二○○六年《伦理学研究》总目录

和谐社会与道德建设改造和提升小农伦理———再读马克思的《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》陈瑛(2·01)……………………………………………差异与和谐社会建…………构易小明刘仁贵(2·06)公民道德建设的实效性刍…议邓建国彭柏林(2·11)中国社区道德状况分析及对…………策吴来苏(2·15)教育变革语境中未成年人道德观念的错位与德育革新李海萍(2·73)……………………………………………风险社会与责任伦……………………理潘斌(3·15)慈善文化与和谐社会建设的伦理思…考陈勇(3·34)论弱势群体的道德底…………………线胡宜安(3·38)略论现…     

未成年人道德教育理论研究的新路径——读廖小平教授《代际互动——未成年人道德建设的代际维度》

未成年人的道德教育是人类永恒的课题,尤其在德育已成为21世纪重要前沿课题的情况下,关于未成年人的德育理论获得了迅速发展,呈现出不断繁荣的局面,与此形成鲜明对照的是,道德教育的效果却不尽如人意.     

德育良性互动:未成年人道德建设的新路径

当前未成年人道德建设中效益不佳的原因之一是教育者与被教育者道德互动不足,以及家庭、学校和社会三者合力凝聚不够。道德教育的良性互动无疑是解决这一问题的主要途径。为此,要充分发挥三大德育领域中的施教和受教双方的“互动”机制,并做到与“三位一体”德育网络整体“联动”的有机结合;发挥大众传媒的舆论导向作用,以营造和优化道德互动的舆论环境;广泛开展内容丰富、形式多样、切实有效的未成年人道德实践活动,并与整个公民道德建设实践相结合。     

新时期高校德育与高雅音乐契合互动模式探析

高校德育的目的是培养“审美的人”,注重培养社会主义崇高的思想品德,树立高尚的道德水平,促进新时期高校道德教育的全面发展。艺术审美观可以提升大学生道德价值观,高校大学生审美的品位、愿望和观念与其思想境界、道德观念和政治追求的紧密联系,高校德育同高雅音乐实现的目标上是一致的。新时期,要注重发挥家庭、学校、社会三个主体作用,实现高雅音乐的审美与高校德育的契合互动。     

公民品德塑造重在从青少年抓起--徐州市未成年人思想道德现状的调查与思考

本调查报告认为 ,当代未成年人的思想道德素质基本状况是积极向上的 ,文明素质较高 ,但也存在不少值得重视的问题。中小学德育要针对未成年人的思想实际 ,切实改进教学方法 ,提高教学质量。     

医药代表现象与药品价格政策的改革

探讨医药代表所引出的药品价格政策等问题,通过分析医药代表发生阶段性错位的原因,引出对药品价格改革的思考。我国的药品价格虚高是导致医疗市场失控的根本原因,医药代表的错位只是一种表现。根除这种错位必须首先解决药品价格虚高的问题。     

医药代表现象与药品价格政策的改革

探讨医药代表所引出的药品价格政策等问题,通过分析医药代表发生阶段性错位的原因,引出对药品价格改革的思考.我国的药品价格虚高是导致医疗市场失控的根本原因,医药代表的错位只是一种表现.根除这种错位必须首先解决药品价格虚高的问题.     

当代中国社会主义道德文化经济向度的伦理辩护

当代中国社会主义道德文化建设的现实根据不是道德观念的革新,而是道德生活世界的建造。因此,当代中国社会主义道德文化的现代构建,基础性条件在于具有中国特色的社会主义市场经济的现代到场。没有个人在有中国特色社会主义市场意义上的经济解放,就不可能有个人在道德意义上的自我解放。而个人要在中国特色社会主义市场意义上获得真正的经济解放,必然性前提是个人必须获得具有我国特色的、确定性的、明晰的现代产权,这是为当代中国社会主义道德文化的经济向度进行伦理辩护的逻辑起点。最后,本文进一步指出,"效率优先兼顾公平"应属现阶段当代中国社会主义道德文化经济向度中的分配正义。     

网络文化对高校德育模式的挑战及其应对策略

网络文化的兴起对高校德育模式提出了重大挑战 ,理性地审视这种挑战并选择正确的应对策略 ,对高校德育理念、内容和方法进行探索和创新 ,是高校德育工作者必须承担的时代责任。     

论亚当·斯密正义伦理的价值错位

亚当·斯密既把正义作为一种具体的行为规范,又看作是一种美德或德性.但他主要是把正义作为行为规范来运用的.亚当·斯密的正义伦理呈现出一种价值上的错位,这种价值错位首先表现在主要作为行为规范的正义本来只具有底线的或很低级的价值,但亚当·斯密却赋予其德性或美德的性质与价值;其次,亚当·斯密正义伦理的价值错位表现在正义作为德性总是消极的,其德性价值的程度很低,从而与正义的社会作用极不相称.要解决正义伦理的这种价值错位,必须重建立足于人的统一性的新的德性伦理,倡导做一个具有正义美德的人.     

