假言推理的否定词效应

介绍假言推理中的4种否定词效应,以及相关的理论模型。被试在进行假言推理时,对前提或结论所表示的事件加进了否定词, 产生了一系列的心理效应。研究发现,范畴前提含有否定词,被试更难做出正确的推论;如果结论中含有否定词,被试却更容易做出正确的推论。为此,心理模型理论,规则理论,概率模型理论以及我国的学者对该问题都作了研究和阐述。     

谈冠以否定词的概念

在一定的论域中,一个语词所表述的概念和在它前面冠以否定词之后所表述的概念之间,是否一定具有矛盾关系呢?有人可能会作出肯定的回答。然而事实并非如此,一个概念和对应的冠以否定词的概念之间并不一定具有矛盾关系;因为它们还可以是反对关系,例如: ①人民检察院对公安机关侦查终结移送的案件,或自己侦查终结的案件,经审查,可以作出起诉、不起诉或者免于起诉的决定。这里的起诉、不起诉和免于起诉是三个界限分明、互相排斥的法律概念。起诉、不起诉     

“不A不B”四字格的逻辑表达

本文说的“不A不B”四字格的两个否定词“不”只各自否定后面与之搭配的A或B,而不是互相否定,表达肯定意思的双重否定四字格,如“不是不去”之类,不在本文讨论之列。“不A不B”四字格的逻辑涵义内容丰富,或表达概念,或表达判断,或隐含着逻辑推理,下面略加分析。 1.不A不B=半A半B=半AB这类“不A不B”可当作正概念看。如: 不新不旧=半新半旧=半新旧不中不西=半中半西=半中西不死不活=半死半活=半死活     

次协调逻辑及其应用前景

一．什么是次协调逻辑所谓次协调逻辑（Ｐａｒａｃｏｎｓｉｓｔｅｎｔ　Ｌｏｇｉｃ）其通俗含义是指这种逻辑本身的协调性次于经典逻辑即矛盾律在这种逻辑中不再普遍有效，但又远高于完全不协调系统即矛盾在这一逻辑系统中不会任意扩散。次协调逻辑的确切含义可以用以下语言来表述：假定一种理论Ｔ的基础语言采用符号作为否定词，Ｔ被称为是不协调的，当且仅当，在Ｔ中至少有一公式Ａ，使得Ａ与Ａ都是Ｔ的定理。否则Ｔ被称为是协调的；如果Ｔ语言中的所有公式都是它的定理，那么它被称为是平凡的（ｔｒｉｖｉａｌ）。否则Ｔ就被称为是不平凡…     

一种否定方式的语用分析

言语交际中,听说双方时常会对对方的陈述作出否定,否定词“不”是一个使用频率极高的符号。说话人(sh)陈述一个命题,听话人(t)不同意这个或关于事实、或关于事理的说法,报之以“不”,从逻辑的角度看,t提出了“非p”,已达到了否定的目的。然而,大量的言语交际事实表明,否定符号的使用者在运用“不”之后,往往并未逻辑地合作地提供明确的信息。因此,从语用角度,讨论一番言语交际中常见的在句首采用“不”的那种否定方式的实际情形和应当注意的事项,乃是一件有趣而有意义的事情。     

“次协调否定”──“辩证否定”的一种形式刻画

在逻辑系统中，人们采用的初始联结词一般有五个：否定（T）、折取（V）、合取（A）、蕴涵（→）和等值（←），而在这五个初始联结词中，否定词是最重要也是最基本的联结词。在逻辑史上，有人虽试图将一个逻辑系统采用的初始联结词减少到最低限度，但后来证明一个逻辑系统采用     

友爱在亚里士多德伦理学中的地位

在亚里士多德的伦理学中,他关于友爱的理论一直只受到很少的关注和讨论。②这也许有些不公平。一方面是因为,在他的伦理学讨论中,他对于友爱的讨论占有最大的篇幅。在较早些的五卷本的《欧台谟伦理学》中,有一卷专论友爱;在十卷本的《尼各马可伦理学》中,有两卷专门讨论友爱。这足以表明,亚里士多德在著述伦理学时,对友爱问题是非常关注的。他不仅非常关注友爱的问题,而且对于它的讨论达到了对所有其他主题的讨论所未见的精致程度。另一方面是因为,这部分讨论在他的伦理学讨论中非常重要,因为只是在对友爱问题的讨论中,亚里士多…     

