Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability

Premise acceptability is conceptually connected to presumption. To say that a premise is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor is to give a first approximation to this connection. A number of popular principles of presumption suggest that whether there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim depends on the sources which vouch for it. Sources consist of internal belief-generating mechanisms and external testimony. Alvin Plantinga's notion of warrant lays down four conditions upon a source for the belief which it generates to be warranted. We argue that there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim if and only if there is a presumption of warrant for that premise,belief or claim. This amounts to the thesis that there is a presumption for a belief from a challenger's point of view if and only if there is a presumption from that person's point of view that her cognitive faculties which have generated the belief have been functioning properly, in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accord with a segment of her design plan aimed at the truth, and that these faculties are reliable. In light of our argument for this thesis, we may legitimately claim that one way to determine that there is a presumption for a belief is to determine that there is a presumption of warrant for that belief, and thus that in determining whether there is a presumption for a belief or premise, we may consider the source.     

ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

This is a working guide for a technique for the initial interview in marital therapy. There is a discussion of the seating arrangement and the opening. The therapist lays out ground rules and suggests a theoretical framework for the couple. Each partner is asked to do a self-assessment scale aimed at assessing his or her desire to stay in the marriage. This is followed by a discussion of family behavior. The session is terminated with homework for each of the partners, and a therapeutic contract is made. Nonsystematic feedback suggests the technique is useful.     

Bayesian analysis for proportions with an independent background effect

Conventional Bayesian analysis for proportions is not appropriate for proportions with a background effect, for example, for the proportion of correct responses in a sensory difference test using a forced‐choice method with a guessing probability. The main difficulty is that it is not reasonable to assume that a proportion with a background effect has a beta prior distribution. A generalized posterior distribution for proportions is derived in this paper. It includes the standard beta posterior distribution for a proportion without background effect as a special case. Bayesian inference and Bayesian sample size determination for proportions based on the generalized posterior distribution are discussed.     

Examining change in maximal reliability for multiple‐component measuring instruments

A method for examining change in maximal reliability for pre‐specified sets of congeneric measures when developing a multi‐component instrument is outlined. The approach is applicable for purposes of estimation and testing of gain or loss in the maximal reliability coefficient as a consequence of adding or dropping one or more measures from a homogeneous composite with uncorrelated errors, as well as when one is concerned with optimal component choice for highest increase or correspondingly smallest drop in maximal reliability. The method is compared with a procedure for ascertaining change in unweighted sum score reliability, and implications for instrument construction and revision are discussed. The approach is illustrated with a numerical example.     

Foundations of Mathematics: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Structure

Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in set theory, the latter is a foundation for mathematics. Whether set theory, as opposed to any of its rivals, is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is philosophical, to provide the metaphysical basis for mathematics. Another is epistemic, to provide the basis of all mathematical knowledge. Another is to serve mathematics, by lending insight into the various fields. Another is to provide an arena for exploring relations and interactions between mathematical fields, their relative strengths, etc. Given the different goals, there is little point to determining a single foundation for all of mathematics.     

Estimating the imputed social cost of errors of measurement

If a loss function is available specifying the social cost of an error of measurement in the score on a unidimensional test, an asymptotic method, based on item response theory, is developed for optimal test design for a specified target population of examinees. Since in the real world such loss functions are not available, it is more useful to reverse this process; thus a method is developed for finding the loss function for which a given test is an optimally designed test for the target population. An illustrative application is presented for one operational test.This work was supported in part by contract N00014-80-C-0402, project designation NR 150-453 between the Office of Naval Research and Educational Testing Service. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.     

Desert for Wrongdoing

Much government and personal conduct is premised on the idea that a person made thereby to suffer deserves that suffering thanks to prior wrongdoing by him. Further, it often appears that one kind of suffering is more deserved than another and, in light of that, conduct inflicting the first is superior, or closer to being justified than conduct inflicting the second. Yet desert is mysterious. It is far from obvious what, exactly, it is. This paper offers and argues for a theory of comparative desert. It offers an account of the conditions under which one harm is more deserved for past wrongdoing than another. The theory offered here can be stated, roughly, like so: One harm is more deserved for a wrongful act than another if, in light of it more than the other, the act is supported by reasons for the agent in a way similar to the way it ought to have been supported by reasons for him. The central task of the paper is to explain, elaborate and offer an argument for this theory. The paper also shows that, under the theory, differences in culpability—as between, for instance, intentionally rather than knowingly bringing about a harm—make a difference to desert. And the paper shows that under the proposed theory it is easier for the state to justify inflicting a punishment that is more deserved than it is to justify inflicting a punishment that is less deserved.     

