How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

Abstract

Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (G&W) suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms.     

Examining how people reason about controversial scientific topics

Improving scientific literacy requires examining both what people believe about scientific issues and why they hold those beliefs. We examined how people justified their agreement with statements regarding evolution, climate change, genetically modified foods, and vaccinations. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements reflecting the scientific consensus on these topics, then responded to open-ended questions asking them to justify their position and to generate challenges to their belief. Responses to individual difference measures allowed us to assess the relationship between participants’ positions on these scientific issues and cognitive style, conspiracy ideation, religious service attendance, and political ideology. Qualitative analyses revealed inconsistent and topic-specific patterns of reasoning. Additionally, greater agreement with scientific conclusions was related to a greater predisposition towards analytical thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. These findings provide a next step for better understanding why some individuals reject science and for developing more effective means of improving science acceptance.     

溯因推理视角看妄想信念的生成机制

溯因推理是为事件赋予解释的认知过程,妄想信念可被看作对病态体验赋予的荒谬解释。以溯因推理作为逻辑认知模型,可以分辨妄想信念形成过程中的病态与合理成分。基于该模型,妄想信念的出现需同时满足以下条件:第一,患者产生了虚幻的主观体验,它的产生源自某种生理性病变;第二,患者缺乏对这一解释进行实际验证的动机或能力,因而坚信自己为其赋予的解释。两大因素中前者是与生理反应关系密切的自动过程,后者是与认知能力关系密切的反思过程。     

幼儿看图叙述中心理状态术语的使用与错误信念理解关系的短期跟踪研究

摘 要：为探明汉语儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语的应用及与错误信念理解能力的关系,并追踪二者相互作用的方向,本研究以101名3-5岁儿童为研究对象,纵向探查了前后相隔3个月的儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语使用情况和错误信念能力的发展状况,并从横向和纵向两个时间点分别探讨了心理状态术语的运用与错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：3-5岁儿童错误信念理解能力快速发展;儿童看图叙述中使用较多的愿望术语和情绪术语,信念术语应用相对较少,且认知词汇类型较少。控制了一般语言能力和年龄之后,仅在第一次测验上,情绪术语、信念术语仍然与同期及后期错误信念理解能力存在显著相关。     

“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires

In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development.     

关于健康观认知构造的中日比较研究

本研究的目的是揭示大学生关于健康观的认知构造,并对中日大学生健康观的认知构造进行比较。通过对收集到的日常生活的健康观数据进行处理,制成了一个包含50个项目的问卷,然后对收集到的儿8名日本大学生和81名中国大学生的数据进行了因子分析,得到了健康观认知构造的五个因子,即“自律性”(因子Ⅰ)、“主观自我”(因子Ⅱ)、“身体因素”(因子Ⅲ)、“心理因素”(因子Ⅳ)、“健康习惯”(因子Ⅴ)。中日学生的健康观认知结构在Ⅰ、Ⅲ、Ⅳ因子上存在差异。     

Are beliefs signals?

Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.     

无关长时记忆表征能否引导视觉注意选择?

与任务相关的长时记忆表征在引导视觉注意选择的过程中扮演着重要的角色,它可以使人们在熟悉的视觉情境中快速搜索目标刺激,并偏离干扰刺激。但当长时记忆表征与任务无关时,还能否引导视觉注意选择?目前还不清楚。实验1采用眼动追踪技术直接比较无关工作记忆表征与无关长时记忆表征在视觉搜索阶段对视觉注意的捕获效应,行为反应时与首次注视点百分率的结果都发现,当无关工作记忆表征在视觉搜索中再次出现时能引导视觉注意偏向到与之匹配的干扰刺激,但无关长时记忆表征并没有表现出类似的注意引导效应;实验2探讨记忆表征由工作记忆系统转移到长时记忆系统的过程中对视觉注意的引导效应,结果发现,随着记忆表征的转移,注意引导效应消失了,实验3排除工作记忆表征的干扰后,依然没有发现无关长时记忆表征对注意的引导效应。以上结果表明,无关长时记忆表征并不能像工作记忆表征一样引导视觉注意选择,工作记忆表征和长时记忆表征对视觉注意的引导属于两个不同的认知过程。