Modelling simultaneous games in dynamic logic

We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player’s powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of ‘concurrent game logic’ CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.     

Logic Games are Complete for Game Logics

Game logics describe general games through powers of players for forcing outcomes. In particular, they encode an algebra of sequential game operations such as choice, dual and composition. Logic games are special games for specific purposes such as proof or semantical evaluation for first-order or modal languages. We show that the general algebra of game operations coincides with that over just logical evaluation games, whence the latter are quite general after all. The main tool in proving this is a representation of arbitrary games as modal or first-order evaluation games. We probe how far our analysis extends to product operations on games. We also discuss some more general consequences of this new perspective for standard logic.     

Transition semantics: the dynamics of dependence logic

We examine the relationship between dependence logic and game logics. A variant of dynamic game logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we show that its relationship with dependence logic is comparable to the one between first-order logic and dynamic game logic discussed by van Benthem. This suggests a new perspective on the interpretation of dependence logic formulas, in terms of assertions about reachability in games of imperfect information against Nature. We then capitalize on this intuition by developing expressively equivalent variants of dependence logic in which this interpretation is taken to the foreground.     

Three ancient problems solved by using the game theory logic based on the Shapley value

The ancient problems of bankruptcy, contested garment, and rights arbitration have generated many studies, debates, and controversy. The objective of this paper is to show that the Shapley value from game theory, measuring the power of each player in a game, may be consistently applied for getting the general one-step solution of all these three problems viewed as n-person games. The decision making is based on the same tool, namely the game theory logic based on the use of the Shapley value, but the specific games involved are slightly different in each problem. The kind of claims of the players, the relationship between the given claims and the given resources available, and the particular way of calculating the generalized characteristic function of the game determine the specific type of game which has to be solved in each of the three ancient problems mentioned. The iterative use of the Shapley value may also justify the well-known Aumann–Maschler step-by-step procedure for solving the bankruptcy problem.

     

多值逻辑与语义赋值博弈

文章在扩展博弈上,给出了多值逻辑的语义赋值博弈的一般框架,避免了博弈者在多值逻辑的语义博弈中声明无穷对象的问题;然后通过Eloise赢的策略定义博弈的语义概念——赋值,证明了多值逻辑的博弈语义与Tarski语义是等价的;最后,根据语义赋值博弈框架对经典逻辑进行了博弈化。     

Subgames within Large Games and the Heuristic of Imitation

We study repeated normal form games where the number of players is large. We argue that it is interesting to look at such games as being divided into subgames, each of which we call a neighbourhood. The structure of such a game is given by a graph G whose nodes are players and edges denote visibility. The neighbourhoods are maximal cliques in G. The game proceeds in rounds where in each round the players of every clique X of G play a strategic form game among each other. A player at a node v strategises based on what she can observe, i.e., the strategies and the outcomes in the previous round of the players at vertices adjacent to v. Based on this, the player may switch strategies in the same neighbourhood, or migrate to another neighbourhood. We are interested in addressing questions regarding the eventual stability of such games. We incrementally impose constraints on the ‘types’ of the players. First, we look at players who are unconstrained in their strategising abilities, in that, players who may use unbounded memory. We then consider the case of memoryless players. We show that in both these cases the eventual stability of the game can be characterised in terms of potentials. We then introduce a simple modal logic in which the types of the players can be specified. We show that when the players play according to these specified types, it can be effectively decided whether the game stabilises. Finally, we look at the important heuristic of imitation. Simple imitative strategies can be specified in the logic introduced by us. We show that in a population of optimisers and imitators, we can decide how ‘worse-off’ the imitators are by playing imitative strategies rather than optimal ones.     

Information and the complementarity game

Complementarity games are explorative games between two players. The deterministic rules of the game are known to both players. The first player freely chooses among a finite number of states of the game but tells nobody of this decision. The second player accesses the game only by primitive, symbolic input‐output interfaces. The task of the second player is to find out the unknown state by input‐output experiments. The logic resulting from this scenario resembles‐ quantum logic in many aspects. It is the empirical logic of choice for virtual realities.     

On the logic of informational independence and its applications

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.     

Information-seeking dialogues: Some of their logical properties

The dialogical games introduced in Jaakko Hintikka, Information-Seeking Dialogues: A Model, (Erkenntnis, vol. 14, 1979) are studied here to answer the question as to what the natural logic or the logic of natural language is. In a natural language certain epistemic elements are not explicitly indicated, but they determine which inference rules are valid. By means of dialogical games, the question is answered: all classical first-order rules have to be modified in the same way in which some of them are modified in the transition to intuitionistic logic. (Furthermore, in some cases quantificational rules have to be modified further.) The rules that are left unmodified by intuitionists are applicable only to the output of certain game rules, but not to others. In. this sense, neither classical nor yet intuitionistic logic is the logic of natural language. We need a new type of nonclassical logic, justified by our information-seeking dialogues.     