A note on steady states and the weber-fechner law

The steady state of a simple reaction system has been shown to have some of the properties of a psychophysical discrimination system, including the possibility of deducing a generalized Weber-Fechner Law, both in integral form and in difference form. The Weber ratio so deduced is not constant, and its dependence on stimulus intensity is exhibited. The dependence of the difference limen on the internal threshold is discussed; it is found that in general there is a finite value of this threshold for which response is impossible. This critical threshold is lower for higher values of the reference stimulus intensity. Similarly, it is shown that the difference limen and the Weber ratio, for a fixed value of the threshold, become infinite (i.e., discrimination is impossible) for a value of the stimulus intensity which in general is finite.     

A theoretical frame of reference for family systems therapy? An introduction to Luhmann's theory of social systems

The starting point for this paper is that family therapy lacks a theoretical frame of reference of its own; thus a stepwise search for such a frame of reference is described. First, social systems are defined as communication systems. Second, it is shown in what way a family can be seen as a social system. With the help of the theory of social systems of the sociologist Luhmann, a theoretical frame of reference for systems therapy is drafted. Finally, we hint at the implications such a theoretical framework could have for clinical practice.     

Justifying Desires

According to an influential conception of reasons for action, the presence of a desire or some other conative state in the agent is a necessary condition for the agent's having a reason for action. This is sometimes known as internalism. This article presents a case for the considerably stronger thesis, which we may call hyper‐internalism, that the presence of a desire is a sufficient condition for the agent's having a (prima facie) reason for action.     

APOLOGIZING WITHOUT REGRET

A common belief about the nature of agent regret is that regretting some event E is closely linked to being sorry for the occurrence of E. Or more specifically, that if one is sorry for E then she must regret E. I will call this ‘the sorry‐regret hypothesis’. My contention is that one may be sorry for some action but not regret it. I take the rejection of this ‘truism’ to be a positive development. I offer two lines of argument for rejecting the sorry‐regret hypothesis. One line of argument is based on counterexamples. The second attacks the validity of a reconstructed argument for the sorry‐regret hypothesis. It is desirable to reject the sorry‐regret hypothesis since there is a component of regret that many will not wish to be saddled with as a condition of apologizing. To regret an act, one must wish that she had not performed that act. Since a person is the person she is (speaking loosely) because of the actions she has performed, for many actions, if one regrets an action, then she wishes that she were a different person. This is a worrisome consequence.     

The Perspectival Nature of Probability and Inference

It is argued that two observers with the same information may rightlydisagree about the probability of an event that they are both observing. This is a correct way of describing the view of a lottery outcome from the perspective of a winner and from the perspective of an observer not connected with the winner - the outcome is improbable for the winner and not improbable for the unconnected observer. This claim is both argued for and extended by developing a case in which a probabilistic inference is supported for one observer and not for another, though they relevantly differ only in perspective, not in any information that they have. It is pointed out, finally, that all probabilities are in this way dependent on perspective.     

Transmission Failure Failure

I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one 9s justification for believing a conclusion can be one 9s premise for the conclusion, rather than simply one 9s justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of knowledge as closure is properly understood.     

Falling From Grace: Understanding an Ethical Sanctioning Experience

Although an ethical sanction is viewed as an incredibly stressful event for professional counselors, the experience of being sanctioned is not well known. This article provides an overview of the sanctioning process, a discussion of professional silence, and a case example of a sanctioning experience for a counselor. The sanctioning experience is described in a 3‐stage response sequence and is illustrated with journal entries from a sanctioned counselor. Response interventions for each stage are suggested, and implications for the counseling profession are offered.     

Overall Lifelong Fortune: A Critique of the Intrinsic Potential Account

It seems clear that a fortunate life for a human being is very different from a fortunate life for a dog. But it is not clear what the appropriate measure is for determining whether a life is fortunate or not. Jeff McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account and defends the Intrinsic Potential Account of overall lifelong fortune. In this article, I argue that the Intrinsic Potential Account fails. More specifically, I will argue that it is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples; fails for the same basic reason that McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account; and is insensitive to a consideration that is morally significant.     