句子理解的实验研究

在三种不同的条件下,对人验证句子的过程作了比较研究。结果表明,无论在哪种条件下,验证不同类型句子的时间模式是一致的。在句子-图形验证任务中,不管这些图形是抽象的符号还是与常识有关的具体事物的图形,其加工所需的时问基本上是相同的。但是,句子-常识验证所需的时间,要比句子-图形验证的时间明显地短。实验还表明,否定词在句中的位置,对句子的理解有一定的影响。     

数学直觉浅析

数学直觉在数学研究中的作用是不可否认的。而且它在数学哲学的讨论中也占有一个重要的地位,而这种讨论则又构成了一般哲学研究,特别是关于认识论问题的讨论的一个侧而。但是,究竟什么是数学直觉呢?对此不同     

论“要”

论“要”胡传胜１．要在人的生命中最常见，最基本。人对它太熟悉和清楚了，以致从思想角度来讨论它，都显得琐屑、无聊。它在人的具体生命（生活）中的重要地位和在学术或思想上的被忽视状态，形成巨大反差。２．在世界各民族思想中，对要的讨论和对认识（“看”与“言”...     

组织中的高质量联结

组织中的高质量联结(HQC)指工作中短期的积极互动关系。它能使交往双方体验到活力、积极关照与相互交融, 并具有高情感承载力、关系张力与联结力三个特征。目前, HQC已成为积极组织行为学关注的热点问题之一, 它不仅对个体生理健康、工作态度、学习行为具有积极影响, 还能通过组织过程、高管团队的决策与张力、团队创新力作用于组织。而认知、情感和行为机制是构建与强化HQC的重要方法。未来HQC研究需要对其影响因素、构建与强化机制间关系做进一步讨论。     

Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non‐normative cases, and this problem is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden.     

Contracting Intuitionistic Theories

I reformulate the AGM-account of contraction (which would yield an account also of revision). The reformulation involves using introduction and elimination rules for relational notions. Then I investigate the extent to which the two main methods of partial meet contraction and safe contraction can be employed for theories closed under intuitionistic consequence. I would like to thank the organisers, Heinrich Wansing, Sergei Odintsov and Yaroslav Shramko, of the Dresden Workshop on Constructive Negation, July 2–4, 2004, for providing the opportunity to present the ideas in this paper for the first time to a constructively critical audience. I am grateful to Sven Ove Hansson for useful comments on an earlier draft. A special note of thanks is owed also to Joongol Kim, who spotted a mistake in an earlier attempt of mine to prove a stronger form of Theorem 8.6. The results in this paper were presented to the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Chicago in April 2005.     

Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability

In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, Michael Dummett. Intuitionists can either point out the intuitionistc invalidity of the inference from the claim that all truths are knowable to the insane conclusion that all truths are known, or they can outright demur from asserting the existence of forever-unknown truths, perhaps questioning—as Dummett now suggests—the applicability of the Principle of Bivalence to a certain class of empirical statements. I argue that if intuitionists reject strict finitism—the view that all truths are knowable by beings just like us—the prospects for either proposal look bleak.     

The Marxian theory of social change∗

This essay is a logico‐philosophical critique of the Marxian system of sociology with special reference to the theory of social change. To every change in the natural order (taken in conjunction with the technological order) corresponds an appropriate change in the human order, that is, in the system of social relations. This, it is shown, is the fundamental Marxian thesis regarding social equilibrium. And accordingly the key idea regarding social change is that a gradually maturing inherent disproportion between the two orders is the basic condition of social change, eventually leading to the establishment of a new social equilibrium at a higher level.