The effects of video game playing on attention, memory, and executive control

Expert video game players often outperform non-players on measures of basic attention and performance. Such differences might result from exposure to video games or they might reflect other group differences between those people who do or do not play video games. Recent research has suggested a causal relationship between playing action video games and improvements in a variety of visual and attentional skills (e.g., [Green, C. S., & Bavelier, D. (2003). Action video game modifies visual selective attention. Nature, 423, 534-537]). The current research sought to replicate and extend these results by examining both expert/non-gamer differences and the effects of video game playing on tasks tapping a wider range of cognitive abilities, including attention, memory, and executive control. Non-gamers played 20+ h of an action video game, a puzzle game, or a real-time strategy game. Expert gamers and non-gamers differed on a number of basic cognitive skills: experts could track objects moving at greater speeds, better detected changes to objects stored in visual short-term memory, switched more quickly from one task to another, and mentally rotated objects more efficiently. Strikingly, extensive video game practice did not substantially enhance performance for non-gamers on most cognitive tasks, although they did improve somewhat in mental rotation performance. Our results suggest that at least some differences between video game experts and non-gamers in basic cognitive performance result either from far more extensive video game experience or from pre-existing group differences in abilities that result in a self-selection effect.     

Investigating the Effects of a Persuasive Digital Game on Immersion,Identification, and Willingness to Help

Abstract

Recent years have seen a tremendous rise in the development and distribution of persuasive games: digital games that are used to influence players’ attitudes and/or behavior. Three studies (N_{Study 1}?=?134; N_{Study 2}?=?94; N_{Study 3}?=?161) tested the effects of a persuasive game on immersion, identification, and willingness to help. The results showed that playing the persuasive game did not result in substantially stronger willingness to help, relative to the control conditions. Video and printed text resulted in more immersion than the digital game, but playing the game resulted in substantially higher perceptions of embodied presence.     

Abstract argument games via modal logic

Inspired by some logical considerations, the paper proposes a novel perspective on the use of two-players zero-sum games in abstract argumentation. The paper first introduces a second-order modal logic, within which all main Dung-style semantics are shown to be formalizable, and then studies the model checking game of this logic. The model checking game is then used to provide a systematic game theoretic proof procedure to test membership with respect to all those semantics formalizable in the logic. The paper discusses this idea in detail and illustrates it by providing a game for the so-called skeptical preferred and skeptical semi-stable semantics.     

The Basic Algebra of Game Equivalences

We give a complete axiomatization of the identities of the basic game algebra valid with respect to the abstract game board semantics. We also show that the additional conditions of termination and determinacy of game boards do not introduce new valid identities.En route we introduce a simple translation of game terms into plain modal logic and thus translate, while preserving validity both ways, game identities into modal formulae.The completeness proof is based on reduction of game terms to a certain minimal canonical form, by using only the axiomatic identities, and on showing that the equivalence of two minimal canonical terms can be established from these identities.     

Thompson Transformations for If-Logic

In this paper we study connections between game theoretical concepts and results, and features of IF-predicate logic, extending observations from J. van Benthem (2001) for IF-propositional logic. We highlight how both characteristics of perfect recall can fail in the semantic games for IF-formulas, and we discuss the four Thompson transformations in relation with IF-logic. Many (strong) equivalence schemes for IF-logic correspond to one or more of the transformations. However, we also find one equivalence that does not fit in this picture, by the type of imperfect recall involved. We point out that the connection between the transformations and logical equivalence schemes is less direct in IF-first order logic than in the propositional case. The transformations do not generate a reduced normal form for IF-logic, because the IF-language is not flexible enough. Research funded by The Samenwerkingsorgaan Brabantse Universiteiten (SOBU).     

From reasonable preferences,via argumentation,to logic

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.     

Hard and Soft Preparation Sets in Boolean Games

A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set to true or false, and are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal formula, while secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. We adopt (pure) preparation sets (prep sets) as our basic solution concept. A preparation set is a set of outcomes that contains for every player at least one best response to every outcome in the set. Prep sets are well-suited to the analysis of Boolean games, because we can naturally represent prep sets as propositional formulas, which in turn allows us to refer to prep formulas. The preference structure of Boolean games with costs makes it possible to distinguish between hard and soft prep sets. The hard prep sets of a game are sets of valuations that would be prep sets in that game no matter what the cost function of the game was. The properties defined by hard prep sets typically relate to goal-seeking behaviour, and as such these properties cannot be eliminated from games by, for example, taxation or subsidies. In contrast, soft prep sets can be eliminated by an appropriate system of incentives. Besides considering what can happen in a game by unrestricted manipulation of players’ cost function, we also investigate several mechanisms that allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable outcomes from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility.     

Playing for the thrill and skill. Quiz games as means for mood and competence repair

ABSTRACT

Recent studies have found that digital games can be used to improve the players’ mood, especially after emotionally unpleasant experiences. We introduce competence repair as an extension of previous work on mood repair. To investigate the effects of digital games on both mood and competence repair, we conducted 3 studies using quiz games. In the quasi-experimental Study 1 (N = 143), we manipulated the necessity for repair via a false feedback task (positive vs. negative), and looked at the impact of in-game success (victory vs. defeat). In the experimental Studies 2 (N = 91) and 3 (N = 109), we aimed at conceptually replicating and extending the findings on the impact of in-game success by varying participants’ success over a series of 4 matches (Study 2: close game outcomes, Study 3: clear victory/defeat). The results of these studies indicate that the efficacy of digital games for mood repair, as well as competence repair, depends on the necessity for repair, as well as success in the game. However, competence repair occurred even after participants were defeated repeatedly in a series of close matches. These results are discussed in light of the potential of digital games for fulfilling (previously thwarted) psychological needs.     

Game Theory in Philosophy

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence (prisoner’s dilemma), liberalism and efficiency (Nash equilibrium), Hume’s concept of convention (correlated equilibrium), morality and rationality (bargaining games), and distributive justice and egalitarianism (evolutionary game theory). A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy.     

From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia

This paper focuses on (an interpretation of) the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics.