Why so negative? Evidence aggregation and armchair philosophy

This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set of rigorous, probability-based tools for determining what we can and cannot learn from intuitions in various conditions. These tools can tell us whether beliefs can be justified by armchair practices, and what empirical findings would have to show to undermine the use of intuitions in philosophy. Using these tools, the paper shows that armchair philosophy makes sense in a broad range of situations, and that it is quite plausible that we are in those situations at the moment.     

Why perfect being theology?

I display the historical roots of perfect being theology in Greco-Roman philosophy, and the distinctive reasons for Christians to take up a version of this project. I also rebut a recent argument that perfect-being reasoning should lead one to atheism.     

What's so special about medicine?

Health care has increasingly come to be understood as a commodity. The ethical implications of such an understanding are significant. The author argues that health care is not a commodity because health care (1) is non-proprietary, (2) serves the needs of persons who, as patients, are uniquely vulnerable, (3) essentially involves a special human relationship which ought not be bought or sold, (4) helps to define what is meant by ‘necessity’ and cannot be considered a commodity when subjected to rigorous conceptual analysis. The Oslerian conception that medicine is a calling and not a business ought to be reaffirmed by both the profession and the public. Such a conception would have significant ramifications for patient care and health care policy.     

Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

Why is conversation so easy?

Traditional accounts of language processing suggest that monologue--presenting and listening to speeches--should be more straightforward than dialogue--holding a conversation. This is clearly not the case. We argue that conversation is easy because of an interactive processing mechanism that leads to the alignment of linguistic representations between partners. Interactive alignment occurs via automatic alignment channels that are functionally similar to the automatic links between perception and behaviour (the so-called perception-behaviour expressway) proposed in recent accounts of social interaction. We conclude that humans are "designed" for dialogue rather than monologue.     

Why a family perspective for pain?

Although it is well established that families have a strong influence on individuals' beliefs and behaviors related to health and illness, relatively little attention has been devoted to the family's role in the development, maintenance, and treatment of pain or to the impact of chronic pain in one family member upon other family members. A major source of information about pain and how to respond to pain symptoms is learned within the family setting. This article reviews ways in which pain conceptualizations are developed in the family and highlights the need to more carefully study health as well as dysfunctional family reactions to chronic pain. A case example is presented that details the far reaching consequences that chronic pain can have on family life. It is concluded that more careful research, particularly in terms of the operationalization of theoretical constructs and the reliable assessment of these constructs, is needed before any definitive statements can be made about the importance and characteristics of pain-family transactions.     

Moral philosophy and theology: why is there so little difference for Roman Catholics?

The cardinal question in Christian moral theory and bioethics is whether the knowledge that Christians have (1) by grace and (2) by revelation (e.g., regarding the character of human and cosmic history as reaching from creation through the Incarnation and the Redemption to the Second Coming and the restoration of all things) makes a crucial contribution to understanding morality, as for example issues such as the good death and the morality of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. This article argues that such a contribution is made by grace and revelation. The reduction of Roman Catholic moral theology and bioethics to secular bioethics is explored, as well as the necessity of the unique knowledge possessed by Christians for adequate end-of-life decision-making.     

What Is so difficult about negation?

Previous experimental study of this topic suggests that negation is typically difficult to process. This notion, by now widely accepted, seems to rest on a view of negation as an operation on statements. We question this view by arguing that difficulty in processing negatives is a question of a complex of issues concerning the material to be processed, e.g., ambiguity, confusability, and context. Experimental results are presented indicating that a decrease in confusability facilitates the processing of true negative and false affirmative statements; these results are interpreted as consistent with predictions arising from the general argument. The results of a number of previous studies are then reconsidered and preliminary conclusions adduced.     

What's so bad about human cloning?

There appears to be a consensus in the general community that reproductive cloning is an immoral technology that should be banned. It may, however, be argued, at least from the perspective of the Jewish tradition, that reproductive cloning has many positive benefits. It is thus essential that one carefully weigh the costs and the benefits before deciding on a definitive course of action.     

Why are artificial polymorphous concepts so hard for birds to learn?

Stimulus sets defined in terms of artificial polymorphous concepts have frequently been used in experiments to investigate the mechanisms of discrimination of natural concepts, both in humans and in other animals. However, such stimulus sets are frequently difficult for either animals or humans to discriminate. Properties of artificial polymorphous stimulus sets that might explain this difficulty include the complexity of the individual stimuli, the unreliable reinforcement of individual positive features, attentional load, difficulties in discriminating some stimulus dimensions, memory load, and a lack of the correlation between features that characterizes natural concepts. An experiment using chickens as subjects and complex artificial visual stimulus sets investigated these hypotheses by training the birds in discriminations that were not polymorphous but did have some of the properties listed above. Discriminations that involved unreliable reinforcement or high attentional load were found to approach the difficulty of polymorphous concept discriminations, and these two factors together were sufficient to account for the entire difficulty. The usual kind of artificial polymorphous concept may not be a good model for natural concepts as they are perceived and discriminated by birds. A RULEX account of natural concept learning may be preferable.     

Is analytical psychology a religion? Jung's search for a substitute for lost faith

Analytical psychology does not aim at curing neurotic symptoms, but at bringing about a change in the patient's attitude to him or her self, and therefore to life in general. This new attitude can be described as religious, but it has nothing to do with creeds or conventional forms of worship. Analytical psychology is not a religon, but can be described as a prolegomenon to religion or religion in statu nascendi.     

Why are artificial polymorphous concepts so hard for birds to learn?

Stimulus sets defined in terms of artificial polymorphous concepts have frequently been used in experiments to investigate the mechanisms of discrimination of natural concepts, both in humans and in other animals. However, such stimulus sets are frequently difficult for either animals or humans to discriminate. Properties of artificial polymorphous stimulus sets that might explain this difficulty include the complexity of the individual stimuli, the unreliable reinforcement of individual positive features, attentional load, difficulties in discriminating some stimulus dimensions, memory load, and a lack of the correlation between features that characterizes natural concepts. An experiment using chickens as subjects and complex artificial visual stimulus sets investigated these hypotheses by training the birds in discriminations that were not polymorphous but did have some of the properties listed above. Discriminations that involved unreliable reinforcement or high attentional load were found to approach the difficulty of polymorphous concept discriminations, and these two factors together were sufficient to account for the entire difficulty. The usual kind of artificial polymorphous concept may not be a good model for natural concepts as they are perceived and discriminated by birds. A RULEX account of natural concept learning may be preferable.     

Why Talk about Chinese Metaphysics?

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as “Chinese philosophy,” “Daoist cosmology,” “Neo-Confucian idealism,” or “Chinese metaphysics.” For some, “Chinese metaphysics” may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about “metaphysics” is frequent and popular and to which talk of “Chinese metaphysics” may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting “Chinese metaphysics” on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy—of which talk about “Chinese metaphysics” may but need not be an example.