Scientific value

Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi‐dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology.     

Creative value

Free agents can create and destroy value, for how much value is realized may well depend on what such agents choose to do. Not only may such agents create and destroy value, but such creation and destruction seem to involve a dimension of value: I call it creative value. An explication of the twin concepts of creating value and creative value is given, motivated by two desiderata. It is then shown that creative value turns out to be equivalent to what Nozick has dubbed originative value, when his suggestive remarks are given a rigorous, although very natural, interpretation. Thus two highly plausible, but quite different, ways of characterizing creative value converge on a single concept. Furthermore, the account throws considerable light on two further areas of moral theory (namely, moral satisficing and the comparison principle) which turn out, rather unexpectedly, to be linked.     

The value of value: Further excursions on the meaning and role of customer value

Grounded on fundamental marketing principles, the concept of customer value has been revisited and refined by academicians and practitioners for the last 30 years. However, research devoted to achieving a consistent theoretical and conceptual development of value‐related concepts has proceeded apace without ever reaching full closure. The present essay seeks reasons behind remaining deficiencies in value‐related research and offers a review intended to move our understanding of customer value toward what promises to become a more enlightened future. The topic of value is approached by theoretical analysis and conceptual development. First, “the challenge” of value research is presented: the researcher faces a topic that is central to the marketing discipline but that suffers from various conceptual and methodological difficulties. Second, among the literature on value from the last three decades, two main research areas are selected: the conceptual delimitation and the methodological links between quality, satisfaction, and value. Third, as a conclusion, we identify several streams of research that promise to expand future knowledge in the area of customer value. Several tables and figures that provide a systematic and structured review of value‐related knowledge support this inventory of the state‐of‐the‐art in value research. Even the most patient theoretical development of value‐related concepts tends to resist full conceptual closure. The breadth of customer value and its richness for marketing implications encourage novel and refreshing approaches. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice by value encoding and value construction: processes of loss aversion

Loss aversion and reference dependence are 2 keystones of behavioral theories of choice, but little is known about their underlying cognitive processes. We suggest an additional account for loss aversion that supplements the current account of the value encoding of attributes as gains or losses relative to a reference point, introducing a value construction account. Value construction suggests that loss aversion results from biased evaluations during information search and comparison processes. We develop hypotheses that identify the influence of both accounts and examine process-tracing data for evidence. Our data suggest that loss aversion is the result of the initial direct encoding of losses that leads to the subsequent process of directional comparisons distorting attribute valuations and the final choice.     

The value of distrust

We assume that a state of distrust is the mental system’s signal that the environment is not normal—things may not be as they appear. Hence, individuals sense they should be on guard. In particular, they are likely to avoid routine strategies, ones proven to be optimal and regularly used in normal environments, because these strategies are easily anticipated by whoever may be seeking to deceive them. Conversely, a state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain from doing what they routinely do. Accordingly, we hypothesize that figuring out a new situation depends on the type of environment and the actor’s state of mind: in normal environments, where routine strategies are optimal, individuals who trust should outperform those who distrust; however, in unusual environments, where non-routine strategies are optimal, individuals who distrust should outperform those who trust. This paper reports three experiments that manipulate distrust via orienting tasks that participants perform prior to attempting to predict a series of events (Experiments 1 and 2) or solve matchstick arithmetic problems (Experiment 3). Performance success depends on discovering and implementing an appropriate rule. We found that, as predicted, the manipulation of distrust sensitized participants to the existence of non-routine contingencies, that is, contingencies that were not expected.     

Absolute value as belief

In “Desire as Belief” and “Desire as Belief II,” David Lewis (1988, 1996) considers the anti-Humean position that beliefs about the good require corresponding desires, which is his way of understanding the idea that beliefs about the good are capable of motivating behavior. He translates this anti-Humean claim into decision theoretic terms and demonstrates that it leads to absurdity and contradiction. As Ruth Weintraub (2007) has shown, Lewis’ argument goes awry at the outset. His decision theoretic formulation of anti-Humeanism is one that no sensible anti-Humean would endorse. My aim is to demonstrate that Lewis’ infelicitous rendering of anti-Humeanism really does undermine the force of his arguments. To accomplish this, I begin by developing a more adequate decision theoretic rendering of the anti-Humean position. After showing that my formulation of anti-Humeanism constitutes a plausible interpretation of the anti-Humean thesis, I go on to demonstrate that if we adopt this more accurate rendition of anti-Humeanism, the view is no longer susceptible to arguments like the ones Lewis has devised. I thereby provide a more robust response to Lewis’ arguments than has yet been offered, and in the process I develop a formulation of anti-Humeanism that creates the possibility for future decision theoretic arguments that, unlike Lewis’, speak directly to the plausibility of anti-Humeanism.