More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism

I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been recognized.

Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism

Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism (EPI) out of hand, while Russellian Monism (RM) is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing field, it is not obvious which will prove to be the better view.     

Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism

The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play.     

Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism

Abstract: I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism.     

Properties,laws, and worlds

Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian can and should insist that, in many cases, these worlds are not metaphysically possible. I will further argue that, having taken such a stance, the necessitarian has additional resources to respond to Schaffer’s other arguments against the view.     

Humean laws,circularity, and contrastivity

Synthese - A well-known objection to Humean accounts of laws (e.g. BSA, Lewis in Australas J Philos 61:343–377, 1983, Philosophical papers vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1986) charges them...     

Physical modality,laws, and counterfactuals

Synthese - Standard philosophical accounts attempt to understand physical modality either in terms of special metaphysical entities and relationships (“relations between universals”,...     

Causation,causal perception,and conservation laws

We investigated the perception of causation via the ability to detect conservation violations in simple events. We showed that observers were sensitive to energy conservation violations in free-fall events. Furthermore, observers were sensitive to gradually perturbed energy dynamics in such events. However, they were more sensitive to the effect of decreasing gravity than to that of increasing gravity. Displays with decreasing gravity were the only displays in which the energy profile was dominated by (apparent) potential energy, leading to an asymmetric trajectory.     

Grounding, scientific explanation, and Humean laws

It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered.     

Looking for laws in all the wrong spaces: Kant on laws,the understanding,and space

Prolegomena §38 is intended to elucidate the claim that the understanding legislates a priori laws to nature (the ‘Legislation Thesis’). Kant cites various laws of geometry as examples and discusses a derivation of the inverse‐square law from such laws. I address 4 key interpretive questions about this cryptic text that have not yet received satisfying answers: (a) How exactly are Kant's examples of laws supposed to elucidate the Legislation Thesis? (b) What is Kant's view of the epistemic status of the inverse‐square law and, relatedly, of the legitimacy of the geometric derivation of that law? (c) Whose account of laws, the understanding, and space is Kant critiquing in the passage? (d) What positive account of the relationship between laws, the understanding, and space is Kant offering in the passage? My answer to (d) depends crucially on my answers to (a)–(c). As I interpret Kant, he holds that a wide range of a priori laws—including geometric laws, the inverse‐square law, and the universal laws discussed in the Analytic of Principles—are ‘grounded’ (a technical term defined in the paper) in categorial syntheses rather than the intrinsic nature of the space given to us in pure intuition.     

Partitions,probabilistic causal laws,and Simpson's paradox

I wish to thank Elisabeth Lloyd, Samuel Mitchell, Greg Ray, Piers Rollins and two anonymous readers for their insightful criticisms and comments.