Are Healthy Eating Policies Consistent with Public Reason?

States are increasingly implementing policies aimed at changing people's dietary habits, such as fat taxes, food bans, and nudges. In this article, we ask whether healthy eating policies are consistent with public reason, the view that state laws and policies should be justified on the basis of reasons that all citizens can accept at some level of idealisation despite their different conceptions of the good. What we intend to explore is an ‘if…, then…’ line of thought: if one is committed to public reason, then may one consistently endorse healthy eating policies? First, we illustrate multiple ways in which contemporary societies are characterised by a reasonable pluralism concerning conceptions of health and values attached to eating practices. Second, we critically assess the implications of three main conceptions of the structure of public reason, i.e. ‘shareability’, ‘intelligibility’ and ‘accessibility’, for the public justifiability of healthy eating policies. We conclude that healthy eating policies are only consistent with public reason under the ‘accessibility’ conception, i.e. if they are based on reasons grounded in shared epistemic and moral evaluative standards, as long as such reasons reflect a reasonable balance of political values and do not overly prioritise or neglect any of these values.     

Perfectionism and changes in athlete burnout over three months: Interactive effects of personal standards and evaluative concerns perfectionism

ObjectivesA recent longitudinal study with junior athletes (Madigan, Stoeber, & Passfield, 2015) found perfectionism to predict changes in athlete burnout: evaluative concerns perfectionism predicted increases in burnout over a 3-month period, whereas personal standards perfectionism predicted decreases. The present study sought to expand on these findings by using the framework of the 2 × 2 model of perfectionism (Gaudreau & Thompson, 2010) to examine whether evaluative concerns perfectionism and personal standards perfectionism show interactions in predicting changes in athlete burnout.DesignTwo-wave longitudinal design.MethodThe present study examined self-reported evaluative concerns perfectionism, personal standards perfectionism, and athlete burnout in 111 athletes (mean age 24.8 years) over 3 months of active training.Results and conclusionWhen moderated regression analyses were employed, interactive effects of evaluative concerns perfectionism × personal standards perfectionism were found indicating that personal standards perfectionism buffered the effects of evaluative concerns perfectionism on total burnout and physical/emotional exhaustion. To interpret these effects, the 2 × 2 model of perfectionism provides a useful theoretical framework.     

Science as Public Reason: A Restatement

According to John Rawls, the methods and conclusions of science—when these are non-controversial—constitute public reasons. However, several objections have been raised against this view. This paper focuses on two objections. On the one hand, the associational objection states that scientific reasons are the reasons of the scientific community, and thus paradigmatically non-public in the Rawlsian sense. On the other hand, the controversiality objection states that the non-controversiality requirement rules out their public character when scientific postulates are resisted by a significant portion of the citizenry. The paper replies that both objections miss their mark. To the associational objection, it replies that the relevant test for a reason to be public is whether the reasons have been construed under the rules and constrains of a public frame of thought. Insofar as scientific methods and conclusions correspond to the principles of reasoning and rules of evidence that liberals understand as public, their associational origin is secondary. To the controversiality objection, it replies that the standard for a scientific argument to be regarded as non-controversial should refer to its degree of intra-scientific consensus, since ordinary citizens accept or reject scientific pronouncements conditioned to their particular comprehensive views. Nonetheless, a wide extra-scientific agreement on the epistemic virtues of the scientific method will be needed. The paper concludes that there is a good case to think about scientific reasons as public to the extent that scientific reasoning is a mode of inquiry that mirrors a central aspiration of Rawlsian political liberalism: having a public way of thought and an impersonal standpoint to adjudicate between competing claims.     

Expanding Technical Assistance Consultation to Public Schools: District-Wide Evaluation of Instructional and Behavior Support Practices for Students with Developmental Disabilities

SUMMARY

We describe consultation to a public school district in the form of a systems-wide evaluation of instructional and behavior support practices for students with developmental disabilities. The evaluation targeted (1) the financial costs of educating students out-of-district, (2) an analysis of a representative sample of Individualized Educational Plans, and (3) interviews with and a questionnaire completed by teachers. The primary objective of the evaluation was to determine practice standards in the public school district and to make recommendations to improve service delivery. The format of the evaluative model, respective findings, suggested remedies, and implications for large-scale public school consultation are presented.     

