How to Know That Time Travel Is Unlikely Without Knowing Why

What's the point of time travel? Not to change the past; no matter how carefully a time traveler plans, all of her attempts to change the past end in failure. Paul Horwich has argued that the implausibility of such failures gives us reason to doubt that there will be frequent time travel to the local past. I defend a modified version of Horwich's argument and show how we might gain evidence about the chance of there being frequent time travel in the future without having any information that explains why that chance value obtains.     

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical.     

Illusions and Knowing What Is Real

Geometrical illusions are displays that give false impressions that observers take to be accurate. They have traditionally been cited as evidence against the naive realist claim that people see the world as it "really" is. Such illusions, however, often depend on their being viewed from a single vantage point (Kennedy & Portal, 1990). In Gibsonian terms, they depend on the availability of impoverished information. In this study, spatial transformations were applied to line-length (Sander parallelogram) and area (Jastrow curves) illusions to provide information to observers about veridical size. In particular, the reversal of certain parts of the displays resulted in informative invariants that specified the veridical nature of the parts. Most observers were able to use the information.     

Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness

I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt to find a ‘third way’ of engaging with it, which displaces the traditional dichotomy between the effable and the ineffable, that is, between what can be said and what cannot be said. In this way, they seek to overcome the threat of self-stultification mentioned above. Still, one important challenge to this kind of approach, which Moore addresses, is, as he puts it, ‘to show how it is possible’ to talk about the ineffable ‘without belying its very ineffability’. His solution to the problem of the ineffable takes the notion of ‘knowing how’ to play a central role, and is formulated in accordance with his commitments to truth and objectivity. A further important challenge to the kind of approach to the ineffable Moore proposes concerns the issue of objectivity. In Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion, Anderson draws attention to our epistemic locatedness, which brings in questions concerning, for example, gender and culture. Pursuing this view, the challenge is to show ineffable insight without ignoring our epistemic locatedness and, in particular, the role of gender in the conceptualisation and imagery through which we seek to come to terms with the ineffable. My paper deals with these challenges. By engaging with Moore’s and Anderson’s discussions of the ineffable, I examine how it is possible to talk philosophically about the ineffable, without breaking a commitment to enlarged or objective thinking, and without ignoring the epistemic locatedness of thinking.     

Seeing What We Know, Knowing What We See: Challenging the Limits of Visual Acuity

Ageism has resulted in overstated expectations regarding the inevitable deterioration in human capabilities, such as visual perception, with age (Rowe and Kahn in Science, 237, 143?C149, 1987; Grant in Health and Social Work, 21, 9?C15, 1996). Human visual perception, however, is of a largely constructive nature, evidenced in the complementary interactions between top-down inputs (e.g., expectations) and bottom-up stimuli (Engel et al. in National Review of Neuroscience, 2(10), 704?C716, 2001; Miller and Cohen in, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 24, 167-202, 2001). Based on this constructive nature, we hypothesized that visual perception may be better than is typically expected. In three experiments, we demonstrated the malleability of visual acuity using a conditioning procedure involving manipulations in bottom-up stimuli. Experimental groups read a book excerpt with one letter in decreased font size, while the control groups read the same book excerpt with all letters in the same font size. Experiment 1 (N?=?112) examined whether visual acuity could be enhanced for a specific letter. Experiment 2 (N?=?70) assessed whether visual acuity could be enhanced for a non-conditioned letter, while Experiment 3 (N?=?108) evaluated whether the visual conditioning effects would transfer to all non-conditioned letters. Visual acuity for experimental groups was significantly better than that in the control groups, speaking to the general malleability of our visual sense.     

Therapeutic Communication: Knowing What to Say When, 2nd edition

Abstract

Counselling in Medical Settings, Patricia East, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995, 153 pp., £10.99 pb.

An Introduction to the Therapeutic Frame, Anne Gray, London: Routledge, 1994, 162 pp. £30 hb., £10.00 pb.