A close examination of the concept of mode of production and changes therein is attempted in the course of elucidating the above thesis. It is argued that the technological interpretation of the concept of mode of production conflicts with the Marxian anthropology and that we should have a structural interpretation according to which it will refer to the economy as a whole and will include among other elements production relations. This interpretation leads the discussion into one of the central problems of Marxism, namely, the relation between the mode of production and the social system. It is argued that the social system is basic to Marx and after a close analysis of the concept of system it is shown that the Marxian theory of base and superstructure rests mainly on confusion of conceptual orientations. This, it is shown, is connected with a fundamental idea of Marxism, viz., that of a system without a transcendent centre. This essay endeavours to prove that such an idea is logically untenable. Hence the Marxian Laws of Transformation of Quantity into Quality and Negation of Negation are examined and shown logically untenable.

The last section discusses the question about the determinant of technological change and eventually of social change. Three possible Marxian solutions are examined: (a) in terms of needs — it is argued that this is inconsistent with Marx's theory of man and labour; (b) in terms of science and new ideas — it is shown that this ultimately goes contrary to Marxian materialism and positivism; and finally, (c) the systemic solution in terms of the dialectic of nature and man is subjected to logical scrutiny and it is shown that this cannot be consistent and valid without involving a trans‐historical standpoint; for, it is argued, the idea of the self‐directing Humanity on which it rests is a self‐contradictory notion.     

Nelson's Negation on the Base of Weaker Versions of Intuitionistic Negation

Constructive logic with Nelson negation is an extension of the intuitionistic logic with a special type of negation expressing some features of constructive falsity and refutation by counterexample. In this paper we generalize this logic weakening maximally the underlying intuitionistic negation. The resulting system, called subminimal logic with Nelson negation, is studied by means of a kind of algebras called generalized N-lattices. We show that generalized N-lattices admit representation formalizing the intuitive idea of refutation by means of counterexamples giving in this way a counterexample semantics of the logic in question and some of its natural extensions. Among the extensions which are near to the intuitionistic logic are the minimal logic with Nelson negation which is an extension of the Johansson's minimal logic with Nelson negation and its in a sense dual version — the co-minimal logic with Nelson negation. Among the extensions near to the classical logic are the well known 3-valued logic of Lukasiewicz, two 12-valued logics and one 48-valued logic. Standard questions for all these logics — decidability, Kripke-style semantics, complete axiomatizability, conservativeness are studied. At the end of the paper extensions based on a new connective of self-dual conjunction and an analog of the Lukasiewicz middle value ½ have also been considered.     

A Predicate Logical Extension of a Subintuitionistic Propositional Logic

We develop a predicate logical extension of a subintuitionistic propositional logic. Therefore a Hilbert type calculus and a Kripke type model are given. The propositional logic is formulated to axiomatize the idea of strategic weakening of Kripke's semantic for intuitionistic logic: dropping the semantical condition of heredity or persistence leads to a nonmonotonic model. On the syntactic side this leads to a certain restriction imposed on the deduction theorem. By means of a Henkin argument strong completeness is proved making use of predicate logical principles, which are only classically acceptable.     

Towards a Semantics Based on the Notion of Justification

Suppose we want to take seriously the neoverificationist idea that an intuitionistic theory of meaning can be generalized in such a way as to be applicable not only to mathematical but also to empirical sentences. The paper explores some consequences of this attitude and takes some steps towards the realization of this program. The general idea is to develop a meaning theory, and consequently a formal semantics, based on the idea that knowing the meaning of a sentence is tantamount to having a criterion for establishing what is a justification for it. Section 1 motivates a requirement of epistemic transparency imposed onto justifications conceived as mental states. In Section 2, the formal notion of justification for an atomic formula is defined, in terms of the notion of cognitive state. In Section 3, the definition is extended to logically complex formulas. In Section 4, the notion of truth-ground is introduced and is used to give a definition of logical validity.     

Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition

I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the paradox of inference, the other on considerations concerning the content of a statement.     

Intuitionistic Games: Determinacy,Completeness, and Normalization

We investigate a simple game paradigm for intuitionistic logic, inspired by Wajsberg’s implicit inhabitation algorithm and Beth tableaux. The principal idea is that one player,  ?ros, is trying to construct a proof in normal form (positions in the game represent his progress in proof construction) while his opponent, ?phrodite,  attempts to build a counter-model (positions or plays can be seen as states in a Kripke model). The determinacy of the game (a proof-construction and a model-construction game in one) implies therefore both completeness and semantic cut-elimination.