The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason,Diversity and Stability

John Rawls's transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies. After rejecting Rawls's conception of public reason, we offer an ‘indirect alternative’ that we believe is much more robust. We cite experimental evidence to back up this claim.     

Ideological differences in attitude and belief similarity: distinguishing perception and reality

ABSTRACT

Attitude and belief similarity have long stood as topics of inquiry for social psychology. Recent research suggests that there might be meaningful differences across people in the extent to which they perceive and actually share others’ attitudes and beliefs. I outline research examining the relationship between political ideology and the perception and reality of attitude similarity. Specifically, I review research documenting that (a) conservatives perceive greater ingroup similarity than do liberals, (b) conservatives overestimate and liberals underestimate ingroup similarity, (c) liberals and conservatives both underestimate similarity to outgroup members, and (d) liberals possess more actual ingroup similarity than do conservatives on a national level. Collectively, this review contributes to understanding how political ideology relates to (perceived) attitude similarity.     

A School-Based,Primary Violence Prevention Program

Summary

This article presents findings from an evaluative study of a multidisciplinary violence prevention project jointly administered by a family practice clinic and junior high school in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The project team hypothesized that an intervention established on a public health model and aimed at enhancing adolescent self-esteem through cognitive and behavioral strategies would reduce the tendency to engage in violence of participating students. The project united health care personnel, social workers and legal profession-als in an effort to teach students specific cognitive tools for the reduction and avoidance of violent encounters. The experimental results do not reveal Project effectiveness in boosting self-esteem indicators among students, although the Project docs seem to have contributed to the control of students' behavioral aggression. Although a clear relationship between self-esteem and violent behavior is not demonstrated by the experimental results, the project study suggests that school-based, anti-violence programs based on a public health model can have a positive effect in the reduction of physical and verbal aggression among adolescents.     

When do stereotypes become really consensual? Investigating the group-based dynamics of the consensualization process

Although it has long been recognized that stereotypes achieve much of their force from being shared by members of social groups, relatively little empirical work has examined the process by which such consensus is reached. This paper tests predictions derived from self-categorization theory that stereotype consensus will be enhanced (a) by factors which make the shared social identity of perceivers salient and (b) by group interaction that is premised upon that shared identity. In Experiment 1 (N=40) the consensus of ingroup stereotypes is enhanced where an ingroup is judged after (rather than before) an outgroup. In Experiment 2 (N=80) when only one group is judged, group interaction is shown to enhance the consensus of outgroup stereotypes more than those of the ingroup—an apparent ‘outgroup consensus effect’. In Experiment 3 (N=135) this asymmetry is extinguished and group interaction found to produce equally high consensus in both ingroup and outgroup stereotypes when the ingroup is explicitly contrasted from an outgroup. Implications for alternative models of consensus development are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Review of Cultural Psychology,by Steven J. Heine

Summary

An A-B, B-C, A-C mediation paradigm was used to investigate observational learning of attitudes in a laboratory situation. The A-B stage involved the learning of dissyllables as responses to instances of three concepts. In the B-C stage, Ss observed a model apparently receiving different levels of shock in association with the dissyllables. In the A-C stage, Ss pulled a lever after the presentation of each of the previously learned concept instances and an equal number of new instances of the same concepts. During a second presentation, Ss gave evaluative ratings of the concept instances. The latency, speed, and amplitude of the lever pull response were not affected by the experimental manipulations. With respect to ratings, instances of concepts associated with shock to the model were significantly more disliked than instances of concepts not paired with shock to the model.     

Global Public Reason,Diversity, and Consent

Abstract

In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason.     