Coefficients alpha for components

The formula for coefficient alpha for a component is developed. Kaiser's special formula for coefficient alpha for a principal component and the Kaiser-Guttman Rule for the "number of components" are mentioned. A numerical example is added. It is conjectured that the sum of coefficients alpha is invariant under orthogonal rotation.     

EQUIVALENCE OF CROSS-CULTURAL DATA: AN OVERVIEW OF BASIC ISSUES

The logic of comparison is taken as a starting point. It is argued that any cross-cultural comparison presupposes a comparison scale, i.e. a scale that is identical across the populations included in a study. Scale identity can be specified for various levels of measurement. In the second section a simple classification is presented for inferences about cross-cultural differences derived from psychological measurements. Two questions are asked for various categories of inferences, viz., whether they are logically feasible and whether they can be validated empirically. In the third section the statistical analysis of psychometric conditions for equivalence is discussed. The fourth section deals with the problem what alternatives for meaningful interpretation a researcher has if data turn out to be lacking in equivalence. In the fifth section a conceptual problem is raised, namely whether the basic assumption of this article is realistic that psychological concepts are identical across cultures.     

Isolated and interrelated concepts

A continuum between purely isolated and purely interrelated concepts is described. Along this continuum, a concept is interrelated to the extent that it is influenced by other concepts. Methods for manipulating and identifying a concept’s degree of interrelatedness are introduced. Relatively isolated concepts can be empirically identified by a relatively large use of nondiagnostic features, and by better categorization performance for a concept’s prototype than for a caricature of the concept. Relatively interrelated concepts can be identified by minimal use of nondiagnostic features, and by better categorization performance for a caricature than for a prototype. A concept is likely to be relatively isolated when subjects are instructed to create images for their concepts rather than find discriminating features, when concepts are given unrelated labels, and when the categories that are displayed alternate rarely between trials. The entire set of manipulations and measurements supports a graded distinction between isolated and interrelated concepts. The distinction is applied to current models of category learning, and a connectionist framework for interpreting the empirical results is presented.     

Accounting for occurrences: a new view of the use of contingency information in causal judgment

When people make causal judgments from contingency information, a principal aim is to account for occurrences of the outcome. When 2 causes are under consideration, the capacity of either to account for occurrences is judged from how likely the cause is to be present when the outcome occurs and from the rate at which the outcome occurs when that cause alone is present, which gives an estimate of the strength of the cause. These propositions are formalized in a weighted averaging model, which successfully predicted several judgmental phenomena not predicted by other models of causal judgment. These include a tendency for judgment of one cause (A) to be reduced as the number of occurrences of when only the other one (B) increases and a tendency for A to receive higher judgments than B if A is better able to account for occurrences than B is even if B has a higher contingency with the outcome than A does. Overshadowing, a tendency for judgments of B to be depressed if A has a higher contingency, is weak or absent when B is better able to account for occurrences than A. Results of several experiments support these and related predictions derived from the accounting for occurrences hypothesis.     

Breaking it or Faking it? Some Critical Thoughts on the Voluntary Suspension of Play and Six Proposed Revisions

The voluntary suspension of play (VSP) is a putative fair play norm that has emerged in the last 20 years in association football, though there is no reason in principle why it is limited to that sport. It occurs in football when an injury appears to have been sustained and another player deliberately puts the ball out of play so that the injury can receive rapid attention. It is widely understood as a positive development within the sport and philosophers have added their support on the basis that VSP is a way of players exercising autonomous moral responsibility. It is represented as a case of athletes putting care for their competitors before care for the contest. In this paper, however, it is argued that moral praise for VSP is misplaced. Attempts to induce a VSP almost always occur when a team is seeking to hold a position within a game. As a delaying tactic, it encourages the faking of injuries, which is all the more reprehensible because it exploits someone else's concern for that apparent injury. Conditions for the possibility of VSP within a sport are analysed as well as conditions for the abuse of VSP. VSP occurs because of a loophole, and ways in which this can be closed are presented. In an appendix, some initial empirical evidence is presented that backs the evaluative claims of the paper.