Supervising the Counsellor: A Cyclical Model, Steve Page and Val Woskett, London and New York: Routledge, 1994, 215 pp., £35 hb., £12.99 pb.

Paedophiles and Sexual Offences against Children, Dennis Howitt, Chichester: Wiley, 1995, 289 pp., £27.50 hb., £16.99 pb.

A Question of Time: Essentials of Brief Dynamic Psychotherapy, Angela Molnos, London: Karnac, 1995, 132 pp., £14.95 pb.

Mental Space, Robert M. Young, London: Process Press, 1994, 200 pp., £15.95 pb.

Counselling in the Pastoral and Spiritual Context, David Lyall, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994, 159 pp. £10.99 pb.     

Knowing What To Do,When, and How: An Integrative Approach to the Use of Psychoanalytic Play Therapy with Children Affected by Cancer

This article delineates a comprehensive approach to play therapy in work with children with cancer. It considers different psychological needs experienced by the patient in connection with significant moments related to cancer treatment and the psychological tasks it involves. Different therapeutic aims are presented, and the therapeutic components related to each are described in detail. The therapeutic aims approached by play therapy are reality testing and ego strengthening, unveiling and working through of unconscious conflicts related to disease, and defense maturation. Therapeutic components leading to the attainment of those aims include the provision of realistic information about diagnosis and treatment by means of play, the use of play as a space for containment, the detection and interpretation of unconscious anxieties and defenses within play, and the exploration and trial of adaptive defenses in the face of illness-related anxiety. Implications of this approach in terms of the precision and flexibility of therapeutic actions and the diversity of roles played by the therapist are discussed.     

Ability and Knowing How in the Situation Calculus

Most agents can acquire information about their environments as they operate. A good plan for such an agent is one that not only achieves the goal, but is also executable, i.e., ensures that the agent has enough information at every step to know what to do next. In this paper, we present a formal account of what it means for an agent to know how to execute a plan and to be able to achieve a goal. Such a theory is a prerequisite for producing specifications of planners for agents that can acquire information at run time. It is also essential to account for cooperation among agents. Our account is more general than previous proposals, correctly handles programs containing loops, and incorporates a solution to the frame problem. It can also be used to prove programs containing sensing actions correct.     

Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How,Rules, Methods,Principles and Criteria

I advance a variety of intellectualism about knowing‐how that is, paradoxically, suggested by Ryle's positive discussions of that phenomenon. I discuss the roots of the view in Ryle's work, its affinity with John Hyman's (2015) view of factual knowledge, and important points of contrast with Stanley and Williamson's (2001) proposal. Drawing on work by Cath (2015) and Wiggins (2012) I also discuss conditions on knowing practically, in ‘the executive way’, as an alternative to appealing to practical modes of presentation.     

Living Danger: On Not Knowing What We Know

This paper contextualizes the struggle around the American Psychological Association's ethical standards regarding psychologists' participation in abusive interrogations of detainees by examining the psychological and political meanings of living in a society in which the state assumes the right to torture. To highlight the implications of authoritarian trends in America's post-9/11 political culture, I offer an interdisciplinary psychoanalytic analysis of the extreme social situation of the Argentine Dirty War, in which torture was used by the military government not as a tactic to make detainees talk but as a strategy to silence an entire population. I explore the defense mechanism of disavowal and its use by both perpetrators and victims in ways that contributed to sustaining authoritarian rule in Argentina. I suggest that it is within the legitimate arena of psychoanalysis to consider the psychological meanings of patients' experience in the larger social order. I argue for a psychoanalytic project that does not disavow the centrality of social reality in the formation of subjectivity and for a clinical model that provides a potential space in which the subject can develop a critical psyche able to co-construct a more democratic political as well as personal life.     

Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That p

Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue thatthis implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replacethe TG view that makes better sense of the value ofknowledge.