Reasonable Pluralism,Interculturalism, and Sterba on Question-Beggingness

In From Rationality to Equality, James Sterba (From rationality to equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) argues that the non-moral, and non-controversial, principle of logic, the principle that good arguments do not beg-the-question, provides a rationally conclusive response to egoism. He calls this “the principle of non-question-beggingness” and it is supposed to justify a conception of “Morality as Compromise.” Sterba’s basic idea is that principles of morality provide a non-question-begging compromise between self-interested reasons and other-regarding reasons. I will focus, first, on Sterba’s rejection of the alternative Kantian rationalist justification of morality, and second, I discuss the logical principle of non-question-beggingness and I argue that Sterba is wrong to assume that there is a formal, logical requirement that a rational egoist must provide a non-question-begging defense of egoism. I argue that, like the Kantian, Sterba needs a more substantial conception of practical reason to derive his conclusion. My third focus is the problem of reasonable pluralism and public reason (Rawls in Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York, 1996; The law of peoples with the idea of public reason revisited. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999). The Rawlsian principle of public reason is analogous to Sterba’s principle of non-question-beggingness. Sterba recognizes that public policies should respect competing perspectives and that a public conception of justice must be justifiable to all reasonable people. The problem is that that reasonable people disagree about fundamental moral questions. Rawls calls this the fact of reasonable pluralism. I argue that an intercultural conception of justice is necessary to provide a response to reasonable pluralism and a shared basis for public reason.     

Avoidance temperament and social-evaluative threat in college students' math performance: a mediation model of math and test anxiety

Background and Objectives: Standardized testing has become a common form of student evaluation with high stakes, and limited research exists on understanding the roles of students' personality traits and social-evaluative threat on their academic performance. This study examined the roles of avoidance temperament (i.e., fear and behavioral inhibition) and evaluative threat (i.e., fear of failure and being viewed as unintelligent) in standardized math test and course grades in college students. Design and Methods: Undergraduate students (N = 184) from a large public university were assessed on temperamental fear and behavioral inhibition. They were then given 15 minutes to complete a standardized math test. After the test, students provided data on evaluative threat and their math performance (scores on standardized college entrance exam and average grades in college math courses). Results: Results indicate that avoidance temperament was linked to social-evaluative threat and low standardized math test scores. Furthermore, evaluative threat mediated the influence of avoidance temperament on both types of math performance. Conclusions: Results have educational and clinical implications, particularly for students at risk for test anxiety and underperformance. Interventions targeting emotion regulation and stress management skills may help individuals reduce their math and test anxieties.     

Performing well in an evaluative situation: The roles of perceived competence and task-irrelevant interfering thoughts

Abstract

This research expands on previous research by arguing and demonstrating that high perceived competence buffers the detrimental effects of an evaluative situation. In Study 1 (n=75, 38.7% male), the situation (evaluative vs. non-evaluative) and perceived competence (high vs. low) were manipulated, whereas in Study 2 (n=42, 33.3% male), perceived competence relied on naturally occurring differences in perceived competence. The results of Study 1 indicate that people may underachieve in an evaluative situation. More importantly, in Study 2 it was demonstrated that such an evaluative situation had only a negative effect on test performance among individuals low in perceived competence. The occurrence of task-irrelevant interfering thoughts during task completion accounted for this inimical effect of an evaluative situation on test performance among these individuals.     

Public Reason as a Form of Normative and Political Justification: A Study on Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason and Kant’s Notion of the Use of Public Reason in What is Enlightenment?

Abstract

This article explores the historical and philosophical backgrounds that inform the appropriation of the term “public reason” in liberal theory. Particularly, it studies the differing nuances attached to public reason by Kant and Rawls. The article suggests that, while Kant viewed the public use of reason as a conditio sine qua non for Enlightenment to take place within the Prussian society, Rawls’s notion of public reason in Political Liberalism serves a different purpose in our contemporary world. Rawls sees public reason as a tool, which would enable citizens of the pluralistic liberal state to unearth tolerable bases for coexistence, despite their trenchant and often conflicting ideological, cultural and religious differences. Moreover, Rawls’s notion of public reason aims at liberal legitimacy: the normative and political justification of the legal power of the state in liberal democracy.     

Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence

According to political liberalism, laws must be justified to all citizens in order to be legitimate. Most political liberals have taken this to mean that laws must be justified by appeal to a specific class of ‘public reasons’, which all citizens can accept. In this paper I defend an alternative, convergence, model of public justification, according to which laws can be justified to different citizens by different reasons, including reasons grounded in their comprehensive doctrines. I consider three objections to such an account—that it undermines sincerity in public reason, that it underestimates the importance of shared values, and that it is insufficiently deliberative—and argue that convergence justifications are resilient to these objections. They should therefore be included within a theory of political liberalism, as a legitimate form of public justification. This has important implications for the obligations that political liberalism places upon citizens in their public deliberations and reason-giving, and might make the theory more attractive to some of its critics, particularly those sympathetic to religious belief.     

