“Ablation of the Parental Images”: A Secret Core in Charles Rycroft’s Psychoanalytic Thought

This article arises from the need to “present” (that is, to read again in a “present and actual” light) the paper, “Why Analysts Need Their Patients' Transferences” by Charles Rycroft (which first appeared in 1993 and is re-published in this Special Issue), and is therefore strictly connected to the ideas the latter contains. The authors, on the one hand, outline the stages of the journey that took Rycroft to elaborate the concept of “ablation of the parental images”, and on the other, retrace his personal “analytic genealogy” and discover a “missing forefather”, Sándor Ferenczi, who has represented for a long time a direct “missing link” in the history of psychoanalysis.     

Goodman’s “New Riddle”

First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman’s infamous “grue” paradox is presented. Then, Goodman’s argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman’s “grue” argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the “New Riddle” is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman’s problem, and the “problem of old evidence”. Several other novel aspects of Goodman’s argument are also discussed (mainly, from a Bayesian perspective).     

“Heidegger’s Biological Nietzsche”

Heidegger’s lecture courses on Nietzsche give prominent attention to the question of what he calls “Nietzsche’s Alleged Biologism”. This biologism is what has been labelled the official Nazi reading of Nietzsche. Yet, there is no single Nazi reading of Nietzsche. There were biologistic and non-biologistic Nazi readings of Nietzsche, as well as anti-Nietzschean Nazis such as Ernst Krieck who denied that his philosophy was either socialist, nationalist, or racial. I will show that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is a critique of the so-called official Nazi reading of Nietzsche as biologistic. However, Heidegger is not merely replacing the Nazi biologistic reading with a metaphysical reading, for his metaphysical reading of Nietzsche is biological, in a distinct sense. Although I reject this metaphysical reading, Heidegger aids my project of constructing a non-naturalist, yet physical reading of Nietzsche in at least four ways: 1) he rejects the Nazi biologistic reading of Nietzsche; 2) he sets forth distinct notions of the biological and the physical akin to Nietzsche; 3) he argues against scientific naturalism in favour of an alternative mode of knowing; and 4) he recognises that rather than reducing everything to nature, Nietzsche anticipates him in intertwining more originary, dynamic notions of physis and techne.     

Reducing REBT’s “Wince Factor:” an insider’s perspective

The author discusses three aspects of rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT) that occasionally make him wince. They are: REBT does not adequately address issues relating to diversity-sensitive counseling; there is a tendency for some REBT adherents to display poor interpersonel skills, and lack a philosophical commitment to the interdependence of humans on one another; and, there is a tendency for REBT to promise more than it can deliver. A list of 15 recommendations and wishes for a “new and improved” version of REBT are included. Reprinted from Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 14(1), 63–78, 1996. The author expressed his appreciation to Dominic DiMattia and Ellen Finkelstein who provided valuable suggestion to a draft version of this article and to Windy Dryden who initiated this dialog and saw it through to its publication. Stephen G. Weinrach was a professor of counseling and human relations at Villanova, PA and a Fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York. He maintained a private practice in Havertown, PA. He died in 2004.     

Pavlov’s “higher nervous activity”

The term higher nervous activity was introduced by Pavlov about 1909 to replace what he previously called “psychical” or “mental.” In Russia “higher nervous activity” is now used for what we often designate as psychophysiological or psychosomatic. “Higher nervous activity” was not a synonym in Pavlov’s use for psychical or mental; it indicates what physiology can deal with and measure as opposed to our subjective feelings and representations. The philosophical differences underlying Pavlov’s concepts, as well as the philosophical basis for distinguishing between what we measure physically and the subjective correlates, are discussed.     

Eluding Wilson’s “Elusive Narrators”

George Wilson has defended the thesis that even impersonal third-person fictional narratives should be taken to contain fictional narrations and have fictional narrators. This, he argues, is necessary if we are to explain how readers can take themselves, in their imaginative engagement with fictions, to have knowledge of the things they are imagining. I argue that there is at least one class of impersonal third-person fictional narratives—thought experiments—to which Wilson’s model fails to apply, and that this reveals more general problems with his argument. I further argue that there is no good reason to think that Wilson’s account applies more restrictedly to those impersonal third-person fictional narratives that feature in standard works of literary fiction.     

Mandela’s “Force of law”

In “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” Jacques Derrida argues that the law’s authority is mystical, unattainable in its origins, theforce of law therefore precipitating conditions for its perpetual contest. The force of Derrida’s “Force of Law” is illustrated in his study of Nelson Mandela (“The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration”). Derrida’s Mandela reflects the law’s divisibility, and therefore its iterability in representation beyond the force of its founding letter—of which apartheid was an extreme example. Mandela makes visible the need for the law’s supplement, as performative justice in the face of inherent violence in the law’s conserving force. Mandela’s performativeforce of law, contesting the inaugural violence of law, is inseparable from an implicit warp and weft of historical and theological influences.     

