Goal-referenced selection of verbal action: modeling attentional control in the Stroop task

This article presents a new account of the color-word Stroop phenomenon (J. R. Stroop, 1935) based on an implemented model of word production, WEAVER++ (W. J. M. Levelt, A. Roelofs, & A. S. Meyer, 1999b; A. Roelofs, 1992, 1997c). Stroop effects are claimed to arise from processing interactions within the language-production architecture and explicit goal-referenced control. WEAVER++ successfully simulates 16 classic data sets, mostly taken from the review by C. M. MacLeod (1991), including incongruency, congruency, reverse-Stroop, response-set, semantic-gradient, time-course, stimulus, spatial, multiple-task, manual, bilingual, training, age, and pathological effects. Three new experiments tested the account against alternative explanations. It is shown that WEAVER++ offers a more satisfactory account of the data than other models.     

Mechanisms of selection for the control of hand action

Most attention research has viewed selection as essentially a perceptual problem, with attentional mechanisms required to protect the senses from overload. Although this might indeed be one of several functions that attention serves, the need for selection also arises when one considers the requirement of actions rather than perception. This review examines recent attempts to determine the role played by selective mechanisms in the control of action. Recent studies looking at reach-to-grasp responses to target objects in the presence of distracting objects within a three-dimensional space are discussed. The manner in which motor aspects of the reach-to-grasp response might be influenced by distractors is also highlighted, rather than merely addressing the perceptual consequences of distractors. The studies reviewed here emphasize several factors highlighting the importance of studying selective processes within three-dimensional environments from which attention and action have evolved.     

Action matters: The role of action plans and object affordances in selection for action

In a series of three experiments requiring selection of real objects for action, we investigated whether characteristics of the planned action and/or the “affordances” of target and distractor objects affected interference caused by distractors. In all ofthe experiments, the target object was selectedon the basis of colour and was presented alone or with a distractor object. We examined the effect of type of response (button press, grasping, or pointing), object affordances (compatibility with the acting hand, affordances for grasping or pointing), and target/distractor positions (left or right) on distractor interference (reaction time differences between trials with and without distractors). Different patterns of distractor interference were associated with different motor responses. In the button-press conditions of each experiment, distractor interference was largely determined by perceptual salience (e.g., proximity to initial visual fixation). In contrast, in tasks requiring action upon the objects in the array, distractors with handles caused greater interference than those without handles, irrespective of whether the intended action was pointing or grasping. Additionally, handled distractors were relatively more salient when their affordances for grasping were strong (handle direction compatible with the acting hand) than when affordances were weak. These data suggest that attentional highlighting of specific target and distractor features is a function of intended actions.     

Action selection and action awareness

Human actions are often classified as either internally generated, or externally specified in response to environmental cues. These two modes of action selection have distinct neural bases, but few studies investigated how the mode of action selection affects the subjective experience of action. We measured the experience of action using the subjective compression of the interval between actions and their effects, known as ‘temporal binding’. Participants performed either a left or a right key press, either in response to a specific cue, or as they freely chose. Moreover, the time of each keypress could either be explicitly cued to occur in one of two designated time intervals, or participants freely chose in which interval to act. Each action was followed by a specific tone. Participants judged the time of their actions or the time of the tone. Temporal binding was found for both internally generated and for stimulus-based actions. However, the amount of binding depended on whether or not both the choice and the timing of action were selected in the same way. Stronger binding was observed when both action choice and action timing were internally generated or externally specified, compared to conditions where the two parameters were selected by different routes. Our result suggests that temporal action–effect binding depends on how actions are selected. Binding is strongest when actions result from a single mode of selection.

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Perception in action: multiple roles of sensory information in action control

Perceptual processes play a central role in the planning and control of human voluntary action. Indeed, planning an action is a sensorimotor process operating on sensorimotor units, a process that is based on anticipations of perceptual action effects. I discuss how the underlying sensorimotor units emerge, and how they can be employed to tailor action plans to the goals at hand. I also discuss how even a single action can induce sensorimotor binding, how intentionally implemented short-term associations between stimuli and responses become autonomous, how feature overlap between stimulus events and actions makes them compatible, and why action plans are necessarily incomplete.