Privacy and Justification*

In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel’s claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their ‘control of the culture’. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel’s desire to leave the social and cultural space radically neutral is incompatible with Rawls’ conception of public reason and clashes with the need to justify liberal institutions.*Winner of the inaugural Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2005.     

Moral Foundations and Heterogeneity in Ideological Preferences

Scholars have documented numerous examples of how liberals and conservatives differ in considering public policy. Recent work in political psychology has sought to understand these differences by detailing the ways in which liberals and conservatives approach political and social issues. In their moral foundations theory, Haidt and Joseph contend the divisions between liberals and conservatives are rooted in different views of morality. They demonstrate that humans consistently rely on five moral foundations. Two of these foundations—harm and fairness—are often labeled the individualizing foundations, as they deal with the role of individuals within social groups; the remaining three foundations—authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity—are the binding foundations as they pertain to the formation and maintenance of group bonds. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek demonstrate that liberals tend to disproportionately value the individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives value all five foundations equally. We extend this line of inquiry by examining whether different types of liberals and conservatives value the moral foundations to varying degrees. Using survey data (n = 745), we rely on a mixed‐mode latent class analysis and identify six ideological classes that favor unique social and fiscal policy positions. While most of the respondents belonging to these classes self‐identify as conservative, they endorse the moral foundations in varying degrees. Since our findings demonstrate considerable heterogeneity with respect to ideology and moral preferences, we conclude by encouraging scholars to consider this heterogeneity in detailing the motivational and psychological foundations of ideological belief.     

Rationality and Synchronic Identity

Many requirements of rationality rely for their application on facts about identity at a time. Take the requirement not to have contradictory beliefs. It is irrational if a single agent believes P and believes ～P, but it is not irrational if one agent believes P and another believes ～P. There are puzzle cases, however, in which it is unclear whether we have a single agent, or instead two or more. I consider and reject possible criteria of identity at a time before proposing a pluralist alternative on which there are vastly more agents than we might have thought. This pluralist thesis is analogous to mereological universalism, on which there are all sorts of strange disconnected objects of which we don’t usually take note. I conclude by giving a pragmatic account of which of these rational agents it makes sense to attend to, by appealing the purposes that we have in employing rationally evaluative language.     

In Defense of Common Content

Abstract

In this essay, I critically discuss a theory of utterance content and de re communication that Anne Bezuidenhout has recently developed in a series of articles. This theory regards the significance of utterances as more pragmatic in nature than allowed by traditional accounts; further, it downplays logical considerations in explaining de re communication, choosing instead to emphasize its psychological character. Included among the implications of this approach is the rejection of what can be called ‘common content’, or utterance content that is held in common by speaker and listener. After describing this theory, I argue that Bezuidenhout does not supply a compelling reason to prefer her account of utterance content over more traditional alternatives that make room for elements of content held in common between speaker and listener. Further, I argue that her account of de re communication supplies even more reason to reject the view of content to which she subscribes. In the end, it will be clear that she has no principled reason for rejecting common content.     

The two roads of passionate goal pursuit: links with appraisal,coping, and academic achievement

Background and Objectives: In this research, we tested the role of cognitive appraisals in explaining why harmonious and obsessive passion dimensions are related to distinct forms of coping and explored if performance was impacted by these appraisal and coping processes. Design: Undergraduate students (N = 489) participated in a longitudinal study and completed three surveys throughout the course of an academic year. Methods: Participants completed assessments of both passion dimensions (Time 1), reported how they were appraising and coping with the mid-year examination period (Time 2), and provided consent to obtain their final grade in Introductory Psychology (Time 3). The hypothesized model was tested using structural equation modeling. Results: Harmonious and obsessive passion dimensions were linked with approach and avoidant coping responses, respectively. Cognitive appraisals, particularly appraisals of challenge and uncontrollability, played an indirect role in these relationships. In addition, both appraisals and coping responses had an indirect effect in the relationship between passion dimensions and final grade. Conclusions: These results identify cognitive appraisal as a reason why passion dimensions are linked with distinct coping tendencies and demonstrate the role of appraisal and coping processes in the journey to passionate goal attainment.