Comments on Daniel E. Flage’s “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities”

According to Daniel Flage, Berkeley thinks that all necessary truths are founded on acts of will that assign meanings to words. After briefly commenting on the air of paradox contained in the title of Flage’s paper, and on the historical accuracy of Berkeley’s understanding of the abstractionist tradition, I make some remarks on two points made by Flage. Firstly, I discuss Flage’s distinction between the ontological ground of a necessary truth and our knowledge of a necessary truth. Secondly, I discuss Flage’s attempt to show that, according to Berkeley, the resemblance relation does not constitute a necessary connection.

Weyl’s Appropriation of Husserl’s and Poincar“s Thought

This article locates Weyl's philosophy of mathematics and its relationship to his philosophy of science within the epistemological and ontological framework of Husserl's phenomenology as expressed in the Logical Investigations and Ideas. This interpretation permits a unified reading of Weyl's scattered philosophical comments in The Continuum and Space-Time-Matter. But the article also indicates that Weyl employed Poincaré's predicativist concerns to modify Husserl's semantics and trim Husserl's ontology. Using Poincaré's razor to shave Husserl's beard leads to limitations on the least upper bound theorem in the foundations of analysis and Dirichlet's principle in the foundations of physics. Finally, the article opens the possibility of reading Weyl as a systematic thinker, that he follows Husserl's so-called transcendental turn in the Ideas. This permits an even more unified reading of Weyl's scattered philosophical comments.     

Jung’s Axioms: An Introduction to Jung’s “Note on Number”

This article is an introduction to C. G. Jung’s handwritten note on natural numbers (in this issue), which became the basis of Marie-Louise von Franz’s book Number and Time. I present the historical background of Jung’s note and discuss part of its content using mostly Jung’s own words.     

“Octave illusion” or “Deutsch’s illusion”?

The “Deutsch’s illusion” occurs in most people when a dichotic pair of tones spaced an octave apart is presented repeatedly in alternation, so that when the right ear receives the high tone, the left ear receives the low tone, and vice versa. The illusory percept consists typically in a single low tone heard at one ear alternating with a single high tone heard at the other ear. Here, we investigate whether the frequency interval between the tones and their duration play a role in the perception of the illusion. By testing 74 subjects we demonstrate that the illusion is not confined to tones spaced an octave apart but it is perceivable also with tones separated by a major seventh, a minor ninth, a major ninth, and a minor tenth. Regarding duration, the present results show that the illusion is stronger with tones lasting 500 than 200 ms. The present results suggest that the perceptual mechanisms at the basis of the illusion are not strictly linked to the frequency relationships between the dichotic tones.     

Looking Through Ulanowicz’s “Third Window”

After a ??very personal?? introduction, and a reference to how accurate indeed is the use of the ??new window?? metaphor by Ulanowicz and about what ??can be seen through it??, the article dwells into the evolution of our understanding about the most general sources??material and/or non-material??of change and transformation; in order to examine further the item about the ways through which ??information?? can be a source of change and transformation also in pre-biotic processes, where commonly it is not taken into account. Thus, the article argues the convergence between Ulanowicz??s and the Author??s treatments of??non only biotic??networks of configuration of processes (a central theme in Ulanowicz??s book). Finally, the article pays attention to how Ulanowicz??s vision through his ??new Third Window??, can indeed help us transcend the non desirable division of contemporary culture into two isolated compartments (science and technology versus the humanities and ethics), which has contributed not only to the globalization of communications, transactions, knowledge and so on, but also to the globalization of multiple crisis of different sort that need to be solved if we want ??a better world to be possible??.     

Remarks on Penrose’s “New Argument”

It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas–Penrose arguments and even Penrose’s ‘new argument’ in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42] and elsewhere of this question.     

Psychoanalytic Interpretation as Pharmakon: Applying Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” to Psychoanalysis

This paper presents a metaphorical heuristic to expand psychoanalysts’ views on the nature and method of interpretation from an intersubjective perspective. It uses one of Jacques Derrida’s findings in his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy,” a critique of Plato’s Phaedrus, as a model of psychoanalytic interaction. A parallel is drawn between psychoanalytic interpretation and the pharmakon—an ancient Greek term for ‘drug’ that means both remedy and poison. From this comparison, the inescapable dependence of personal meaning on contextual factors, specifically the context of the clinical intersubjective field, is shown. As a result, when an interpretation is offered, the analyst cannot truly know if the patient will receive it as remedy or poison. By keeping the context-dependent nature of personal meaning in awareness through the use of the pharmakon metaphor, analysts increase their abilities of interpretive understanding. In further discussion, the classical psychoanalytic concept of ‘negative therapeutic reaction’ is presented as an example of a decontextualized and reified psychoanalytic construct that becomes superfluous when interpretations are viewed through an intersubjective lens as pharmakon. Without the burden of expectation for being the authoritative imparter of reality and truth, the analyst may now attend to the patient in a way that is more fluid and reciprocal, where the relational field becomes what is primarily interpreted. Further, practical clinical implications of the concept of pharmakon suggest that since the analytic interpretation is subjective in every respect, effective clinical practice cannot be reduced to rigid protocols of technique.