CREATED CO-CREATOR IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CHURCH AND ETHICS

Abstract Philip Hefner's work on created co‐creator is presented for consideration as a contemporary theological anthropology. Its reception within the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America falls into three main lines, which are reviewed here because they are suggestive of its potential impact on Christian thinking. This review raises two major questions and leads to a critique. The first question is whether created co‐creator should be replaced by another term for the sake of more clearly encapsulating the ideas represented in Hefner's work. The second question concerns the moral “payoff” of created co‐creator. Such questions lead to the critique that Hefner's corpus gives insufficient attention to responsibility as integral to freedom and that it lacks a theory of obligation. I then sketch the amenability and benefit of linking created co‐creator with “responsibility ethics,” exemplified by the work of Hans Jonas.     

THE KENOSIS OF THE CREATOR AND OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR

Abstract I comment on moral and theological aspects of human technology, which I consider as an evolutionary moment of our cultural and genetic variation. It is an important moment both scientifically and theologically. Starting from Philip Hefner's theological program of the human being as created co‐creator, I distinguish between the limitations and responsibilities of the human being as a created agent and the possibilities and ideals as a co‐creator. I develop the idea of the kenosis (self‐emptying) of the Creator, which as the root of God's love principle should be reenacted by the created co‐creators. I analyze elements of this kenosis presented by Jürgen Moltmann in relation to creation and eschatology.     

THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PHILIP HEFNER'S “CREATED CO‐CREATOR”

Philip Hefner's understanding of humans as “created co‐creators” has played a key role in the science and religion field, particularly as scholars consider the implications of emerging technologies for the human future. Hefner articulates his “created co‐creator” framework in the form of scientifically testable hypotheses supporting his core understanding of human nature, adopting the structure of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programme. This article provides a brief exposition of Hefner's model, examines his hypotheses in order to assess their scientific character, and evaluates them against the relevant findings of contemporary science. While Hefner's model is largely commensurate with contemporary science, he at times makes claims that cannot be scientifically falsified or corroborated. Hefner's accomplishments in demonstrating the scientific compatibility of many theological notions is admirable; however, his overall position would be strengthened with a more tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of scientific knowledge. His anthropology draws also from extrascientific commitments and is all the richer for it.     

PHILIP HEFNER AND THE MODERNIST/POSTMODERNIST DIVIDE

Abstract Philip Hefner is part of neither the dominant Western paradigm nor the usual postmodernist reaction against it. He belongs within an Anglo‐American viewpoint that also is within neither the dominant Western nor the postmodernist paradigm. Herein I sketch the differences between these paradigms. I elaborate Hefner's theology of the created co‐creator to show where Hefner constrasts with them and then contrast his ideas with those of two contemporary theologians who fit into the second paradigm, George Lindbeck and Mark C. Taylor.     

CO‐CREATING CO‐CREATORS? THE “HUMAN FACTOR” IN EDUCATION

This article presents an example of the contributions the field of science and religion could offer to educational theory. Building on a narrative analysis of Philip Hefner's proposal to use “created co‐creator” as central metaphor for theological anthropology, the importance of culture is brought to the fore. Education should support a needed revitalization of our cultural heritage, and thus enable humanity to (re‐)connect with the global ecological network and with the divine as grounding source of this network. In the concluding reflections of this article, the possibility of a secular interpretation of “created co‐creator,” in which “God” is reduced to “evolution,” is assessed.     

Can the Created Co‐Creator Be Lutheran?A Response to Svend Andersen

Abstract : The author responds to Svend Andersen's article in this journal 43: 4(Winter 2004) 312–23, “Can Bioethics Be Lutheran?” in which Andersen criticizes the concept of humans as created co‐creators, particularly because it asserts an equality between God and humans; he recommends in its place Luther's concept of humans as God's co‐operators or co‐workers. It is argued here that the created co‐creator meets the critique offered. The concept can be both theologized and secularized, which Andersen overlooks. The concept can be integrated into the Christian theology of divine creation, but it introduces irony into theological formulation which is necessary, and which the idea of “God's co‐operators” fails to do. Finally, the chief and most difficult theological issues are framed: Why does God create co‐creators? and How can they receive grace within a Lutheran framework?     