Crossmodal action selection: Evidence from dual-task compatibility

Response-related mechanisms of multitasking were studied by analyzing simultaneous processing of responses in different modalities (i.e., crossmodal action). Participants responded to a single auditory stimulus with a saccade, a manual response (single-task conditions), or both (dual-task condition). We used a spatially incompatible stimulus-response mapping for one task, but not for the other. Critically, inverting these mappings varied temporal task overlap in dual-task conditions while keeping spatial incompatibility across responses constant. Unlike previous paradigms, temporal task overlap was manipulated without utilizing sequential stimulus presentation, which might induce strategic serial processing. The results revealed dual-task costs, but these were not affected by an increase of temporal task overlap. This finding is evidence for parallel response selection in multitasking. We propose that crossmodal action is processed by a central mapping-selection mechanism in working memory and that the dual-task costs are mainly caused by mapping-related crosstalk.     

Implementation intentions and efficient action initiation.

Implementation intentions ("If I encounter Situation X, then I'll perform Behavior Y!") are postulated to instigate automatic action initiation. In 4 studies, the hypothesis was tested that implementation intentions lead to immediate action initiation once the specified situation is encountered, even under conditions of high cognitive load. First, individuals whose action control is known to be hampered by disruptive cognitive business, such as opiate addicts under withdrawal (Study 1) and schizophrenic patients (Study 2), benefited from forming implementation intentions. Second, the beneficial effect of implementation intentions was also found in 2 experiments with university students (Studies 3 and 4) in which cognitive load was experimentally induced by using dual task paradigms. Results of the 4 studies suggest that forming implementation intentions instigates immediate action initiation that is also efficient.     

Neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive control: the role of prefrontal cortex in action selection, response inhibition, performance monitoring, and reward-based learning

Convergent evidence highlights the differential contributions of various regions of the prefrontal cortex in the service of cognitive control, but little is understood about how the brain determines and communicates the need to recruit cognitive control, and how such signals instigate the implementation of appropriate performance adjustments. Here we review recent progress from cognitive neuroscience in examining some of the main constituent processes of cognitive control as involved in dynamic decision making: goal-directed action selection, response activation and inhibition, performance monitoring, and reward-based learning. Medial frontal cortex is found to be involved in performance monitoring: evaluating outcome vis-a-vis expectancy, and detecting performance errors or conflicting response tendencies. Lateral and orbitofrontal divisions of prefrontal cortex are involved in subsequently implementing appropriate adjustments.     

Executive control of thought and action: in search of the wild homunculus

Executive control is studied in many areas of psychological research using a wide variety of procedures. This article focuses on studies of the executive processes involved in switching between tasks. The experiments discussed were designed to isolate and measure the duration of the executive processes required to switch from one task to another. However, the research is open to alternative interpretations that do not hypothesize executive processes, suggesting that task-switching procedures may not measure the duration of executive control. Further research is required to determine whether or not behavioral effects reflect the involvement of executive processes.     

Personality and action control: BAS Reward predicts motor control accuracy

Theoretically, the processes involved in approach motivation and action control should overlap. In both cases, a person must commit to a goal, identify a goal target, and seek to reduce discrepancies between the self and this goal target on a somewhat continuous basis. These ideas motivated three studies (total N = 253) in which personality differences in the behavioral approach system (BAS) and the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) were assessed as potential predictors of performance in an objective motor control task. People high in BAS Reward had markedly better motor control (i.e., smaller distances from targets) than people low in BAS Reward. This was true across a variety of affective priming conditions. The other components of BAS and BIS, by contrast, were inconsistent predictors. The results support both reward-based and functional perspectives of the BAS in the context of a cybernetic view of how self-regulation by approach operates.     

How decisions evolve: The temporal dynamics of action selection

To study the process of decision-making under conflict, researchers typically analyze response latency and accuracy. However, these tools provide little evidence regarding how the resolution of conflict unfolds over time. Here, we analyzed the trajectories of mouse movements while participants performed a continuous version of a spatial conflict task (the Simon task). We applied a novel combination of multiple regression analysis and distribution analysis to determine how conflict on the present trial and carry-over from the previous trial affect responding. Response on the previous trial and the degree of conflict on the previous and the current trial all influenced performance, but they did so differently: The previous response influenced the early part of the mouse trajectory, but the degree of previous and current conflict influenced later parts. This suggests that in this task experiencing conflict may not proactively ready the system to handle conflict on the next trial; rather, when conflict is experienced on the subsequent trial the previous compensatory processing may be re-activated more efficiently.     

