empirical work examining different facets of positive affect and their consequences for psychological adaptation remains sparse, however. This study (young, middle-aged, and older adults; N = 293) investigated the links between two dimensions of positive affect (positive involvement and pleasant affect) and two lifestyles (hedonic and growth related), each indicated by general value orientations, self-reported everyday activities, and activity aspirations. Structural equation models showed that pleasant affect and positive involvement constitute distinct dimensions evincing different age trends and relating differentially to hedonic and growth-related lifestyles. Specifically, pleasant affect, but not positive involvement, was related to a hedonic lifestyle, whereas positive involvement, and not pleasant affect, was associated with a growth-related lifestyle. These findings underline the importance of considering two dimensions of positive affect--pleasant feelings and positive involvement--separately when studying the link between affect and lifestyle.     

What do you think of followers? Examining the content,structure, and consequences of implicit followership theories

Implicit followership theories (IFTs) are defined as individuals’ personal assumptions about the traits and behaviors that characterize followers. Goals of this research were to: (1) Identify the content and structure of IFTs, (2) examine the relationship between IFTs and extant implicit theories in the leadership literature, and (3) establish a preliminary nomological network of leaders’ implicit followership theories by examining its consequences for leader–follower interpersonal outcomes. This study included 1362 participants across five separate studies and seven samples. Results provide evidence for content, convergent, discriminant, criterion, and incremental validity, as well as internal and temporal consistency of the IFTs instrument. IFTs are represented by a first-order structure (Industry, Enthusiasm, Good Citizen, Conformity, Insubordination, and Incompetence), and a second-order structure (Followership Prototype and Antiprototype). Leaders’ IFTs predicted interpersonal outcomes: liking, relationship quality, trust, and job satisfaction. Future research and practical implications are discussed for this understudied branch of leadership research.     

Relations between implicit measures of prejudice:what are we measuring?

Some recent findings suggest that different implicit measures of prejudice assess the same underlying construct, but other work suggests that they may not. In this experiment, White participants completed a version of a priming measure of racial attitudes that either encouraged categorization of the face primes in terms of race or did not encourage such categorization, and then completed the Implicit Association Test. Correspondence between the two measures was found only when categorization by race was required on the priming measure. Moreover, participants appeared more prejudiced when they were led to construe individuals in terms of race than when they were not so encouraged. The discussion focuses on the potential for dissociations between evaluations of a category and evaluations of members of the category.     

Do you see what I see? How social differences influence mindreading

Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand our accounts of how we understand others in order to accommodate these data and explain how such profound disagreements arise amongst informed, rational, well-meaning individuals.     

“Why do (don't) you ask?” transference and the desire (not) to know

One of the criterial distinctions of psychoanalysis is its renunciation of indoctrination through suggestion. In spite of the fact that psychoanalysis is both an organized body of knowledge and a disciplined form of interpersonal influence, it regards an analyst who tells the analysand what to think or do as essentially doing harm by substituting a new form of prejudice and alienation for the preexisting form he is attacking. Even though an analyst regards his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory as adequate at a general level, this "truth" is not an adequate mode of discourse with an individual. Why not? It is a fact that analysands often do not accept an analyst's idea. However, the fundamental problematic of clinical psychoanalysis comes precisely at the point that the analysand would accept the analyst's idea, involving the distinction between a properly psychoanalytic cure and a transference cure. Psychoanalytic theory itself holds that unreflective incorporation of another's idea about oneself comes at the expense of autonomous and spontaneous self-revelation. Despite its resolute pursuit of new truths, the aim of psychoanalysis is less concerned with attaining specific ideas about unrecognized conflicts than it is with achieving a general attitude--that self-understanding requires a capacity to admit dubious and unwanted ideas and feelings that symptoms, dreams, and free associations bring to light. This "psychoanalytic" attitude permits a new type of discourse in which the person recognizes himself or herself through expression, rather than parrotting the analyst's (or others') words, or continuing rigidly to hide the truth of desire for oneself. In the long run, psychoanalysis offers to correct a primary misunderstanding: that one can acquire a comprehensively true image of oneself. As Barratt (1988) emphasizes, this transformation is tantamount to a change in personal epistemology for the analysand and a change in epistemological theory for the culture as a whole. In our culture, most analysts and lay people alike take for granted that the ego is an agent that is to be integrated and strengthened in order to direct one's life. Likewise, the unconscious is commonly regarded as a type of savage alter ego that must be mastered by the ego. According to Lacan's critique, the ego is a snare and a delusion for the patient, however highly commended by society it may be, because its very essence is to furnish the illusion of enduring self-knowledge.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Why do implicit and explicit attitude tests diverge? The role of structural fit