比较改革前后的中国医疗卫生体制与伦理的优先

中国的医疗卫生问题近几年来一直是一个重大的社会热点问题。过去的市场化的医疗卫生有许多缺陷,特别是有重大的伦理缺陷。通过比较分析中国改革前后的医疗卫生特点,提出了今后中国医疗卫生体制改革以及伦理优先的思想轮廓。     

当代道德教育指向:从道德顺从到道德选择的理路

我国的道德教育有着悠久的历史,其主体流质是道德顺从教育,原因有:伦理本位的思想传统;群体本位的教育倾向和道德教育的政治统治功能强化。当代道德教育的时代背景的变迁即社会结构的转型和多元化社会的形成以及当代道德教育人本倾向和生活世界的实践回归,标示着道德选择教育成为了道德教育的内在要求和指向。     

关于道德原则的几点思考

信仰缺失、经济转型和文化变革,使信仰和道德从一元化走向了多元化,并引起了人们对道德的迷茫、沉思和渴求。在追求普遍适用道德原则的过程中,绝对主义把这种原则看成亘古不变的教条,而相对主义则否定这种原则的存在。我们认为,这种原则是存在的。它是绝对性与相对性的统一,是客观性与主观性的统一,是人们对历史必须性的一种表述形式。我们必须认真研究客观规律,才能总结出有价值的道德原则、范畴和规范。     

Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.     

Emotion and Moral Judgment

This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful , where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert that the intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is in this category. It has the form "That is A" (pitiful, contemptible, rude, etc.). Such judgments combine the features of cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism, an advantage that explains why we find moral weakness problematic in spite of its ubiquity. I then outline a process I call "thinning" the judgment, which explains how moral strength, weakness, and apathy arise. I argue that this process is necessary for moral reasoning and communication, in spite of its disadvantage in disengaging the agent's motivating emotion from the judgment.     

交往理性与德育理念的重建

哲学意义上的交往理论,尤其是哈贝马斯的交往理性可以解决当前目的理性泛滥带来的的德育危机。交往德育是在超越灌输德育的基础上,对主体存在、人的存在目标和生存意义提出本质追问并提供某种可能性诠释的德育理论。它是一种扬弃与超越灌输德育而又与灌输德育截然不同的德育理念,是德育发展的必经阶段。     

A Spinozistic Model of Moral Education

Spinoza’s claim that self-preservation is the foundation of virtue makes for the point of departure of this philosophical investigation into what a Spinozistic model of moral education might look like. It is argued that Spinoza’s metaphysics places constraints on moral education insofar as an educational account would be affected by Spinoza’s denial of the objectivity of moral knowledge, his denial of the existence of free will, and of moral responsibility. This article discusses these challenges in some detail, seeking to construe a credible account of moral education based on the insight that self-preservation is not at odds with benevolence, but that the self-preservation of the teacher is instead conditioned by the intellectual deliberation of the students. However, it is also concluded that while benevolence retains an important place in Spinoza’s ethics, his causal determinism poses a severe threat to a convincing account of moral education insofar as moral education is commonly understood to involve an effort to influence the actions of students relative to some desirable goal.     

全面建设小康社会与思想道德教育的重点

在全面建设小康社会的历史实践中 ,思想道德教育对培育社会主义先进文化和建立社会主义道德体系 ,具有举足轻重的作用。当前 ,思想道德教育的重点环节应放在以下三个方面 :加强对广大农村居民的思想道德教育 ;围绕依法治国和以德治国相结合的治国方略有效开展法治、德治教育 ;在方法论上实现由以义务为起点的思想道德教育转变为以权利为起点的思想道德教育 ,由单纯的思想道德教育转变为以利益赏罚为载体的思想道德教育。     

Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck‐sensitive moral practices.     

Self-doubt: One Moral of the Story

This essay focuses on the value of self-doubt in moral inquiry and in moral education. Using John Patrick Shanley’s play, Doubt: A parable, as illustration, it shows how self-doubt initiates and extends moral inquiry, highlights one’s epistemic fallibility and connects the inquirer to the virtue of humility. The essay draws on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Hullett, Nussbaum, Thayer-Bacon and Elbow to support the idea that the question ‘Am I wrong?’ is important for moral inquiry and for moral education.