The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.     

Inferences of mental illness from noninvolvement

These studies continue the exploration of variables related to a person's use of the mental illness categorization. The central concern in the present studies was the effect of perceived variation in a target person's level of involvement in a social situation. While a low level of involvement, as portrayed in videotaped scenarios, prompts attribution of mental illness, other features of implicit personality theories also relate to greater or lesser attribution of mental illness. Those participants who gave evidence of having attributed lower levels of involvement, regardless of filmed information, also attributed higher levels of mental illness. Social workers, compared to general population participants, attributed higher levels of mental illness at all levels of target involvement. We discuss the implications of these findings for dissemination and assignment of the mentally ill role.     

The detection of malingered mental illness

Clinical approaches to the detection of malingering are examined from the perspectives of both the general practitioner and forensic examiner. Specific strategies for identifying malingering patients is presented with particular attention to psychoses and post-traumatic stress disorders.