Self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection: Investigating indirect conscious control

The assumption that the contents of our conscious visual experience directly control our fine-tuned, real-time motor activity has been challenged by neurological and psychophysical evidence that suggest the two processes work semi-independently of each other. Clark [Clark, A. (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? The Philosophical Review, 110, 495–519; Clark, A. (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 181–202; Clark, A. (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensori-motor contingency theory. PSYCHE, 12 (1). Available from http://www.psyche.cs.monash.edu.au] argues that such evidence implies a more indirect relationship between conscious visual experience and motor-control where the function of visual consciousness is not to control action but to select what actions are to be controlled. In this paper, I argue that this type of dynamic also exists at the wider level of self-regulation where conscious intent appears to indirectly control the enactment of the intended behaviour. I argue that by drawing parallels between Clark’s proposed dynamic and self-regulation, the former is not only bolstered by a previously unrecognised source of support but our understanding of the latter can help to further elucidate Clark’s proposed mechanism of indirect conscious control.     

Toward the more efficient use of assessment center technology in personnel selection

Empirical research has consistently supported the validity and business utility of the assessment center method as a selection instrument. Nonetheless, the method as typically applied may be unnecessarily costly and inflexible. This paper begins by describing how the model for assessment center design that is widely used today came to be accepted as a standard. Then modifications in design and operation are discussed. These suggested modifications are intended to enhance the utility and flexibility of assessment centers, while at the same time maintaining, or even increasing, the validity of the process.Seymour Adler is Associate Professor of Applied Psychology at Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey, and Vice President of Assessment Systems Incorporated, a New York-based consulting firm.     

Conditional control in visual selection

Attention and eye movements provide a window into the selective processing of visual information. Evidence suggests that selection is influenced by various factors and is not always under the strategic control of the observer. The aims of this tutorial review are to give a brief introduction to eye movements and attention and to outline the conditions that help determine control. Evidence suggests that the ability to establish control depends on the complexity of the display as well as the point in time at which selection occurs. Stimulus-driven selection is more probable in simple displays than in complex natural scenes, but it critically depends on the timing of the response: Salience determines selection only when responses are triggered quickly following display presentation, and plays no role in longer-latency responses. The time course of selection is also important for the relationship between attention and eye movements. Specifically, attention and eye movements appear to act independently when oculomotor selection is quick, whereas attentional processes are able to influence oculomotor control when saccades are triggered only later in time. This relationship may also be modulated by whether the eye movement is controlled in a voluntary or an involuntary manner. To conclude, we present evidence that shows that visual control is limited in flexibility and that the mechanisms of selection are constrained by context and time. The outcome of visual selection changes with the situational context, and knowing the constraints of control is necessary to understanding when and how visual selection is truly controlled by the observer.     

Putting the "affirm" into affirmative action: preferential selection and academic performance

Two studies explored the relation between academic performance and preferential selection. In Study 1, female participants were led to believe that they had been selected to be leaders in a team problem-solving task because of their gender, because of their gender and ability, or at random. Results showed that women who believed they had been selected because of their gender performed significantly worse on a subsequent problem-solving test than women who believed they had been selected at random and women who believed they were selected because of both their gender and their ability. In Study 2, students' suspicion of having benefited from race-based preferences in college admissions was negatively related to their grade point average (GPA). Furthermore, this suspicion partially mediated the GPA gap between academically stigmatized (Black and Latino) and nonstigmatized (Caucasian and Asian) students.     

Gestalt principles in the control of motor action

We argue that 4 fundamental gestalt phenomena in perception apply to the control of motor action. First, a motor gestalt, like a perceptual gestalt, is holistic in the sense that it is processed as a single unit. This notion is consistent with reaction time results indicating that all gestures for a brief unit of action must be programmed prior to initiation of any part of the movement. Additional reaction time results related to initiation of longer responses are consistent with processing in terms of a sequence of indivisible motor gestalts. Some actions (e.g., many involving coordination of the hands) can be carried out effectively only if represented as a unitary gestalt. Second, a perceptual gestalt is independent of specific sensory receptors, as evidenced by perceptual constancy. In a similar manner a motor gestalt can be represented independently of specific muscular effectors, thereby allowing motor constancy. Third, just as a perceptual pattern (e.g., a Necker cube) is exclusively structured into only 1 of its possible configurations at any moment in time, processing prior to action is limited to 1 motor gestalt. Fourth, grouping in apparent motion leads to stream segregation in visual and auditory perception; this segregation is present in motor action and is dependent on the temporal rate. We discuss congruence of gestalt phenomena across perception and motor action (a) in relation to a unitary perceptual-motor code, (b) with respect to differences in the role of awareness, and (c) in conjunction with separate neural pathways for conscious perception and motor control.