Implicit and explicit attitude tests are often weakly correlated, leading some theorists to conclude that implicit and explicit cognition are independent. Popular implicit and explicit tests, however, differ in many ways beyond implicit and explicit cognition. The authors examined in 4 studies whether correlations between implicit and explicit tests were influenced by the similarity in task demands (i.e., structural fit) and, hence, the processes engaged by each test. Using an affect misattribution procedure, they systematically varied the structural fit of implicit and explicit tests of racial attitudes. As test formats became more similar, the implicit-explicit correlation increased until it became higher than in most previous research. When tests differ in structure, they may underestimate the relationship between implicit and explicit cognition. The authors propose a solution that uses procedures to maximize structural fit.     

What do I think you're doing? Action identification and mind attribution

The authors examined how a perceiver's identification of a target person's actions co-varies with attributions of mind to the target. The authors found in Study 1 that the attribution of intentionality and cognition to a target was associated with identifying the target's action in terms of high-level effects rather than low-level details. In Study 2, both action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, and in Study 3, they were reduced for a target suffering misfortune. In Study 4, it was again found that action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, but like that for the self or a liked other, positive actions were identified at higher levels than negative actions, with the reverse being true for disliked others. In Study 5, the authors found that instructing participants to adopt the target's perspective did not affect mind attribution but did lead to higher level identifications of the target's actions.     

Who are you and what do you want? Life aspirations,personality, and well-being

In two studies with undergraduate samples, we investigated the relations between life aspirations and personality and evaluated whether aspirations added to the prediction of psychological well-being and sexuality. Within the HEXACO framework, aspirations were highly related to Honesty–Humility. Within the Big Five framework, intrinsic aspirations were related to high Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, and extrinsic aspirations were most related to low Openness and Agreeableness. Aspirations did not add to the HEXACO’s prediction of well-being in study one, but in study two, aspirations added to the prediction of sexuality variables beyond the two personality frameworks. These results suggest that aspirations may account for beyond personality in explaining specific types of well-being.     

Why do I hate thee? Conflict misperceptions and intergroup mistrust

Members of partisan social groups often exaggerate how much their own opinions differ from those of their rivals. In the present two studies, partisans estimated their own and their rivals' attitudes toward different issues related to the social conflict and also made a variety of evaluative judgments about their own and the rival group. The authors found that (a) partisans perceive more disagreement with their rivals about values that are central to their own sides' ideological position than those that are central to their rivals' position and (b) perceptions of disagreement about the partisans' own central values are what predicts partisans' global evaluations of members of the outgroup (e.g., disliking, trait stereotypes, perceived similarity). Furthermore, partisans believed their adversaries were motivated by an opposition to the partisans' own core values rather than by promotion of the adversaries' core values. Discussion concentrates on the theoretical and applied implications of these findings.     

What do you (think you) need? Perceived vs. experienced effects of need fulfillment on well-being

We compared two approaches towards assessing inter-individual differences in the effect of satisfaction and frustration of basic needs (autonomy, competence, relatedness) on well-being: perceived need effects (beliefs about the effect of need fulfillment on one’s well-being) and experienced need effects (the within-person coupling of need fulfillment and well-being). In two studies (total N = 1281), participants reported perceived need effects in a multidimensional way. In Study 2, daily need fulfillment and affective well-being were additionally assessed (daily-diary study; ten days). Associations between perceived and experienced need effects were significant (albeit small) for all three frustration dimensions, but only for one satisfaction dimension (relatedness), suggesting that they capture different constructs and might be related to different outcomes.