TECHNO‐SECULARISM,RELIGION, AND THE CREATED CO‐CREATOR

Abstract. I take up the challenge posed by John Caiazza (2005) to face down the religiously vacuous ethics of techno‐secularism. Techno‐secularism is not enough for human fulfillment let alone human flowering. Yet, communities of faith based on the Bible have a positive responsibility to employ science and technology toward divinely appointed ends. We should study God's world through science and press technology into the service of transforming our world and our selves in light of our vision of God's promised new creation. This warrants invocation of the concept of the human being as the created co‐creator developed in the theology of Philip Hefner.     

“FILL AND SUBDUE”? IMAGING GOD IN NEW SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL CONTEXTS

While the social and ecological landscape of the twenty‐first century is worlds away from the historical‐cultural context in which the biblical myth‐symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil first emerged, Philip Hefner's understanding that Homo sapiens image God as created co‐creators presents a plausible starting point for constructing a second naïveté interpretation of biblical anthropology and a fruitful concept for envisioning and enacting our human future.     

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN'S EVOLUTIONARY NATURAL THEOLOGY

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin develops, as is well known, a model of evolution as a convergent progression from primordial multiplicity through increasing degrees of complexity toward a final Omega point of spiritual consummation. I explore how Teilhard fuses Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of evolution in developing his own, and in particular his defense of the view that Lamarckism is fundamental to a proper understanding of evolution's human phase. Teilhard's scientific interpretation of evolution is inspired by Christian cosmological insights derived from patristic theology and contemporary Pauline scholarship and cannot be separated from them. His integration of science and theology provides the basis for a renewed evolutionary natural theology that supplants the traditional static models developed by William Paley and others. Teilhard's natural theology also provides a framework for theological ethical reflection on how humanity should act in its capacity as created co‐creator with God. In later work, he considers the implications of his evolutionary theology for the wider universe. Teilhard thus presents an invigorated natural theology grounded in evolution that confirms and completes a dynamic and teleological view of the cosmos.     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

IS THERE A TENSION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?

This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill‐phrased and should be re‐worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method.     

RALPH WENDELL BURHOE AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS FOR AN AGENDA

Abstract. This paper deals with Ralph Wendell Burhoe's scientific theology and his theory of altruism. Its task is a critical examination of some of the main aspects of Burhoe's approach within the dialogue between science and theology; its goal is to enhance his vision. In the first part I argue that Burhoe's concept of God can be related to the Christian concept of a God of love through his theory of altruism. The second part deals with Burhoe's way of yoking religion and science. I apply insights of evolutionary epistemology as well as Philip Hefner's fruitful suggestion that Burhoe's enterprise is unavoidably metaphysical. In the last part, I investigate Burhoe's philosophy of science and the dominant role of Western culture, including the Judeo-Christian tradition, in Burhoe's thought. Incorporation of a more critical attitude toward science within Burhoe's positivistic approach is suggested.     

KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM,FREEDOM AND THE DIVINE MIND1

Without denying the importance of a range of independent epistemic and metaphysical considerations, I argue that there is an irreducibly theological dimension to the emergence of Kant's transcendental idealism. Creative tasks carried out by the divine mind in the pre‐critical works become assigned to the human noumenal mind, which is conceived of as the (created) source of space, time and causation. Kant makes this shift in order to protect the possibility of transcendental freedom. I show that Kant has significant theological difficulties ascribing such transcendental freedom to creatures in relation to God, and that he intends transcendental idealism to be a solution to these difficulties. I explain how this provides Kant with a powerful motivation and reason for denying the so‐called “neglected alternative”, and conclude by suggesting that the nature of any theological response to Kant will depend upon some fundamental options about how to conceive of the relationship between the creator and creation.     

IS JOHN ZIZIOULAS AN EXISTENTIALIST IN DISGUISE? RESPONSE TO LUCIAN TURCESCU

This essay responds to Lucian Turcescu's article, “ ‘Person’ versus ‘Individual’, and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa”, Modern Theology Vol. 18 no. 4 (October, 2002) in which he argues that John Zizioulas's relational ontology of trinitarian personhood is indebted more to modern personalism and existentialism than to the Cappadocian Fathers. Turcescu's focus on Gregory of Nyssa does not warrant the claim that a relational ontology of personhood cannot be found within the thought of the Cappadocian Fathers. More substantively, Turcescu never addresses Zizioulas's interpretation of the Cappadocian affirmation of the monarchy of the Father, which, I argue, is central to Zizioulas's relational ontology insofar as such an ontology attempts to express the realism of divine‐human communion.     

ON THE ROAD WITH RELIGION‐AND‐SCIENCE AND THE ROMANCE OF THE PAST

This essay responds to the question “Where Are We Going?Zygon and the Future of Religion‐and‐Science” and was first presented on 9 May 2009 at a symposium honoring Philip Hefner's editorship of Zygon. It offers four suggestions for the future of religion‐and‐science: Ask big questions; encourage cultural literacy in the public sphere; bring a critical voice to other academic disciplines; and include the history of philosophy.     

AN EVOLUTIONARY CRITIQUE OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR CONCEPT

Abstract The created co‐creator theology states that human beings have the purpose of creating the most wholesome future possible for our species and the global ecosystem. I evaluate the human aspect of this theology by asking whether it is possible for human beings to do this. Do we have sufficient knowledge? Can we be motivated to do what is necessary to create a wholesome future for ourselves and our planet? We do not at present have sufficient knowledge, but there is reason to believe that with further scientific research we will be able to acquire it. The more difficult question is whether we can be motivated to cooperate on the scale necessary to fulfill this purpose. Evolutionary theories of human sociality, altruism, and cooperation are reviewed. I conclude that it is possible for human beings to fulfill the purpose defined for us by the created cocreator concept, but doing this will not be easy.     

‘THERE IS A WAR ON! SOMEONE IS GOING TO GET KILLED’

This paper describes the first three years of work providing consultation at the interface between adult mental health and children's services. It suggests that significant numbers of children, living with parents whose mental illness may be ‘severe and enduring’, remain hidden from services. The author applies psychoanalytic theory in an attempt to understand the unconscious factors, for organizations as well as for individuals, which may contribute to making it so difficult for services to work co‐operatively to recognize these children's existence and their emotional needs. She reviews some of the related fields in which the application of psychoanalytic thinking has occurred and also describes the context in which the work takes place. A series of vignettes demonstrate some of the difficulties encountered and the ways in which the presence of a neutral third or ‘other’ can contribute to their resolution. She suggests working relationships between adult's and children's services are profoundly affected by the psychotic processes operating in the minds of these parents and that the consultant acts as a container enabling staff to manage the fragmentation and splitting which would otherwise be inevitable.     

Authenticity and Heidegger's Antigone

Sophocles' Antigone is the only individual whom Heidegger names as authentic. But the usual interpretations of Heidegger's ‘authenticity’ (as being-towards-death, taking responsibility for norms, world-historical creation, and a neo-Aristotelian phronēsis) either do not apply to Antigone or do not capture what Heidegger finds significant about her. By working through these failures, I develop an interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity that is adequate to his Antigone. The crucial step is accurately identifying the finitude to which Antigone authentically relates: what Heidegger calls ‘uncanniness' (Unheimlichkeit). I argue that uncanniness names being's presencing through self-withdrawal and that Antigone stands authentically towards this in her responsiveness to the call of being and her reticence at the end of explanation. In conclusion, I consider Sophocles' own creative act, which bequeathed to the West an understanding of being and a vision of how to relate to it authentically. I argue that Sophocles' status as a world-historical creator does not provide a competing picture of authenticity but must itself be understood as responsive and reticent.     

WHAT SIN IS: A DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS

Sin is clearly evil, but what differentiates sin from evil? The idea that sin is moral evil is widely held, but important theological arguments have been posed against it. Theologians who reject sin moralism have, however, found it hard to distinguish sin from evil—partially because they share hidden assumptions with sin moralists. Helped by a philosophical theology of deep responsibility, I propound sin responsibilism: sin is culpable evil. This analysis of sin is open to multiple accounts of sin's relation to morality or theories of responsibility, and thus of sin's scope—but I defend a non‐moralistic, compatibilist sin responsibilism.